LAOS- ITEM NUMBER 15 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST OF 31 JULY 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00552R000100040005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 8, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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*NSC Review Completed*
SUBJECT Laos - Item Number 15
Senate Select Committee Request of
31 July 1975
1. Attached hereto are various notes and reports
relating to the 1961 Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task
Force. This material was requested in Item 15, IV, Second Priority of
reference. Please note that some items appear to be
internal Agency documents but refer to discussions with
White House and National Security Council staff members.
Since we have no way of knowing the ultimate disposition
or use of some of the documents, we defer to the Review
Staff for a decision as to whether the following items
should be cleared with the White House or National
Security Council prior to their release to the Senate
Select Committee:
a. Memorandum for the Record dated 23
June 1961. Subject: Meeting for Discussion
on Further Development of Deterrence Paper.
b . Memorandum dated' 22 November 1961,
Subject: Conversation with Walt Rostow,
c. Memorandum for Director of Central
Intelligence and Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence, dated 13 December 1961,
Subject: Report on Counter-Guerrilla Warfare
Task Force.
d. Memorandum for CA/C/ dated 2
February 1962.' Subject: Background of Counter-
Guerrilla Warfare Task Force.
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2. Please note that many memoranda contained in this
package make reference to draft attachments which we have
not been able to locate. If additional materials are
found pertinent to item 15 they will be forwarded,,
Attachments;
As Stated
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23 June 1961.
Rostow, White House; General Edward G. Lansdale,
DOD; Mr. Henry Ramsey, Dept., of State;
DD/P
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Meeting for Discussion on Further Development
of Deterrence Paper
PARTICIPANTS:
1. The officers named above met in the DD/P conference
room at 1130 hours, 22 June 1961, to discuss further action on de-
velopment of the paper on the subject of the U. S. Capabilities for
Deterring and Countering Communist Subversion and Guerrilla Opera-
tions in Underdeveloped Areas. 2. '. stated that he felt that there was need for
papers in a number of different categories and that in several of these
categories, there were already available existing papers which could
be pulled together and edited to form a small reference library which
could be of valuable assistance in formulating an overall paper. He
listed these categories as follows:
a. Historical case studies. A number of such
studies are already in existence.
b. Military doctrine. A number, of papers, in-
cluding Frank Lindsay's paper on guerrilla warfare, a
recent Dept. of the Army paper on unconventional warfare,
and the tactical doctrine for South Vietnam are available.
c. Present and threatening situations.. A paper
on this subject by OCI dated March 1961 is available.
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d. Communist doctrine. A recent paper by
CI/ICD is available as well as works by Mao Tze Tung,
Che Guevara, etc.
e. Organizational papers. !noted
that in specific cases such as South Vietnam and Laos
today, there seems "to be reasonable agreement at high
government levels as to responsibilities for actions". He
felt that there was a need for a sub-paper in this cate-
gory on responsibilities for unattributed action and that
there was some need for a discussion on this subject.
He also. stated that he felt there was a need for a broader
sharing of knowledge in the Executive Branch. noting
particularly as an example, the PARU activities and the
problems involved.
f. Cuba, noted that he felt that one
point that was missing in the Taylor report is a recogni-
tion that if a decision is made to use violence, which will
probably involve some degree of attribution, there must
be political - s and costs and a determination must
be made as to just what kind of and costs are
acceptable. He noted that Walter Lippman is addressing
himself to this problem in recent articles. Mr. Lippman
seems to argue that anything that we do must be truly co-
vert, and if that is accepted, what then are the limits
within which the U. S. can act? Mr. Rostow pointed out
the extent of communist aggression in South Vietnam, and
queried as to whether do we simply try to cope with it de-
fensively or do we, having established that aggression is
taking place, attack Hanoi. General Lansdale remarked
on the necessity for establishment of a legal, base on
which to operate and pointed out how the communists in
Laos had recognized a government of their choice and
then openly assisted that government.
3. Mr. Rostow then presented in outline form what he considered
should be the format for the proposed paper. This was as follows:
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1. A basic summary of the problem. ( -rioted
that this should be a brisk, short summary. )
2. Communist techniques.
3. The U. S. role and doctrine.
a. Overt
b. Covert
c. Legal basis - international law
d. The role of and attitudes in the UN
1. Types of situations. ( . felt that the approach
used in the original outline paper, which establishes several types of
situations, was a valuable one and should be made a part of this paper.)
2. Current and foreseeable situations.
a. Defensive
b. Aggressive (East Germany)
This section should containa description of just what the U. S. Govern-
ment is doing in each of the situations that are examined..
3. Description of the current U. S. organization and capability
to handle the situations,with particular reference to the foreseeable pro-
blems in Africa, and the preparation or lack of preparation being made
therefor.
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III Recommendations.
The recommendations should be specific and should. be related
to concrete cases discussed in the previous parts of the- paper. Among
items mentioned as properly deserving of specific recommendations are:
a. The role of diplomatic action.
b. Clarification of overt-covert actions and
responsibilities.
c. Specific note of areas in which our capabilities
are in substantive arrears.
d. The prompt identification of the establish-
ment of a communist arms base in Africa and the im-
mediate action to be taken thereon.
e. The effectiveness of our operations in Columbia
where there seems to be a grave threat to the government.
f. Specific recommendations with regard. to the
UN, with attention paid to the role of the neutral nations,
to getting the communist aggression in South Vietnam. into
the UN, with the suggestion that effort be -made to provide
Ambassador Stevenson with A documented and pictorial.
evidence as to the communications network. operating from
Hanoi to South Vietnam.
4. ; noted that in every problem situation there was
always present some element of indigenous revolt. We must develop a.
concept of what is aggressions and then what can legally be done to counter
that aggression. In this regard, he again mentioned Colombia.and then
Cuba stating that we must surface Castro's expanding activities in VH
by training, propaganda, arms deliveries, etc.
5. General Lansdale stated that he felt that it must be recognized
that there are two kinds of evidence - legal evidence that can be produced
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and will stand up in court, and propaganda evidence such as that
used by the Commies in Indonesia which is used to create public
opinion rather than to gain a Legal decision.
6. In answer to a question on organization, Mr. Rostow
stated that the recommendations on organization should be based
on concrete cases rather than on abstract reasoning.
7. Mr. Ramsey queried as to the purpose of the paper. Mr.
Rostow replied that it was to provide a more profound awareness,
probably through the NSC mechanism to the President, the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the DGI of the problems and
to make recommendations for specific regional and country actions,,
for better structural organization of the UN, and as an example., to
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highlight to the Department of State the need for various actions
with
regard to the UN.
8. There was a discussion on the subject of mild versus
deep disclaimable operations. East Germany and North Vietnam
were illustrative of mild disc laimabiLity, while under current con-
ditions, Cuba and Tibet would represent deep disc laimability.
9. Mr. Rostow re-emphasized the importance of the paper
providing, in effect, an order of battle which arrayed our capabilities
against our problems.
10. General Lansdale stated that because of some of his pro--
blems in the Pentagon, he hoped that a draft of the paper could be pro-
vided to circulate through the DOD and that he hoped that the knowledge
of continuing development of the paper in the next few weeks could be as
limited as possible so that he would not be constantly called on by his
associates who -night like to participate in the early drafting. It was
agreed to set a July 20 deadline for producing a draft to be circulated,
and that until such a draft was prepared, the size of the group was to
remain as constituted at the -meeting. . further undertook
to produce a draft by 8 or 10 JuLy for circulation just among the parti-
cipating members.
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11. queried Mr. Ramsey a;s to a paper which
he had briefly been shown which had been produced in State and con-
cerns itself with a juridical and moral basis for actions- Mr.. Ramsey
briefly outlined the purpose of the paper indicating that it did not have
formal approval within the Department of State, but agreed to furnish
with a copy of the paper.
12. Mr. Rostow stated that, in essence, he thought the paper
should state how we propose to do things in terms of doctrine, in terms
of specific cases, and in terms of organization. He felt that the paper
would always be subject to nit-picking, and never ba fully accepted , but
that it should lead to a number of specific and helpful actions.
13. Mr. Rostow and General Lansdale then had a brief dis-
cussion with regard to President Diem's letter to the President re-
questing a force increase of 100, 000. I will not report on this con-
versation in this memorandum. Closed the meeting by
saying that there were two specific matters which he felt would require
decision and action in the very near future. The first was the continuing
support of the 9 - 10 thousand MEO's that we have armed in Laos, and the
second was reports that had reached him and caused him concern, to the
effect that Ambassador Young's proposed programs for Thailand had
been running into difficulty in State, apparently largely because of eco-
nomic reasons.
Covert Action Staff
' ..41W
Ui'Uiit_
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SUBJECT: Conversation with Walt Rostov
1. Walt Rostow called me this morning on the paper on deter-
rence of guerrilla warfare. He seemed to have no particular quarrel
with the statements mq.de or the principles enunciated in the draft
paper, a copy of which was sent to him on Tuesday morning. He
appeared to agree with the thought that this paper-vas. designed to
establish a general concensus of agreement concerning the principal,
factors to be considered in countries where violence and guerrilla
warfare are present or imminent and of general over-all courses of
action desirable to meet these situations. His specific question was
"Where do we go from here?"
2. After some discussion, I believe that we ended in. agreement
that the next step should be one or more papers concerned with specific
aspects of the problems raised by the general paper.. These subsidiary
papers would outline specific steps which should be taken to put the
Government in a position to initiate and carry through integrated pro- .
grams along the lines indicated in the over-all paper in specific areas,
3. The first and most important subject for specific analysis
seems to me, and I think also to Walt, to be the problem. of devising an
adequate intra-governmental structure to develop, monitor and manage
suitable programs. This includes the problem of organization here in
Washington both for the purpose of establishing a basis for policy making
and for the purpose of exercising continuing supervision of programs
once they are initiated. It also includes consideration of the organiza-
tion of the American community in the field.
4. Related to the problem of the structural organization of the
Government to facilitate decisions and management of operations. is the
question of how best to organize the indigenous community for the
purpose of consolidating its resources to meet the attack.
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5. There are a number of subsidiary points suggested by the
titles in an earlier memorandum sent by ? which- include.
a. Alerting the International Community.
b. Socio-Economic Action Programs.
c. Revamping the MAP for Counter-Guerrilla Emphasis.
d. Appropriate Range of Covert Activities.
e. Training Programs.
f. Counter-Guerrilla Operations.
g. Counter-Pressures on Hostile Territory.
I am not at the moment personally impressed with the necessity
for all of these subsidiary papers. There is at least some question as
to whether any of them are really essential.
6. In any event, I left it with Walt that he would be responsible
for taking the initiative in developing a draft of a paper at least on the
organizational question and of requesting a meeting of the Task Force
(presumably early next week) when the draft paper is completed- In the
meantime, he is holding a paper, apparently on organization, which I
gather was submitted by Hilsman, presumably with Ramsey's concurrence.
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13 December 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR: "Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Report of Counter Guerrilla Warfare Task Force
1. This memorandum contains information for the Special Group
Meeting on 14 December.
2. Some eight months ago on the initiative. of Mr. McGeorge Bundy
and Mr. Walt Rostow I was designated chairman of a small Task Forcee on
the deterrence and countering of guerrilla warfare. Other members were
General Lansdale for the Department of Defense, Mr. Henry Ramsey for
the Department of State and Mr. Rostow for the White I-louse. In the course
of a number of periods of rather intense activity which were interrupted
by lulls when members of the Task Force were too busy with other rrnatte'rs,
a great deal of writing and rewriting was done which finally resulted on
12 December in the Task Force Report of which a copy is attached hereto.,
3. It was understood from the start that the members of the Task
Force participated in this work as individuals and did not speak for their
Departments or Agencies. This procedure was adopted in part in order
to avoid the circulation of successive drafts within the Departments.. Upon
completion I transmitted copies of the report to Mr. Bundy and General
Taylor and through the members of the task force to the Departments of
Defense and State. Presumably the White House staff will now ask for the
comments of the Departments.
4. Since this report recommends additional responsibilities for
General Taylor and for the Special Group, it is of special interest to him_
I understand he may mention it to you at the Special Group meeting on.
14 December although he understands that the members of the Special-
Group will not have had time to study it by that date.
.Attachment:
Subject Report Deputy Director
I (Plans)
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2 February 1962
.ORA~TDiM FOR: CAC/M
SUBJECT: Background'of Counter-Guerrilla Warfare Task Force
Report
1. For your background information, the following is a brief ru.n-
wo n on the background and genesis of the Counter-Guerrilla Warfare.
Task Force's Report, "Elements of U.S. Strategy to Deal with 'Wars
of #atioval Liberation'."
2. Mr. Robert Ko er of Mr. McGeorge Bundy' s staff at the White
~; rase told me that the idea for a task force on the problems of counter--
Co:unist insurgency was discussed by Mr. Rostow with Mr. Bundy
early in February 1901, that it was included in a "list of planning
acti or_s" prepared by Mr. Bundy, and that it was approved by the Presidern?.
in mid-February, 1961. Mr. Komer belie :--s that this was done orally,.
;ri thout 'o r