TALKING POINTS FOR THE DDCI FOR 18 SEPTEMBER NSPG MEETING 17 SEPTEMBER 1987 UPDATE ON THE SITUATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 17, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
TOPJSECRET
Talking Points for the DDCI for 18 September NSPG Meeting
17 September 1987
Update on the Situation in the Persian Gulf
The prospect is high for further escalation. Iranian leaders avoided
rejecting outright resolution 50 in the r djjQu&Lions with cretary
General Perez de Cuellar in Tehran. Iraq has concluded that the Secre ary
General's trip to Tehran was a failure.
Tehran wants to appear sufficiently flexible on the issue of ending the
war in the hope of preventing a consensus for imposing sane ions by he
Security Council members.
-- Tehran says it will agree to a comprehensive ceasefire, but only
after the UN implements potion six of tha res ion, which calls
for identification of the party responsible for starting the war.
-- Iran, however, envisions such a process as similar to the Nurembur&
Tribunal, with power not onl to name, but to try and to punish
Iraq--par icu ar y raq president Saddam Husavn--as the aggressor.
-- Iran is also trying to deflect pressure onto Iraq by indicatin its
willingness to abide by a ceasefire in the Gulf--an approach tha
Iraq rejects__ Tehran continues to try to separJtm e
Gulf--where Iran is most vulnerable--from r, in which it
has the initiative against Iraq.~ 7
s efforts to impose sanctions are 9agg ag, it will
probably intensify attacks agains
-- Baghda ntinues t ee such a cks as its trump card to obtain
vigorous sups weM supp or,its ition and for ending the war.
-- The Iraqis hope that Arab Foreign Ministers at their meeting on
Sunday will agree to break diplomatic relations with Iran.
Iran has not thus far reaponded
1 Earlier this mop , however, it did fire the
fpm launch sites on the Iranian-occupied portion of
Kuwait
the Al Faw peninsula.
-- One of the missiles overflew the reflagged tanker Surf City at an
altitude o about ee In this case, we definitely bens tted
from good IRK.
TO CRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
TOP SECRET
-- No Silkworm launchers or missile transporters have been seen at any
o he sites n 7ar'tne str-n of Hormuz in the past month. but
construction of rsonne bunkers and equipment shelters is
continuing
-- Beijing is urging Tehran to use restraint and to employ the Silkworm
missiles only in a defensive capac ..Y as the Iranians pled ed Fie
would when the weapons were purchased
At the same time, China us signed a new
million arms deal with Iran and overa past few months as been
negotiating other arms contracts worth over half a billion 7Mars.
Iranian mine warfare operations, which have declined in recent weeks,
could pick up again now-tbat Tehran has acquired sophisticated mines from
Libya.
C9) -- A Libyan aircraft took a limited supply of probably bottom influence
/ mines to Iran between 10 September and 12 September.
-- Influence mines--ma netic or aco -- are more difficult to detect
and would increase significantly the risk to ships in the Persian
Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.
CILPto..,
The expanded European presence in the region has complicated Tehran's
calculations on forcing the US to back down.
n pres ,Ace a?rd~trying
t in the
coming attacks, terrorism, or s ab a e.
Iran may also begin focusing attacks on Saudi Arabia as relations
decline further.
-- Tehran' ch in the Gulf so far suggests Iranian
actInns against uwa h l1 robabl
remain indirect--at least in the near term.
Intelligence sharing with several .urnnean nations and nprtain Gulf Arab
Mates has heen either initiated-or increased in the wake of recent events
in the Persian Gulf.
-- At the direction of the NSC Policy Review Group, and with the
concurrence of the Intelligence Community, CIA sent a team of
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
analysts to six European capitals--Rome, Paris, Bonn, Brussels, The
Hague, and Ankara_--__~o_ brief po cym ers In those countries on
Iranian mine warfare efforts, the resulting threat in the Persian
Gulf, and recent Libyan-Iranian military exchanges. The briefing
also is to be presented to NATO's North Atlantic Council and its
Military Committee.
-- General assessments of the situation in the- region, and in some
instance datailAd nce re also being provided periodically
not only by CIA, but by DIA, defense attaches, and the US military
to Persian Gulf and European governments.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
Background on Delivery of Libyan Naval Mines to Iran
a Libyan 707 cargo plane left Tripoli
for Tehran, carrying 15 unspecified boats and 9 Soviet-made
probable sea-mines
-- The delivery was part of a plan to coordinate
the use of these mines with a Libyan effort to
mine the Red Sea and approaches to the Suez Canal.
-- In exchange, Iran agreed to provide chemical
weapons to Libya for use in the war with Chad.
The type of mine sent is probably a large Soviet-
built Type 995 magnetic-acoustic mine.
-- Libya used the Type 995 to mine the Red Sea in
1984.
-- The Type 995 is a bottom mine with an advanced
firing system that delays detonation until the
most vulnerable part of a ship is directly above
it. This mine also has other advanced features,
such as a ship counter and arming-time delay.
-- The mine has a 1,500-pound (700 kilogram) warhead--
about seven times the size of the moored contact
mines Iran currently uses. It could probably damage
a supertanker beyond repair.
-- This type of mine is easy to lay and difficult to
defend against. They must be hunted by sonar and
then destroyed.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
SF SET
In the past seven years China has become Iran's largest
supplier of military equipment. Since late 1985 the Chinese
have made more than $1.5 billion in arms sales to Iran and arms
transfers since 1981 have totaled more than $2.5 billion.
Year
Agreements*
Deliveries*
------
-----------
-----------
1981
50.0
NA
1982
7.0
50.0
1983
447.9
175.3
1984
62.0
315.6
1985
430.0
26.0
1986
1,174.0
650.0
Comments
------------------------
Contracts were for small
arms and ammunition.
Ammunition and small arms
again purchased and
delivered.
China agreed to provide
through North Korean and
other intermediaries
larger amounts of
artillery, ammunition, and
small arms in 1983-1984.
Iran took delivery of
rest of 1984 arms deal.
Major contract signed for
HY-2 Silkworm missiles,
CSA-1 surface-to-air
missiles, artillery, and
ammunition.
HY-2s and CSA-1s delivered.
HY-2s, CSA-ls, artillery,
ammunition, and possibly
fighter aircraft and
surface-to-surface missiles.
China agreed to provide
Iran and China have continued contract discussions in 1987.
Negotiations are under way for $97.5 million worth of additional
HY-2s and contracts were signed in June for $336 million worth of
equipment that may include a new Chinese short-range ballistic
missile. Another contract for $203 million was also signed this
summer. Although it probably involved only ammunition, the deal
may include Chinese antiship missiles similar to the French
Exocet
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
SECRET
Iraq-China Arms Transfers
During the same period China provided Iraq with over $3.5
billion worth of military equipment including more than 2,000
tanks and 1,000 armored personnel carriers, approximately 40
fighters and 4 long-range bombers, several HY-2 batteries and
large amounts of artillery, antiaircraft guns, and ammunition.
Sales to Iraq lagged between 1983 and 1985, but Beiiing sold arms
worth over $1.4 billion in 1986.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
TOP SECRET
Iran/Soviet Relations Update
Iran and the USSR are continuing their efforts to cultivate better
relations.
-- Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov has visited
Tehran--as well as Baghdad--in June and August, and he also talked
with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani in Geneva at the end
of June.
-- On 8 September Larijani visited Moscow to continue discussions
between the two sides on gas and oil pipelines and another rail link
between their two countries.
-- The Soviet press has cast Iran's response to the UN Secretary
General in a favorable light, noting that Tehran has indicated its
willingness to accept UN resolution 598 and quoting Iranian
assessments of the Secretary General's visit as "useful."
-- Moscow is continuing to cultivate the Arabs as well as the Iranians,
however, and does not want to be forced into actions--such as a
sanctions resolution--that might damage relations with either party.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7
ALLIED FORCES IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND ARABIAN SEA
France
UK
4
frigatesa
1 air-defense dest
royerb
1
destroyer
2 frigates
3
minesweepers
4 minesweepers
2
replenishment
ships
2 replenishment sh
ips
3
support ships
2 support ships
Carrier battle group
1 aircraft carrier
10 fighters
14 fighter-bombers
2 air-defense destroyers
1 replenishment ship
En Route/Projected
Italy
Netherlands
3
frigates
2 minesweepers
3
minesweepers
1
replenishment
ship
Belgium
1
support ship
1 or 2 minesweepers
a The carrier battle group is currently in Djibouti for a
two-week maintenance period. Three frigates, a minesweeper, a replenishment, and the support ships
are also at Djibouti. A second destroyer is on a training and defense equipment marketing cruise in
the Indian ocean and would be available in an emergency.
b Two British warships normally are in the Gulf area while the third is outside the region for
maintenance--typically at Mombassa, Kenya. One replenishment ship and one support ship are expected
to leave the area in the near future.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/10/13: CIA-RDP89B00224R000501750002-7