AGENDA FOR 12 AUGUST 1982 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING: LONG RANGE PLANNING--COVERT ACTION AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040016-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 5, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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EXCOM 82-7032
5 August 1982
FROM : Executive Assistant to the DDCI
SUBJECT : Agenda for 12 August 1982 Executive Committee
Meeting: Long-Range Planning--Covert Action and
Counterintelligence Capabilities
The Executive Committee will meet at 1600 on Thursday, 12 August,
in the DCI Conference Room to continue Phase III of this year's long-
range planning process. You will be asked for your comments and/or
approval of the attached papers on Counterintelligence (Tab 1) and
Covert Action (Tab 2) capabilities.
25X1
Attachments:
As Stated
cc: Director of Personnel
Comptroller
Acting Inspector General
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Distribution:
1 - O/DCI w/o att
1 - DDCI w/att
1 - ExDir w/att
1 - DDI w/att
1 - DDA w/att
1 - DDS&T w/att
1 - DDO w/att
1 - Comptroller w/att
1 - D/OP w/att
1 - Acting IG w/att
1 - Planning Staff w/o att.
1 - ER via ES w/att
1 - EXCOM Chrono w/o att
1 - EXCOM Agenda w/o att
1 - EA/DDCI w/att
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STAT
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
EXCOM Agenda Items
FROM: ./
EXTENSION
NO.
Deputy Director for Policy, Analysib
DATE
and Evaluation
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED
-
-
1 ' EA/OP
--
---
~
~ ~
5E58 Hqs
-
'
AP
Jim:
2.
The CI paper will be a useful
tool for our phase of the long-
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the increased. personnel needs (pg.
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---
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it delineates
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ears)
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.
4
the types of people needed with :
enough specificity for our planning
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use. The paper offer; no program
5. D/OP
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surprises but does outline the
5E58 Hqs
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steps needed immediately, mid-term
-
---
-term for both active and
and lon
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6
passive CI. It appears to me to
be a very useful focus document.
7?
The CAk paper, to me, is not as
useful for OP long-range planning
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states that "existing human
resources are inadequate to under-
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9.
not go on and identify the numbers
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10
and assessing program needs in each
area of the world. The TABS identi
- --
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---
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fy initiatives, activities to be
1
developed, proposals and tech-
nological developments required.
-
-
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-
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One additional step is still nee
e
12
and that is to identify the people
needs to accomplish the initiatives
---
-
and proposals.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS
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4 August 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
VIA: Deputy Director for Operations
25X1 FROM:
Chairman, Long Range Planning
Team for Counterintelligence
SUBJECT: Long Range Planning Program
Attached is the revised Phase II and III submission
on Counterintelligence for the 1982 Long Range Planning
Cycle.
25X1
Attachment: a/s
25X1
WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
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This paper has been prepared by the Interdirectorate
Planning Team for Counterintelligence in response to
guidance provided by the Executive Director for Phase II and
III of the CIA long-range planning for FY 1985 through 1990.
it addresses the long-term threat represented by foreign
intelligence and security services, reviews the FY 1983 CI
Category Base Capability Statement, and lists the enhanced
capabilities needed to meet the long-term threat. We have
assumed a favorable policy climate for the practice of
counterintelligence (CI), the availability of resources
(money and manpower) at the current. or an increased level
and the absence of a major conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
The paper accepts the definition and scope of
counterintelligence as expressed in the Preface to the July
1982 NSSD 2-82 paper, "Capabilities Against the Hostile
Intelligence Threat, 1983-88." In other words, we have
xcluded from our consideration international terrorism
(even t ough Executive Order 12333 includes
counter-terrorism in its definition of counterintelligence)
and we have included protective security, even though
security is excluded from counterintelligence by E.O.12333.
We also take into consideration countermeasures necessary to
deal with broad technical threats such as imagery and
SIGINT collection. Finally, although the time frame of the
NSSD-2 Study (1983-88) varies slightly from the time frame
of this paper (1985-90), both the nature and extent of the
threat, and the enhanced capabilities needed to meet that
threat, are expected to remain essentially the same for the
additional two years covered by this paper.
The United States, during the planning period FY 1985
through 1990, faces a serious and growing human and
technical threat from foreign intelligence and security
services intent on acquiring a broad range of U.S.
information and technology. The Soviet Union represents the
principal threat with a lower but still significant threat
from the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies, Cuba, the PRC and other
communist countries. CIA's counterintelligence and
countermeasures programs are presently inadequate to cope
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with this threat; immediate management decisions are needed
to reallocate certain resources;
million dollars will be required to correct manpower and
other resource deficiencies, with the bulk of the resources
going to the Directorate of Administration (DA) for
strengthening security related countermeasures and to the
Directorate of Operations (DO) for rebuilding its overseas
counterintelligence program. The Directorates of
Intelligence (DI) and Science and Technology (DS&T) require
lesser but significant resource enhancement to-develop
counterintelligence and protective security programs to
support the Agency-wide effort. Specific enhancements of
CIA counterintelligence and countermeasure capabilities,
grouped in Section V of this paper by relative urgency and
by type of commitment (i.e. management or resource) needed,
will include:
--An increase in the number of CIA officers overseas who
are actively involved in the effort to acquire additional
penetrations of the KGB and GRU, and of the Communist Bloc,
PRC and Cuban services.
--The assignment of CI operations officers to selected
stations overseas and to management level positions in DO
area divisions.
--Expansion of the counterintelligence analytical capability
within the DO (Counterintelligence Staff), DI, and DA
(Office of Security) to include damage assessment,
counter-deception analysis, and counterintelligence concerns
applicable to staff and staff-like personnel.
--Additional resources devoted to the counterintelligence
aspects of the technology transfer problem with emphasis on
developing CI related countermeasures.
--Expansion of counterintelligence training.
--Increase in number of security investigators and polygraph
examiners to correct clearance time lapse and delayed
reinvestigations.
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--Development of improved computer security systems
including R&D.
--Expanded linguistic capability.
--Expansion of counterintelligence relationships with
cooperating foreign intelligence and security services.
--Development of computer programs specifically designed to
support counterintelligence and protective security.
--Strengthening of document security programs with special
emphasis on SCI material.
--Acquisition of additional security equipment including:
safes, emergency destruction devices, surreptitious entry
detection devices, closed circuit TV, and the expansion ofd
the number of security officers overseas.
--Strengthening of industrial security programs.
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The hostile activities of foreign intelligence and
security services of the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact
allies, Cuba, the PRC, and other communist countries
represent, and will continue to represent, the most serious
threat to the security of the United States and its allies.
Services of the "third world" and even those of countries
historically friendly to the United States will represent an
increasing threat. While there will be no dramatic change in
the numbers and types of operations directed against U.S..
interests, the threat will be increased by the continued
rapid development of technology used in support of agent
operations. Also, the extent of the drain of U.S. and
Western technology through espionage and other means, both
legal and illegal, is only now beginning to be understood,
and, if left unchecked, will become increasingly serious.
A more detailed threat assessment is attached as an
appendix.
FY 83 Allocation of CIA Resources Devoted to CI
4
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CIA's counterintelligence mission is to detect and
frustrate the overseas activities of foreign intelligence and
security services that are inimical to the United States and
foreign governments allied or cooperating with it. The DO
plays the leading role in the CI effort, utilizing the
resources of other CIA directorates and the Intelligence
Community as required. The DA, especially the Office of
Security (OS) and Office of Communications (OC), is
responsible for protective security support of the overall
counterintelligence mission. The DS&T, primarily its Office
of SIGINT Operations (OSO), and the DI play minor but
important roles. The DO's mission includes penetration of
foreign intelligence and security services through the
recruitment of in-place sources, research and investigation
of counterintelligence leads, exploitation of defectors,
conduct or coordination of double agent operations, foll.owup
of hostile contracts with Americans overseas, the operational
security of its own operations, coordination of the overseas
CI activities of other members of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, liaison with foreign intelligence and security
services, the production of CI studies and disseminations,
and the maintenance for the benefit of the Intelligence
Community of a central index of foreign counterintelligence
information.
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The Intelligence Division of the FBI is the DO's
domestic counterpart, having for the most part the same
functions and responsibilities within the United States as
the DO does abroad. Coordination between the two agencies
within the framework of E.O. 12333 works well, and
cooperation on specific operational activities and
investigations is excellent. Although the FBI contributes to
the central counterintelligence index maintained by the DO,
the FBI maintains its own index and data base in support of
its counterintelligence efforts in the United States. While
these data bases overlap somewhat, they are not identical and
are controlled separately. Information is obtained by each
service from the other's holdings through established and
effective procedures which permit access while protecting
sensitive source material. The CIA Office of Security also
has effective liaison with the FBI'Intelligence Division on
security matters, particularly those concerned with
penetration of the Agency through its employees or security
approved/cleared associates.
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Both the CIA and FBI have growing programs designed to
develop information on, negate, disrupt, and/or neutralize
Soviet and other hostile efforts to acquire U.S. technology.
There have been significant successes of late in this field
which have added considerably to U.S. knowledge of the
extent, direction, and degree of success of the Soviet
effort. CIA works closely with investigative and
law-enforcement agencies of the U.S. Government to ensure
that the exchange of information with and between such
agencies is an ongoing effort designed to achieve maximum
results in negating hostile objectives. The level of effort
that can be devoted to the problem, however, is inadequate.
There are important questions of policy, organization, and
definition of objectives to be resolved before the United
States capability to counter technology loss will be
improved. The problem is so extensive, moreover, that
substantial collection, analytical, and enforcement resources
will have to be devoted to it.
Much of the effort of the DI is devoted to analysis of
Soviet technical intelligence collection systems and
analyzing technology transfer issues. Some portions are
assigned to the DCI's Technology Transfer Intelligence
Committee, working on providing intelligence opinions to
State concerning communist visitors to the U.S. The
remainder is spread throughout the directorate, working on
such things as imagery analysis topics, and on maintaining a
number of data bases on foreign intelligence matters. Most
of the external analysis funds available to the DI are used
in support of efforts to analyze Soviet technical
intelligence collection systems. A small effort involves
analysis of Soviet camouflage, concealment and deception
(CC&D) practices.
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V ENHANCEMENT OF CAPABILITIES
Just as the 1983 program was described as "a
continuation of well established activities", the program
for 1985-90 will not see a major deviation in types of
activities. However, important management decisions will be
required to implement changes in emphasis and to order
immediate reallocation of available resources; and there are
major resource enhancements, in terms of manpower and funds,
which will be required in order to implement programs over
the longer range. Within the DO, it will be important to
ensure, through clear managerial commitment, through of
training, and through career enhancement, a greater
appreciation for counterintelligence concerns and a
concomitant increasing commitment to counterintelligence
operations. In all of the directorates, enhanced
recruitment and training will be necessary in order to
attain the overall resource level, required. R&D and
state-of-the-art technology will be needed for adequate
countermeasures against hostile technical collection, as
well as for additional security measures. There is also a
need for a significant change and increase in analytical
capabilities, requiring additional positions and funds.
In listing below the enhanced capabilities which are
required, we have attempted to group them in terms of
relative importance. This has been done from two points of
view: the urgency of the need, and the nature of the
capability. In other words, there are some capabilities
which can be implemented more quickly than others, and some
which by their nature will take longer to put into action.
Frequently the latter are also more costly in terms of
manpower and funds. In general, the measures which should
be implemented immediately are those which will require,
particularly in the DO, management decisions to reallocate
positions and activities. For example, assigning more
operations officers to counterintelligence duties can only
be done by taking them from other duties, and by filling the
gaps created through immediate increases in recruiting and
training. However, the cycle of recruitment, training, and
acquisition of experience requires longer than the 1985-90
period to produce a functioning CI operations officer.
/Immediate requirements in the analytical field, needed in
both the DI and DO, are subject to similar conditions:
immediate reallocation of current resources supplemented by
recruitment and training over the longer run. Immediate
requirements of the DA and DS&T have a higher initial need
for R&D, funding for new equipment, along with a hiring
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program which can be implemented in the short range, for
security investigators, polygraph operators, etc. The most
urgent need, and the one most easily solved, is the
improvement of personnel security by hiring sufficient
personnel.
There has been no attempt to provide cost figures for
each enhanced capability. However, each directorate has
submitted its total resource requirements for the 1985-90
period. These figures follow:
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THREAT ASSESSMENT APPENDIX
25X1
At the present time and for the long-range planning
period (FY 1985-90), the hostile activities of foreign
intelligence and security services--especially those of
Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, China and other com-
munist countries--represent a serious threat to the secur-
ity of the United States and its allies. Services of the
so-called "third world" and, in a few instances, those of
countries historically friendly to the U.S. will represent
an increasing threat as they acquire expertise and tech--
nology either through their own efforts or with the assis-
tance and cooperation of other countries--usually, but not
necessarily, communist. We do not.foresee a dramatic
increase in the traditional human-related intelligence
collection activities directed against us except in the
area of high technology.
,A. Current and Projected Threat
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COVERT ACTION:
LONG RANGE PLANNING
1982 - 1992
WARNING NOTICE:
Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
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The Phase II CA effort set forth the view of world conditions
and pressures on the United States which might give rise to both
needs and opportunities for actions in support of overall U.S.
objectives. In addition, the Executive Committee review defined a
group of core issues around which to focus proposed CA
capabilities. In this paper, we discuss the core issues and area
targets from the viewpoint of what operational needs/problems they
create, what new concepts may be useful in planning long range CA
activities, and planned initiatives. Technological means and
other ideas are included which, if developed, would enhance CA
propaganda efforts in reaching certain targets.
The paper begins with a summary of "Key Judgments" that were
considered in planning future CA activities. There are four
informational tabs. Tab A is a compendium of planned CA
initiatives. Tab B is made up of additional CA activities against
USSR/Eastern Europe targets that should be considered. Tab C
comprises a list of a miscellany of CA proposals to exploit Soviet
economic vulnerabilities. Tab D identifies technologies that need
to be either refined or exploited. Tab E lists the DCI's approved
CA Development Program.
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The area target problems and core issues defined during the
Phase II review point to some specific future operational
problems:
-- Need for an enhanced positive intelligence base;
-- need to develop interdirectorate and intradirectorate
task forces for non-country specific issues;
-- for most of the area targets, we will have identified by
1986 an infrastructure to conduct on-demand a variety of
CA activities.
Ongoing Initiatives: The DCI's CA Development Program has
done much to prepare CIA to carry out actions in support. of U. S.
policy. However, the infrastructure rebuilding program will need
to develop capabilities tailored to the particular needs of each
geographic region.
New Technology: CA remains a human intensive business, yet
present media technology can be employed to increase access to
certain targets. Traditional CA methods will continue to be used
throughout: the next decade with emphasis on new techniques. CA
programs will be enhanced by employing current technology and by
acquiring certain electronic gear. However, agents of influence
and media placement assets will continue to be the essential
ingredient. for political action.
Programs for the 80's: CA programs begun in the 80's will
continue into the 90's with emphasis upon: countering Soviet
and their surrogates' efforts to destabilizing governments
friendly to the U.S., countering terrorism, obstructing
international narcotics production and trafficking, countering
nuclear proliferation; and selectively influencing international
economics decisions of vital concern to the U.S.
Manpower: Existing human resources are inadequate to
undertake new CA initiatives.
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