THE PHILIPPINES -- SOME PARTING REFLECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 9, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
Q
Next 14 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
'~ SBCRBT
87 4425352 SSP
-NC 4425352
TOKYO 06230
PP RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSS.S ZOC STATE ZZH
sTC12539
PP RUEHC
DE RQEEiKO X6230/01 0990411
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 0904062 APR 87
F'M AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8896
INFO RUEHML./AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 2268
BT
EZ1:
S E C R E T TOKYO 06230
E%DIS
EZ2:
FROM AMBASSADOR BOSWORTH
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TOR: 0915042 APR 87
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RP, US, MASS, MARK
SUBJECT: THE PHILIPPINES -- SOME PARTING REFLECTIONS
1. (S - ENTIRE TEYT.)
2. THE PHILIPPINES IS AN IMl~ASURABLY HEALTHIER
COUNTRY NON THAN ANY OF US WOULD HAVE SPED A COUPLE OF
YEARS AGO. WITH THE ELECTION OF A NEW CONGRESS NEZT
MONTH AND NEW LOCAL OFFICIALS IN AUGUST, THE
PHILIPPINES WILL HAVE A FULL SET OF DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS OPERATING UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION. THE
SURVIVAL OF THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT SEEMS NO LONGER IN
QUESTION, AT LEAST FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. THE
ECONOMY HAS BEGUN TO GROW AGAIN, AND PER CAPITA REAL
INCOME WILL INCREASE IN 1987 FOR THE-FIRST TIME IN NARY
YEARS. MOST STRIKING IS THE CHANGE IN THE NA?IONAL
MOOD. THE COLLECTIVE VIEW OF THE FUTURE IS ONE OF
MODEST OPTIMISM, A DRAMATIC REVERSAL OF THE DEEP
PESSIMISM OF THE LAST YEARS OF MARCOS.
3. THE U.S.-PHILIPPINE RELATIONSHIP IS ALSO IN FAR
BETTER CONDITION THAN MANY OF OS WOULD HAVE FORESEEN A
S E C R E T
MSGNO 28 (STZx) *04/09/87" ?12:12:34.6.5
ZCZC 17:11:052 (ST)
EMI DTG 87040911233006
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
.. 3BCRBT
PAGE 0002
FEW YEARS BACK. OUR RBLA?IONS YTH THE AQUI110
GOVERNl~I1T AND OOR IMAGE AMONG THB FILIPINO PBOPLB ARE
GOOD. MRS. AQUINO D10ifS YE WANT HBR TO SUCC? AND
APPRECIATES THE ECONOMIC AND P~.ITICAL SUPPORT YB HARE
PROVIDED. THE POPULATION RETAINS AFFECTION AND
ADMIRATION FOR THE UNI?ED STATES AND CONSIDERS TWIT,
FOR THE !LOST PART, YE GAVE DONE THE RIGHT TAIIlGS HERE
OVER THE .PAST FEW YEARS.
4. ON TAE OTHER HAND, THE CHARACTER OF THE PHILIPPINES
HAS NOT BEEN TRANSFORMED. NOR HAVE THE COUNTRY'S
@iORMOUS PROBLEMS FADBD AWAY. THIS I3 STILL A SPRAWLING,
TEEMING COUNTRY WHBRB THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS
IRRELEVANT TO THE LIVES OF MOST PEOPLE AND WHERE MORE
THAN HALF OF THE POPULATION WILL REMAIN BELOY THE
NATIONAL POVERTY LINE EVEN WITH SEVERAL YEARS OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH. THE COl~II~IUNIST-LED INSURGENCY IS A SERI0IJS
NATIONAL PROBLEM AND IS LIEE[.Y TO REMAIN SO FOR SEVERAL
YEARS, AND TIC COUNTRY'S POLITICS WILL CONTINUE TO BE
FRACTIOUS, l~SSY, AND EVEN AT TINES CHAOTIC, PARTICULARLY
WHEN VIEWED FROM TAB OUTSIDE.
MRS. AQUINO'S LEADBRSHIP
S.--PRESIDENT AQUINO HAS GROWN ENORMOUSLY IN HER FIRST
YEAR IN OFFICE. SAE IS NOW FAMILIAR WITH THE PROCESS OF
GOVERNMENT AND IS FAR MORE CONFIDENT OF AER OWN ABILITY
AND JUDGtNrIiT. SHE HAS BECOME TOUGHER AND MORE
ASSERTIVE. SHE IS ESTABLISHING MORE DISCIPLINE OVER HER
CABINET, AND AS THE GOVERNMENT GAINS EXPERIENCB AND SOME
IMPORTANT PERSONNEL MOVES ARE MADE, IT IS SLOWLY BECOMING
MORE EFFICIENT.
6. IR]WBVER, WHILE MRS. AQUINO ARTICULATES A SET OF BROAD
NATIONAL GOALS (RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY, RF,CONCILIATION,
ECONOMIC RECOVERY, SOCIAL JUSTICE, ETA.), SH6 HAS NOT FOR
TAE MOST PART PROVIDBD AN ACCOMPANYING STRATEGY OR
PROGRAM OF GOVHRNI~NT. T~ ONE PARTIaL EXCBPTION TO THIS
HAS BEBN ECONOMIC POLICY WHERE HER TEAM 8AS LAID OUT A
FAIRLY CO1~REfD!JTSIVE MARKET-0RIBNTED APPROACB TO ECONOMIC
GROWTH.
7. BUT THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE THE DQUIVALENT OF
ONGPIN, MONSOD, AND COIRrEPCION IN OTHER AREAS OF PUBLIC
POLICY. MOREOVER, SHE HAS TAUS FAR GIVEN PRIORITY TO
HOLDING TOGETHER AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF TAE AMORPHOUS
POLITICAL MOVEMENT YWCA BROUGHT HER TO POWER. GIVEN THE
CONFLICTS AND COMPETITIONS WHICH CHARACTERIZE EVEN THE
BROAD CENTER OF THIS COALITION, SHE HAS HAD TO PROCEED
SLOWLY AND CAUTIOUSLY.
$. I WOtJI.D EXPECT THAT HER PERSON L GRO T AND T~ SLO
II~ROVHlENT IN THE BFFICIENCY OF HER GOVERNl~NT MILL
CONTINUE. BUT WE SHOULD NOT EXPECT ANY MAR? CHANGE IN
HFR STYLE OF LEADER H P. NOR SHOULD WE EXPECT DRAMATIC
IMPROVFAlENT IN TAE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF TAE CF~iTRAL
GOVER1II~liT.
S E C R E T
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
SECRET
PAGE 0003
9. THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT ?S LIKELY TO BE00lN: EVEN
MORE 00l~LICATED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONGRESS,
WHICH WILL BE VERY MDCH A CENTER OF POWER IN ITS OWN
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 TOKYO 06230
BXDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR BOSWORTH
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RP, US, MASS, MARR
SUB.TECT: THE PHILIPPINBS -- SOME PARTING REFLECTIONS
RIGHT. I EXPECT THAT MRS. AQUIl10 WILL BE ABLE lb !lARSHAL
WORKING MAJORITIES IN THE OONGRESS ON THOSE ISSUES WHERE
SHE CHOOSES TO COMMIT HER PERSOItAL PRESTIGE. BUT AS WE.
HAVE SEEN, SHE HAS HER OWN SEHSE OF TIMING, AND SHE WILL
CONTINUE TO SEEK CONSENSUS BEFORE SHE ACTS. THAT
CONSENSUS WILL NOW HAVE TO INCLUDE THE CONGRESS, AND THE
SETTING OF WELL-DEFINED NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAMS TO REALIZE THEM WILL BE EVEN
MORE DIFFICULT.
POLITICAL DEVOLUTION
--------------------
10. I DON'T MEAN THIS TO BE A PESSIMISTIC ASSE.S.SMENT,
HOWEVER. GIVEN THE STILL VIVID BXPERIENCE WITH MARCOS
AND MARTIAL LAW, I DOUBT THAT THE COUNTRY WOULD RESPOND
POSITIVELY TO A SUBSTANTIALLY STR~GER, FROM-THE-TOP-DOWN
STYLE OF LEADERSHIP FROM MRS. AQUINO. I ALSO DOUBT THAT
THIS IS IN FACT WHAT THE COUNTRY REALLY NEEDS. FIRST OF
ALL, THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LACbS BOTH THE MONEY AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE REACH TO HAVE MUCH DIRECT EFFECT ON THE
BASIC CONDITIONS OF LIFE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. ITS STATED
RELIANCE ON 1~ PRIVATE SECTOR AS THE ENGINE OF BOTfI
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL CHANCE MAKES SENSE.
11. MOREOVER, THERE IS NOW SOt~ EVID>L11CE THAT ARE
INITIATIVE AND DE FACTO DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY HAVE
BEGUN TO FLOW $ACK TO THE PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL LEVELS OF
GOVERN!!ENT, REDUCING THE CONCENTRA?ION OF POWER IN THE
MALACANANG PALACE WHICH OCCURRED ONDER MARTIAL LAW.
LOCALLY CONCEIVED INITIATIVES IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN SUCH PLACES AS
NEGROS AND DAVAO ARE EXAMPLES OF WHAT COULD BEC01~ A MORE
GENERAL TREND. WE SHOULD TRY THROUGH OOR AID PROGRAM AND
OTHER ACTIVITI S TO ENCOURAGE THIS REVOLUTION OF
POLITICAL AUTHORITY.
THE ECONOMY
12. THE BRIGHTEST AREA IN THE CURRENT OUTLOOK IS THE
ECONOMY. THERE IS NOW UNAMBIGOOUS EVIDF1~iCE THAT RECOVERY
IS UNDER WAY. IN PART, THIS IS A REACTION TO POSITIVE
MOVES BY THE GOP OVER THE PAST YEAR. IT IS ALSO
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE FACT THAT, WHILE CORRUPTION HAS BY NO
lN;ANS ENDED, THE CENTRALLY-DIRECTED CORRUPTION OF TAE
MARCOS ERA IS NO LONGER DRAINING A ID;ASIIRABLE PERCENTAGE
S E C R E T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
SBCRBT
PAGE 0004
OF GDP OFF TAE TOP OF THE EOONO!!Y.
13. THE COUNTRY'S ABILI?Y TO SILS?AIM THIS RECOVERY AND
TURN IT IN1~0 SEVERAL YEARS OF SABLE GROWTH WILL DEPEND
IN SOME MEASURE ON FOLLOW-THROUGH IN T~ ENACTlI~IT OF THE
VARIOUS STRUCTURAL REFORMS TAE GOP HAS LAUNCHED. POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION HAS BEEN SLOWER THAN THE GOP ECONOMIC TEAM
HAD EYPECTED AS OLD -- AND NEW -- VESTED INTERESTS HAVE
DUG IN AS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF PRIVATIZATION. WE
SHOULD CONTINUE TO PUSH FIRlII.Y, BUT QUIETLY, IN SUPPORT
OF THESE RBFORMS.
THE INSURGENCY
14. THE (.'0!!lUNIST-LED INSURGENCY IS WITHOUT QUESTION THE
CAUSE OF OUR HOST ACTIVE CONCERIT AS WE CONTEMPLATE THE
FUTURE OF T~ PHILIPPINES. I AM MYSELF CONFIDENT THAT
MODEST BUT SUSTAINED IMPROVEMENTS IN T~ QUALITY OF
GOVERNANCE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND THE ECONOMY WILL
PREVENT THE CPP/NPA FROM GROWING TO THE POINT AT WHICH IT
BECOMES LIFE THREATENING TO THE EXISTING POLITICAL SYSTEM
OF TAE COUNTRY IN THE FORFSEEABLE FUTURE. MORE
IMMEDIATELY, HOWEVER, I WOULD LIFE TO SEE MORE PROGRE S
IN THE BUILDING OF A MILITARY FORCE CAPABLE OF TAKING THE
FIGHT TO THE NPA AT LEAST ON A RBGIONAL BASIS. A
PROTRACTED STALEMATE IN TAE STRDCGt,E WITH THE INSURGENCY
IS BAD FOR AFP MORALE, DIVERTS ATTENTION FROM ECONOMIC
RECOVERY, AND WILL INEVITABLY ADD TO TENSIONS BETWEEN THE
MILITARY AND THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.
15. MARCOS, ENRILE, THE MILITARY ITSELF, AND EVEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF MRS. AQUINO MUST TAKE PRIMARY
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INADEQUACIES OF THE AFP, THE
S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 TOKYO 06230
EXDIS
FROM AMBASSADOR BOSWORTH
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, RP, OS, MASS, MARR
SUBJECT: THE PHILIPPINES -- SOME PARTING REFLECTIONS
FACTIONALISM WITHIN ITS RANKS, AND THE CONTINUING
TENSIONS IN THE CIVIL/MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. BUT WE HAVE
NOT PERFORMED AS WELL AS WE SHOUi.D HAVE EITHER.
16. I APPRECIATE FULLY OOR OWN B(TDGET PROBLEMS. BUT
THERE IS SIMPLY NO REALISIC ALTERNATIVE 1b OUR FINANCIAL
SUPPORT IN THE REBUILDING OF T~ MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF
THE AFP. AT DOLS 100 MILLION PER YEAR, WE ARE BARELY
STAYING EVEN IN TERMS OF SPARE PARTS, MOBILITY,
COMMUNICATIONS, ETC. WHEN WE (:UT THpT A~p~ gy 50
PERCENT THIS YEAR, WE SENT A S?RONG NEGATIVE SIGNAL TO
THE AFP AND TO THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT. WHEN WE THEN
PUBLICLY CRITIZE THE GOP'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO IMBLEMENT A
COMBREHENSIVE COUNTER-INSURGF.MiCY PROGRAM AND CREATE THE
PERCEPTION THAT WE ARE SOMEHOW MAKING U.S. AID
CONDITIONAL ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A PROGRAM, WE
COMPOUND THE DAMAGE.
S E C R E T
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
sECRBT
17? ~ ~ NOT NEED TO WORRY ?HA? IBIS GOVERNMp~T IS
COMPLACENT ABOUT THE INSURGENCY. IIHNrED, T~ INSURGENCY
IS RIGHT UP AT THE TOP OF ITS AGENDA. WE SHOULD AL,Sp
CONTROL OUR IFlPATIENCE ABOUT THB YAY TREY RESPOND T~0 TAE
INSURGpICY. EVEN ASSUMING TBEIR APPROACH IS MEP'ECTIVE
OVER TIME -- AND I AM INCREASINQ,Y CONFIDENT IT HILL BE
-- IT IS UNLIKELY TO MEASURE OP TO WBA? WE MIGHT LIFE TO
SEE IN TERMS OF COIiERENCE, CENTRAL COORDINATION, ETC. NO
STRATEGY WHICH WE MIGHT PROVIDE IS GOING TO BE ACCEPTED
-- MUCH LESS BE SUCCESSFUL, -- PARTICULARLY SINCE WE ARE
SO OBVIOUSLY UNABLE TO FUND IT AS WB FUNDED, FOR EXAMPLE,
MAGSAYSAY'S PROGRAM.
18. WHAT WE SHOULD DO IS TO HELP PITH THE MONEY THEY
NEED TO REBUILD THE AFP. EARLY DELIVERY ON THE DOLS 50
MILLION SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST WOULD ~,p GREATLY, BATH .
POLITICALLY AND IN TERMS OF REAL RESOURCES. WE 380ULD
ALSO CONTINUE TO OFFER PRIVATELY OUR HELP IN SUCH AREAS
AS TRAINING AND INTELLIGENCE. WE SElOULD NOT PUSH THIS ON
THEM, EpWEVER, AND I SUSPECT THA? FOR THE FAST PART THEY
WILL PREFER TO DO THESE THINGS T~,VES.
THE BASES
19. WITHIN THE NE%T SI% TO NINE MONTHS, WE WILL FIND
OURSELVES IN THE EARLY STAGES OF NEGOTIATION OVER OUR
CONTINUED ACCESS TO CLARK AND SUBIC. T8E GENERAL,
POLITICAL CLIMATE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THE TONE AND
SUBSTANCE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP ARE ABOUT AS
FAVORABLE 1b A SUCCESSFUL pUTppME OF TAE.SE NECATIATIONS
AS WE COULD HAVE HOPED __ AND FAR MORE AUSPICIOUS THAN
MOST OF US WOULD HAVE DREAMED Tip OR THREE YEARS AGO.
20. IN MY JUDGlHO1T, THE MAJORITY OF FILIPINOS, CERTAINLY
THE MAJORITY OF THE ELITES, ACCEPT AS A WORKING
HYPOTHESIS THAT THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE SHOULD
CONTINUE ~~ 1991. I AM CONFIDENT' TEAT THIS IS FIRS.
AQUINO'S VIEW. THE BIG QUESTIONS ARE IN WHAT FORM THAT
PRESENCE SHOULD CONTINUE, t.E. iBIAT WILL WE BE ABLE r0 DO
AT TLpSE FACILITIES, AND HOW MUCK ARE WE WILLING TO PAY.
21. THERE WILL, BE A DIRECT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WHAT WE
WANT TO DO AND HOW MUCH WE WILL HAVE TO PAY. BUT EVEN
ASSUMING WE ARE WILLING TO DO SOMEWHAT LESS AND EVEN
AFTER WE BANNER THE GOP DOWN TO ITS ABSOLUTE BOTrpM LINE
ON CO!'IPENSATION, IFRANKLY DON'T SEE HOW WE WILL BE ABLE
TO [SET THE COMPENSATION BILL FROM THE SECURITY
ASSISTANCE ACCOUNT IN OUR BUDGET. THIS MEANS WE WILL,
HAVE TO BE PREPARED EITHER TO DO SUBSTANTIALLY LESS AT
CLARK AND SUBIC THAN AT PRESENT, FIND MONEY IN OTHER
BUDGET ACCOUNTS, OR BE WILLING lb PROVIDE SOFA FORM OF
NON-FINANCIAL COMPENSATION SUCH AS TRADE BENEE'ITS, ETC.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
---------------------
22. WITH THE SINGLE E%CEPTION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE,
S E C R E T
PAGE 000
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09 :CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5
? $ [; G K 1: T
PAGE 0006
WHERE WE NEEC TO PUT OUR MONEY WEB:RE OUR MOUTH IS, OOR
OVERALL APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES AND THE AQUINO
GOVER~QlQiT SHOULD, IN MY JUDGMENT, BE ABOUT THE SAME IN
TAE IMMEDIATE FUTURE IN TERMS OF BOTH SUBSTANCE AND TONE
AS I? HAS BEEN OVER THE PAST YEAR.
S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 TOKYO 06230
E%DIS
FROM AMBASSADOR BOSWORTH
E.0.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PRE[., RP, OS, MASS, MARR
SUBJECT: TAE PHILIPPINES -- SOME PARTING REFLECTIONS
23. THE RELATIONSHIP IS NOT WITROUT PROBLEMS AND
IRRITANTS. POST-COLONIAL COMPLETES STILL EZIST ON BOTH
SIDES. THE FILIPINOS ARE QUICK TO ?AKE OFFENSE AT ANY '
EVIDENCE OF U.S. INTRUSIV@IESS AND ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY
SUSPICIOUS THAT WE HAVE THE MEANS TO DO FAR MORE TO SOLVE
THEIR PROBLEMS IF ONLY WE WANTED TO DO S0.
24. ON OUR SIDE, WE SOl~'TIMES GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT
WE'RE MORE AWARE OF AND CONCERNED BY THE PROBLEMS OF THE
PHILIPPINES THAN ARE THE FILIPINOS TE~I.SELVES.
SIMILARLY, WE'RE NEVER RELUCTANT TO OFFER ADVICE BUT
OCCASIONALLY FORGET THA? SUCH ADVICE IS MORE LIKELY TO BE?
ACCEPTED IF OFFERED PRIVATELY.
25. THE LONGER I'VE BEEN HERE THE LESS CERTAIN I'V
BECOMB THAT I REALLY UNDERSTAND THE PLACE. THE PEOPLE
ARE FRIENDLY, SPEAK ENGLISH, AND HAVE COUSINS, BROTHERS,
AND CHILDREN LIVING IN THE U.S. BUT IT IS ESSENTIALLY A
MALAY CULTURE, NON-CONFRONTATIONAL YET CAPABLE OF
KINDLESS VIOLENCE, AND ORGANIZED AROUND AN IMPENETRABLE
SET OF INTERPERSONAL AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS.
26. IT WILL NONETHELESS REMAIN OF ENORMOUS IMPORTANCE TO
THE U.S. THE AURA OF CRISIS OF THE PAST FEW YEARS SHOULD
BEGIN TO FADE, BUT THE PHILIPPINES WILL HAVE TO REMAIN
RIGHT AT THE TOP OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA FOR MANY
YEARS. WE WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO B WILLING TO DEVOTE
THE HIGH-LEVEL'POLICY A?TENTION -- AND THE RESOURCE`S
--THAT OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE. BOSi~ORTH
MANSFIELD
END OF MESSAGE SECRET
NNNN
NNDD
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/09: CIA-RDP89B00224R000602290003-5