(Classified) (MISSION 1115)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00551R000600290001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 14, 1956
• Content Type: DISP

~ Ap~hroved For Release 2000/05/31 :CIA-RDP89B005518000600290001-~
DISPATCH NO. EZZA-?.~r9
K V ~i VSL~AI~~
TO Headquarters
25X1 A '~ Z' v
FROM ~QriF~t!EMT R0. / ~ ~ 7 r \.
eca
cn
cry
Chief of Station, - ~o cHa~~~ 4r+ cu-ss. ^ G' ---~
GENERAL O DES~A5S6FIE~ -~
SUBJECT ~ orations cuss. CwahoED Tee Ts ~ cam., uz
25X1 A L SPECIFIC Mission lllj ~`~~T R~EIIPEYY DATE1 ~'~' ~ ~ ?~
k6TH: HR 70.2 W
1tTE; ~~~ - $'? REYIEWEHa_,. ~ ~ C 3 ~$ 25X1 A
LJ/~ I /" ~ ~ ~ Mission 1115 was flo obey 9 956
Special equipment consisted of Duration of ;he igz
was five hours and thirty--four minutes. Take-off was as scheduled. TJo prob-
lems were encountered 3n launching the mission.
2. L-$ HS 731, shutter tension spring broke after thirty-four exposures,
Preliminary reports from local group indicate that SI-7 and R-6 were excellent
through-out. L-8 was excellent for the first thirty-four exposures. There is
no indication of fogging or frosting. This is the fourth broken spring that
has occurred and each break has been at the same relative position on the spring,
directly below the hook on the first coil of the spring. Further, the design
of each break has been identical, i. e., an "L" shaped break. The first theory
was a double wind on the spring caused by the improper functioning of the latch.
This I disagree with, as it would indicate such on the exposure. Aiy theory is
that when the spring is manufactured, heat is applied to form the hook, and in
re-tempering the spring the part directly below the hook does not get the proper
treatment, resulting in weakness ixi this area, Magnafluxing the spring has
proven unsatisfactory. Instead each spring is periodically examined under a
microscope; although this method is not a positive fix, it is a precau.~ion and
has resulted in the discovery of one of the four defective springs. Conclusion:
Recommend this theory be further investigated at the plant and that a more
stringent test or inspection be initiated to ascertain that each spring meets
the specifications.
3, Ido problems were encountered in the briefing or de-briefing of this
mission.
!~, The route was clear for the entire route south of the Alps. On both
the outgoing and incoming legs light low clouds were encountered dust north of
the Alps gradually increasing to an overcast condition as it approached .~Jies-
baden. The pilot was on course throughout the flight. From the viewpoint of
maintaining the planned course line, this was probably the most successful flight
flown to date. The quality of the tracker film was generally good, although the
~;
CLASSIFICATION
~pyp~p~d~8~r Release 2 1 RtSt9 g_~p~opies;
MAR 1949 ~~-Lf^ ~ Q ~= ,2,,
 Approved For Release 2000/05/31 :CIA-RDP89B00551 R00~~2,9(~~~61-3
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T~S~CRET
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last fifty feet were badly obscured with 'sun streaks'. This was due to the
ex~?eme low angle of the sun at the close of the flight. Plotting time for
this mission was one hour and fifty minutes.
5. Peferenc All
in~3.eate was cleared and urgency existed to accomplish mission on
25X1A 12 Octob fore I feel _51"/1 wa.s unnecessary criticism, Project
Headquarters commo has bean reluctant to use patch under similar conditions.
However, in future subject messages will be dispatched Operational Immediate
through eommo patch. Again I must point out the original notification was
not received under the times specified in Operations Order 1~-56. This must
~ed to if we are to comply with all existing directives in dispatching
25X1 A messages.
25X1 A ~'? ~ is to be highly commer3ded for this mission.. Hi~~~~ take-off (`~~
Th
g
t
''~'e~
.
in
e
y and
was an instrument take-off with one half mile visibili
landing was a standard GCA approach with one half to three fourths mil e visi-
25X1A bi]'3ty and 300 foot ceiling.
visibility conditions and had
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was dire~tec? to land at
25X1 A ' to pracee.8 to ~1 in this event.
~.
was the only alternate with better
of been able to land ~t ~ he 25X1 A
d crew and equipment was s an 3.n.g by
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'!. It is recommenaea tinati tine uperaLions vraer ~-7n ana a.~i vperatizons
Policy letters be reviewed by Project Headquarters and revised to better
direct the operations of the field units. This is particularity true after
has completed their move t
o icy otter number 19 should be
responsibilities of
after ~ has m
the same review to
Specifically: Operations
to delineate the proced~~7.d 7FX1 A
Operations Policy letter numbed requires
ility and procedures for the Flint Tapes.
This is especially true now that USAF'E is getting copies of both the f31m and
the tapes; Operations Policy letter 11~ should be modified where applicable.
25X1A
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - Addressee
Approved For Release 200q .i's~~f~~DP89B0055