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December 16, 2016
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August 9, 2005
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December 22, 1982
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Approved For Tease 2, 00,41 145 :,6IA, P -01114WO300040012-7 9!,- 'i t J ~_' ! d1n, '- ~ L. EXCOM 82- 7062 22 December 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members SUBJECT: Minutes of 9 December 1982 Executive Committee Meeting: Long-Range Planning, Phase I'V: Support Capabilities 1. The Executive Committee met on 9 December 1982 to review the DDA's long-range planning paper on support capabilities. Mr. (ExDir) chaired the session; participants included Messrs. c anon (DDCI); Stein (DDO); Hineman (DDS&T); Fitzwater (DDA); Gates (DDI); Taylor (IG); Glerum (D/OP); and Childs (Comptroller). (AIUO) 2. Mr. Fitzwater noted the additions on security and training to the original DDA paper and introduced to highlight the paper. outlined the methodology used and noted the paper focused on providing support capabilities for two alternative Agency populations: E -1 He stressed the need for a much more sophisticated support structure in the years ahead. Continued emphasis should be placed on the communications recapitalization program, computer security, central ADP services, increasing training requirements, automated support systems and growing space requirements. (AIUO) 3. summarized his reactions to the paper. He did not vee the requirements to keep up with new initiatives and to rebuild the DDA support infrastructure as either/or propositions. He found a heavy emphasis on automation in the paper but noted the lack of any qualitative discussion regarding how automation will contribute to enhanced productivity. He reiterated the conclusion from an earlier session that a separate scientific computing facility would not be required. concurred with the suggested increase in computer graphics and the need to address. new means for data archiving for storage and backup. He saw nothing dramatic in the communications portion of the paper other than the acknowledged need to follow through on the recapitalization program. (AIUO) 4. thought the training section overemphasized automation. He suggested the need for management training, focusing on techniques for generalists who manage specialists. He also noted the need to broaden the focus on the secretarial/clerical work force to include possibilities for cross training and restructuring of existing job categories. Mr. thought the security section was good in the polygraph, countermeasures, and overseas support areas. He suggested developing a stronger employee security awareness program. He Approved For Release 2005/08/15: CIA-RDP89-01114R0 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved ForceIease 2005idr~A-IBC) 01114W00300040012-7 found nothing innovative in the finance section. In the logistics area, applauded the concept of an interservices support agreement with the Air Force. He supported OMS's suggestions for focusing on the impact of increased use of computer terminals on employees' well being. He also noted the possibility of including a gym in the new building. 25X1 thought the OIS portion of the planning paper overemphasized artificial intelligence; he also qualified the concept of an "uninterrupted exchange of data." suggested that an 25X1 employee population of about would probably be reasonable 25X1 for planning purposes for the coming decade. (C) 5. observed that the future themes contained some interesting and not unfamiliar ideas, including giving employees unclassified work to do while awaiting clearances, the mobile crisis center, formalizing the operations support assistant positions, and He found the paper weak in outlining the strengths and weaknesses of the DDA. He suggested addressing what the directorate needed to do to attract and retain employees. Overseas service and rotational assignments should be considered. The DDA should also develop a strategy for developing support capabilities in nontechnical areas, including social and psychological areas. He also noted the need to focus on the impact of the national programs on administrative support. (C) 6. Mr. Stein observed that the DDA paper seemed to overemphasize automation. His main concerns were the need for more people and funds and the seriousness of the security threat. He saw maintaining appropriate compartmentation as a serious problem. Mr. Hineman saw the DDA paper stressing closing the support gap rather than looking ahead--a natural result of the reductions in recent years. He believed more people were needed to work on computer security and the polygraph program. He was concerned about getting the right kinds of people in these areas and suggested more DDA/DDS&T exchanges might help. He also thought that the DDA should establish priorities among its rebuilding needs. noted that when the Deputies were asked to provide their space requirements, the resulting; list exceeded the space that the will make available. Mr. Hineman precipitated a discussion of the training that will be required for the secretaries/clericals. Mr. McMahon opined that the skill mix will change considerably, with more secretaries/clericals functioning more as intelligence assistants. (C) 7. Mr. Gates was concerned that the DDA paper had been written in isolation from the personnel paper. He pointed out that while other directorate planning papers focused on how to accomplish their missions, the DDA and Office of Personnel should force the other directorates to focus on people concerns. He suggested that the DDA should be thinking about nonfinancial incentives to attract and retain people. Examples included physical fitness facilities, an aggressive health care program, 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 :2CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 'A L Approved F crRd~iease 2Q O8/1A :,,f ,IA-RDP89-011 000300040012-7 legal counseling, and better use of existing space. Mr. Gates thought the Office of Security needed to be revitalized. More attention should be paid to personnel security. Considerable thought will be required regarding maintaining security standards in the midst of the evolving social mores of current and future applicants. Mr. Gates thought in general the DDA paper lacked imagination for dealing with the Agency's problems in the coming decade. (AIUO) 8. Mr. Glerum acknowledged the resource dilemma of choosing between rebuilding the Agency's dwindling infrastructure and pursuing new initiatives. He supported the program outlined for operational support assistants. He cautioned that categorizing the Agency as a Foreign Service agency could have negative as well as positive effects. He advocated that OMS do more psychological assessments, particularly for people going overseas. (AIUO) 9. Mr. Taylor regretted that the planning paper appeared to call for more money and more people as the answers to all problems. He pointed out that the paper did not discuss the important relationships between support entities and other components. Large charter issues, such as the advisability of decentralized versus centralized computer support, were also missing. As another example, he questioned whether ORD was noted that, the information handling specialist who will be added to his Planning Staff will focus on the centralized ADP support issue and strive to anticipate developments rather than react to them. Mr. Taylor thought some serious thinking was warranted on what a central support capability should be. noted the possibility of dividing the DDA into two groups of activities: one people related and one oriented toward "things." (AIUO) 10. Mr. Childs praised the many good ideas reflected in the planning paper. He was not persuaded that automation would become as pervasive within the next decade as the paper indicated. He suggested including some ideas on management training, particularly in the area of managing specialists. Mr. Hineman noted a reluctance to obtain outside training. Mr. speculated this was a legacy from the recent budget cuts in training. (AIUO) McMahon thought the discussion had fostered some Mr 11 . . good ideas worth pursuing. He agreed that the Office of Securty needed to think more about the impact of changing societal values on the Agency's security standards. He urged more attention be paid to physical security in the wake of the growing terrorist threat. He encouraged increased availability of medical services for employees. He recommended that the Office of Training prepare for the expected change in the mix of skills among employees. He also emphasized that increasing the number of polygraph operators could not wait until 1984. Finally, he said 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 ? Approved Foc eleas uJfP89-01 I h4R00300040012-7 6 `i a t that he would like to see more on how to reinstitute a broader Agency focus to the Career Trainee program. (AIUO) 12. advised that the Planning Staff would summarize the planning process and develop a draft guidance document for components. It will also evaluate the process. Mr. then adjourned the meeting. (U) 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Distribution: DDCI (Subject File) ExDir DDI DDO DDA DDS&T Comptroller IG D/Persndnel Planning Staff EXCOM Minutes ER 4 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 LONG-RANGE PLAN ?- .PHASE IV SUPPORT CAPABILITIES ADDENDUM (SECURITY-TRAINING) DIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATION SECRET Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 SECRET During the next decade, the Office of Security (OS) must continue its commitment to provide full and timely security support on a world-wide basis; this within the framework of appropriate attention is new requirements occasioned by an expanding population, changing staff patterns resulting from the technological explosion, and maintenance of the capability to service the "traditional" security disciplines. To do so, it will be necessary to control, expedite, and generally modernize Office functions through enhancement of automatic data and word processing capabilities, realize growth in personnel strength and acquire space. Among the major issues with which OS must deal in the decade beginning in FY '1983 are: polygraph capability, computer security, technical countermeasures, leaks, overseas support and the changing psychological profile of the Agency employee. The polygraph, as an investigative aid, has been and will continue to be the most effective tool in the construction of the mosaic that represents the basis for adjudication of security suitability for applicants, employees, staff-like associates, contractor's employees, certain operational assets and others. The tool necessarily is pervasive; the security of Agency operations and activities is related directly to the trustworthiness of the people who carry them out. The polygraph capability must grow and in the near-term (FY 1984), the number of examining rooms will have doubled will and the staff will increase by 7 examiners to= More examiners 25X1 e required in the mid- and far-term and recruitment will be approached both through efforts to hire qualified personnel and establishment of an in-house training capability. The first in-house training class is now in progress and offers specialized instruction that equals the quality of commercial counterparts. Since recruitment of trained polygraphers is difficult, this in-house training capability is our best hope to obtain and maintain an adequate polygraph service potential. 'Technical security threats and vulnerabilities will fire-ent a steadily increasing problem through the decade, both domes! and abroad. Technology that is with us or on the horizon represents a danger to the Agency's security far beyond the classic threat of surreptitiously planned "bug". Lasers, fiber optics, television, and the potential for ap-.'ication of even more exotic positive audio technology. The Office of Security is acutely aware of the problem and will receive funding in FY '1983 =or the improvement and enhancement of current audio countermeasures tr; ining and equipment. the future, OS will concern itself with researc-- and -La development of The incr =:asing complexity of positive audio capability and the deployment of CRAFT will necessitate a need for an enhanced overseas presence of engineers and technicians In addition, the OS operates and maintains the This is the only facility in the U.S. Government which provides I __1 and is open to representatives from all NFIB agencies. The US' budget for FY 1983 SECRET Page 1 M1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 SECRET contains funds to begin a long delayed upgrade of this facility. Leaks represent the most insidious and damaging form of unauthorized disclosure and, as such, have been addressed on the national level. The Office of Security, through representation on the DCI SECOM, has supported the provisions and recommendations of the "Willard Report" submitted to the National Security Council. Within the Agency, OS will continue an attack on leaks and unauthorized disclosures in general through investigation referral for prosecution when warranted, imposition of internal administrative sanctions up to and including termination, information control, enhanced physical security and strict enforcement of security regulations. A primary goal in combating leaks and other unauthorized disclosures of classified information is reaching and maintaining currency in the reinvestigation program (RIP). The RIP has suffered because of the necessity to apply limited resources to personnel security functions of immediate and pressing priority. From a counterintelligence viewpoint and in terms of a viable personnel security program, the shortfall in the RIP will be reduced in the near-term and must be eliminated in the long-term. The OS overseas presence has been diminished from 25X1 people in the 1970s. to a current strength 0 The latter figure does 25X1 not permit rapid response and forces Headquarters-based personnel to provide supplemental suppc-t that is neither timely r-_=- cost effective. OS will be called upon to provide additional overseas support in the years to come in proportion to new requirements, new activities, and the certainty of expanded technical threat and vulnerability. To address this problem, we are to lace 25X1 abroad I More 25X1 security personnel exposed to TF-eoverseas experience will nave the ancillary benefit of the redevelopment of a balanced support capability. In the security processing of applicants, OS has for some years faced behavioral and attitudinal changes consistent '. th shifting mores and lifestyle of the general populace. This will continue with exact direction unknown; however, it can be assumed that motivation, personal standards, values and conduct will be far different from those held or practiced 20 years ago and not necessarily similar to today's. This does not mean that basic security standards will change; a person is either loyal and trustworthy or he/she is not. What will change is application of basic standards in the perception of security suitability; i.e., evaluation of security risk as measured against a realistic understanding of societal evolution. The impact on OS will include more difficult investigations, adjudications that require a high de. ee of sophistication, and more. complexity in determinations re Iat in ; to probationary causes and reinvestigations. Further, since the Agency must insist on standards of security eligibility that may not be readily found, OS anticipates that the number of individuals processed to fill a single vacancy will increase. Central to the future of the Office of Security is modernization. The SECRET Page 2 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 SECRET Office oversees the development of the Community-wide, Computer-assisted .Compartmentation Control System (4C), which is on track and will permit a dramatic improvement in control and accountability of Sensitive Compartmental Information (SCI) access. The ongoing application of ADP to communications, centralization of records and access to record holdings must figure as a managerial priority over the decade. While not all security support lends itself to exploitation of technology, development of ADP systems will figure significantly in the efficiency and productivity of OS in the coming decade and beyond. Computer security is listed as a major DA resource concern in the body of this current study. We plan to double the current Information Systems Security Group (ISSG) by 1985 and triple it by 1992. The following programs areas. will be emphasized both in the re..r- and long- terms. NEAR-TERMS ADDITIVES (1983-MID-1985) a. Finalize current drafts of regulatory issuanc -s (DCID, HR, HHB) to establish computer security policy and standards. b. Monitor all information handling systems procurement for enforcement of fundamental computer security requirements. c. Develop new audit trail techniques and alerting systems, for better security management of systems controls and privileges and detect abuses. d. Provide acceptable, reliable, and verifiable routine and emergency destruction methods for digitally-stored data. e. Use new technology to develop better access controls at: 1. The system level for both individuals and users, programs, and other systems (via networks). 2. The file level for segregating user privileges. 3. The operating level to protect :.-,a systems's safeguards from modification by privileged but u:,authorized users. f. Develop for the Agency's more sensitive data '.uses: 1. . Online file encryption for produ,--ion libraries. 2. Improved Systems Management Facility (SMF) utilization and report generation by system utilities in support of- the security auditing program. 3. More positive control of privileged functions on Multiple Virtual System (MVS). SECRET Page 3 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 SECRET 4. Wider use of check sums. 5. Control of hard copy at remote printer terminals and slave printers in the Document Logging System (DLS) manner. 6. An in-depth understanding of the causes of spillage. 7. Control and monitoring of system programmers access to system(s). g. Build a personnel training awareness and screening program for computer security and focus on data processing personnel and systems users alike. LONG-TERM ADDITIVES (MID-1985 AND BEYOND) a. Develop innovative authentication method for more secure system access control by 1986, including testbed development and prototyping. c. ISSG, together with the Office of Research and Development, will continue to support research in the design and development of reliable, trusted information systems by addressing security hardware as well as software technology development. d. A priority effort will be to fund research and development initiatives to explore hardware integrity verifications. Our security interest centers in the development of methods of component verifications. e: Research and development initiatives as well as development and engineering projects must provide the hardware and software techniques to satisfy new compartmentation and dissemination control requirements stemming from networking, shared data bases and outsi:'~ users. ISSG must actively foster these efforts. f. Finally, we will maintain our support to the Intelligence Community, particularly the new Department of Defense Computer Security Center, in effectively influencing ADP manufacturers in developing security "certified" hardware and software. 25X1 SECRET Page 4 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/1S:EEDf89-01114R000300040012-7 Each Directorate has the responsibility for career development of its employees. One aspect of- career development is training, and the Office of Training and Education (OTE) must be sure that the full spectrum of training, be it professional, functional, or skills related, is available to supplement each Directorate career development process. Within this context, the major concern of OTE over the next decade will be to deal with change. This change will be driven by an expanded Agency which is much more automated than it is today. The impact of the increased numbers of new employees requiring training and the new skills that current employees will have to acquire at an accelerated rate will force OTE to change its product and the way in which it is delivered to the Agency. An evolutionary shift of resources from broad educational programs to narrow and specific skills training will take place. More training will be coordinated for specific component audiences. The Off Campus Program and Agency directed assignments to external- training will grow in conjunction with the need to - upgrade the skills of our analysts, technicians and operations officers. A major change in the office setting will be the presence of a more skilled, sophisticated, and competent clerical employee. Training and developing the Agency's clerical employees to enable them to meet the requirements of the automated office environment will become a high priority requirement. To respond to this, OTE is developing an aggreQate training and development program so that we will have a skilled professional clerical work force in the future. As a first step, clerical employees will receive up to two or three weeks' training before reporting to their first assignment. During this period, the clerical will receive, in addition to a general Agency orientation, specific training in office skills such as the use of the telephone, proofreading, effective written English, word processing, information handling equipment, and office security. This program will be expai ded to help the current clerical work force meet the challenge of automation and to help future clerical employees cope with changing office automation. . Training in Intelligence Analysis will become an integral part of the DDI analyst's professional growth from EOD through mid-career and senior analyst training programs. New analysts will enter on duty via a six week orientation and training program which will be similar in concept but more narrow in scope than the Career Trainee Program. Also, OTE is in the process of working with the DI to formalize a two week training program for DI Intelligence assistants, an econometric modeling course for non- economics analysis, and to establish a course for the military analyst. Information handling in all of its aspects will experience rapid growth. The Information Science Center will experience difficulty meeting internal requirements and maintaining an appropriate level of response to Community requirements. As our experience in office automation grows, Approved For Release 2005/0l8I1.&.: GIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/QC. %J L_ elRT89-01114R000300040012-7 PAGE 2 we will concentrate on integrating the factors learned from office .automation into the current offerings of clerical, supervisory, and management courses. It is too soon to identify spz-~-ific curriculum but, for example, we will need to change our proofreading course, which currently addresses written documents, to one which addresses proofreading via the CRT. , In any case, we anticipate that over the next ten years we will need to train four-fifths of our entire work force in some yet-to-be-determined amount of automated systems use. This may necessitate contracting out on the commercial market for instructors, facilities, and equipment to accomplish this considerable training requirement. OTE will need increases in hardware, software and personnel to .provide training on specific major computer-based systems, such as CAMS, CRAFT, SAFE, and for basic training in information handling skills, such as word processing/office automation and use of the Agency computer system. Language training requirements will increase in response to operational and analytic requirements. Language maintenance and achievement awards will increase proportionately. OTE will need to ensure the availability of the appropriate resources to meet o,r exceed requirements placed on the Language School (LS) in the areas of teaching and proficiency testing. In the teaching domain, the LS will strive to make instruction more efficient and increasingly tailored to the special needs of Agency students. The LS will develop and implement fixed short-term advanced level courses for "2" and "2+" level students in French, Spanish, German, Russian, and Chinese to ensure continual proficiency maintenance. In conjunction with ORD, LS will continue to develop a capability for Computer Assisted Instruction (CAI) in languat. .s. And finally, the LS will continue its program of intensive survival language skills and, if appropriate resources can be acquired, will expand this program. In testing, the LS will continue to elaborate and refine the definitions of proficiency levels and promulgate a government-wide standard, improve the quality of oral testing through research and training, and develop up-to-date tests of reading proficiency. Operational training requirements will expand significantly requiring additional instructors. To improve the quality of operations training courses, the personnel and training resources of Operations Training Division and . Cover Instruction Division will be integrated to more efficiently conduct quality operations training. In consultation with IMS/DO, a determination of the extent to which the CRAFT system should be included in training courses for DO employees will be made. While operational training will increase in volume and some of the tools used ~,,, the case officer will change, the methods of training which have been tested and proven through the Agency's history will not change significantly. During most of this period, properly designed and equipped facilities will be a continuing constraint on the OTE. With the projected increase in training requirements over the next ten years, it appears probable that current planned classroom and conference space will not be adequate. We Approved For Release 20'i..VSETIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 F? .Approved For Release 200524 J-RDP89-Olll4ROOO3OOO4OOl2-7 PAGE 3 may have to keep some of our currently leased space. We also will explore the feasibility of ? ?wilding a conference center at the Agency's property at This site would alleviate the problem of using the for other than operational training and could also be used as a crisis center. In FY 1982, students attended operations training courses, and II students conferees participated in non-operations training courses and con erences 0 Approved For Release 200514?{ 4 RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 DATE TRANSMITTAL SLIP TO: D/Personnel ROOM NO. BUILDING REMARKS: The attached is a supplement to the DDA Long-Range Planning paper on Phase IV, Support Capabilities and will be discussed at Thursday's Executive Committee Meeting at 2:30 in the DCI Conference Room. EA/DDCI Attachment FROM: 7E-12, Hqs. T- ROOM NO. BUILDING I N FORM NO. I EB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 SECRET LONG-RANGE PLAN-PHASE IV SUPPORT CAPABILITIES DIRECTORATE OF ADMINISTRATION Approved For Release 2005/%IC RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 Approved For Release 2005/08/15 CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040012-7 ~/jrp"f'syl.~ ~` y~,++Wyri.?y ~ rw~ C~3 S 'I~ 7- ~,~,~-- s~?~.....~. c~ _ : ~ ov,;,_