MINUTES OF 22 JULY 1982 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING: HUMINT COLLECTION CAPABILITIES; ANALYTIC CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: July 29, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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EXCOM 82-7030
29 July 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
FROM: Dianne Rankin
Executive Assistant to the DDCI
SUBJECT: Minutes of 22 July 1982 Executive Committee
Meeting: HUMINT Collection Capabilities;
Analytic Capabilities (S)
1. The Executive Committee met on 22 July 1982 to continue
Phase III of the long-range planning process focusing on HUMINT
collection and analytic capabilities. (ExDir) chaired
the session; participants included Messrs. Me a on (DDCI);
Fitzwater (DDA); Stein (DDO); Gates (DDI); Hineman (DDS&T);
Taylor (ADDS&T); (Acting IG); Glerum (D/OP); and Childs
(Comptroller). A/IUO
2. Analytic Capabilities. reviewed the Steps in
the planning process to date and then highlighted the key points
of the DDI's paper on analytic capabilities, which he found
excellent. He emphasized the implications for more contributions
from the rest of the government and the implied trend toward
publishing more information under the aegis of other departments,
particularly Commerce and State. Mr. Gates affirmed the latter,
citing the example of DDI-produced papers on terrorism being
broad
i
li
.
ng a
v
distributed by State to American businessmen
X3411P L L L y . .. .... w -.. . ,~ - -
(DDI/PMS/PG) advised that the DDI probably also would not want to
need
exceed a work force of about 0 explained
for additional computer assistance to permit analysts to do the
more sophisticated modeling that is increasingly required. (C)
3. Messrs. Hineman, Stein and Fitzwater praised the paper,
and Mr. Fitzwater added that his directorate would be able to
anticipate the support capabilities the DDI will require for
implementing its proposed plan. Mr. Glerum mentioned that the
personnel the DDI hoped to recruit over the next decade included
primarily hard-to-get categories, such as economists,
scientists/engineers and computer scientists. This will require
extensive DDI involvement in the recruiting process. In response
to Mr. Childs' comments, Mr. Gates affirmed that the planning
paper reflected the DDI's priorities and tracked with past
DDCI/DCI guidance. Mr. McMahon pointed out that the paper was
dded
t
G
es a
a
consistent with the 1985 Capabilities Study. Mr.
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that it also was consistent with the National Intelligence Topics
and the budget. The Committee approved the paper. (A/ IIJO)
4. HUMINT Collection Capabilities. Mr. Stein acknowledged
that this paper could use some more work and welcomed members'
suggestions. He noted that the DDO culture did not lend itself
to planning as precisely as the DDI's did.
(DC/PCS/DDO) then highlighted the HUMINT paper. He noted the
need for more exploitation of open source data, clarifying
responsibilities in clandestine collection, and a broader
approach to foreign liaison. He explained that instead of
identifying operational capabilities for each intelligence target
identified by the DDI, the HUMINT paper focused on generic
capabilities that cut across target areas, such as more and
better audio penetrations, combined technical and HUMINT
collection to overcome access barriers, and increased recruitment
of foreign military officers. I Isaid that he found the
DDI's projected view of the world in a next decade too
pessimistic. He suggested that instead, intelligence agencies
should be concentrating on identifying the exploitable weaknesses
of our adversaries. (S)
5. Mr. Gates agreed with the paper's call for clarifying
DDI priorities and increasing the exploitation of open source
material. He noted that quite a bit had been accomplished in
identifying our adversaries' weaknesses for policymakers.. He
maintained that the DDI planning paper's projection of an
extremely challenging, complex world in the years ahead was a
valid one. He then noted the following concerns with the HUMINT
paper: It did not address long-range strategies or objectives;
it focused on DDO concerns rather than the more substantive,
strategic elements of the Agency's business; and it focused on
the tools of the Agency's work rather than the Agency's overall
objectives. Mr. Gates also said the paper provided no sense of
building up DDO capabilities. He suggestd that intelligence
needs will not diminish, requiring establishing clear priorities
for building future capabilities. He pointed out the lack of any
strategy for improving cover. In summary, he found the paper
focused on immediate DDO concerns rather than on a long-range
strategy for building capabilities needed in the years ahead.
(A/IUO)
6. Mr. Stein acknowledged Mr. Gates' comments. He
explained that it was difficult for his Directorate to escape the
constraints of insufficient cover and lack of slots in Embassies
in thinking about future capabilities. He welcomed the
opportunity to determine what collection opportunities existed
for specific intelligence targets. (S)
7. Mr. Hineman generally concurred with Mr. Gates'
comments, suggesting that the HUMINT paper should specify what
needs to be done to satisfy future intelligence needs and the
problems involved so that senior managers could then make the
t sections in the
d th
i
a
ne
required decisions. expla
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paper on combined HUMINT/technical collection, audio operations
and increasing recruitments of foreign military officers had been
intended for that purpose. Mr. Taylor thought the paper had some
interesting ideas and represented a good start. He encouraged
the DDO to consider the suggestions offered in revising it. (S)
8. Mr. Fitzwater said that he had similar problems with
both the HUMINT and technical collection papers because both
failed to lay out a strategy and plans for the future. He
suggested both be given more time and begin their revisions by
addressing one intelligence target at a time. Mr. Gates
mentioned that both papers should be tied more to the substantive
priorities the Agency must address in the years ahead. (A/IUO)
9. Mr. McMahon observed that the HUMINT paper was not a
planning paper but a reflection of the DDO's frustration with its
current problems. He stated that the DDO had to take the DDI's
projection of the future environment as a given and determine
what the DDO could do against the identifed targets. As specific
examples, he said the DDO should be thinking about what it needs
to do to maintain its stable of agents and replenish the 25
percent it loses annually; how to effectively plow the knowledge
gained from experience back into operational training courses;
needed improvements in clandestine technical collection; how to
tackle the nuclear proliferation target; and how to increase
collection in the Third World. He noted that problems regarding
the DCI's supremacy in clandestine collection represented an
irritant, not a planning issue. He urged the DDO to exploit the
knowledge of the thousands of military personnel serving
overseas. He observed that the 1984 budget will not solve the
problems of the rest of the decade. The DDO should be
identifying the language skills and other technical skills it
will need in the years ahead so that these needs can be factored
into future budgets. He acknowledged that the HUMINT paper
represented progress in the Agency's planning process and
encouraged the DDO to incorporate the suggestions offered in its
revision. (S)
10. agreed that the planning process continued
to be a valuable learning experience. He suggested that
additional guidance would be required before Mr. Fitzwater could
launch the support phase. He therefore asked that both the DS&T
and DDO be given time to revise their respective collection
papers. They should both include one-page statements of the
capabilities and improvements that will be needed to address each
intelligence target. They should also identify any
infrastructure required and any generic problems to be tackled.
The papers on covert action and counterintelligence will be
postponed until 12 August. The Interdirectorate Planning' GrouD
will then review all the Phase III papers to develop alternative
investment strategies for Executive Committee consideration. In
mid-September the Committee will meet again to reach a
preliminary judgment regarding priorities for addressing
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intelligence targets. The DDA
will then
be able to focus its
support planning accordingly. I
I
adjourned the meeting.
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cc: Acting Inspector General
Director of Personnel
Comptroller
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Distribution:
1 - O/DCI
1 - DDCI (File EXCOM Subject)
1 - ExDir
1 - DDI
1 - DDA
1 - DDS&T
1 - DDO
1 - Comptroller
1 - D/OP
1 - Acting IG
1 - Planning Staff
1 - ER via ES
1 - EXCOM Minutes
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (optional)
Proposal for Revision of Long Range Planning Cycle
FROM: ~ EXTENSION NO. ---------- - -
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1012 Ames 29 Jul 82
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
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OFFICER'S
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show from whom
COMMENTS (Number each comment to+l
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
EA/OP
5 E 58 Hqs
Pete asked me to share
with you the change in
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schedule for the Long-Range
2. DD/OP
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3' D/OP to
Planning effort. Phase IV,
which includes personnel, is
rescheduled from 1 Jul-15 Sep
to 1 Oct-15 Nov. The purpose
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is to permit more adequate
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phase dealing with priorities
and strategy.
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STAT
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PROPOSAL FOR REVISION OF LONG RANGE PLANNING CYCLE
CURRENT SCHEDULE
--Called for completion of Phase III by 1 July
--Phase IV (Support capabilities) 1 July-15 September
--Phase V (Long Range Forecast) 15 September-15 October
PROBLEMS
--With the transition in DDCI and EXDIR offices, the Phase III
EXCOM sessions had to be postponed , extending the Phase III
schedule by about one month. Last Phase III EXCOM meeting
was set for 29 July (Covert Action and Counterintelligence
presentations).
--Two Phase III papers (Technical Collection
and HUMINT) need substantial modification
and re-review.
--Even with the existing slippage, the Covert Action paper
could not be completed in time for EXCOM review on
29 July. It was decided to also postpone presentation
on the Cl paper.
--The EXCOM has indicated a desire for a preliminary
assessment of how the ideas generated in Phase II
and III fit together. They also want a preliminary
idea of investment utility.
PROPOSAL
--Create Phases IIIb and IIIe as follows
PHASE III b
--Redraft the HUMINT and Technical Collection papers,
to include the following information:
.One-page capability, incremental improvements and/or
major initiative statement for each intelligence target
.Section on generic and/or infrastructure problems and
needed improvements (incremental or major initiative).
--Reschedule the EXCOM sessions for Phase III papers as
follows:
12 August: Covert Action and Counterintelligence
24 August: Technical Collection and HUMINT
PHASE IIIc:
--Create this subphase of the planning effor to produce a
preliminary assessment of intelligence targets and
collection initiative priorities.
--The Planning Staff would create intelligence target
perspectives from the one-pagers produced in Phases II and
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IIIb (the problems and information needs; technical
collection and analysis capability statements).
--Covert Action and Counterintelligence would continue to be
treated sparately.
--The Planning Staff and IPG would lead an assessment, at the
DD or OD level, of the target/capability initiative
combinations which are deemed to have the highest potential
for payoff.
--The Interdirectorate Planning Group and the Planning Staff
would create a preliminary investment strategy model for
EXCOM consideration.
--This activity would take place from mid August through mid
September.
ACTIONS
--Conduct IPG/PS effort to define assessment and investment
--methodology.
-Reschedule Long Range Activities as follows
12 August:EXCOM on Covert Action and Counterintelligence
24 August:EXCOM on Revised Technical Collection and
HUMINT papers
24 August-12 September: Prepare target perspectives and
conduct priorities assessment survey.
13 September-17September: IPG and PS prepare preliminary
forecast model for EXCOM.
23 September: EXCOM review of preliminary forecast
1 October-15 November: Conduct Phase IV (Support
Capabilities)
15 November-15 December: Conduct Phase V (Long Range
Forecast)
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CONFIDENTIAL