THE PRUDENT OPTION IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00676R000501110024-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: November 24, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

UTLO?K
academe
standing in for Mr. Bennett at the
itegie Foundation conference, As-
ant Secretary Chester Finn
tided a similar theme and received
lamp response from the college
sidents. But what Mr. Finn said is
t-ntialty what Carnegie said: That
eges have "an affirmative respon-
lity for moral development, for
iracter formation, for democratic
ties."
The college presidents seem reluc-
t to accept this responsibility. At
Carnegie conference, the Rev.
ucthy Healy, president of George-
s University. nostalgically eulo-
od "the dear, dead days when we
I 'in loco parentis.' " But college
ninistrators can no longer play the
? of surrogate parent, he said.
The Carnegie report found the
nbivalence" that the Rev. Healy
! other college administrators feel
-tit their overall responsibility for
dents' conduct "particularly dis-
Icing." It lamented the colleges' un-
tainty about standards of behavior
y should expect or require from
dents. Too true.
t'he movie "Animal House" was
.nt the long-ago animals in a Prat
se. In many contemporary college
rings, however, the animal house
. taken its act into auditoriums
ore the speaker is the U.S. secre-
v of defense or others whose poll-
, are uncongenial to some under-
]ds. And of course the kids don't
rely find philosophical justification
mob politics among themselves.
speakers' offending politics has
eady received plenty of "moral"
nineiation in class from tweedy,
tired adults. Shutting up the "ideo-
ties" becomes an imperative moral
that takes precedence over lesser
nciples such as free speech. This is
sort of muddled moral drivel Mr.
nnett has been attempting to wash
of the colleges.
if there is a common theme it) the
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00676R000501110024-2
By Joim M. POINDEXTEIR
Managing foreign policy is rarely sim-
ple. The president must not only respond to
events, but try to shape them as well.
When countries of strategic significance,
like Iran, are in the midst of transitions,
one can choose to sit back and ride it out
or try to be active and shape the emerging
reality.
While the risks of action are always ap.
parent, the risks and costs of inaction may
be less obvious but frequently even more
damaging. Few would argue that we paid
a high price for not anticipating the Iwten-
flal for convulsive change iii Iran in the
late 1970s. Maybe there was h111e we could
have done to alter the events of that time,
but there is precious little evidence that we
anticipated the profound changes that took
place or did anything to position ourselves
to shape or cope with that new reality.
We were overtaken and overwhelmed
by the Iranian revolution and its after-
math. We were traumatized by the new re-
gime and its virulent anti-American pos-
ture. Rather than continuing to paralyze
us. that trauma ought to be a potent re-
minder of the costs of waiting for change
and not trying to shape it.
Today, change is again looting in Iran
and the signs have been apparent for some
time. The current transition won't return
us to the pre-1979 days, but the conse-
quences and outcome of this transition-
though remaining unclear-may still prove
to be very dramatic. The actual unraveling
and disintegration of Iran is a distinct pos-
sibility as the costs of war prove increas.
ingly ruinous to the Iranian economy. fac-
tions harden and struggle intensities in an
ticipation of Khomeini's eventual death.
Keeping the Country Intact
Neither we nor our regional friends
have an interest in Iran's disiutegr tiou.
Iran is a critical geographic and strategic
buffer that physically separates the Soviet
Union from the Persia mu gull. No one tit the
area wants to see that buffer disappear.
Pragmatic elements in the Iranian lead
ership understand what has been happen
ing internally and the need to face up to
their problems if they are to keep their
country intact and sustain Mullah rule. At
a minimum. they have begun to search (or
ways to reduce their international isolation
and establish more normal relations with
the outside world. In these circumstances,
it is not surprising that we would begin to
get "feelers" from intermediaries repre-
senting those in Iran who appreciate the
The Prudent Option in Iran
problematic nature of their own situa-
tion.
We did not respond immediately to
these signals. Rather,' we wanted to be
sure that the signals were coming from
credible, authoritative leaders. We had and
continue to have no illusions about the indi-
viduals we have been dealing with or what
could emerge from this dialogue.
A pro-tt.S. leadership that invites its
back into Iran is not in the cards. But
that's also not necessary to serve our inter-
ests of building peace and stability in this
region; of maintaining a bulwark against
Soviet expansionism; or of ending a brutal
war whose hideous consumption of human
type-was not that important. In fact, the
amount sold equated to about 1/ 1000 the
total value of arms already bought by Iran
during the war. It was also clear that the
arms embargo was not to be lifted, nor
was this their objective. What was impor-
tant was the demonstration of power and
willingness to make the limited exception
to sell arms: a sign of serious intent in our
dialogue.
For our part, we needed Iranian demon-
strations as well. We told our interlocuters
that we must see signs of Iranian opposi-
tion to the use of terrorism and that they
must also help gain the release of U.S. hos-
tages in Lebanon. There were signs: Iran-
Those who now question us owe the country an
explanation of how they would have acted differently
given the stakes, the opportunities and the dangers.
life -especially it nation's precious youth -
is almost without precedent, yet has seem-
ingly escaped public attention in the U.S.
What we seek is an Iran that lives at
peace with its neighbors; that desires nei-
ther to undermine them nor to export revo-
lution; and that no longer supports terror
as an instrument of policy. We accept the
Islamic revolution as a fact and believe
that an Iran that is independent. economi-
cally healthy, and living in peace with its
neighbors can be a force for stability in the
region.
That, of course, requires the emergence
of an Iranian leadership that is prepared to
accept a similar vision and role for Iran.
We have seen the growth of such prag-
ntatic elements in Iran, and, as a result,
we began it tentative, probing dialogue
with them. As a inininium, we were build-
ing a channel for communication.
As this dialogue began, it was charac-
terized by Jeep rnnlual suspicion-rooted
in history with painful, vivid images and
memories on both sides. We each sough( to
probe the motives and seriousness of the
other. For the Iranians-who were running
great personal risks-a demonstration of
presidential involvement and support for
the dialogue was deemed essential; in
their eyes, since only the president could
authorize a sale of military material of
some sort, this was viewed as a clear and
convincing measure of presidential sup-
port, Moreover, arms are an important,
valued commodity in the Muktle East. The
amount of arms-for that matter even the
ian public opposition to the use of terror;
the cessation of hostage taking by some
Iranian-supported factions; the arrest of
government officials linked to terrorist ac-
tivities; Iranian intercession with the TWA
hijackers last summer in Beirut; their
quick opposition to the Pan Am hijacking
in Karachi and their immediate and public
denial of landing rights; and the release of
Benjamin Weir, Father Jenco, and David
Jacobson, held in Lebanon by the Islamic
Jihad.
Throughout, it is important to note, the
policy basis of all our actions-overt and
covert -was consistent: bring about an end
to the Iran-Iraq war, and stop state-spon-
sored terrorism. Actions to achieve policy
objectives should not be confused with the
objectives themselves. For example, our
arms embargo is not it policy objective but
simply an action taken to bring about an
end to the Iran-Iraq war.
tit me reiterate one point: The Iranians
who have been part of this dialogue and
who have been responsible for these dem?
onstralions are not pro-American. They
are pro-Iranian. It is their understanding
of Iranian needs and the importance of
comununty that is motivating them.
Would it be responsible for us not to try
to reach out to such groups-especially
when they indicate a desire for a dialogue
and contact with us? Would we serve U.S.
interests or the interests of our friends in
the Gulf if we were to avoid building rely
tions with these groups as the process of
jockeying for position in the pcst-Khomenii
period has gotten under way' How many
would be quick to castigate us-or any ad.
ministration-for not using it variety of in
struments to position ourselves to deal
with the looming struggle in Iran'.'
If Iran were a country with little strait'
gic weight or significance, we could afford
to lake a relaxed, disinterested view of de
velopments there. Unfortunately, we can
not. The Persian Gulf's importance will not
simply lade away. It remains a critical
strategic crossroads. Moreover, while the
oil market of today may suggest dimiu
ished importance, in the nod 1990s that is
not likely to be the case any longer--and
stability in the region will continue lu M?
vital to the well-being of the Western
world.
Stakes Justified the Risk
We must think ahead and think strategl
catty. We are, as a result, working strate-
gically, trying to enhance the longer-terns
stability of this vital region. In the course
of doing sco, we are not losing sight of our
near-terns objectives of ending the war
honorably; stopping state-supported ter
ror; and getting our hostages out of Leba
non.
We felt we were making progress in
each of those areas. With publicity over-
whelming this sensitive undertaking, it is
not clear what will now happen to this dia
logue.
What is clear, however, is that we tack
a calculated risk in going ahead with the
dialogue and developing it. The president
believes that the strategic objectives we
were pursuing and the stakes involved hi
Iran justified ibis risk. Leadership often
requires lough decisions and tough choices.
Statesmanship is rarely revealed when the
choices are easy.
Those whit question its sow are right to
do so. Hut rasher than only criticize what
we did, they owe the '?m untr?v ,iii .Xptana
lion of how they wutild hate acted (filter
eotly given the siakcs. the optwrlunities
and the dangers. They need to tell us how
and why they would have turned aside Itic
kinds of overtures we were receiving. They
need to tell us how they would have gone
about protecting such au obviously sense
live mission. And they need to tell as how
they would safeguard ow interests tit . it
cumslances where the future slabih[v ?d
this vital region nisi} hinge on IN, unfold
ing dramas in Iran lotlay.
Vice Arlmunl Nouuh .1 rev Is nulmnol +.
curtly advisri In Pi# sedrnl Hi o(yi i
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/22 : CIA-RDP89B00676R000501110024_2 _