PFIAB MEETING, 11 NOVEMBER 1987 1030 HOURS, ROOM 340 OEOB

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00224R000903150004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 9, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: PFIAB Meeting, 11 November 1987
1030 hours, Room 340 OEOB
TAB A Background on the Meeting. Attached is a memo from
the Executive Assistant/Executive Director that
provides some background on the questions PFIAB would
like you to address, an explanation of the Board's
agenda for its two-day session, a listing of CIA
support to PFIAB during the 10 September-11 November
period, and a listing of the Board members and staff.
TAB B Embassy Security: The Audit and Inspection Office.
Although PFIAB would like to discuss how you envision
specific operations of the Audit and Inspection
Office, Bob Gates suggests you limit your comments to
the process involved in studying and deciding upon the
set-up of this office. Attached are talking points
from IC Staff, that provide a
general description of the process -- these talking
points will be a lot more valuable to you if you
discuss them and the general subject of the Audit and
Inspection function with _ while you are at the
Offsite Conference -- I understand the DDCI was
planning such a meeting. Also attached for your
reference is the Shultz/Webster letter, Anne
Armstrong's letter to the President commenting on the
Shultz/Webster letter, your response to the Armstrong
letter, and the White House letter implementing
recommendations from the Shultz/Webster letter.
TAB C 25X1
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, DCI/DDCI Executive Staff
FROM: Executive Assistant/EXDIR
SUBJECT: PFIAB Meeting, 11-12 November 1987
1. Gary Schmitt, the Executive Director of the PFIAB Staff, reports
that Ambassador Armstrong and the Board would like to hear from the Judge on
the status of the intelligence community's "embassy audit" recommended in
PFIAB's recent overseas security study. The Board would also like an update
2. Before the DCI appears, the Board will be hearing from the Naval
Investigative Service on the status of its continuing investigation of the
marine embassy guard force. After the Judge appears, the Board will hear
from Herb Meyer (former Deputy Director, National Intelligence Council) on
the NIE process and the "politicization" issue. After that, General Odum
will update the Board on NSA activities (though this may evolve into a
discussion of intelligence leaks), and Bob Lamb (Assistant Secretary of
State for Diplomatic Security) will brief them on the rehabilitation of the
old embassy building in Moscow. On 12 November, the Board will receive a
status re ort from NASA
Challenger disaster.
3. Attached is a rundown on things we have done for the PFIAB since the
last meeting in September.
Attachment:
As stated
cc: EA/DCI
EA/ DDC I
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SEC
The Honorable Anne Armstrong, Chairman
Mr. Leo Cherne, Vice Chairman
Dr. William 0. Baker
Dr. W. Glenn Campbell
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.
The Honorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF (Ret.)
The Honorable William French Smith
Senator John G. Tower
Dr. Albert D. Wheelon
Dr. James Q. Wilson
Professor Albert J. Wohlstetter
Staff
Dr. Gary J. Schmitt, Executive Director
Dr. Robert L. Butterworth, Deputy Executive Director
Mr. Ryan Malarkey, Assistant Director
Miss Nina Stewart, Assistant Director
Mrs. Gwendolyn I. Watson, Administrative Officer
Mrs. Sandra Van Namee, Administrative Assistant
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B
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SUET
WORKING PAPER
DCI/ICS 0972-87/1
6 November 1987
TALKING POINTS FOR DCI USE WITH PFIAB
Status of Foreign Mission Security f ce
o Too soon to be definitive about specifics of what Foreign Mission Security
Office (FMSO) is to be and to do.
-- Work started in early October to flesh out concept contained in
audit/inspections function paragraphs of joint letter on embassy
security from SecState and me to President.
-- CIA Office of Security had already done first-cut at organization and
personnel to implement PFIAB's recommended FMSO. Would be a heavy
consumer of resources.
Colin Powell's Presidential Instruction dated 10/22 is the effective
direction to proceed. (Attached)
0 Two actions in process.
Letter to heads of six concerned Congressional Committees in draft
with objective of delivery this week (9-13 November).
-- Working group preparing options on details of specific tasks for FMSO
and its organization, report due Thanksgiving week.
o Congressional reaction to what equates to a request for a supplemental
will be very important and a bellwether because:
-- While too early to talk about the options, FMSO will:
- Be expensive, partly because it is to be a new independent unit.
- Be front-end loaded for same reason.
- Be very difficult to staff because it needs people with skills
already in very short supply.
o Clear that FMSO cost and size will be function of the specific detailed
tasks assigned to it and the frequency with which these tasks are to be
performed.
-- e.g., if required to perform annual inspection on site of embassy
plain text processing equipment (PTPE, i.e., Wang word processing
system or IBM personal computer) two to three hundred man years per
year will be required for that task alone.
o Basic question still to be decided with the Congress, consequently, is
"How thorough?" Do we cut cloth to fit pattern or cut pattern to fit
cloth?
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SECRET
SUBJECT: Talking Points for DCI Use With PFIAB
D/CCISCMO/ICS~
(6 November 1987)
Distribution DCI/ICS 0972-87/1 (w/att)
Original - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/ICS
1 - DD/ICS
1 - CCISCMO chrono
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? SECRET/NOFORN ER 87 - 418 4X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
President's
Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Dear Bill:
August 31, 1987
Enclosed is a copy of a letter I sent to the President on
August 28 regarding your proposed changes to enhance
security at U.S. overseas missions. I wanted to be sure
that you had a chance to read the Board's views directly.
Sincerely,
Anne Armstrong
Chairman
The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D. C. 20505
SECRET/NOFORN Unclassified when Enclosure
is removed.
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The Dircctor of Ccntral Intclligcncc
wntunS.x-D C ZOSOS
ER 4184/2-87
September 4, 1987
The Honorable Anne Armstrong
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Room 340, Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20500
Thanks for your letter of August 31st enclosing a copy of
your August 28th letter to the President commenting on the
August 3rd letter to the President signed by the Secretary of
State and myself.
The so-called Shultz/Webster letter followed an NSPG
meeting at which I had briefed the President on the
Intelligence Community views on security at US overseas
missions and at which Secretary Shultz expressed his strong
views on correcting security deficiencies without impairment of
his departmental responsibilities. It appeared at the close of
the discussion that there were basically only two areas in
which we were in disagreement, and the Secretary proposed that
the two of us undertake to resolve competing interests so far
as possible and to report back to the President. In the course
of the discussions which followed, components of the
Intelligence Community were kept informed of developments.
I will be out of the country when your board meets next
week and will therefore be unable to join you. Bob Gates will
represent me, but inasmuch as the discussions were between
Secretary Shultz and myself I thought I should at least offer
you my comments on your letter to the President.
1. State Department Security:
I do not believe that we misrepresented PFIAB's
recommendation regarding the independence of the proposed
Diplomatic Security Agency. Certainly no misrepresentation was
intended. Our letter made clear that PFIAB envisaged a
separate agency responsible to the Secretary of State. We
proposed instead a senior-level executive position responsible
directly to the Secretary of State as Director of Diplomatic
Security. This approach had been discussed at the NSPG meeting
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and was not really an issue so long as there were no
bureaucratic barriers between the Director of Diplomatic
Security and the Secretary. As we were undertaking to resolve
differences, no detailed effort was undertaken to define the
other requirements and prerogatives of the Office. Secretary
Shultz made it very clear that he wanted a strong and effective
Office of Diplomatic Security. The details for achieving this
within his own department seemed to me to be properly his
responsibility.
2. Foreign Mission Security Office:
As you know, we studied the Laird and Schlesinger reports
in addition to your own. The proposal for a Foreign Mission
Security Office to set physical, technical and personnel
security standards originated with PFIAB and was endorsed by
the Intelligence Community. Secretary Shultz and I had some
frank and trenchant discussions about achieving the goal of an
office outside the Department of State which would set
standards for security, monitor compliance and deal with
noncompliance. Implicit in these discussions was the
responsibility of the Secretary to manage the missions for the
President. Secretary Shultz recognized the need for an outside
agency. Our recommendation sought to, and I believe did,
accommodate both legitimate interests. It was agreed that "the
head of the unit should be named by and responsible to the DCI,
who will report problems and recommendations to the Secretary
of State for his action as the person responsible for the
management of embassies and missions abroad." The unit would
report to the Director of Central Intelligence and would not be
a "de facto employee" of the. Secretary of State. It seemed
entirely reasonable to me, and important to Secretary Shultz,
that he be given first opportunity to take corrective action.
In the event that no such action were taken, the recommendation
clearly permits' an appeal to the President. You refer to this
as "an unlikely course of action." I prefer to think that it
would be more unlikely that the Secretary of State would ignore
or reject the recommendations of the Foreign Mission Security
Office and I can assure you I would have no hesitation in
taking an appeal to the President if I believed his reasons for
inaction were unfounded and detrimental to the national
security. Certainly in his capacity as Secretary of State he
would have an appeal to the President on any requirements made
by the DCI should he deem them unreasonable or inimicable to
the national interest, if the process was formulated in that
manner.
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SECRET
Finally, your letter incorrectly states that the
Shultz/Webster letter "effectively upholds the Shultz position
regarding the polygraph." Our letter made it very clear that
"we have a difference of opinion on the issue of polygraphing"
and that "the DCI believes that all personnel assigned to
Moscow should be polygraphed."
The recommendations contained in our letter took into
account the three principal reports and my earlier memorandum
outlining the Intelligence Community perspective, as well as
what was said at the NSPG meeting. These responses were
necessarily constructed in a short timeframe and do not purport
to deal with all engineering aspects of the various studies,
including the PFIAB report, in specific detail. For example,
the slicing recommendation of PFIAB was accepted by the
Community as a desirable secondary approach. I doubt that
there is sufficient data to warrant utilization of that
technique as the primary method of protection. We all
recognize the difficulty of mounting a removal and
reconstruction operation in Moscow. This was our best sense of
what was doable, but it would not surprise me if the actual
detailed planning produced additional or alternative ways to
improve technical security.
I appreciate very much your deep concern for a prompt and
effective effort to correct the fundamental security problems
facing US overseas missions. What is needed now is a program
which has the full commitment of the interested departments and
agencies and the endorsement and support of the Congress. Time
is of the essence.
Sincerely,
William H. Webster
cc: Secretary of State
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
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TALKING POINTS FOR THE DIRECTOR
ANGOLA: MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
9 November, 1987
For the second time in three years UNITA and South African forces
have defeated a major Angolan offensive aimed at the insurgents'
southeastern stronghold. South Africa's assistance this year was
greater than in past years and included the commitment of major
ground forces to the fighting.
- Although the fighting continues, seasonal rains have begun,
and the terrain will soon become unfavorable for large-scale
military operations. Luanda will probably end up with no
territorial gains and substantial loss of troops and
equipment.
Following two years of extensive preparation, the Angolan
government, in early July, launched an offensive aimed at taking
the strategic insurgent base at Mavinga and cutting UNITA supply
lines from the southeast to insurgent positions elsewhere in the
country.
- Angolan government forces advanced along two major fronts:
from Cuito Cuanavale toward Mavinga with a force of about
8,000 to 9,000; and from Lucusse to points south with about
3,000 troops.
- UNITA leader Savimbi's strategy was to first lure Luanda
into overextending its forces and then to attack isolated
government units.
- Soviet military advisers drafted the plans for the offensive
and directed operations, probably deployed to at least the
brigade level of Angolan units. Cuban forces--which number
about 37,500 and are deployed at major government garrisons
and economic centers--appear to have, at best, played only a
minor role in this year's operations.
After moving approximately fifty miles into UNITA territory along
the Cuito Cuanavale front, government operations began to lose
momentum in early September. By early November, a combination of
UNITA and South African counterattacks along the Lomba River
forced Luanda to begin a general retreat.
- UNITA countered the government advance with a force of about
6,000 to 7,000 combat troops, including both conventional
and guerrilla forces. Pretoria provided extensive air and
artillery support to insurgent operations and has a sizable
presence--we estimate as many as 3,000 troops--on the ground
as well.
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- UNITA and South African forces virtually destroyed a
reinforced Angolan brigade in early October.
Government forces that had advanced from Cuito Cuanavale
have now retreated back to the vicinity of their starting
point and are under attack from both UNITA and South African
forces.
On the Lucusse front, the government was equally frustrated.
After advancing about 40 miles into UNITA territory, Angolan
forces became bogged down in mid-August.
UNITA contested the advance on this front with a force of
about 4,000 to 5,000 men.' Insurgent gains appear to be
largely attributable to successful interdiction of Angolan
supply lines and constant harassment of forward government
bases.
Role of US Assistance
US aid to UNITA played an important role in turning back the
government's drive. Insurgent air defenses--especially US
supplied Stinger SAMs--helped force the government to curtail the
use of its air power, previously one of its greatest comparative
advantages over the insurgents.
The insurgents report that the Angolan and Cuban air forces
flew few missions and were not a factor in the fighting.
UNITA's improved air defense capability forced government
aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, resulting in inaccurate
bombing.
The Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces recently
commented that the refusal of the Angolan Air Force to
provide support for ground troops contributed to the failure
of the offensive and that Luanda was preparing a commission
of inquiry to examine the matter.
In late October, a UNITA Stinger team downed a MiG fighter,
capturing two Cuban airmen, one of whom was Havana's second
in command of air and air defense forces in Angola and one
of their most competent officers.
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SECRETI 25X1
Response to the Defeat
Luanda put two years of work into preparing for this offensive.
According to reports from various Angolan officials, the
government appeared generally confident that the greatly
strengthened Angolan Army would produce a significant victory.
- The government is trying to play down the magnitude of the
failure, characterizing the fighting in press reports as a
routine sweep operation that would have succeeded had
Pretoria not intervened.
- Although President dos Santos is likely to deflect criticism
of his role, the defeat will fuel infighting among the
fractious Angolan leadership. The search for scapegoats
reportedly has already begun.
- Luanda's Cuban and Soviet backers probably will come in for
a share of the recriminations. The Cubans, who took little
part in the fighting, have been accused by Angolan officers
of not providing needed air support to government forces.
The Soviets, given their role in planning the ambitious
offensive, are likely to share blame for the setback.
Outlook
Although its defeat is not sufficiently threatening to push
Luanda toward reconciliation with UNITA, Luanda may try to
improve its military prospects by limiting Pretoria's ability to
intervene in future fighting.
- The government may show more interest in pursuing a
negotiated end to South Africa's occupation of Namibia by
trading off a Cuban troop withdrawal.
- Luanda might also consider restricting its operations to
regions in Angola sufficiently far from Namibia to make
South African intervention more difficult and costly.
Savimbi probably realizes that a battlefield victory in the
southeast will not by itself force the government to pursue his
goal of political reconciliation and power sharing. He has won
some relief from government attack in the southeast for the next
few months and is now likely to intensify countrywide guerrilla
operations, particularly in northern Angola where the government
is most sensitive to military pressure because of the area's
large population centers and vital oil facilities.
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STATEMENT OF THE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
OCTOBER 8, 1987
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INTRODUCTION
MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INVESTIGATIONS, I AM PLEASED TO APPEAR HERE TODAY AND SHARE
WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON AN IMPORTANT SUBJECT: PERSONS WHO FLEE
FROM THE COMMUNIST BLOC TO THE UNITED STATES AND HOW OUR
COUNTRY MIGHT BETTER TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALL THEY HAVE TO OFFER.
LET ME BEGIN BY DISCUSSING BRIEFLY THE ONE AREA TO WHICH I
CAN SPEAK OFFICIALLY AS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:
THE VERY SMALL FRACTION OF THESE PEOPLE WHO ARE OF INTELLIGENCE
INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, OVER WHICH I AS DIRECTOR PRESIDE, HAS A SYSTEM TO
IDENTIFY AND COLLECT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND ADDRESS OTHER
INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS WITH RESPECT TO THESE PERSONS. THE
SYSTEM IS COMPREHENSIVE, VERY ACTIVE AND HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL.
THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF OUR WORK IS, OF COURSE, CLASSIFIED AND
CANNOT BE DISCUSSED IN THIS FORUM. I CAN SAY, THOUGH, THAT I
AM SATISFIED THE COMMUNITY IS WORKING VERY HARD AND, INDEED,
HAS MADE IMPROVEMENTS IN EXISTING EFFORTS.
TODAY, HOWEVER, THE SUBCOMMITTEE FOCUSES NOT ON THESE FEW
INDIVIDUALS BUT ON THE LARGER GROUP: THOSE PERSONS NOT OF
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT OFFICIALLY CHARGED
WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEALING WITH THIS LARGER GROUP.
NONETHELESS, I AM PLEASED TO SHARE MY THOUGHTS ON THE SUBJECT
WITH YOU.
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THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED
I WILL REFER TO THIS LARGER CATEGORY OF PERSONS AS
"RESETTLEMENT CASES", RATHER THAN AS "DEFECTORS," DUE TO THE
FACT THAT FOR US IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY THE WORD
"DEFECTOR" IS A TERM WITH A VERY LIMITED, SPECIFIC MEANING.
RESETTLEMENT CASES HAVE CHOSEN TO COME HERE OF THEIR OWN
FREE WILL AND INITIATIVE, JUST AS HAVE SO MANY MILLIONS OF
IMMIGRANTS THROUGHOUT OUR HISTORY. BEING HUMAN, THEIR
MOTIVATIONS, AMBITIONS AND CAPABILITIES VARY WIDELY. THERE
ARE, HOWEVER, TWO CHARACTERISTICS WHICH ALL SEEM TO SHARE.
ON THE ONE HAND, THEY ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE RESTRICTIVE
SOCIETIES FROM WHICH THEY HAVE COME AND LOOK FORWARD TO
ENJOYING THE LIBERTIES WE TAKE FOR GRANTED. ON THE OTHER HAND,
THEY HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE DIFFICULTIES OF READJUSTMENT TO LIFE
IN A NEW SOCIETY IN WHICH THE MORES, CUSTOMS, LANGUAGE, RULES
AND REGULATIONS ARE DIFFERENT FROM THOSE TO WHICH THEY ARE
ACCUSTOMED.
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THE LATTER POINT MAY SEEM APPARENT BUT I THINK IT DESERVES
SOME EMPHASIS. AMERICANS WHO HAVE CHANGED THEIR RESIDENCES
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES ARE AWARE OF THE SIMPLE FRUSTRATIONS
INVOLVED: DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF TRASH COLLECTION; DIFFERENT
WAYS OF CALCULATING STATE INCOME TAXES; VARIANCES IN WHETHER
RENTALS NORMALLY INCLUDE REFRIGERATORS AND STOVES, AND SO ON.
THIS IN OUR OWN COUNTRY. THINK HOW DIFFICULT IT IS FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO BUILD A NEW LIFE
UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH ALL THE RULES HAVE CHANGED AND THE
LANGUAGE IS DIFFICULT TO SPEAK AND UNDERSTAND. ALSO, I NOTE
THAT ON OCCASION THOSE WHO COME HERE HAVE UNREALISTIC
EXPECTATIONS AND PLANS THAT SIMPLY DO NOT MATERIALIZE.
THE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZES ROUTINELY AND TO A VERY MODEST
EXTENT THE INITIAL RESETTLEMENT EXPENSES OF MANY RESETTLEMENT
CASES. THESE FUNDS ARE DISTRIBUTED BY THE GOVERNMENT TO THE
VOLUNTARY AGENCY WHICH SPONSORED THE INDIVIDUAL. BEYOND THIS
ASSISTANCE, WHICH COVERS ONLY THE FIRST WEEKS FOLLOWING ARRIVAL
IN THE UNITED STATES, THERE IS NO ORGANIZED SYSTEM THROUGH
WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OFFERS ASSISTANCE TO SUCH INDIVIDUALS.
FOR HELPING TO SMOOTH THE TRANSITION AND ADJUSTMENT FOR SO
MANY OF THE RESETTLEMENT CASES AND THEIR FAMILIES, MUCH CREDIT
AND PRAISE IS DUE TO THE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES WHO ASSUME-THE
OVERWHELMING TASK OF RESETTLING MANY THOUSANDS OF THESE
INDIVIDUALS EACH YEAR. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL
HEAR FROM SOME OF THEIR REPRESENTATIVES TOMORROW.
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GIVEN THE RELATIVELY LIMITED RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO THEM, THEY
ACCOMPLISH A GREAT DEAL.
BEYOND THESE, THERE IS ALSO A ROLE FOR INDIVIDUAL AMERICANS
TC PLAY HERE. ANY OF US MAY, AT SOME POINT, HAVE OCCASION TO
ENCOUNTER THESE PERSONS IN A WIDE VARIETY OF SETTINGS. . .AS
NEIGHBORS, AS COLLEAGUES IN THE WORKPLACE OR AS FELLOW MEMBERS
OF RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS. IN SUCH INSTANCES, WE SHOULD TAKE
THE INITIATIVE AND OFFER ASSISTANCE, SUGGESTIONS AND GUIDANCE
ON DEALING WITH AMERICAN LIFE. WHILE THIS MAY SEEM A SMALL
THING, IT CAN MEAN A GREAT DEAL TO A PERSON COMING FROM A
CLOSED, HIGHLY STRUCTURED, REPRESSIVE SYSTEM TO ONE WHOSE
OPENNESS, BREADTH AND FREEDOM OFFER A SENSE OF LIBERATION BUT
ALSO A SOMETIMES BEWILDERING RANGE OF CHOICES.
WHAT THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE To OFFER
LOOKING BEYOND THE EARLY STAGES OF RESETTLEMENT, THESE
INDIVIDUALS HAVE A POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE TO OUR SOCIETY IN A
VARIETY OF WAYS. THEY POSSESS A PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND
UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR FORMER CULTURES AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS
WHICH THEY COULD PROVIDE TO INTERESTED PARTIES WERE THE EFFORT
MADE TO REACH OUT TO THEM. SOME POSSESS UNIQUE LANGUAGE
SKILLS, A POINT WHICH I BELIEVE GENERAL ODOM MAY ADDRESS IN
MORE DETAIL IN HIS TESTIMONY. POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS OF THESE
BENEFITS INCLUDE: ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS, SCHOLARS, CIVIC
GROUPS, UNIVERSITY AND HIGH SCHOOL CLASSES AND, IN CERTAIN
CASES, GOVERNMENT.
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SOMETIMES, HOWEVER, THERE IS A PROBLEM IN MATCHING THESE
INDIVIDUALS WITH POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS. AGAIN, THE VOLUNTARY
AGENCIES PERFORM AN IMPORTANT SERVICE HERE. THESE AGENCIES,
HOWEVER, CANNOT BE EVERYWHERE AND IN TOUCH WITH ALL PEOPLE AT
ONCE. INDIVIDUAL INITIATIVE BY THE POTENTIAL RECIPIENTS TO
SEEK OUT SUCH PEOPLE AND OFFER THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE
THEIR PERSONAL CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY PROVIDE THEM
WITH A SENSE OF SATISFACTION AND ENRICH OUR SOCIETY. THIS IS
OBVIOUSLY AN AREA ON WHICH THE SUBCOMMITTEE MAY WISH TO FOCUS.
I NOTE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AS THE PRIMARY UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS FROM OVERSEAS
TO THIS COUNTRY, HAVE IMPORTANT ROLES TO PLAY HERE AND I WOULD
ASSUME THE SUBCOMMITTEE PLANS ON CONSULTING THEM.
IN THESE BRIEF OPENING REMARKS I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TOUCH
ONLY IN THE MOST GENERAL TERMS ON THIS IMPORTANT TOPIC. THE
PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES ARE AS VARIED AND INDIVIDUAL AS YOU
MIGHT EXPECT WITH PERSONS OF WIDELY DIFFERING AGES, EDUCATIONAL
BACKGROUNDS, EXPERIENCE AND FAMILY CIRCUMSTANCES. AT THIS
POINT, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MCRE APPROPRIATE TO CONCLUDE MY
GENERAL COMMENTS AND RESPOND TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH MAY BE
OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO YOU.
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