AFGHANISTAN: REGIME DURABILITY UNDER VARIOUS WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLES--A SPECULATIVE ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000401590001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 26, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
NOTE TO: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
j j
Attached is a follow-up paper that was
requested at a recent NSPG meeting on Afghanistan.
The paper discusses possibilities of the Kabul
regime surviving the withdrawal of Soviet forces
over six, twelve, or eighteen months. I think
you will find it interesting.
I have also forwarded copies to the principal
members of PRG (Powell, Armacost, Armitage, and
Moellering), as well as Ikle, Don Gregg, Bob
Oakley; Ed Djerejian (State/NEA), Fritz Ermarth,
and Dan Webster. NESA plans to make
Ittd-hard e
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
NESA M 87-20032, dtd 26 March 1987
STAT
STAT
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DIRECTORATE OF.-INTELLIGENCE
26 March 1987:.
. Afghanistan: Regime Durability Under Various
SUMMARY
Withdrawal Timetables--A Speculative Assessment
We . believe the.lcurrent Kabul regime. would. not survive a
withdrawal of-Soviet forces,. be it,over.'a period of i'1 six', twelve,
or eighteen months. A combination of intense factionalism in the
ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the
Afghan ':military's inability to stand on its own without ;, massive
Soviet support,-in our.opinion,.insures the demise of the Kabul
regime.before the completion of a.Soviet withdrawal, even if. the
withdrawal was stretched out over 18 months. In our view, the
regime is kept in power only by the presence of Soviet troops; it
lacks popular support and has failed to establish a11r ble.
bureaucratic machine:
The disintegration of the Afghan armed forces would!-begin.
soon after the announcement of a Soviet withdrawal.11 Despite
marginal improvements in .1986, most Afghan forces suffer from
poor. morale and are undermanned Ill-tra d poorly
equipped.
The party and the military currently are in theimidst of a
debilitating bout of factionalism featuring splits within the
Parcham Faction. between supporters of Najib and those of Babrak
as well as an escalating dispute between the Parcham and the
bigger Khalq faction. These disputes have undermined what little
support the regime has managed to. attract. In the Afghan armed
forces, the largely Khalgi senior officer corps is showing an
Central Intelligence Agency
-"pared by
Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and should be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division,
Eastern and South Asian . Analysis
SE ET
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increasing propensity to balk at orders from the
Parchami-dominated political leadership.
Assumptions
Our assessment is rooted in three major assumptions:
--Moscow will comply with an accord and agree to a withdrawal schedule
that is "front-loaded," resulting in an immediate withdrawal of up
to one-third of its troops, with the remainder removed in stages
over the duration of the withdrawal timetable. (We believe the
Soviets are unlikely to leave behind a sizable "adviser corps"--say
several thousand troops--to assist the Afghans; such a group would
be unable to defend itself adequately against insurgent attacks. We
also believe the Soviets are unlikely to leave behind significant
air assets to support the Afghans; the security of such aircraft
probably could not be guaranteed without the presence of large
numbers of Soviet ground forces.) Troop withdrawal arrangements are
to be part of a bilateral Soviet-Afghan agreement.
--The Soviet withdrawal--of whatever duration--will be based on an
accord worked out under UN auspices at Geneva in which the
Pakistanis agree to shut down support for the resistance within 30
days after an agreement was signed. (We do not believe that
Islamabad--even with its best effort--is capable of completely
sealing Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. Contraband arms are
likely to continue to flow, albeit at a much-reduced rate, across
the border, especially through the tribal areas of the North West
Frontier Province.)
--No cease-fire would accompany the accord. All parties to the
conflict recognize the need to establish an interim or national
reconciliation government. We believe that such a government--if
dominated by the PDPA--would fall apart at roughly the same rate and
same manner as a PDPA-only regime. In our opinion, however, an
interim or reconciliation government dominated by the insurgents, or
by Afghan exiles acceptable to the insurgents, probably would
survive each of the three scenarios discussed herein.
Regime Survivability Under Six-, Twelve-, and Eighteen-Month Timetables
Although we do not believe that the PDPA regime could survive the
withdrawal of Soviet troops under any of the three timetables, there
probably would be some differences in the manner in which the regime
collapsed. The shorter the timetable the quicker and more complete would
be the collapse of the government in Kabul. Such a collapse probably would
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be punctuated by armed clashes between the Parcham and Khalq factions, a
rapid melting away of the Afghan armed forces, and a massive transfer of
allegiances from the regime to the resistance by all levels of government
and party cadres. Under an 18-month withdrawal the regime's collapse would
be relatively slow--some Afghan units might continue to fight, the regime
might continue to control Kabul, and some senior officials might remain at
their posts on the chance the Soviets would renege on withdrawing--but its
ultimate dissolution, in our judgment, would be no less certain. (There
are some Afghan Army units that probably would remain effective over a much
longer period--such as the 25th Infantry Division at Khowst--because they
manned by individuals who the insurgents would reject as defectors for
ethnic reasons or because they are commanded by long-time, hardcore
supporters of the PDPA. The existence of such units probably would create
l
would
ast longer than others.)
We believe the psychological impact of a Soviet withdrawal announcement
would cause the Afghan armed forces to begin to lose their presently
limited combat effectiveness soon after the announcement. Although the
Afghan army's combat capability increased marginally last year, it is
plagued by severe manpower shortages, factionalism in the senior ranks, low
morale, and inadequate training and equipment. These shortcomin s
despite vigorous efforts to eliminate them by Moscow and Kabul.
Because Afghan operations would rapidly lose most Soviet ground, air,
and artillery support during 6- and 12-month withdrawal schedules, we
believe that the Afghan army could not sustain attacks against the
insurgents. We also think the Afghan army and paramilitary units would
suffer mass desertions and heavy casaulties under either of these
The more abundant Soviet support available under an 18-month scenario
might prolong the staying power of the Afghan army, but not to the point of
insuring the survival of the Kabul regime. The Soviets might also provide
the Afghans with more sophisticated equipment during an 18-month withdrawal
in an effort to slow the erosion of their combat capabilities; in our view,
however, not enough time would be available to train the Afghans to use the
new equipment effectively. Although the start of an 18-month departure
might see an upsurge in Soviet-Afghan combat operations greater than that
witnessed under 6- and 12-month timetables, we believe that such activity
would quickly taper-off and that the Afghan forces would begin to melt away
once it became apparent that the Soviets were leaving.
We believe the insurgents have lone been stnnknilino ~?~~ ,..a
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All Vt"' Vi
provide them with a 6-to-12 month reserve supply of weaponry andCw Will
ammunition. We believe that captured Soviet and Afghan arms, black-market
arms procured in Pakistan, and aid from supporters such as Iran would be
available to supplement shortfalls in resistance stocks during either of
these timeframes. We also believe Afghan army deserters would provide the
insurgents with a considerable amount of weaponry and intelligence under
any of the three scenarios. We assume, however, that the resistance could
not support a high level of combat activity from its own a stocks
during an 18-month withdrawal period.
We cannot definitively predict the level of combat the insurgents would
try to maintain under the three scenarios. Because there is no single
command-and-control organization for the insurgency, we believe that the
level of resistance attacks under each scenario probably would vary
markedly from commander to commander as well as from region to region. Our
best estimate is that the level of insurgent-inspired combat would increase
as the length of the Soviet withdrawal timetable increased. We also
believe that unity among the seven alliance leaders would be strongest
during the 12- and 18-month timetables when the Soviets would be able to
bring the most
ilit
m
ary pressure to bear.
How Each Scenario Might Unfold
SIX MONTHS: In our view, the announcement at Geneva of a six-month
Soviet withdrawal schedule would prompt the almost immediate collapse of
the Kabul regime. Officials at all levels would begin looking for avenues
of escape, military organization would disintegrate and morale would
plummet, and the regime's assets in the countryside--such as the tribal
militias--would move quickly to make peace with the insurgents. We believe
that under this scenario the insurgents might well try to lay low
militarily to avoid antagonizing the departing Soviets--who, under the
logistical demands of a six-month schedule, probably would have little time
to launch large-scale attacks on insurgent targets other than those that
would threaten lines of withdrawal and/or communication--and to conserve
supplies for the violent jockeying for political dominance that almost
certainly will o
i
ccur
n the immediate post-Soviet period.
We believe that the unity of the seven-party resistance alliance might
weaken under a six-month scenario as each party leader sought to solidify
his support for the post-war power struggle. In our opinion, Pakistan
almost certainly would make a good-faith effort to halt the flow of support
for the insurgents through Pakistan under a six-month timetable, believing
the Kabul regime would not survive the withdrawal and, more important, that
there was no point in takin
the ri
k
f
g
s
o
giving the Soviets plausible
grounds for reneging. Iranian support for the guerrillas--currently a
small fraction of t
t
l
o
a
aid--probably would not be reduced.
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TWELVE MONTHS: We do not believe that an additional six months would
increase the survivability of Najib's PDPA government. A front-loaded
Soviet withdrawal timetable--even of a year's duration--would still mean
the near-term loss of protection for the Afghan communists and, as a
result, we would expect a widespread scurrying for cover under this
scenario. We would also expect to see, however, more insurgent combat
activity, particularly in the form of attacks against Afghan military
targets and an increased campaign of urban violence. Because the
resistance leaders have always feared that the Soviets would use a
non-logistically based withdrawal timetable to try to destroy insurgent
capabilities, they almost certainly would keep combat activities at a high
level so as not to give the Soviet-Afghan forces a respite in which they
could plan and deliver a devastating blow. The perception of such a Soviet
threat probably would prompt alliance leaders to close ranks and project a
united image, much in the way they reacted when caught off-guard by the
Soviet-Afghan peace initiatives in early 1987. Likewise, we believe the
Pakistanis also harbor fears about an extended Soviet withdrawal and that
they would therefore be somewhat less diligent in stopping the flow of arms
across the Af?hanistan-Pakistan border during a 12-month withdrawal.
EIGHTEEN MONTHS: Because the Soviets would be much less hurried under
an 18-month scenario and could carry out a few concentrated offensive
ground and air operations against the insurgents while withdrawing, panic
among the PDPA cadre probably would be less common under this scenario.
The better Afghan military units might continue to perform effectively,
some tribal militias might remain intact and loyal, and party splintering
might slow as factional leaders tried to judge the prospects for
regime--and personal--survival. In addition, senior PDPA cadre almost
certainly would believe that an 18-month schedule provides the best chance
of producing an environment in which intense resistance attacks could
prompt a Soviet decision to abandon--or at least suspend--a Geneva accord.
Nonetheless, we believe that the collapse played out over an 18-month
withdrawal would be merely a slower version of that occurring under the 6-
We also believe, however, that an 18-month withdrawal would be the most
difficult with which to cope for the resistance. In our judgment, none of
the insurgent commanders--with the possible exception of Masood, who claims
to rely heavily on captured weaponry--have stockpiled sufficient arms to
support a high level of combat for an 18-month period. At the same time,
the insurgents' fear of an extended-withdrawal schedule almost certainly
would make them eager to maintain an intense level of attacks against both
Afghan and Soviet targets. Under this scenario, the insurgents almost
certainly would press their backers--both privately and publicly--for
additional supplies. We believe that the Pakistanis probably would be the
least diligent in limiting the flow of supplies across the border to the
resistance under an 18-month withdrawal.
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Appendix
Insurgent Ability to Sustain Co
Cut-off of Aid Via Pakistan
We believe the Afghan insurgents could sustain fighting against Soviet
and Afghan forces at or near current levels in much of the country for six
to twelve months if support via Pakistan were withdrawn. The resistance is
caching arms and has moved some training facilities inside Afghanistan at
least partly in anticipation of a possible cutoff of aid from Islamabad.
Panjsher Valley commander Masood and other insurgent groups in northern
Afghanistan would probably be the best equipped to carry on the fighting.
Although support from Arab countries, Iran and China would probably
continue at low levels, we estimate the insurgents would exhaust their
supplies of ammunition for heavy machine guns, rockets and mortars after
six to twelve months. Thereafter, o carry on only
low-level guerrilla war.
In the event of a cutoff of aid through Pakistan following a
negotiation settlement, insurgents would probably still receive significant
financial aid from sympathetic Arab countries plus support from Iran and
China. Arab and Iranian financial aid has been funneled to insurgent
groups--primarily fundamentalists--that agree with the donors' religious
and political beliefs, and we believe these eroups would' continue to
receive most of the aid.
Financial aid to the insurgent groups from Arab countries now comes
through a variety of sources, including both private and government
donations. Major private donors include the Wahhabis, based in Saudi
Arabia and Muslim Brotherhood groups in Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Kuwait.
we believe that donations from private Arab
--- ~~~ ++ cav least ; uv million per year.
We believe that this Arab aid combined with cash
il
bl
ava
a
e to the
resistance from its own sources would be sufficient to enable them to
purchase substantial amounts of small arms and ammunition even if other
outside support were cut off. In addition, some Arab donors provide the
insurgents military equipment, and we believe this would continue even if
resistance groups are receiving at leasthsomevmililaryuequipmentadirectly
from private Arab sources.
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 WITHDRAWAL
SCENARIOS
SIX
MONTHS
TWELVE
MONTHS
EIGHTEEN
MONTHS
NUE'URN NOCONTRACT ( ORCON I. I
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REGIME INSU INSURGE COMBAT
REACTION I RE CT IONT I SUPPLIES I LEVELS
Immediate
collapse; cadre
desertions
increase; rapid
melting away of
armed forces.
Lowering of overall
military activity;
some attacks on
Afghan targets;
conserve supplies
for postwar power
struggle; decline
in alliance unity.
Adequate for
fighting at
current levels.
Much reduced;
insurgents
focus on Afghan
targets; Soviets
concentrate on
threats to
withdrawal routes.
No difference
from six-month
scenario.
Some control in
urban areas and
traditional regime
strongholds;
minimal military
effectiveness; slower
version of 6- and
12-sonth scenarios.
AVAILABILITY OF '
EXTERNAL SUPPORT-,
Substantial
reduction of
supplies to
insurgents to
avoid giving
Soviets a
plausible basis
for reneging
Increased fear
Barely adequate
Significant
of Soviets trying
to maintain
levels of
to deal a
"
current levels;
combat;
knock-out' blow
some fall-off
insurgents
before departing;
in activity.
step up
more attacks on
attacks across
Afghan targets.'
the board
urban areas.
Closing of ranks
within alliance;
public and private
demands for greatly
increased external
support; sharply
-increased attacks
on all targets.
Adequate
only for
small-scale
guerrilla
attacks
High levels of
combat on all
sides; Soviets
seek to inflict
maximum damage
on insurgents
before leaving.
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Slight increase
in supplies over
6-month scenario
level, but wary
of giving the
Soviets a basis
for halting the
withdrawal.
Supplies still
well below
pre-Gene va
agreement levels,
but Pakistanis
likely to
discreetly assist
insurgent resupply.