POLICY REVIEW GROUP MEETING ON HAITI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000401500003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 8, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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SUSPENSE
Date
Remarks
Exec ti &Secretary
9 Dec '87
Date
3637 (")-81)
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SE ET
NATIONALSECURTYCOUNCL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
December 8, 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State
COLONEL WILLIAM M. MATZ
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
MR. L. WAYNE ARNY
Executive Secretary
Office of Management and Budget
MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
SYSTEM TT
91362
REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH C. STRASSER
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Entati
j 87-3868X/3
MR. RICHARD MEYER
Executive Secretary
Agency for International Development
SUBJECT: Policy Review Group Meeting on Haiti (S)
A Policy Review Group (PRG) meeting is scheduled for Thursday,
December 10, 1987, at 3:00 p.m., in the White House Situation
Room. (S)
The purpose of the meeting is to review the crisis in Haiti. (S)
Attached for your information is an agenda for the meeting,
together with a copy of a Policy Options paper prepared by the
Department of State for the PRG's consideration. (S)
Attachments
Agenda for PRG Meeting
Policy Options Paper
Decl ify on: OADR
aek41 14/01A?""??-"'
Paul Schott Ste ens
Executive Secretary
SE 'T
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t.7 C.k./11C. I
SECRET
POLICY REVIEW GROUP MEETING
Thursday, December 10, 1987
White House Situation Room
3:00 - 4:00 p.m.
HAITI
Agenda
SYSTEM II
91362
I. Introduction John Negroponte
(3 minutes)
Intelligence Update CIA
(5 minutes)
Political/Economic Overview State/USAID/DoD
and Introduction of Policy (15 minutes)
Option Paper
O Overview State
O Threat Assessment re Amcits
and Evacuation Plan
O Status of Economic and
Military Assistance
State/DoD
USAID/DoD
State
O Introduction of Policy Paper
IV. General Discussion All
(30 minutes)
V. Summary and Conclusions John Negroponte
(3 minutes)
SECRET
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SECRET
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US STRATEGY TOWARDS HAITI
Policy Objectives:
- To prevent unacceptable levels of spillover from turmoil
in Haiti (e.g. uncontrolled migration, exploitation by
narcotics traffickers).
- To ensure that outside, inimical powers do not gain
foothold; special concern about Cuban, Libyan attempts to
establish positions in Haiti.
- To assure safety of American residents in Haiti.
- To forestall egregious human rights abuses, total
collapse of law and order leading to massive bloodshed.
Policy Options.
I: Redefinition of USG interests in minimalist sense, pursuit
of low key policy of "benign neglect".
Considerations/Discussion:
- With reduction in our assistance levels, there will be a
concomitant lessening of direct involvement in Haitian
military and economic development. The parlous security
situation likely will result in at least a partial pull-out
of those assembly and other industries which represent the
modest American private investment in Haiti. As security
deteriorates, the missionary and other private American
presence will slim down. Some unofficial American presence
will remain.
- Haiti historically was isolated. Its strategic
importance is mostly negative -- denial to hostile forces.
The Cubans have played a cautious game and may be reluctant
to buy into what appears to be a losing proposition. We
have had little indication that the Soviets perceive Haiti
to be a plum. Recent disruptions do not appear to have
triggered new Cuban or Soviet interest.
- A policy along these lines would put the USG in position
freely to criticize human rights violations, and GOH
conduct (the "Paraguay option").
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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- 2 -
- Perhaps under any of the options, but especially so here,
we would have to anticipate a flood of political refugees.
Haiti, already vulnerable to narcotics traffickers, could
become a safehaven for them.
Evaluation:
This option is feasible only if we can confidently assume a
modicum of stability will prevail in Haiti. We do not believe
this to be the case, at least in the foreseeable future.
Rather, we anticipate growing popular, political frustration
and a downward spiral into chaos, likely resulting in
continuing bloodshed. Given the proximity of Haiti, the size
of the Haitian population in the U.S., the likelihood of
increased refugee flows (with an AIDS-related public dimension)
and the historic political involvement and interest on the part
of American political and ethnic groups, both U.S. foreign
policy interests and domestic political imperatives already
argue for some strong action. Benign neglect will not work as
a long-term policy.
Accomodation with CNG in order to restore stability and
democratic transition.
Considerations/Discussion:
-'Namphy is no longer credible, positive element. USG
cannot endorse rigged elections.
- All indications are that Namphy is determined to pursue
this course, impervious to our clearly stated objectives.
Regala, though admitting to differences in personality and
style, voices his loyalty to Namphy, claims that Army is
united in its support. There is no clear fracture line
within the Haitian military.
- Expansion of CNG may be necessary step if process is to
be restored. USG might exert political pressure, but
ultimate decision in CNG, Haitian hands.
- Some elements/interest groups which, under constitution,
are to be represented on CEP have already taken position
that CNG dismissal was illegal. It may not be possible to
form a new CEP. Even if that hurdle is overcome, any
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- 3 -
elections organized by Namphy/CNG will be suspect.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether respectable candidates
would stay in a sham race.
- Our leverage over Namphy/CNG is now palpably limited. In
the end, they ignored our advice, proved unreliable in
fulfilling their commitments to us and the Haitian
electorate and candidates. Our one-time jolt of
drastically cutting back our assistance programs has evoked
bitterness from Namphy, but no hint that it is enough to
make him reconsider his actions.
Evaluation:
Namphy and the present CNG have lost all credibility with
Haitian populace -- and abroad, including in the U.S. They are
unbending, determined, apparently united. Most importantly,
the Army remains the only institution with both a national
security role and some capability to carry out those
responsibilities.
We cannot embrace the course now being pursued by
Namphy/CNG. But prospects for persuading them to change course
are minimal. Elections acceptable here or internationally will
not materialize. USG acceptance of sham elections would
undercut our policy in Panama, Nicaragua, and Chile.
Accommodation is not an acceptable or realistic option.
III Flexible confrontation/multilateral diplomacy to induce
acceptable change in CNG policies or, if unsuccessful,
evoke removal of Namphy, Regala, or both.
Considerations/Discussion:
- A policy of calibrated confrontation would be the logical
extension of the tough message we sent through suspension
of military and non-humanitarian economic assistance. It
would build on our unequivocal private and public
condemnation of the CNG's failure to ensure a secure
environment for the election.
- Likewise, this policy would serve our domestic political
interests and objectives. It would dovetail with growing
media and congressional enthusiasm for a tougher line.
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- 4 -
- Importantly, under this policy line the Administration
could continue to press our fundamental determination not
to accept less than a transition to meaningful democracy in
Haiti.
- Prospects for effecting changes in the CNG (either in
composition or policies) are more problematic. By
definition, the Army is in position to veto any changes.
Even presuming that splits develop and that some in the
military might be willing to move against Namphy/Regala,
the follow-on leaders would inevitably come from ranks of
military. Among those in the wings are highly
objectionable, even dangerous, individuals (e.g. Dessalines
commander Col. Paul). Additionally, the army has become
increasingly unpopular, suspect among the Haitian
population. It would be difficult to persuade Haitians
that a new military figure would be any more democractic,
reliable than Namphy/Regala.
- The army is and will remain the political makeweight. We
will have to deal with it and its leaders. Confrontation
might have a moderating influence on Namphy/CNG, or could
evoke even harsher, repressive measures. We cannot
discount the possibility that Namphy/CNG might conclude
that they have nothing to lose by proclaiming themselves a
permanent government. This would be a quick reversion
towards dictatorship.
- Internationally, we perceive some trend to a similar
confrontational posture. The OAS meets 12/7 to debate (and
probably pass) a resolution of condemnation, calling for
restoration of the electoral process, and opposing
intervention.
- PM Seaga is working to put together a delegation of
"concerned Caribbean leaders." He hopes that delegation
can go to Haiti 12/10 to tell Namphy that the CNG's course
is unacceptable, will not work, and carries the risk of
outside intervention. From discussions with Washington
ambassadors and government leaders in the context of the
Miami Conference, we are hearing the message that PM
Compton, as head of CARICOM, should lead any delegation to
Haiti (which, in their view, can only take place at the
invitation of Namphy). We are encouraging a Caribbean
initiative, whether Seaga's or by CARICOM. An appropriate
delegation should be armed with specific proposals as to
how the Caribbeans could be helpful in getting the
electoral process back on track.
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- 5 -
- Our actions on assistance will have the effect of making
it almost impossible for Haiti to meet IMF and IBRD
requirements; we might stiffen this by opposing IMF/IBRD
proposals for Haiti. We are seeking to coordinate
positions with other major bilateral donors, notably France
and Canada.
Evaluation:
For all its faults, this option offers us greater
flexibility and potential influence over the course of Haitian
developments than either of the other options. It is
consistent with our present position that progress towards
democracy is a sine qua non for progress in Haiti.
A policy of confrontation can be graduated, nuanced, and
has many possible diplomatic and economic facets. We can
increase pressure or ease up to reflect the situation in and
response from Haiti. Opposition to the CNG's actions have been
indecisive, inchoate thus far. However, we believe-it unlikely
that the Haitian people passively will accept Namphy/CNG
actions. Should they do so, we could be reduced to Option I.
Contrarily, should Namphy and the CNG unexpectedly reverse
course and credibly restore the electoral process, we could
shift to Option II.
A U.S. policy of confrontation may be ineffective at a
given level and may stimulate a harsh CNG crackdown on the
Haitian populace. It should be recognized, therefore, that
confrontation implies the possibility of escalation to the
level of direct U.S. military involvement, both to achieve our
policy goals and to quell violence perhaps arising in response
to our actions. Initial diplomatic consultations indicate some
sympathy for a strong policy. However, there is no perceived
desire to undertake multilateral military actions.
There are a variety of economic, diplomatic, political,
intelligence and military measures which could be considered
under this option. All would have to be weighed carefully. At
this time we recommend against actions which would create more
hardship within the Haitian population. Illustrative measures
include:
Restricting Haiti's access to CBI, GSP, OPIC or
Eximbank programs, discouraging trade and investment
with Haiti, further cutbacks in our bilateral
assistance and discouragement of multilateral
assistance.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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- 6 -
A show of force through regional military exercises
and overflights, closer cooperation with the Dominican
Republic (which is trying to close its border with
Haiti).
A carefully calibrated, imaginatively implemented policy of
confrontation/multilateral diplomatic effort is the preferred
course of action.
SECRET! SENSITIVE
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ARA/CAR: DZweifel:#1017A
12/04/87x76610
ARA: EAbram
P: MArmacost
INR: MAbramowitz
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