TOWER COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION PAGE V-6: THE ROLE OF THE CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000300690007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 27, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 00876-87
27 February 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
VIA: Brig Gen Frank B. Horton III, USAF
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Tower Commission Recommendation Page V-6:
The Role of the CIA
1. On page V-6 of the Tower Commission report, para 5 The Role of the
CIA, the text states "The NSC staff was actively involved in the preparation
of the May 20, 1985 (sic) update to the SNIE on Iran (actually 30 May). It
is a matter for concern if this involvement and the strong views of the NSC
members were allowed to influence the intelligence judgments contained in
the update. It is also of concern that the update contained a hint that the
US should change its existing policy and encourage its allies to provide
arms to Iran. It is critical that the line between intelligence and
advocacy of a particular policy be preserved if intelligence is to retain
its integrity and perform its proper function. In this instance the CIA
came close enough to the line to warrant concern."
-- This analysis by the Tower Commission in our opinion erroneously
blurs the distinction between intelligence and policy mechanisms.
While the Commission--perhaps understandably--may have reached this
conclusion through limited knowledge of the mechanics of this
relationship--these important distinctions need to be addressed in
this memo.
2. "The NSC staff was actively involved in the preparation of the
SNIE." In fact, the NSC had no participation whatsoever in writing,
coordinating or in reaching the conclusions of the 30 May 1985 SNIE on Iran.
-- The NSC was correctly and properly involved in using existing
mechanisms to task the Intelligence Community, through the NIC, on
issues of policy concern to them. The NSC regularly tasks the
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Intelligence Community for Estimates and provides the rationale and
bureaucratic purpose for which these Estimates are intended to be
used. The NSC usually sets forth the key areas of concern it
wishes to be addressed. This tasking procedure is the norm and not
the exception.
The Intelligence Community considers that any questions of an
intelligence nature coming from the NSC, or any other policy body,
is entirely valid and must be answered. However,
The NIC has never allowed policy bodies to fully dictate even the
total framework of questions to the community. While we are, of
course, responsive to specific questions asked, we have never
hesitated to raise and answer other questions we feel are
appropriate to shedding full light on the policy question--and to
avoid being boxed into a narrow, leading, and possibly misleading
framework of questions.
The Community is fiercely jealous in guarding the integrity of the
estimative process. Representatives of the policy Community are
never part of the drafting process nor are they permitted to be
present in the room when the coordination process is under way.
Every NIO is well aware of his responsibility to maintain a stance
independent of the policy community and indeed the Community
representatives are highly sensitive to the merest suggestion that
they might be under manipulation by policymakers; they are properly
vociferous in their objections to any suggestion of Community
accommodation to policy wishes. Indeed, the NIO in question,
Graham Fuller, who chaired a three year series of Iran Estimates,
also chaired another series of three Estimates on Lebanon in
1983-84 which were highly uncongenial to policymakers.
Although distinctions between the intelligence and policy
process--as the Tower Commission notes--must be and is carefully
preserved, there is a clear interrelationship between the two
bodies. The NIO, to be effective, must enjoy broad access to the
policy Community and to be aware of their activities and
intelligence needs. Intelligence that is not pertinent or
illuminating to current problems is nearly worthless.
There is a regular c cle of interchange between the intelligence
and policy communities. Po icymakers read intelligence, hopefully
include intelligence in their decision, and in turn take actions
generating new intelligence questions and analytic problems. The
dialogue is essential. Yet each side must understand its role
clearly and preserve its independence. Gray areas inevitably exist
where policy meets intelligence--particularly at the NIO level.
Only a clear understanding by the NIO and the Intelligence
Community of its independent stature will permit these gray areas
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to be safely traversed. We believe these distinctions are well
understood, appreciated, and jealously guarded.
3. Virtually every Estimate written includes a section called Policy
Implications for the US. This section attempts to draw for the policymaker
the me igence ommunity's best sense of how our analysis impacts upon
decisionmaking. It tends to suggest a range of de facto constraints--based
on the realities of a foreign situation--within which po icymakers must
operate. It should avoid being policy prescriptive, but must be policy
relevant.
4. The NSC tasker of 1 M1985. Against the general background above,
a few specific points must be drawn about the May 1 tasker calling for an
updated SNIE on Iran.
The tasker specifically cites revious intelli ence (an earlier
SNIE dated 18 October 1984, and a 28 Marc in ependent DDI
publication--Iran: Prospects for Near-Term Instability) as basis
for its concerns about possible deterioration of stability in Iran.
The tasker specifically makes clear to the Intelligence Community
its request for an Estimate prior to a planned review of US olic
options and states that an N DD will be developed for future N
consideration and approval on Iran policy. There was no doubt in
anyone's mind why the NSC sought this information and the purpose
for which it would be used.
The tasker proceeds to pose questions about Iran--questions which
would be highly relevant to any intelligence review of Iran. Even
by benefit of hindsight the tasker gives no indication or hint of
any independent activity that would then or now excite the
suspicions of the Intelligence Community as to an alternate
agenda. The Community itself had no inkling of other NSC
operations under way. Needless to say, the Community would not in
any case limit its response exclusively to those questions posed by
the NSC.
The tasker states that "particular attention should be given to
possible opportunities for, as well as threats to, US interests" in
the situation. The NSC clearly sought Community consideration of
the policymakers' range of options. In the event, the SNIE
suggested that US options were highly limited and that US influence
could be exerted primarily only through third parties.
The NSC tasker explicitly requested the Community to highlight
areas in which intelligence information was weak or
uncertain--hardly suggestive of a desire for a ringing affirmation
of NSC's own agenda.
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-- Neither Graham Fuller as NIO nor the NIC had any role whatsoever in
writing or even conceiving the tacker. Fuller was, however,
obviously aware of NSC policy concerns--some of which he clearly
shared--and was aware that a tasker would be coming.
-- It should be noted that the 1 May NSC tacker preceeded Fuller's 17
May 85 memo to the DCI which set forth his own independent concerns
for the geopolitical situation in Iran--the subject of other memos
by him for some time.
5. A review of correspondence and material related to preparation of
the Estimate indicates that the established Intelligence/policy process was
implemented, and the objectivity and independence of intelligence analysis
was preserved. No skirting of established procedures occurred in the
preparation of this, or earlier, or subsequent Estimates on Iran.
6. It is worth pointing out that Fuller has been actively involved in
producing a continuum of personal analysis and "think pieces" for the DCI's
benefit all the while supervising Community analysis on ongoing Intelligence
Estimates. These personal views have regularly been shared with appropriate
DDI analytic offices, and were regularly articulated at Community monthly
Warning Meetings. The NIO's personal views have been well known--as are the
views of other key analysts. Nearly every NIO handles his job in the same
way--offering advice and counsel to the DCI freely, informing the Community
of his own analytical concerns and thoughts--often in formative
stages--testing hypotheses, and bestirring the Community to constant
consideration of alternative analytic views.
7. Fuller's 17 May memo was written exclusively at his own initiative
and is part of a series of memos presenting evolving views of his concerns
for the geostrategic relationship of Iran and possibilities for US influence
there.
-- Fuller's May 17 memo was sent to then DDI/Chairman/NIC Gates for
his information, although the memo was addressed directly to the
DCI. Fuller distributed the memo to a handful of key policy people
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as well as to appropriate analytical elements within the DI. He
had general license to do so from DCI Casey, and Casey may have
passed the memo on to others--as he very frequently did to
encourage broad interchange. Bob Gates took no hand in
distributing to policymakers this or any other memo that Fuller
wrote to the Community. That responsibility was carried out by
Fuller and/or the DCI.
8. We wish to draw attention to SSCI's 15 August 1986 memo to the DCI
providing a study and critique of Intelligence Community production--drawn
up following a long review of Community production by SSCI staffers. That
study among other things, establishes a set of desirable criteria for
intelligence production including statements that:
-- "the product should be written with a thematic approach"
-- "the product should offer interpretation"
-- "the product should offer retrospective analysis"
-- "the product should highlight both opportunities and risks for
policy"
-- the product should explore the effects of alternative policy
options."
9. Among the major final recommendations of the 1986 SSCI study is the
recommendation: "once the production of intelligence reporting has begun,
the National Intelligence Officer or other appropriate official should
consult regularly with the principal consumer to ensure that the concept
paper, terms of reference, or other guidance address the appropriate
question. This is particularly important with respect to unscheduled
product."
10. While we fully concurred with each of the above SSCI suggestions
and recommendations, we also noted in our response to the committee that:
"While we can and do honor the policymakers' questions in full, the NIO must
also insure that the questions are broadly framed and address any important
questions not asked by the policymaker that have a direct impact on the
understanding of the problem."
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11. We believe SSCI's recommendation above were an integral part of the
intelligence/policy process which took place between the NIC and the NSC in
the preparation of the 30 May 1985 SNIE on Iran.
rte-- ~ ~~
Graham E. Fuller
6--
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NIC 00876-87
27 February 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Tower Commission Recommendation Page V-6:
The Role of the CIA
DCI/NIC/VC/NIC: GEFuller:jcn 27 Feb. 87
Distribution:
1 - ADCI
-1'- -D/Exec Staff
1 - ER
2 - NIO/NESA
1 - IG
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/NESA
1 - OCA
10 copies provided to Office of OCA for SSCI
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