OVERSEAS SECURITY ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000501720002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 4, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/30: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501720002-0
The Deputy Director of Central lntziligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
(eta 1 '"I-LA A ~~y1S
STAT
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
NOTE FOR: DDCI
SUBJECT: Overseas Security Issues
Bob:
I understand there will be an NSPG on
overseas security issues (focused in the first
instance on Moscow but likely to broaden)
probably in July. The NSC (Kelly) will have
concluded its damage assessment, the PFIAB will
have presented its ideas, the Schlesinger report
will be complete, and there may be additional
ideas from Capitol Hill on the table.
My guess is that the NSPG will confront some
very bold proposals for change from the PFIAB and
perhaps the Hill. State will be aghast - CIA and
Defense will likely look at their feet and mumble
that they believe State should be in charge.
Attached is a different kind of
response... uncoordinated with anyone, though
Clair George, Bill Donnelly,
What would you think about opening up some
internal discussions about options to the status
quo...(with the understanding that State would
probably hear about it and find it unhelpful)?
STAT
STAT
STAT
Attachment
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New Initiatives in Overseas Security
1. The Moscow Marine and New Embassy Building cases, following the
Walker, Howard, Chin, Pelton, and GUNMAN cases, is generating pressure for
changes in the organization and conduct of the U.S. Government's overseas
security activities. The Laird Commission, the PFIAB, and former Defense
Secretary Schlesinger are all focused on overseas security and
counterintelligence issues. There is discussion about whether
responsibility for certain or all aspects of the United States' overseas
security posture should be shifted from State to NSA, CIA, the FBI, or
possibly an entirely new organization. There may well be pressure for
"solutions" in the Washington area as well.
2. Perhaps the most fundamental issue with respect to the security of
our overseas missions is: Who really is responsible? In theory, the
Department of State is. Ambassadors are the President's representatives
abroad. They are responsible for the overall conduct and coordination of
all aspects of mission performance, including security. Other departments
and agencies have traditionally operated under State's umbrella. However,
this fragmented approach has come under intense criticism. . .as has the
Department. Many believe there have been major deficiencies in State's
security capabilities. Perhaps the most fundamental criticism of the
Department's security performance is that security is only a second-order or
even a tertiary concern within the Department and the Foreign Service. In
addition, many believe the Department lacks the necessary competence to
manage the sophisticated technological effort which must necessarily form a
large part of a comprehensive overseas security program in this day and age.
3. Moving responsibility for security out of the Department to NSA or
CIA or the Bureau would answer both of these criticisms. Each of these
organizations accepts security as an integral part of its operations, and
each has had experience in successfully managing the related technologies.
In addition, each is involved in 'offensive' operations and can therefore
better appreciate how important a 'defense' can be.
4. But placing CIA, NSA, or the FBI in a position of overall
responsibility for overseas security would create new problems. It is easy
to see how the FBI, CIA, or NSA might be given full responsibility for
technical security overseas. It is less clear how one of these
organizations might effectively be made responsible for all aspects of
physical security. It is even less clear how any of them might be given
overall responsibility for personnel security in our overseas missions.
(Our embassies abroad are populated by representatives of many different
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federal agencies. Some have suggested that the FBI be given a personnel
security role over all employees in selected overseas missions. But CIA,
NSA, and State all would consider a continuing FBI role with respect to
their people to be unacceptable, given that each regards personnel security
as an integral part of its own command responsibilities. An equally
important criticism of this idea is that it's adoption would further
fragment responsibility overseas... precisely what we do not need.)
5. Our experience in the last several years should tell us, if we
needed to be reminded, that the Soviet attack on the security of our
missions and people overseas is both relentless and comprehensive. It might
not be possible to prove in a court of law that the Soviet's have benefited
from our fragmented response to their comprehensive attack, but one
important goal of any change to our current way of doing business must be to
facilitate a more comprehensive and integrated U.S. Government response.
"Comprehensive and integrated" suggests that the United States' defensive
procedures and programs overseas should continuously benefit from the
experience of our offensive units, and that the best thinking of our
personnel, physical, and technical security people should consistently be
brought to bear on the security situation in a given country to ensure a
continuing, close assessment of any possible weaknesses.
6. It follows that over the long haul, the USG's goal should be to put
organizational arrangements and procedures in place which concentrate and
focus responsibility for the physical, technical, and personnel security of
all aspects of America's overseas embassy presence, and which provide for
continuing, close coordination between the different organizations
involved. In furtherance of this basic approach, it would be useful to
consider an Executive Order which would establish or affirm the following
principles:
- First, special procedures, standards, and mechanisms will be
specified for technical, physical and personnel security programs in
criteria countries by the NSC.
Second, CIA will assume full responsibility for technical security
in such countries, with support and cooperation from State, NSA,
and, occasionally, the FBI. The whole Government's technical
security resources are very scarce--it makes no sense to sustain or
encourage a fragmented approach. CIA should also be responsible for
those aspects of physical security within embassies which have a
direct bearing on, or where there is an intimate relationship with,
technical security issues.
- Third, the Department of State should be fully responsible for
physical security of U.S. embassies, consulates, and related
facilities--except where physical security issues merge with the
technical security responsibilities outlined above.
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Effectively then, responsibility for physical security abroad would be
divided: State would be responsible for those aspects which relate to
such things as possible terrorist attack and protection of embassy
buildings from demonstrations; CIA would be responsible for
ingress-egress issues, locks, alarms, surveillance systems and the
like.
Fourth, each Department or Agency represented overseas would continue
to be responsible for personnel security issues concerning its own
employees. Under NSC direction, however, posts would be classified as
to the espionage-related security threat they faced, and a set of
NSC-mandated personnel security standards would be imposed on all
employees serving in criteria countries. The highest personal
security standards (to include mandatory use of the polygraph under
specified circumstances) would be imposed in these high threat posts,
the standards adopted would apply uniformly to all agencies
represented in a mission, and compliance would be assured by a
certification process of some kind. Certification would be backed up
by periodic audit or inspection by the parent organizations and
supplemented by the knowledge of all embassy employees that they were
all individually held to the same standard. The DCM might chair a
Country-Team Subcommittee explicitly charged to monitor personnel
security/counterintelligence issues relating to employees. To further
support this effort, State's Regional Security Officers would have
independent authority to communicate directly from embassies abroad to
State Department Security here in Washington.
7. Other steps will be required to make this three-pronged approach
work. Not the least important of these will be a sea-change in security
consciousness among those outside the Intelligence Community. In this
connection, CIA, NSA, and the FBI probably should be tasked to develop and
support an intensive security briefing program to ensure that no one is
assigned overseas without detailed exposure to the Government's best
understanding of the possible risks involved. And new interagency
mechanisms might need to be developed to ensure the proper integration of
the new physical, technical, and personnel security effort described.
8. Such an approach seems reasonable and workable. It answers the most
difficult questions we face, it properly preserves department and agency
line authority over employees, it would provide a more appropriate
integration of our physical and technical security capabilities than exists
today, and it would better fix responsibility, ensure the best use of scarce
personnel resources, and help achieve a more integrated approach to the
security situation in individual embassies. It could also be the basis for
a comprehensive NSC initiative which might help prevent well-intentioned but
misguided solutions from being imposed on the Executive Branch by Congress.
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