MEMO TO DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00423R000400420015-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2009
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: May 2, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

TRANSMITTAL SUP 7 May 1984
TO:
DIX
Registry
NOON NO.
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FROM:
Latin American Analysis
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423.L V
NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
The attached is a letter for your signature
to H. Eugene Douglas, Ambassador at Large with
the Department of State. Ambassador Douglas
visited you last week and subsequently sent you
multiple copies of a report, Central America:
The Future of the Democratic Revolution. The
report was published by the Gulf and Caribbean
Foundation, an organization with which our
analysts are unfamiliar. The letter for your
signature thanks the Ambassador for forwarding
the report to us and indicates we are arranging
to have future reports from the Foundation sent
directly to us.
Robert4I. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment: DI As stated ( C.ajL ,c
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
 Directorate of Intelligence DDI-Q ____/ZS4/a
Office of African and Latin American Analysis --`"'~G1I'`` fff
Attached is a note for your signature
to the DCI requesting his signature on a
letter to H. Eugene Douglas, Ambassador
at Large with the Department of State.
Ambassador Douglas met with the Director
last week and subsequently forwarded
several copies of a report, Central America:
The Future of the Democratic Revolution.
The report was published by the Gulf and
Caribbean Foundation, an organization
unfamiliar to ALA analysts. In our judgment
the report contains many substantive errors
and does not reflect accurately the situation
in the region. The letter for the DCI's
signature merely thanks the Ambassador
for forwarding the report to us and
indicates we are arranging to have future
reports from the Foundation sent directly
to us.
 Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
The attached is a letter for your signature
to H. Eugene Douglas, Ambassador at Large with
the Department of State. Ambassador Douglas
visited you last week and subsequently sent you
multiple copies of a report, Central America:
The Future of the Democratic Revolution. The
report was published by the Gulf and Caribbean
Foundation, an organization with which our
analysts are unfamiliar. The letter for your
signature thanks the Ambassador for forwarding
the report to us and indicates we are arranging
to have future reports from the Foundation sent
directly to us.
Attachment:
As stated
For Release 2009/03/04 : CIA-RDP89B00423R000400420015-0
 ffI-02632/84
Thank you for forwarding copies of the Gulf and
Caribbean Foundation report, Central America: The
Future of the Democratic Revolution. I have sent the
report to the analysts who follow events in the region
and asked that we arrange to have future reports from
the Foundation sent directly to us.
Yours,
~ /. Bill
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
The Honorable H. Eugene Douglas
Ambassador at Large and Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
 Distribution:
Orig, -- Addressee
1 -- DDCI (w/basic)
1 -- ER
1 -- DDI
1 -- DDI Registry
1 -- DDO
1 -- Chief, LA/DDO
1 -- D/OLL
1 -- D/PAO
1 -- NIO/LA
2 -- D/ALA
1 -- MCD/CA
 Approved For Release 2009/03/04 : CIA-RDP89B00423R000400420015-0
Attached is a report prepared by the Gulf
and Caribbean Foundation on "Central America:
The Future of the Democratic Revolution". Would
you please prepare an acknowledgement for the
DCI's signature along with a note from the DDI
explaining the package. Sorry for the short
deadline of 1 May.
I Thanks,
STAT
 ACTION
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5/1
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AM B?SS AD0 AT LARG_
WAS Hi MG TON
I enjoyed our talk this morning. Regarding the Texas based
Gulf and Caribbean Foundation, I want you to have the first
report they produced. Thousands of copies have already been
distributed to newspapers, universities, and church groups,
and just last week the Foundation got a request for a copy from
Kenya. Now that's what I call coverage!
Peter Rodman is out of the office on leave until Monday.
My staff is trying to rustle up a draft of the President's
speech.
I'll be in Texas from Friday to next Monday speaking on
Mexico and Central America. If rates doesn't reach me before
then, I'll call him when I come back.
10 copies of "Central America: "fhe Future of the
Democratic Revolution"
The Honorable
William J. Casey,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
 Approved For Release 2009/03/04 : CIA-RDP89B00423R000400420015-0
 EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SUP
SUSPENSE 1 May
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Please prepare acknowledgment
for DCI's signature. .
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25 April 1984
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ACTION
INFO
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INITIAL
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 DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON
I enjoyed our talk this morning. Regarding the Texas based
Gulf and Caribbean Foundation, I want you to have the first
report they produced. Thousands of copies have already been
distributed to newspapers, universities, and church groups,
and just last week the Foundation got a request for a copy from
Kenya. Now that's what I call coverage!
Peter Rodman is out of the office on leave until Monday.
My staff is trying to rustle up a draft of the President's
speech.
I'll be in Texas from Friday to next Monday speaking on
Mexico and Central America. If Gates doesn't reach me before
then, I'll call him when I come back.
10 copies of "Central America: "Ihe Future of the
Democratic Revolution"
The Honorable
William J. Casey,
Director, Central Intelligence Agency.
 Central America:-_
~T-he Future
tof the
I
_Democrat~ic
jai
 CENTRAL AMERICA:
THE FUTURE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
 Copyright ? 1984 by the Gulf & Caribbean Foundation
All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conven-
tions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by
any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any
information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing
from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to the Gulf & Caribbean
Foundation.
This study was commissioned by the Gulf & Caribbean Foundation, a private,
non-profit foundation concerned about Central America and the Caribbean. The
study is based upon considerable independent research by the main participants
in a study group formed by the Foundation, upon a fact-finding trip to the region
by Max Singer and Joachim Maitre in December, 1983, and upon discussions
with Mr. Elie Wiesel later that month prior to his own trip to the area in early
1984.
 Elie Wiesel is a world-renowned author, teacher and humanitarian,
having written numerous novels and essays about the Holocaust and the
dilemmas of contemporary man. Because of his unique humanitarian
concerns, Mr. Wiesel was invited to participate in the discussions of the
group, and to make his own trip to Honduras and the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua to investigate the human costs of one element in the Central
American crisis.
Max Singer, formerly president of the Hudson Institute, is the president
of The Potomac Organization, Inc. in Washington, D.C. He has written
extensively about Central America in publications such as the Washington
Post, the Miami Herald, Commentary and Reader's Digest, and is the
author of Nicaragua: the Stolen Revolution, a publication of the United
States Information Agency.
Joachim Maitre is Professor of International Relations at Boston Uni-
versity, and was formerly Editor in Chief at Springer Publications in
Germany, and Professor of Literature at McGill University in Montreal,
Canada.
Michael A. Ledeen, formerly special adviser to Secretary of State
Alexander Haig, is Senior Fellow in International Affairs at the
Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, D.C., and a consultant to the Department of State. The
views in this article are not necessarily those of the United States Gov-
ernment.
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INTRODUCTION:
THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND ITS
ENEMIES
Americans are torn between two passions in the conduct of foreign policy:
they wish to see democracy advance, and they wish their government to
refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. The first
is a reflection of our national ideals, the second represents a desire to see
others emulate our democratic revolution on their own, without the kind
of outside assistance that might throw into doubt the legitimacy and
spontaneity of that revolution. Both ideals are admirable, but in practice
they cannot coexist, for the simple reason that the enemies of the demo-
cratic revolution join together to prevent its spread and to threaten it
where it already exists. If we wish to defend and advance democracy, we
must be willing to give it our assistance
For the past few years, an encouraging attempt at moderate democratic
revolution has been underway in Central America, and the enemies of
democracy have predictably launched a counterrevolution against it. In
this political and military drama, many of the actors play unfamiliar roles,
and this has confused many people who believe in the values of the demo-
cratic revolution, but who find themselves baffled by events in the area.
We are not used to seeing military officers leading democratic revolu-
tions, yet in both Salvador and Honduras, military leaders have been in-
strumental in moving their countries from traditional, autocratic dictator-
ships onto the road toward democracy. We are inclined to take people at
their word, especially when they are willing to risk their lives for a demo-
cratic ideal. Yet in Nicaragua, many self-proclaimed revolutionaries who
spoke avidly of democracy when they fought against the tyranny of
Somoza just a few years ago, are now leading their country toward the
darkness of a dictatorship that threatens to be far more efficient than the
one that preceded it.
In all three countries (as well as in the other countries of the region),
5
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6 Central America: The Future of the Democratic Revolution
the United States has been called upon to exert its great wealth and power
to influence the outcome of internal and external conflicts. The question
has been debated at great length in Congress, in the universities and in the
press; international conferences have been devoted to the matter, and
American diplomats regularly deal with Central America from one end of
the world to the other. Yet the American people are confused. According
to the most sophisticated opinion polls, less than ten percent of the
American public can correctly identify the position of the American Gov-
ernment in both Salvador and Nicaragua. Fewer still have any clear idea
of what is at stake in this regional crisis. Are we, as our leaders assure us,
really supporting the forces of democracy in Central America, or do the
governments we support down there thwart the aspirations of the people,
murder their political opponents, and use American assistance to advance
their own personal interests?
Finally, there is the-question of the significance of the Central Ameri-
can turmoil. Need we involve ourselves in the conflicts, or should we in-
stead follow the second of our two conflicting' passions, and simply abs-
tain, restricting our activity to diplomacy and economic assistance where
it seems warranted? '
Our view is that it is morally imperative for the United States to support
the forces of the democratic revolution in Central America. We believe
that these forces-with all their admitted defects, which are sometimes
grave by (primarily military
ones-are best represented b those Salvadorans
officers) who staged and supported the coup of 1979 that produced a radi-
cal land reform program, and democratic elections in 1982; by the Hon-
duran military and civilian leaders who have moved that country from a
traditional military dictatorship to a duly elected civilian government; and
by those Nicaraguans who fought against Somoza and who-along with
groups singled out for repression by the new regime-are now resisting
the efforts of the Sandinistas to install a new totalitarianism. We further
believe that the major threat to the democratic revolution in Central
America comes from anti-democratic extremists of the Right and Left
who see their own power and objectives threatened by democracy, and
who consequently wish to destroy the delicate democratic experiments in
Salvador and Honduras, and to consolidate the Sandinista tyranny in
Nicaragua. The extremists of the' Right are largely a local phenomenon;
those of the Left receive considerable assistance from ohter countries:
first and foremost, the Soviet Union and Cuba,' along with their allies in
[; Eastern Europe and elsewhere. This international Communist network
systematically assists, and sometimes actually directs the radical guerrilla
movements in Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala.
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 Finally, a few words need to be said about the all-important question of
social justice, for democracy cannot flourish in a society where misery
and unfairness predominate. All the countries in Central America, with
the possible exception of Costa Rica, have long been characterized by
poverty and oppression, and social equity cannot be rapidly achieved in
these countries. Yet we feel quite strongly that the guerrilla movements in
Central America have falsely claimed that their basic motive is the desire
to eliminate injustice and misery. We believe their real motive is the de-
sire to destroy the democratic revolution that is underway. If the demo-
cratic forces of the region are to succeed, they will have to overcome
some imposing obstacles and defeat their counterrevolutionary opponents
at the same time they give the people of the region hope that a more equi-
table society can be constructed through democratic processes. The
United States must lend its strength and wealth to these tasks.
 ONE:
NICARAGUA
(OR, THE REVOLUTION BETRAYED)
The best description of the unhappy fate of the Sandinista revolution in
Nicaragua comes from one of its most distinguished former officials. Ar-
turo J. Cruz was a member of the revolutionary junta from April, 1980
until the following March, when he left to become Nicaraguan Ambas-
sador to the United States. He resigned his post in Washington in
November, 1981, took up residency in the United States, and later wrote
about his experiences in the Summer issue of Foreign Affairs magazine:
I joined the Revolutionary Government with appreciation and
pride. I served it with a loyalty founded on the conviction that the
Revolution would be good, first and foremost, for Nicaragua. My
experience has disillusioned me: dogmatism and adventurism seem
to have wiped out the democratic and plurastic ideals which, in
1979, united all Nicaraguan advocates of freedom. My lamentation
and criticism is that these ideals have been shattered and the moral
defenses of the Revolution have well-nigh vanished ...
The tragedy that befell the Sandinista revolution is all the more disap-
pointing because the revolution itself was thoroughly justified, and re-
moved an odious and corrupt dictatorship from Nicaragua. The Somoza
family had in fact dominated the country for 45 years, from 1934 to 1979,
and dealt harshly with anyone who challenged (or was suspected of chal-
lenging) the family autocracy. The success of the Sandinista revolution
was due, in the end, to popular rage against the Somoza tyranny, but the
revolt took its name from a man-Augusto Cesar Sandino-who or-
ganized a radical movement in the late 1920s to oppose the establishment
of American military bases in Nicaragua. Sandino was assassinated in
1934, probably on the orders of the first Somoza, Anastasio Somoza Gar-
 Central America: The Future of the Democratic Revolution 9
cia (himself assassinated by a lone gunman in 1956), and Sandino's fol-
lowers continued to constitute a violent opposition movement. In 1962
the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) was organized
(significantly, as events would later demonstrate, in both Nicaragua and
Cuba) and the revolutionary movement gathered steam following the De-
cember, 1972 earthquake when some 10,000 people died and the gov-
ernment proved unable to organize a decent relief operation.
The combination of arbitrary repression, a greedy and incompetent
elite (half of the 32 million dollars of American aid sent after the ear-
thquake was never accounted for, and presumably finished in the pockets
of Somoza and his followers), and impotence in the face of challenge
(whether from natural catastrophe or, later, from the armed Sandinista
guerrillas) proved fatal to the last Somoza, and he was overthrown by the
FSLN-now expanded to include many distinguished moderates as well
as the hard-core Leninists who dominated the movement-in July, 1979.
A year later he was assassinated in Paraguay in one of the more spectacu-
lar terrorist acts of recent years: his armored car was blown to pieces by
bazooka shells.
Somoza's conquerors promised a democratic revolution, and many of
their acts, both before and immediately after the overthrow of Somoza
suggested that they were honest in their promises. The 5-member Junta of
National Reconstruction included two persons of undoubted democratic
credentials: the businessman and political leader Alfonso Robelo, and
Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, the widow of the distinguished and
courageous owner of La Prensa, the country's one truly independent
newspaper; in the months before the seizure of power the Sandinistas had
opened their ranks to people of various political persuasions, and had
promised to respect political pluralism once in power; free elections were
promised within "a reasonable period of time"; a major program of pub-
lic education was launched, with notable results (although, with the pas-
sage of time, much of the "education" turned out to be Marxist indoctri-
nation); and, finally, with considerable foreign help the medical care of
the population was dramatically improved.
But the early promise was not fulfilled, and it is now apparent that the
Sandinistas never intended to permit their triumph to be diluted by de-
mocracy; they wanted to create a Communist tyranny, allied with Cuba
and the Soviet Union, and opposed to the United States. Many Nicara-
guan leaders and many more American writers and politicians, have ar-
gued that the United States might have been able to have good relations
with the Sandinista Regime, and thereby prevent the drive toward Com-
 munist totalitarianism. Many of the same people argue that the failure of
the United States to provide economic assistance to Nicaragua created, or
helped to create an economic crisis in the country, thereby intensifying
the "siege mentality" of the leaders and accelerating the imposition of
emergency measures, press censorship and political repression.
Yet the Sandinistas' own literature argues against this interpretation,
and shows that their own counterrevolutionary intentions were clear from
the moment of triumph. On 5 October, 1979, the Sandinistas published a
remarkable document that contained the central ideas of the new regime.
These had been presented to the faithful-the FSLN Cadre-during a
three-day meeting the previous month, and three of the theses presented
during that meeting expose the basic, counterrevolutionary intent of the
Sandinista leadership:
1. The Provisional Government, with its two distinguished moderates,
was described as "an alliance of convenience organized by the San-
dinistas to thwart Yankee intervention." In case this was not absolutely
clear, later on the Sandinistas explained that several steps had to be taken
during the "interim period" in order to protect the revolution from its
enemies. Among these steps was the necessity of maintaining small politi-
cal parties "because of international opinion." Their first. task upon
seizing power, they said, "is to educate the people to recognize that the
FSLN is the legitimate leader of the revolutionary process."
In other words, the talk about pluralism was a ploy designed to trick other
countries, and was never a real objective of the Sandinistas.
2. They called for the creation of "an army politicized without prece-
dent", and they kept their promise. By 1983, Nicaragua had by far the
largest armed force in Central America (50,000 men, with projects for a
potential fighting force of a quarter of a million), and called for every
able-bodied man to enlist (simultaneously witholding rationing cards
from those who declined).
3. They called for support for "the World Revolution".
Two years after the conquest of power, President Daniel Ortega gave a
speech to a group of military specialists in Nicaragua, in which he reem-
phasized both the counterrevolutionary nature of the regime, and the un-
alterable anti-American character of their world-view. First, the counter-
revolution: Ortega announced that the future elections in Nicaragua "will
 in no way-like a lottery-decide who is going to hold power. For this
power belongs to the people, to the FSLN, to our Directorate." More-
over, Ortega said; "Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine that
guides our revolution... We cannot be Marxist-Leninist without:San-
dinism, and without Marxism-Leninism Sandinism cannot be revolution-
ary .....
Concerning Nicaragua's choice of foreign policy, Ortega declared:
on July 19, 1979, world society was polarized into two major
camps ... the camp of imperialism, the camp of capitalism, headed
up by the United States and the rest of the capitalist countries in
Europe amd throughout the world ... (and) the socialist camp made
up of various countries in Europe, Asia and Latin America and with
the Soviet Union in the vanguard.
Of the early period, during which time he was in the Junta, Arturo Cruz
has written, ""our foreign policy began to show how senseless our goals
were. Instead of dedicating all our energy to building the ideal society for
which our people had hoped, we were chasing chimeras abroad ... Dec-
laring ourselves nonaligned, we were, in fact, leaning to the Socialist
bloc." Indeed, the Sandinistas supported the Soviet Union on most sig-
nificant international questions, and remained silent-imposing it via
press censorship when necessary-about the Solidarity trade union
movement in Poland.
In other words, the Sandinista leaders were profoundly counterrevolu-
tionary, for they acted to prevent the people from expressing their true
sentiments, imposed a preordained model on Nicaraguan society, and
subordinated Nicaraguan interests to those of the international Com-
munist movement. The Sandinistas' fear of democratic revolution-and
their eagerness to proclaim and demonstrate their true Leninist nature-
were so strong that when the Pope visited Nicaragua in 1983, the sound
system at his first big rally in Managua was rigged so that his words were
"jammed". As we have' learned from several Sandinista defectors, the
regime in Managua has devoted considerable manpower and money to
creating an alternative religion in Nicaragua, mixing the traditional
Catholic liturgy with Marxist slogans. And Ronald Radosh, a well-known
spokesman for the American Left, has written that "to back the Church in
the context of the Nicaraguan revolution is to oppose the F.S.L.N." In
the autumn of 1983, there was an open break with the Catholic Church,
with some of the leading religious figures in the country leaving for other,
more hospitable lands.
 ~ 11
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12 Central America: The Future of the Democratic Revolution
Such a regime has quite predictably exceeded even Somoza's horrend-
ous record on human rights. Jose Esteban Gonzalez, a distinguished op-
ponent of Somoza and the founder of Nicaragua's Permanent Commis-
sion for Human Rights, was unceremoniously thrown in jail by the San-
dinistas, and was released only after well-publicized protests from the
International Commission of Jurists. Gonzalez has noted that there are
now more political prisoners in Nicaragua than "the highest figure ever
registered under Somoza", and that systematic murder has also taken
place, killings that "cannot be dismissed as rash acts of post-revolution-
ary anger" because they have continued for several years. And perhaps
the most savage acts of the Sandinistas have taken place against the Mis-
kito Indian population of the Atlantic Coast region, where 10,000 or more
persons have been uprooted from their native villages, which were then
burned to the ground. Many have been killed, others-including some of
the leaders-have spoken of being tortured.
The Economic Disaster
The Sandinistas led a revolution against a corrupt and unfair regime,
and promised to create a more equitable society. But this has not taken
place, even though improvements have taken place in education and
health care. Indeed, Gross Domestic Product is still below pre-revolution
levels (the economy was wrecked by the final year of. fighting, but did
grow during the first two years of the new regime). More importantly,
many business leaders-including men like Robelo, who were favorable
to the Sandinistas and participated in the revolution for a while-have
gone into exile, convinced that the new regime is unalterably opposed to a
independent private sector and to a pluralistic society. Agriculture-the
backbone of the economy-has also suffered, with the best cotton grow-
ers having left the country, and production is well below traditional
levels.
Once again, Arturo Cruz provides reliable, first-hand testimony of his
period as President of the Central Bank (1979-80):
...the new leaders seemed to overlook the simple fact that social
programs must be financed out of public revenue. Frankly, we vir-
tually emptied the well of fiscal revenue with the establishment of
the so-called People's Property Area ... a holding composed of
properties formerly owned by Somoza and his closest followers ...
The government ... is obsessed with state ownership of the means
of production. The consequences of such policies are increases in
 the money in circulation, arrears in public loan portfolios, and fiscal
and balance-of-payment deficits. Nicaragua is condemned to be an
international beggar.
Not only the private sector has been driven into opposition to the San-
dinista counterrevolution: the independent trade union movement, having
been maltreated by the regime, continues its fight. "The regime," ac-
cording to Radosh, "sees independent unions as potentially dangerous,
and strikes as a part of a C.I.A. attempt to destabilize Nicaragua." Thus
the President of the Confederation of Nicaraguan Workers was beaten up
at the airport upon returning from a foreign trip, and workers participating
in a union demonstration were attacked by Sandinista thugs wielding lead
pipes.
All those who speak out, or act against the policies of the regime are
likely to find themselves singled out by the Sandinista Defense Commit-
tees, modelled on the infamous institutions created by Castro in Cuba to
maintain rigid control over neighborhoods. When Robelo began to speak
out against the betrayal of the revolution, the windows of his home were
smashed by the local Defense Committee; which also painted the house
with threatening graffiti. Things reached such a stage that Eden Pastora,
the Commandante Cero who was the most celebrated military leader of
the revolution, publicly stated in April, 1982:
...in the light of day or in the dead of night, the seizures, expropri-
ations and confiscations oppress somicistas and anti-somocistas,
counterrevolutionaries and revolutionaries, the guilty and the inno-
cent. In the jails they beat the counterrevolutionaries together with
the Marxist revolutionaries, these latter punished for the grave crime
of interpreting Marx from a different point of view than the com-
rades in power.
Pastora, Robelo and other leaders of the revolution are now conducting
an armed struggle against the Sandinista counterrevolution. Like the San-
dinistas in the late seventies, the opponents of the regime are based in
large part outside Nicaragua: Pastora and Robelo operate out of Costa
Rica, while the FDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Front), which receives the
bulk of American "covert" assistance, is based in Honduras. This fact,
along with the American support for those fighting against the Sandinis-
tas, points to one of the most important aspects of the current Central
American crisis: it is truly a regional battle, and has been for many years.
 TWO:
EL SALVADOR
(OR, THE REVOLUTION UNDER SIEGE)
The Sandinistas have not been content to subvert the Nicaraguan revolu-
tion; they have sent many of their leaders, and hundreds of young people
to be trained in the Soviet bloc, from Cuba to Bulgaria, and they have
joined'the international counterrevolutionary movement to create regimes
similar to their own throughout Central America (and, according to their
own testimony, in Mexico as well). In so doing, they have yielded a good
deal of control over their own destinies, for Nicaragua is flooded with ex-
pert "advisers" from the Communist countries, whose advice is more
like commands than suggestions. The international connections of the
Sandinistas thus serve not only their own desires, but those of the Kremlin
as well.
The best documented connection is that with the guerrilla movement in
El Salvador, the FMLN/DRU, and its political arm, the FDR. Nicaragua
has served as haven, financier, supplier and control center for the Sal-
vadoran guerrilla movement which, like the Sandinistas, took its name
from an early twentieth-century figure, in this case Farabundo Marti. But
unlike Sandino, who-was an independent and democratic man, Marti was
a Communist, and for a while served as the liaison for the Comintern with
the early Sandinistas. The FMLN/DRU has generally stayed in line with
the. doctrines of its founding father, and the unified Salvadoran guerrilla
movement was created in 1980-in Havana, at Fidel Castro's insistence.
The Cubans agreed to support the Salvadorans provided, that they put
aside the political and operational differences that had heretofore divided
the groups on the extreme Left, and formed a unified command. The Sal-
vadorans did so, thereby constituting a formidable fighting force with
considerable international: support.
. The' FMLN/DRU came into existence at precisely the moment that
most of its alleged objectives were being enacted by the new, revolution-
 ary government of Salvador. For in October, 1979, a group of army col-
onels led a coup that deposed the old ruling class of the country (some
30,000 of whom would leave the country in the next few years), instituted
one of the most radical land-reform programs in the history of Latin
America, nationalized the banks and the major exports, and promised
democratic elections within three years. The army was purged, a civilian
branch of the government (including Communists) was created, and steps
were taken to diminish the activities of the "death squads" of the extreme
Right that had terrorized the country for some time. Had the guerrillas
been serious about desiring a democratic revoluton for Salvador, they
would have participated in the new political order that was ushered in by
the coup. Instead they declared war on the new government.
In the heady atmosphere that followed the Sandinista victory in
Nicaragua, the Salvadoran Leftists expected that they would conquer their
own country in short order, and by January, 1981, they were ready to
launch their "final offensive" against the revolutionary government in
San Salvador. It was a great failure, the first of several fiascos that would
demonstrate a profound difference between the situations in Nicaragua
and Salvador: the great majority of the people in Nicaragua supported the
revolution against Somoza; but the great majority of the Salvadorans re-
ject the insurrectionary appeal of the extreme Left. It is probably fair to
say that, were it,not for the great foreign support given to the guerrillas,
the violent Left in Salvador would be defeated in a relatively short period
of time. Alas, there is substantial support, some of it from very far away.
Weapons and ammunition have arrived from Vietnam on Soviet ships, via
Libya, Cuba and Nicaragua. The PLO, Ethiopia, North Korea and
Mexico have also provided help in one way or another, and the command
headquarters for the guerrillas is located just outside Managua,
Nicaragua, where the course of the military campaign is analyzed by the
Salvadorans along with Cuban and Nicaraguan experts in such matters.
This great international organization was brought to bear on a revolu-
tionary government that offered real promise for the people of Salvador,
but its programs could not be reasonably carried out in an atomosphere of
constant fighting, where the guerrillas increasingly aimed their attacks at
targets that would make normal life impossible in the country. Electrical
stations and power lines, bridges and roads were primary targets, with
periodic assaults on army strongholds and terrorist attacks on the cities.
The army responded in kind, with some elements conducting mass kil-
lings of civilians suspected of complicity with the guerrillas.
Under similar circumstances in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas declared a
 state of national emergency, suspended many civil rights, called for mass
inductions into the armed forces, and generally increased repression. In
Salvador, the elections went ahead as promised in March, 1982, even
though the guerrillas threatened to kill people who went to the polls. More
than 80% of the people voted, and although the Christian Democratic
Party of Napoleon Duarte-the man named by the military to head the ci-
vilian branch of the revolutionary government-got more votes than any
other party, five parties to the right of Duarte collectively obtained 60%
of the vote, and were therefore able to exclude Duarte from power, and to
name their most charismatic spokesman, a militant Rightist named
Roberto D'Aubuisson, President of the Constituent Assembly. The big
losers were the forces of the extreme Left, who refused to participate in
the elections, and who had banked on a large proportion of abstentions.
Following the elections, a new Constitution was drafted, with Presidential
elections scheduled for the spring of 1984.
In the mean time, the guerrilla war has ebbed and flowed, depending
upon the performance of the army (an increasing proportion of which was
trained in the United States), the flow of weapons to the guerrillas from
outside sources (a factor which in turn was affected by the success of the
anti-Sandinista forces fighting the Nicaraguans from north and south),
and the weather.
The upshot of all this was that the democratic revolution had come
under attack from both political extremes. The Leftist guerrillas de-
manded a share of power, even though they could demonstrate little in the
way of popular support. The Rightists, after their initial defeat by the rev-
olution in 1979, insisted that the only way to end the guerrilla war was by
unrestrained violence, and after a significant decline in the activity of the
infamous "death squads" following the revolution, these odious institu-
tions acquired new vigor in 1983, with a new, ominous twist: whereas the
traditional "death squads" had engaged in indiscriminate killing of per-
sons suspected (often with little evidence) of helping the Left, the new
ones assassinated moderate political, religious and trade union leaders.
While it was obvious that some of the killers came from the army, by late
1983 there were signs that the officials who supported the democratic
revolution were finally moving to put an end to at least the latest version
of the Rightist assassins.
As Max Singer wrote shortly before the 1982 elections,
...for the last two years El Salvador has been torn apart by two
counterrevolutions, or phony revolutions, trying to gain power and
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 reverse the actions of the revolutionary group that has ruled since
October 1979: one counterrevolution from the extreme Right, made
up of the former ruling class, and one from the extreme Left, con-
trolled and led by violent fanatics with the support of most of the
enemies of the U.S. from all over the world.
The guerrillas could claim a major success in having thwarted the im-
mediate goals of the revolution, for although there is little doubt that the
great majority of Salvadorans supported the goals of the 1979 coup, at a
certain point order and security become more important than political ide-
als, and Salvador showed alarming tendencies toward polarization by the
end of 1983. The economy predictably suffered from the effects of the
war, with a considerable expansion of government debt (in 1982 the gov-
ernment deficit was 35% of its total expenditure, and 7.3% of GDP, and
was growing), and a parallel decrease in GDP (remarkably, however, the
rate of decrease was slowing: it fell by about 9% in 1980 and 1981, but by
5.4% in 1982).
Even more discouraging was the reaction of "enlightened" public
opinion in much of the West, for there were tendencies in the United
States and Western Europe to treat the guerrillas as the true revolu-
tionaries, and the army as a reactionary force. Prior to the 1982 elections,
President Duarte was widely considered to be a reactionary, even though
he had been imprisoned and tortured for the "crime" of having won the
elections of 1972, and even though Duarte and the military leaders of the
coup followed through on their promises for land reform, democratic
elections, and a reduction in the activity of the traditional death squads.
There was a great unwillingness to recognize what had happened in
Salvador, on both sides of the basic conflict between the government and
the guerrillas: the notion that military officers might lead a successful
democratic revolution is difficult for many people to accept, especially
since the military caste in Latin America has so often played an authori-
tarian role. And it is also difficult for many Western journalists and politi-
cians to recognize that the self-proclaimed "revolutionaries" in Salva-
dor-the FMLN/DRU-are vicious counterrevolutionary killers in dis-
guise. The same thing happened in Nicaragua, where even those jour-
nalists who knew that the hard-core Sandinistas were deeply committed
Marxist-Leninists refrained from criticizing them early on (at a time when
international pressure might have been decisive in preserving free institu-
tions in Nicaragua). Georgie Anne Geyer, one of the best American jour-
nalists on the Latin American beat, wryly recalled:
 When I went back (to Nicaragua) after the Sandinista takeover, I
was willing to give the new forces the benefit of the doubt, despite
the prevalence of hard-core Marxists in the top command. Part of
the reason for this was that I had been so harsh on Marxist Cuba
over the years that I wanted to be especially fair, trying to believe
there could indeed be a "new" kind of revolution here. In retros-
pect, I was too fair ...
It was normal to bend over backwards to be kind to the Sandinistas, be-
cause the sentiments of Americans quite naturally support ostensibly rev-
olutionary enterprises against dictators like Somoza, and one can under-
stand-barely-the difficulty encountered by Americans trying to grasp
the uniqueness of the democratic revolution led by the colonels in El Sal-
vador. But one is hard pressed to explain the unwillingness of many ob-
servers to accept the fact that the guerrilla movement in Salvador is part
and parcel of the same general phenomenon that has produced the awful
results in Sandinista Nicaragua, and that if the FMLN/DRU wins in Sal-
vador, it will become a second Nicaragua. Yet not only is this rarely if
ever said (even now, when the Nicaraguan control over the Salvadoran
guerrilla movement is largely recognized), but there is an ongoing ten-
dency to overrate the popular support for the guerrillas. This is why ABC
television (to take one example among many) was able to "report" at
midday of the March, 1982 elections in Salvador, that there would be a
lighter-than -expected turnout at the polls. Not only was this empirically
wrong, but virtually every public opinion poll for weeks in advance had
predicted a very high participation by the voters. Only the guerrillas
claimed-and spread terror in order to guarantee-a large number of
abstentions.
Mistakes of this sort, once they become firmly established, have policy
consequences, and it may well be that the failure to perceive in a timely
way .what was going in Central America deprived the United States-and
the other democratic countries of the world-of an opportunity to act ef-
fectively in support of the democratic revolution in Central America. In
Nicaragua, many Western countries continued to contribute foreign aid
long after it was clear that the Sandinistas were working against Western
interests, and that an attempt was being made to establish a new totalitari-
anism. With regard to the revolution in Salvador, the governments of
France and Mexico called upon the United States and the government of
Salvador to grant the guerrillas a share of political power, and similar
positions were taken by many other European governments, and re-
peatedly by most of the member parties of the Socialist International. It
 was not until the fall of 1983 that Felipe Gonzales of Spain and Willi
Brandt of Germany, speaking for the European Bureau of the Socialist
International, condemned the course chosen by the Sandinistas, but even
at that late date the two leading European Socialists could only warn that
assistance might be terminated if the Sandinistas did not change their pat-
tern of behavior. To make matters worse, they and most other European
leaders continued to insist that the FMLN/DRU be brought into the gov-
ernment of Salvador, thereby acting as if Nicaragua did not exist at all. As
Jean-Francois Revel has written in his latest book, How the Democracies
End:
...commentators, observers and politicians have a hard time under-
standing complex situations... in which it is true on the one hand
that in a given country there is a social crisis due to injustice, and
false that Communism is qualified to resolve that crisis, but true yet
again that Communists are quite capable of exploiting the crisis to
achieve their political and strategic goals.
Who Speaks the Truth in Central America?
One of the problems facing us-and the people of the region who yearn
for the success of the democratic revolution-is that it is normal for the
leaders of Latin America (like those in most of the world) to say one thing
in public and something quite different in private, when they express their
real sentiments. This was dramatically evident, for example, during the
Falklands crisis of 1982, when most of those Latin American leaders who
were able to speak privately with the American Secretary of State told
him that it was urgent for the United States to deal a devastating blow to
Argentina, whatever they might say in public. At the same time, these
very same leaders were denouncing the United States for supporting Great
Britain in the war.
Much the same applies to Central America, where the leaders of Costa
Rica, Honduras, Panama and Guatemala have all told officials of the
United States that the greatest threat to the future of the region is the San-
dinista regime in Nicaragua. But they are reluctant to say such a thing in
public, both because they fear reprisals and because some of them wish to
maintain their own "progressive" credentials intact. In any event, they
believe that the destiny of Central America will be determined by the be-
havior of the United States, and therefore feel free to take public positions
on the basis of their own domestic political requirements.
To be sure, these are dangerous games to play, as the recent past dem-
 Approved For Release 2009/03/04 : CIA-RDP89B00423R000400420015-0
onstrates all too clearly, for the public positions have an effect on Ameri-
can foreign policy. It has been reported, for example, that President Car-
ter was told by Mexican President Lopez Portillo that although Somoza
was a hateful man, if the Sandinistas triumphed in Nicaragua, the Mexi-
cans would be forced to shift their foreign policy in a dramatically radical
direction. Thus, the Mexicans preferred that Somoza be saved. The story
may not be entirely accurate, but as the Italians say, even if it is not true it
makes a true point: public statements by political figures do not always
represent their true feelings, and dramatic events have far-reaching effects
upon neighboring countries. At the moment, the greatest threat to the
democratic revolution in Central America is the government of
Nicaragua, its military might, its international network (above all Cuba
and the Soviet Union), and its efforts to spread violent counterrevolution
throughout the region. If the other countries of Central America are re-
luctant to say this publicly, we must do so. More importantly, if they are
unwilling or unable to defend democracy by themselves, we must seek
ways to help them to do it. And we must do so on the same basis that the
counterrevolutionaries have launched their assault. The counterrevolution
is regional. The democratic revolution must also have a regional struc-
ture.
 THREE:
HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA
(OR, THE EMBRYONIC REVOLUTION)
Honduras is the second largest and one of the poorest of the Central
American republics, and is the most recent member in the club of demo-
cratic governments in the region. For much of its history, Honduran elec-
tions were more honored in the breach than in the observance of their re-
sults, and as recently as 1971 General Oswaldo Lopez staged a successful
coup when he failed to gain reelection to a second 6-year term. Acting
with American encouragement, the Honduran military agreed to demo-
cratic elections in 1981, when Roberto Suazo Cordova became the first
elected civilian in 18 years. He faced one of the worst economic crises in
the country's history. In 1981, total production stagnated and 1982 pro-
duction dropped by an estimated 1%. Lack of international confidence in
the Honduran economy led to a shortage of foreign investment, and the
high interest rates in the industrialized countries led to a flight of capital
from Honduras. In 1982 there was a significant drop in exports of Hon-
duras' basic commodities: coffee, sugar, meat, lead, silver and even to-
bacco, and the loss of revenue was not offset by increases in other ex-
ports. Suazo has adopted the by-now standard remedies to these prob-
lems: reduction of the federal deficit, greater liquidity for the private sec-
tor, and an attempt to maintain a satisfactory balance of payments in order
to stabilize the exchange rate. Thus, while short-term prospects are not
rosy, in the longer term Hondurans have reason to.be cautiously optimis-
tic.
The more dangerous problems for the country stem from the regional
crisis, primarily those elements caused by the counterrevolution. The new
tyranny in Nicaragua has produced a wave of refugees, now numbering
an estimated 35,000 in Honduras alone. These include the so-called con-
tras along Nicaragua's northern border, as well as the approximately
10,000 Miskito Indians who have taken sanctuary in Honduras. This has
 Approved For Release 2009/03/04 : CIA-RDP89B00423R000400420015-0
placed an additional burden on an already strained country, and creates
internal tensions that inevitably threaten the fragile democratic experi-
ment upon which the nation has so recently embarked. As in Salvador,
the Honduran military has lent its power and prestige to a transition to
democracy; but as in Salvador, considerations of national survival will
ultimately prevail over the desire for democratization.
Thus far, the Hondurans have managed to deal effectively with the
counterrevolutionary guerrilla movement in their own country, thanks to
good police work, and to a far lower level of activity by the guerrillas than
in Salvador. It is thanks to the Hondurans, in fact, that we have learned
one of the most interesting and little-known facts about the counterrevo-
lutionaries: they are very often recruited under false pretenses.
It is widely believed that the guerrilla movements consist in part of
idealist revolutionaries, and in part of professional guerrillas. But to these
categories a third must now be added: those tricked into joining. Dozens
of defectors have reported that they accepted invitations to travel to
Nicaragua and Cuba in order, or so they believed, to be trained-in ag-
riculture or other technical skills. It was only after they arrived at their
final destination that they were told the real purpose of their recruitment,
at which time it was impossible to leave. They then went through ex-
tended training (often a year and a half or more) in Marxist ideology and
guerrilla techniques, and were sent into battle in Salvador or Honduras,
often under atrocious conditions (many defected because they were
starving, and suffering from the effects of exposure, having inadequate
clothing).
The activities of the Honduran authorities have uncovered an elaborate
clandestine organization in the country, complete with safe houses, secret
methods of transporting and storing weapons, gathering intelligence and
establishing secret guerrilla cells. Thus the Hondurans were able to rec-
ognize early on that they would not be spared by the forces of counterrev-
olution in Central America, and they have acted to defend themselves.
Not only has the Honduran Government permitted the anti-Sandinistas to
train in Honduras, and use the country as its base of operations, but the
Honduran Army has made it evident that it will not hesitate to fight the
Nicaraguans if it comes to that. Yet, if Nicaragua achieves its announced
military objectives Honduras will be no match in a war with the San-
dinistas. It is for that reason that the United States has been willing to
grant considerable military assistance to Honduras, as well as to aid the
anti -Sandi ni stas.
The democratic revolution is still in an embryonic stage in Honduras,
 but there is reason for hope. Despite difficult economic problems, a se-
vere military threat from Nicaragua, and a guerrilla force operating inside
the country, there are as yet no signs that the military is reconsidering its
decision to take a chance on democracy. The Hondurans have faced their
security problems realistically, and with surprising moderation: no state
of emergency is in effect, the population is generally supportive of gov-
ernmental policies, and there is reason to hope for continued democratic
evolution. All of this, of course, is dependent upon containment or defeat
of the counterrevolution, a theme to which we shall return in short order.
Of all the countries in Central America, Guatemala is by far the most
violent. According to Amnesty International, between 50,000 and 60,000
people were killed in the 1970s, many of them innocent Indians (who ac-
count for some 60% of the population) who have been regularly forced
into near-slave labor conditions, and then murdered when they served
their usefulness. Guatemalan governments have been repeatedly accused
of political assassinations and of systematic torture, and the regime of
General Lucas Garcia (1978-1982) is considered to have been the most
corrupt and repressive in Latin American history, which is quite a record.
In the last three years of his regime, the guerrilla movement multiplied
three times over. Following the rigged elections of 1982, General Eph-
raim Rios Montt, a born-again Christian, seized power and attempted to
relieve at least some of the evils of the recent past. Notorious corrupt gen-
erals were removed from their posts, a public campaign against unethical
practices was launched, and some of the more infamous paramilitary
groups were eliminated.
This was no democratic revolution; Rios Montt had no use for elec-
tions, and he claimed absolute authority for himself. This absolutism was
useful, up to a point, for Rios Montt was able to eliminate some of the
worst of the criminal activities in the country, especially the systematic
exploitation and murder of the Indians. But in the end his religious fanati-
cism was unacceptable to the military, and he was removed in a bloodless
coup by another general, Humberto Mejia Victores, in the summer of
1983. At first it appeared that Mejia would provide a period of calm mod-
eration, but late in the year it appeared that the spiral of internal violence
was beginning once again. Nonetheless, elections for a constituent as-
sembly are scheduled for this July, with presidential elections planned the
following year. There appears to be a rough consensus that this sort of
 evolution, modelled on the Salvadoran and Honduran experiences, is
necessary and desirable.
Guatemala may be in the stage immediately preceding the democratic
revolution, but much will depend upon the success of the revolution in her
two southern neighbors: Honduras and Salvador. And much will also de-
pend upon the behavior of Mexico, to the north. For Mexico, despite its
lip-service to democracy, has of late acted
Y, as handmaiden to the counter-
revolution. As Lopez Portillo warned Jimmy Carter, with the triumph of
the Sandinistas, Mexico shifted her international behavior, and now
seems firmly allied with Cuba and Nicaragua in most regional affairs.
Worse still, the Mexicans have permitted the Guatemalan guerrilla
movement to use southern Mexico as a haven and training area, even
though the guerrillas themselves have told visiting European and Ameri-
can journalists that if they take power in Guatemala, a similar movement
will be launched against Mexico herself.
Mexican support for the counterrevolution has had innumerable pemi-
cious effects, not only in supplying an operational base for the Guatema-
lan guerrilla movement and for the Salvadoran FMLN, but also in the
diplomatic field. To quote Max Singer:
Mexican support for the FMLN was critical in enabling France,
the Socialist International and many leading political figures in the
United States to accept the perspective on El Salvador put forth ...
for the guerrillas. In the American and European discussion,
Mexico was cited as an objective and informed source; at one point
100 Congressmen urged the State Department to pay greater heed to
the Mexican initiative ... Finally, in the summer of 1980 Lopez
Portillo reportedly promised Castro that when the planned final of-
fensive in El Salvador was carried out the following January, the
Mexican army would conduct maneuvers near the Guatemalan bor-
der to discourage the Guatemalan army from interfering. man-
euvers Y ( were carried out as but b
then
promised, y the situation had
changed.)
The future of Guatemala thus depends not only upon the courage and
ability of her own leaders; much depends upon the overall regional situa-
tion. There are recent reports that the Guatemalans are "taking out insur-
ance" and are beginning to talk with Mexico and Nicaragua about some
sort of arrangement between the three. The first results of such contacts
can perhaps be seen in the recent decision by the Guatemalan Navy to
 stop patrolling Salvador's northern waters, thus giving the FMLN greater
operating space, and greater access to arms shipments by sea. A prudent
government must guard against "worst-case scenarios," after all, and the
Guatemalans seem to be taking steps to ensure decent relations with the
counterrevolutionaries should they prevail. Needless to say, such devel-
opments are likely to be fatal to any hopes for a democratic revolution in
Guatemala.
 FOUR:
COSTA RICA
(OR, THE REVOLUTION HELD HOSTAGE)
Costa Rica is the oldest democracy in Latin America, having held free
elections uninterruptedly since 1889. It is also unique in Latin America
for another reason: there is no army there, order being maintained by a
5,000-man police force that changes personnel every five years. Despite
its name (which means "rich coast"), Costa Rica is not rich in natural re-
sources, and has had to depend upon the enterprise and skill of its popula-
tion to develop wealth. By and large it has been a success; Costa Rica has
perhaps the most successful agricultural program in Central America, as
well as a modest industrial base and considerable commercial activity.
Nonetheless, Costa Rica now faces a dramatic crisis, caused by the ir-
responsibility and profligacy of the government that preceded the current
regime of Alberto Menge (a social democrat), by the security problems
resulting from the country's location along Nicaragua's southern border,
and by the world economic crisis resulting from the latest oil shocks and
debt problems. In 1981, Costa Rica's GDP dropped by 3%, the first such
decline in three decades. Unemployment stands at 15%, and inflation at
65%, and Monge has been forced to renegotiate the country's foreign debt
with the International Monetary Fund, and to increase basic prices for
water, electricity, gasoline and telephone service.
Few doubt the ability of the country to rebound from its current dif-
ficulties, but it now faces problems that are new, and that may not be so
easily resolved. In the first place, Costa Rica has been intimately involved
in the cycle of revolution and counterrevolution in Nicaragua, having
been a major staging base for the Sandinistas during the fight against
Somoza. Especially in the last two years, San Jose was a major staging
base for Sandinista operations, which drew to Costa Rica the radical elite
of all of Latin America. Cubans, Tumpamaros, Montoneros and other
radical guerrillas came to Costa Rica, established radio stations, training
 bases, shipping companies and all the other activities required to support
the FSLN. The attitude of successive Costa Rican governments has wa-
vered between a desire to maintain neutrality in the region's violent con-
flicts, and a natural antipathy to dictatorships. The Monge government,
for example, has often spoken critically of the Sandinista regime, but has
recently declared an absolute neutrality which, if enforced, would force
the anti-Sandinista forces led by Eden Pastora and Alfonso Robelo to
leave the country. This would then put Costa Rica in the paradoxical po-
sition of having aided the counterrevolutionaries in Nicaragua, but deny-
ing any support to the Sandinistas' enemies.
The second problem facing Costa Rica is curruption. If Honduras suf-
fers from poverty, Costa Rica's current problem is one of wealth squan-
dered. Unlike the other countries in the region, Costa Rica's corruption is
not limited to a traditional (generally military) elite, but is spread over a
far wider spectrum of the population. But its effects are just as pernicious,
threatening to sap the traditional energy and industry of the country. It
remains to be seen whether Monge has the strength of character to with-
stand the pressures of a powerful counterrevolutionary neighbor to the
north and an increasingly cynical population that seeks private gain at the
expense of national integrity. Like most matters of this sort, the outcome
will depend upon both the leadership qualities of the government and the
eventual victors in the regional conflicts.
Under normal circumstances, Costa Rica would serve as a model for
the moderate revolutions elsewhere in Central America. Surprisingly, no
American Government in recent years has attempted to elevate Costa Rica
to this role. Yet under present circumstances, Costa Rica cannot play such
a part, for she can be so easily overwhelmed by the military might of
Nicaragua. Recognition of this fact undoubtedly plays a major role in
Monge's public embrace of neutrality (one may presume that in private he
repeats his earlier outspoken criticism of the Managua regime), yet if the
counterrevolution prevails in Salvador and then Honduras, Costa Rican
neutrality may take on a Mexican-style coloration.
 FIVE:
THE FUTURE OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTION
Throughout the fall and early winter of 1983-84, a group of distinguished
Guatemalans worked on a draft of a new, democratic constitution for their
country. They met daily at the Francisco Maroquin University, a private
institution renowned throughout the region for its independence and high
standards, and for its commitment to freedom. The chairman of the pri-
vate group was the President of the University, Professor Manuel Ayau,
the dean of Central American economists. In this most violent and tradi-
tionally repressive country of the area, the democratic revolution was
being designed. To be sure, the men who labored over the revolutionary
document had no guarantee that the military rulers of the country would
accept their recommendations; but then, the men who drafted our own
Declaration of Independence and our Constitution also worked against the
odds. The point is that the values of the democratic revolution are
flourishing in Central America. Brave men and women are willing to risk
their lives for it, against the implacable hostility of both political ex-
tremes. We must help them.
In order to help them effectively, we must clear our minds of a series of
myths and stereotypes that have clouded our vision and confounded our
judgment. The central myths are these:
The guerrilla movements are revolutionary, and spring from the justifi-
able rage of oppressed and miserable people.
In fact, the guerrilla movements are counterrevolutionary, and if they
triumph, the countries of Central America will experience a tyranny more
efficient and more systematic than anything they have undergone to date.
We hoped that the Sandinistas would prove an exception to this rule; they
did not. They instead followed the Cuban model. The guerrillas in Sal-
 Central America: The Future of the Democratic Revolution 29
vador, Honduras and Guatemala are cut from the same cloth and will
carry out the same programs as the dictators in Cuba and Nicaragua.
The military in Central America is inevitably authoritarian, cannot ac-
cept the rules of the democratic game, and is an obstacle to the demo-
cratic revolution.
In fact the military has proven to be a vital ingredient in the democratic
revolution in both Salvador and Honduras. Military leaders have over-
thrown the old tyrants, endorsed radical programs of social and political
revolution, and shown a willingness to step aside and endorse civilian
government in their countries. Indeed, in Salvador they have shown rare
courage and consistency, greater than the politicians have demonstrated.
The revolution in Salvador has failed because it was never genuine, and
the only hope for true revolution lies with the participation of the Left in
the government.
In fact the land reform program has been interrupted after its first, most
sweeping phase, but not because of lack of commitment by the military. It
has come about in part because the country is at war, and hence stability
becomes more important than it would be if the country were at peace,
and in part because, provoked by the guerrilla war, the Right has gained
political strength.
The guerrillas want a negotiated settlement, but are blocked by a combi-
nation of the desire of the Salvadoran Government to retain all power,
and the ideological opposition of the Government of the United States.
In fact, numerous captured documents show that the FMLN in Salvador,
supported by Nicaragua and Cuba, has always viewed negotiations with
the Salvadoran and American Governments as a tactic, designed to gain
time in order to win military advantage.
There is a story that has never been publicly told before that warrants
telling: during the first two years of the Reagan Administration, spokes-
men for the FMLN, above all the socialist Guillermo Ungo, complained
publicly that they could not find an American interlocutor to deal with.
They hinted broadly that a negotiated settlement could be arranged if only
the Americans had been willing to talk. In fact, a personal representative
of the Secretary of State had sought out Ungo, asking for any proposal for
 peace he might have. Ungo never responded, even though the message to
him was passed through some of his personal friends in Europe. These
friends became disillusioned with the passage of time, and the silence
from the FMLN.
We cannot judge whether the current negotiations are serious on the
part of the guerrillas, or for that matter on the part of the Nicaraguan re-
gime, but the past gives little cause for optimism. We believe that the
American Government, and those of the region, must act on the assump-
tion that the counterrevolutionary forces of Central America will not
negotiate in good faith, and that they must be defeated if the democratic
revolution is to succeed.
At the same time, we are not willing to abandon all hope that democ-
racy may yet prevail in Nicaragua without the military conquest of the
country. If an Eden Pastora believes it possible, we are willing to enter-
tain the notion.
All this means that the first order of business for those who cherish de-
mocracy is the defeat of the counterrevolutionaries. The war in Salvador
must be won. If it is lost, all hope for democracy and for human rights
will be lost along with the war. But it cannot be won in Salvador alone (as
we have made clear, we believe that had it not been for foreign support,
the FMLN would have been defeated some time ago). This means that the
democratic forces of the region must give themselves a unified military
structure.
The creation of some kind of regional military command goes hand in
hand with the diplomatic initiatives for peace, which are themselves re-
gional (the Contadora Group being the greatest example).
The current weakness of the fight against the counterrevolutionaries is
shown by a consideration of the major counterrevolutionary stronghold in
El Salvador's "Northern Tier," on its border with Honduras. The lack of
joint operations against the FMLN's forces permits the guerrillas to move
undetected and unthreatened across borders, making full strategic and
tactical use of sanctuary in Honduras. Our understanding is that the Hon-
duran armed forces are not, at present, strong enough to secure the coun-
try's borders with El Salvador while simultaneously defending them-
selves against the direct threat to Honduras itself from Nicaragua.
We therefore recommend that a multilateral security organization be
created for Central America, pooling manpower, intelligence and other
resources in order to defeat the counterrevolutionaries.
It is impossible to predict the effects of such a defeat. It would certainly
hearten the forces for democracy throughout Central America, including
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Central America: The Future of the Democratic. Revolution 31
those inside Nicaragua and perhaps even Cuba as well. Even the modest
effort required to liberate the tiny island of Grenada sent shock waves
through the counterrevolutionary regimes, producing a flurry of diploma-
tic activity and other gestures designed to prevent pressure from being
brought to bear directly against them.
One thing is certain: unless the war is won, democracy is doomed in
Nicaragua, and has a highly uncertain future in the rest of Central
America. Victory in the war is the best hope for democracy, for human
rights, and for the economic well-being of the region.
We are not military experts, nor is this essay an attempt to suggest that
the problems of Central America can be resolved by military means
alone. We have rather attempted to address the moral and political issues
facing Central America and the United States in the current crisis. Our
conclusion is, in terms of the debate of the last several years, a highly
controversial one: that an attempt at moderate, democratic revolution has
taken place in Central America, led by forces that heretofore have rarely
been considered to be revolutionary, and challenged by people calling
themselves revolutionary. Our recommendations are, therefore, twofold:
that those charged with designing and conducting the foreign policy of the
United States first explain the realities of Central America to the Ameri-
can people and to the world at large; and that they then move expediti-
ously to assist the democratic forces of the region to defeat the counter-
revolution. Then the brave example of Professor Ayau and his visionary
friends in Guatemala City may initiate yet another democratic experi-
ment, to our great satisfaction and long-term advantage.
If the counterrevolution is thwarted, we can then turn to the second
great task awaiting Central America's energies: the enrichment of the
people through the development of their societies. We have left this very
important point to the last, for two reasons: first, because no orderly so-
cial and economic development can take place so long as these countries
are under siege from the counterrevolution; and second, because it has
been extremely difficult to gain Congressional support in the United
States for the economic development of Central America and the Carib-
bean. We believe that one main reason for the lack of such support has
been the failure to understand the stakes in the Central American conflict,
and hopefully this is being remedied. But there is another reason for the
lack of political support, one with which we sympathize: foreign aid pro-
grams have, with rare exceptions, failed to deliver the results we had
hoped for. The so-called "block grants"-government-to-government
gifts-have more often than not enriched a small elite, and not achieved
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real development. It is for this reason that we wish to add one final sug-
gestion for American policy, provided that the defeat of the counterrevo-
lutionaries is carried out: let us not give to Central America the sort of ec-
onomic presents that will only make it harder to build equitable societies.
In our view, this means that we should assist the Central Americans in
developing their own industries and businesses, help them learn skills,
techniques and modern methods of manufacture and commerce, and join
with them in projects of reciprocal utility. Such programs must be aimed
at institutions and individuals, rather than at the Central American states
as such. For we have learned that central planning, by whatever form of
government, simply does not work. We Americans must accordingly
work with the enterprising groups and individuals in Central America
who alone can complete the transformation of their societies, and lead
them into the family of successful democratic nations.
These challenges are daunting indeed, but the future of this hemisphere
will be determined by our response to them.