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Approved For Release 2011/06/01 : CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 T Op 3 E?[IT PROJECT 119L i E?duo'nd ircre a Io-..io,ic ~. dowrash:g ,...a Jc!,,aii:caiOn _~ NOTICE: THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION -:~ AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEAI.I NG OF THE ES ,01041 LAWS. TITLE IS U.S.C.. SELI IONG 793 AND 794. THt TRANSMISSION OR RFb`:Af10N OF WHICH IO ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHONIIED PE23QM A PROHIBITED BY LAW. RAND TS- / '/i /\FDRD TS Cu 111 1V0. '7 = 1-582 -- - - - - - - - - - - Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOp SE6aErl TITLE PAGE 11 :.IN N PTI'' T 5ION, (N." SuT ^ TUY) 1ST n 'r'T_ ~C`1.CL0(?.ICbL I.J F--'-;!,L :LPCRT P:.CJECT 119L 1. This is TOP ..; LC:117 document and Will be handled in . S of FP. 20 It cont.; iris acCJ'idance v, w_ .t,'_'1 the provisi0:1 O1 ii. _ 5-1. information ? i e 3`ting the Nation l Defense of the United `:tat--s and, accordingly, utmost security will be afforded and isribution C.TlI-~ -~issemi~ atio i1 of its contents will be r3stricted on a 'need to 'cnOTr< basis. The international implications of this operation are such that extraordinary efforts should be expended by all to protect the Government even beyond the precise provisions of Air Force regulations. In this regard, it is strongly urged that all personnel acquainted with the project be again cautioned against inadvertent disclosure of information pertaining to the actual project, even though the operation has been terminated. (C) 2. The information contained herein will not be released to forei_n nationals. (U) 3. '_.eproduction of this document in whole or part is pro- hibited, except wi la the permission of the office of origin. . (U) U F- 5 cys ans~C-2 cys ?GC-2 cys IN.) - ? cys Si1C - 4 cys t 1FCRC- 2 cys `4C -2cys t1EDCOM--2 cys USAFSS-2 cys TAC -2 cys FISHES Brigadier Generral, Commander GROUP-1 Exc!udad from uutomaLc downgroding r:lid c!~L1 i1ictdioa D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01 : CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 0/C Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top 3E?[ 10.1 E, F" I. A cut-off date of 5 March 1956 was established for compilation of statistics on this operation. Subsequent to that date the following vehicles, which were originally entered in the bas-,? -eport as "Successful Launches", have been recovered in the European area, No transmissions were received from these balloons. For any gross analysis of the statistics contained in this report the category for the following enumerated balloons should be changed from "Successful launch" to "Failure" or "Stray" as indicated below: (C) Flight Line Balloon Number Number Serial Number. Type ADA 109 2114 648 66CT ADA 116 2124 655 66CT ADA 150 2109 676 66CT ADA 151 2110 646 66CT GIE 96 5097 704 66CT EVA 71 1071 826 66CT (C) B. Strays: EVA 88 4088 353 66CT ADA 35 2035 19 66CT (C) ~r k P) E r, G9 n Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 D-582 D/c Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 40o p 8 E IR, E T CHAPTER I - GENERAL SUMMARY PAGE 7 Introduction 8 General 8 Mission 8 Assignment of Mission 8 Activation of 1st Air Division 8 Concept of Operations 8 Initial Schedule of Actions 8 Organization .9 Selection of Operational Sites 9 Communications 11 Cover Plan 12 Training Phase Moby Dick Hi Training Launch Hydrogen Generation Tracking Recovery Operational Suitability Test Vulnerability Test Moby Dick Far East Command Post Exercises 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 14 15 15 Deployment Phase 15 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile) 16 1110th Air Support Group 16 456th Troop Carrier Wing 16 Pre-Operational Decisions 16 Ground Cut-Down Stations 16 Surface Recovery Support 17 Preparations for Launch 17 Stipulations by Higher Headquarters 17 Cover Plan Launches 17 Placarci a 18 Launch Limitations 18 2G-BO Auxiliary Safety Unit 18 Locator Beacon 18 Planned Configuration 19 Top SE(~_OIHET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 40p SE6k-"ET C Operational Phase, Primary Mission 20 General 20 Launching 20 Tracking 21 Recovery 22 Major Problems 22 Suspensions of Operations 24 Termination of Operational Phase _ 25 Results 25 Tab "A" - Conclusions 28 CHAPTER II - PRE-PRIMARY MISSION ACTIVITIES Part I Deployment Part II Moby Dick Far East Part III Communications Part IV Cover Launches Tab A The Balloon Tab B The Gondola Tab C Field Test for Modification to System 119L Tab D Launch Operations Tab E Hydrogen Generation Tab F Tracking Tab G Recovery Tab H Control Tab I Vulnerability Tab J Analysis of DMQ-1 Tab K Discussion of DMQ-2 Tab L Information Services Tab M Statistics Tab N Analysis of Ballasting Performance Tab 0 Materiel Tab P Finance Tab Q Personnel Tab R Mission Analysis Part I Meteorological Planning for Operation Part II Guidance for Operation of Launch Control Center Weather Facility Part III Guidance for Operation of Recovery Control Center Weather Facility Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 D-582 ~Dk Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOP SECRET Part IV Requirement for Weather Support Part V Weather Support for Balloon Launching Operation Part VI Comparison of Climatological Estimate of Launch Site Weather and Favorable Initial Trajectories Part VII Losses of Vehicles due to Unfavorable Trajectories Part VIII Accuracy of Climatological Estimate of Launch Site Weather Conditions Part IX Evaluation of Weather Conditions in Recovery Area Part X Forecastability and Reliability of Current Trajectory Launch Criteria CHAPTER V - BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS C 6 D-582 (rZ, Ph Top SUVREY Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 CC E r 7 D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Z/C Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 40p 8 E C-1 C A. General: This is the Final Report of Project 119L conducted by Strategic Air Command through the lst Air Division (Meteorological Survey). This r--port is intended to cover the primary mission for which Weapons System 119L was designed, plus related pre and post mission P::,ivities. In the event a more complete analysis of the project, is contemplated, reference must be made to those documents listed in Chapter V plus data available to Air Force Cambridge Research Center, ARDC. Weapons System 119L is described in Tabs "A" and "B", Chapter III. (C) B. Mission: To obtain photographic and electronic reconnais- sance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites using Weapons System 119L. (TS) C. sf spent of Mission: Weapons System 119L was developed by Air Force agencies and civilian institutions for the purpose of conducting pioneer reconnaissance by use of high altitude balloons. Headquarters USAF monitored this project during the initial planning and development stages by direct coordination with individual commands. It became apparent that a single command was required to further develop, coordinate and conduct the operation. The Strategic Air Command was assigned this responsibility in USAF letter, Subject: "Assignment of Additional Mission to Strategic Air Command", dated 21 March 1955. (TS) D. Activation of 1st Air Division: To accomplish the mission, Strategic Air Command activated the 1st Air Division at Offutt Air Force Base :i.n SAC General Order Number 26, dated 15 April 1955. The Mission of 1st Air Division was established in SAC Regulation Number 23-7, dated 15 June 1955. (U) E. Concept of Operations: The basic concept was to accomplish launches from Western Europe. Balloons were expected to transit the target area in seven to ten days and then be tracked and recovered within the Far East a..'. Alaskan areas. (TS) 1. Initial Schedule of Actions: The most favorable period for launch was determined to be 1 November through 1 May during which period the prevailing were predicted to be West to East at all altitudes. This was therefore established as the period during which the operation would be conducted. Based on this period of favorable winds it was planned to conduct Zone of Interior Operational Suitability Testing and Training during the period May 1955 through September 1955. There would then remain sufficient time for the units involved to deploy to forward bases and prepare such bases prior to the implementation date, 1 November 1955. (S) 8 D-582 T? SE~~wE Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 yOp SECG?3ET 2. Organizations a. 1st Air Division was assigned operational control of the 456th Troop Carrier Wing (TAC), equipped w-,.th C-119 aircraft for recovery operations; 1110th Air Support Group (HEDCOM), the balloon launching organization; and the 6926ti Radio-Squadron (Mobile) (USAFSS), to perform the tracking function. Because of the peculiar nature of the mission, responsibil?_t:'for operational control of the launch and recovery units was almost immediately expanded to include responsibility for training units and crews. This expansion of responsibility was a.r mplished by mutual agreement, between the Commander, lst Air Division, and the Commanders of the parent commands. Also, because of the tremendous quantities of material involved which required shipment overseas to meet deadline dates, it became apparent that lst Air Division should be given the responsibility of monitoring procurement, development, shipping, etc. Accordingly, these logistical responsibilities were also transferred by mutual consent of commanders concerned. (TS) b. 1st Air Division established Detachment 1, 1st Air Division,[at High Wycombe, England,7as a forward command post for the purpose of coordinating launch, support and public information requirements and effecting necessary liaison with supporting agencies. This detachment was activated 9 June 1955. Its mission was later expanded to include the requirement to exercise operational control of all European area launches. Headquarters 1110th Air Support Group,[.lso established at High Wycombe.3 directed the activities of the five launch detachments. (S) c. Headquarters 456th Troop Carrier Wing was established atLShiroi AB, Japan and functioned as a forward command post for the purpose of coordinating tracking, recovery and public information requirements and effecting necessary liaison with supporting agencies in the Far East. The 456th Troop Carrier Wing exercised operational control over tracking and recovery activities. (g) d. A graphic presentation of commE nc, relationship is contained on the following page. (U) 3. Selection of Operational Sitess a. Prior to assignment of Project 119L to Strategic Air Command, it was considered that all balloons. should be launched from Scotland. A further study of meteorological data indicated that more complete coverage could be obtained if sites were widely dispersed in Western Europe; besides, surface weather [in Scotland) was expected to be unsuitable for launch activities a large part 9 D-492 7 a P 3E' Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 C C TO 1 ft! I L O H FE W4 m ~ W. :04 JET El El i0 D-582 Top SEC~G'3E Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 ILJ Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 40p SECG?3EY C of the time. In addition, the distance from the area of interest resulted in a day or so of balloon travel before the photographic mission could be started, an important factor when the criticality of balloon life expectancy is considered. Based on studies of trajectory and surface weather, general areas for the location of launch detachments were selected. [They were Eastern Norway, West Germany, and Turkey. It was also decided to retain one site in Scotland as a matter of political expediency] After selection of the general areas, USAF directed that specific locations be selected by CINCUSAFE. This permitted consideration of logistical feasibility, physical adequacy, and other pertinent information pertaining to the theater and known to USAFE Headquarters. Criteria for physical adequacy to support balloon operations were stated by 1st Air Division. [Final selections were Evanton' Scotland; Gardermoen' Nor--.ay; Giebelstadt and Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany; and Adana, Turkey. An alternate site was selected at Buckeburg, Germany, for use in event that operations were denied at one of the primary locations (use of this site did not become necessary)] In June 1955, the Commander, 1st Air Division, and members of his staff visited each of the primary sites with a view toward inspecting the physical facilities available and stating specific requirement for site preparation. [During this visit to Europe, the lst Air Division Commander, with representatives from USAF and USAFE coordinated the balloon launching mission with high officials in each of the four countries concerned. (TS)] b. The three squadrons of the 456th Troop Carrier Ving were divided into detachments comprised of eight C-119 aircraft each and placed at recovery sites believed to be compatible with the predicted upper air trajectories. L~hese sites were Kadena AB, Okinawa; Adak NAS, Alaska; Kodiak NAS, Alaska; Itazuke AB, Japan; Misawa AB, Japan; and Johnson AB, Japan. In addition to these primary locations, Clark AFB, P. I., and Midway NAS were designated as alternate recovery bases to be used as required. Central AB, Iwo Jima was initially planned as a primary location, however, due to extensive typhoon damage to air base facilities, Itazuke AB, Japan was selected as a replacement base. (Sfl c. Location of tracking sites was predicated upon the forecasted flow f balloons into the recovery area and the require- ment to obtain adequate "cuts" of lines of position (bearings) to establish fixes. Cracking detachments were located at Shiroi AB, Japan; Northwest Field, Guam; Wake Island; Clark AFB, P. I.9 Yontan AB, Okinawa; Pyongtaek AB, Korea; Chitose, Japan; Midway Island; Shemya and Elmendorf AFB, Alaska.] At termination of the project an additional. site had been activated at Nome, Alaska, due to a require- ment based on experience gained during actual operations, and Formosa was being surveyed to determine the feasibility of locating a site on that island. (S) 4. Communicationss 7 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 D-582 D/C Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 T a F.-I 8 E C R E ri a. The lst Air Division communications network was composed of commercially leased and allocated military teletype circuits. The network was parallel to command control charaelsy i.e., from the launch sites to the Launch Control Center (High Wycombe from the recovery base to the Recovery Control enter ~(Shiroi s an( from Headquarters lst Air Division to both.the Launch and Recovery Control Centers. Che network was equipped with on- line encry?.,tu.on devices and all messages transmitted via the network were classified a minimum of Confidential and encrypted during transmission, for the purpose of maintaining communications security. (CJ 5. Cover Plano Meteorological Research was established as the basis for the primary mission cover plan and for this purpose the suffix "Meteorological Survey", was added to the 1st Air Division designator. This cover plan explained the mission as being in consonance with ,thee USAF high altitudes meteorological balloon projects, some of which had received considerably publicity, e.g., Project Moby Dick. The responsibility for development, publication and monitoring of the cover plan was vested initially in Headquarters 1st Air Division and was contained inlst Air Division Operations Plan Project (C) (codeword), dated 10 June 1955. This plan emphasized that no voluntary press releases would be made. When questioned directly, unit personnel would divulge only, but freely, the unclassified meteorological aspect of the mission. (TS) II. TRAINING PHASE-. The training phase for ZI units was originally scheduled for the period 10 May to 1 September 1955, leaving a month for deploy- ment and a month for shakedown overseas. However, due to the fact that equipment non-availability resulted in very little activity during the month of July and the fact that equipment deficiencies dictated further testing prior to beginning operations, decision was made by Headquarters USAF that the operational date would be postponed 30 days (from 1 November to 1 December 1955). [This decision was further influenced by a request for 30 day postpone- ment from tr.; British in order to avoid commencement of operations prior to ^nrletion of certain diplomatic negotiations which were This decision and other considerations made it possible under way. to extend the training phase until, mid-October. (TS) A. Moby Dick Hi-. Limited information was available concerning balloon operations, therefore lst Air Division conducted Moby Dick Hi operations in The Zone of Interior during the period 10 May 1955 through 16 October 1955 for the purpose of testing operational suitability, developing procedures and tactics, resolving deficien- cies, determining capabilities and accomplishing on-the-jo.b training. Originally, only twenty-five 'balloon systems were to be 12 t .582. 70P U? Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 D/ C Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top SE?Gu3~T C provided for this project; howE.~..r, 1st Air Division estimated that a minimum of 150 would be needed if the testing and training were to be accomplished on an acceptable basis. A requirement for this number of systems was established, and later was slightly increased. The final report or this operation is contained in lst Air Division TOP SECRET docnient entitled "Final Report of Operational Suitability Test Project 119L". (S) 1. Training: With '.il.J tial guidance. from AFCRC and General Mills (balloon manufacturer), the training and suitability testing of the system was conducted in the Zone of Interior in accordance with 1st Air Division Operations Order 201-55. (C) a. Launch: During project Moby Dick Hi the 1110th Air Support Group launched 162 119L systems. These launchings provided the only opportunity for development of procedures and the accomplishment of initial and final training prior to actual operations. (C) b. Hydrogen Generation: It was anticipated that the hydrogen gas required for Moby Dick Hi would be produced by primary mission generators at Francis E. Warren AFB, Wyoming. Initially these generators proved incapable of providing the required quantities and quality of hydrogen. Major revisions in procedures and ad ptions of mechanical aids rendered the system serviceable. (C) c. Tracking: Moby Dick Hi, balloons were tracked by USAFSS, FCC, and AACS. No training was accomplished by the 6926 Radio Squadron (Mobile) (primary mission tracking unit), since it was manned at overseas stations during and subsequent to the Moby Dick Hi operation. (See paragraph IIB below.) (C) d. Recovery: Recovery operations were conducted by the 456th Troop Carrier Vs-fig operating from their home base at Charleston AFB, South Carolina. Air-to-air and air-to-surface recovery techniques were without precedent and the first SOP's for such were developed during the Moby Dick Hi operation. Air-to-air recovery action was succes:2fvily accomplished on twelve of the thirty-nine systems on which attempted recoveries were possible. As of completion of Moby Dick Hi, the air-to--water recovery tactic had not proven successful di'e.to water station deficiencies. (S) 2. Operational Suitability Test: During Moby Dick Hi, techniques of varying balloon initial floating altitudes were investigated and developed into SOP. Also it was found that ascent rates and hydrogen purity were less critical than previously believed. It was also determined that the basic equipment for primary mission operations was adequate with the following major exceptions: (C) 13 D-582 70P S 1 T Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 I/C Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 Oo P 3 E (~G~3E T C a. The 128TT balloon was determined to be marginally serviceable. The unacceptably high failure rate of this balloon type (approximately 50%) which was experienced through the.month of August, led to a decision that the contract for this type should be terminated at the midpoint and the 66CT balloon substituted for the remainder. Although not fully tested at the time, the 6(--T was the only other balloon in the inventory capable of doing the job and had been developed expressly for this project. Becaus,,?cf its cylindrical design it was thought to be stronger structurally and less apt to fail under stresses of ascent. It had similar life expectancy, but flew at lower maximum altitudes (45,000 ? 60,000 as compared to 75,000 m 85,000) than the 128TT. At the lower alti- tudes it picked up faster winds and, as a result, doubled the expected rate of arrival in the recovery area. A disadvantage was the possibility of increased vulnerability; however, ADC was unable to demonstrate that the increase would be greater than sli ht in attempting to locate and intercept the small number (15-20) of these balloons launched in the Z I. As a result of the decision to convert the contract from the large balloon to the smaller one, there were approximately 19300 of the 128TT type and 1,500 of the 66CT type available for accomplishment of the primary mission. (TS) b. Minor mechanical innovations and a major revamping of procedures were required to render the gas generation system serviceable. (U) c. The degree of success to be expected from air-to- air and air-to-water tactics remained in doubt. (S) d. Launch Devices The forklift launch vehicle was determined to be inadequate and unsafe due to size,, weight, limited visibility and limited mobility. The forklift was replaced with the Fisher Launcher,, which was a 22 ton 6X6 truck with a super- imposed structure from which the gondola was suspended and released. U) 3. Vulnerability Tests During Moby Dick Hi, a test was conducted to determine the vulnerability of the 119L system:,; To accomplish this test Air Defense Command instructed suboi_.1._.',e units to attempt detection and termination of Moby Dick Hi balloons to maximum degree :short of interference with the ADC primary mission. During the test ADC was advised of launch times.. '_-x'~ected trajectories, and balloon fixes as they became available. Results indicated a limited capability to track balloons using either radar or ground observers. It was demonstrated that balloons at altitudes attainable by fighter aircraft could be destroyed by fighter action if located. It was concluded that the degree of vulnerability to be.expected would be directly proportional to enemy capability to 14 D-582 TOID1 SE~G?3[~ Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 O/t Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 Oo P 8 E C9 G~3E Y locate and track the balloons. Although inconclusive insofar as Russian radars were concerned, test results did not indicate radar tracking capability to be good, (See Tab I. Chapter III),.and it was estimated that the balloon system was not unacceptably vulnerable. .(TS) B. Moby Dick Far East: The Moby Dick Far East program (1st Air Division Operations Order 20255) was established primarily to provide training for, and to obtain factual information on the capabilities and limitations of, the 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile). This was done by simulating primary mission operations in the Far East and Alaska areas during the period 7 September 1955 to 27 December 1955. A total of 211 Moby Dick [Far Eass balloons were launched by two launch teams from sites in 1kinawa, Japan, and Kore . All pha -,s of the tracking functions were exercised during this period. After 23 November 195x: the balloons carried VHF transceivers, which made it possible for recovery crews to fly realistic training missions actually intercepting and homing on balloon signals. Additional benefits derived from this project were: (S) 1. Provided information on frequency propagation characteristics. (U) 2. Provided additional trajectory information. (U) 3. Served to add considerably to the cover plan. (C) C. Command Post Exercises: Commencing in late October 1955, Command Post Exercises involving the primary mission communications network were conducted almost continuously to provide maximum training for all personnel and test the adequacy of the system. Each exercise was approximately 5 days duration with a short break of 2 to 3 days to evaluate results. These exercises were planned to simulate balloon launching, tracking, fixing and recovery operations. Wherever possible command functions and procedures were employed to add realism. Applicable reports required by 1st Air Division Manual 55-8 were submitted and Air Weather Service support capability and other facets of the operation were exercised. (S) A. The deployment schedule of launch and recovery unit personnel and equipment was finally predicated upon the designated date for commencement of operations and the requirement to attain operational proficiency prior to deployment. Also it was desired to have all operational units in place as far in advance of the 15 D=-582 Nor ~/c Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOP SECG~3ET implementation date as possible to assure time for base "shake= down" and mission preparation. As previously stated, the target date for commencement of operations was advanced from 1 November to 1 December 1955. See Part .1, Chapter II. (C) 10 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile)s Deployment responsi bility for tracking units was retained by USAFSS, since personnel. were to be obtained from USAF-wide resources and USAFSS intention was to reassign such personnel and equipment-within the Far East upon termination of the project. Deployment of personnel and equipment was commenced in June 1955 and was completed in August 1955. 725 personnel and 1,280,000 pounds of equipment were involved in this deployment. (C) 2. 1110th Air Support Groups Deployment of the main body of the 1110th. Air Support Group commenced on 10 October and was completed on 1 November 1955. A total of 743 personnel and 477,500 pounds of equipment were involved. (U) 3. 456th Troop Carrier Wings Deployment of the main body of the 456th Troop Carrier Wing commenced on 5 October and was completed on 20 November 1955. A total of 1,763 personnel, 2,751.,290 pounds of cargo and 50 C-119 aircraft were involved. (U) B. There were 27,000,000 pounds of special equipment (Grand Union) shipped in support of this operation in addition to the previously mentioned equipment. This, plus other commitments, equaled an approximate overall total of 3,231 personnel and 32,000, 000 pounds of carL.c., (S) IV. PREOPERATIONAL DECISIONS-, A. Ground Cut=dDown Stations- The original plan of operations called for high altitude operation (80,000 ft) of the 128TT balloon where winds were expected to be of moderate speeds posing a reason- able problem for intercepting Cm119 aircraft. As a result, electroniz balloon termination equipment was installed in project aircraft and no other means of termination was provided. The decision made during Moby Dick Hi to emp/`,y 66CT balloons (which fly at lower altitudes) in approximately eqG-al numbers -to the 128TT required a re-evaluation of termination and recovery plans. It was indicated that at the lower altitudes, wind speeds encountered would be such as to nearly double the expected rate of arrivals in the recovery area. Also, proximity to jet stream altitudes on arrival would result in rapid transit of the recovery area such that balloons might arrive during night and adverse weather, transit the area, and pass far beyond before aircraft could intercept them. It was known that under these conditions the balloon would travel at such speeds as to render 16 D-582. 7Op Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top SEC Inn, Er, overtaking by 0-119 aircraft impossible. It was immediately apparent that a requirement existed for a means to terminate balloons from the ground. From spare airborne electronic-equipment available, ground cut-down stations were established at\Shiroi Air B pejand at each of the recovery squadron bases except Johnson Air Base. T- improve performance a specially constructed Yagi antenna was used. The range of these stations was such that un- broken grruL.-1 cut-down coverage was provided from the northern tip of Formosa to the northern tip of Hokkaidt, around Adak, and around Kodiak. During the o eration, an additional station was established at [Niigata, Japan. The concept of employment of these ground cut-down stations con emplated that at night, during adverse weather, or in the absence of aircraft for the purpose, balloons would be terminated by the ground stations [so as to fall in the Japanese Sea as close to the West shore of Japan as possible, or fall on Japan._] It was thought, and later confirmed, that there would be little possibility of recovering gondolas from the open Pacific. In addition to requiring ground cut-down stations, the increased speed of the balloons required that the exposure rate of the duplex camera be changed from 122 minutes to 64 minutes, to assure overlapping coverage. (TS) B. Surface Recovery Supports With the expected increase in arrival rate and the installation of ground termination equipment, it was anticipated that many gondolas would fall on land with no opportunity for recovery by the C-119 aircraft, or in water where the aircraft recovery effectiv_t y would depend upon state of the sea and proper functioning of the unproven water station. Based on these considerations a decision was made that supplementary recovery support was required. Through FEAF and AAC arrangements were made with CINCAL, CINCFE, and CINCPAC for recovery assistance from all United States forces operating within their theaters. News releases in the theaters solicited the cooperation of civilians by offering a reward for returned gondolas. Plans made were complete and detailed, and later proved to be most effective. (S) C. Preparations for Launchs In anticipation of'starting the operation o_, 1 December 1955, action was taken to be prepared to launch f i,i'.::ach site. at the maximum rate, from the first day. These preparations included the generation and storage of hydrogen, and stockpiling of prepared systems in the mechanical and, electrical, configure"--,,.1 required. (S) D. Stipulations by Higher Headquarters 1. Cover Plan Launches. USAF directed that cover plan balloon launchings be conducted in the Pacific area. concurrently with the conduct of the primary mission. This operation was nicknamed!. White Cloud and was implementated by 1st Air Division Operations 17 D-582 TOP SEO[ EET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOP SU"G~3Er, Order 207?56; it provided for the launching of ten 124A type balloons each at'Okinaw], Hawaii, and Alaska during the period 9 January 19`'5 to July 9560 The first of these balloons was launched on 9 January 1956 with complete press coverage. This was one day prior to commencement of primary mission operations as had been requested by the State Departmei'. (TS) 2. Placards. At the direction r,L ,TJSAF, a cartoon placard., multilanguage placard and Russian language placard were affixed to that part of the gondola housing the cameras. The placards indicated that a monetary reward would be given if the package were turned over to the proper authorities. Due to delayed delivery, the Russian language placard was affixed first on 23 January 1956, 13 days after the operation began. (S) 3. Launch Limitations: For the first seven days of operation, launchings were restricted by Headquarters USAF to a total of ten effective balloons per each 24 hour:,period with an altitude ceiling restriction of 55,000 feet. (Notes An effective balloon is one which has been successfully launched, reaches planned altitude, and-can be assumed to penetrate the area of interest.) (S) 4. 2G-BO (Auxiliary Safety Unit): Safety measures against, free fall of the equipment in the event of balloon failure during and after ascent were provided the 119L system by a safety chute and by the electronic package control unit. To give back=up protection against free fall, in addition to the above, USAF determined that an auxiliary safety unit, the 2G-BO, would be included in the system.. Delivery of the 2G-B0 to launch detachment was subsequent to term.ina' tion of the primary mission, therefore it was never actively employed. (C) 5, Locator Beacons In May 1955 a requirement was stated for a locator beacon which, attached to the gondola, would send signals from a downed position to direct searchers to the location. Without such a beacon it was considered that downed gondolas would be difficult to find on land and practically impossible to find in water. For technical. reasons, development is limited to a beacon which would work in water but not on la?',~'It was designed with a. salt water activated battery to transmit a UHF signal for 48 hours to a range of 100 150 nautical miles. Recovery aircraft and the Air Rescue aircraft were capable of homi:. a these signals using the AN/ARC-27 with the AN/ARA-25 homing adapter. Early attempts to test prototype and first production models of the beacon were in. conclusive, and considerable delay was experienced in getting first article approval. However, because the beacons were known to be capable of functioning, 501 were accepted and shipped to launch sites for use prior to receipt of first article approval. This approval was received on 4 January 1956. A beacon was to be attached to each system launched. (S) 18 D-,582. OnD Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 D/e- 0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 y Oo p S [~(~G3E ~ E. Planned Configurations The configuration of balloon gondola assemblies planned for the beginning of operation wab in consonance with other operational decisions and was standardized for all launches regardless of balloon type. Principal features were: (C) 1. Basic configuration was normal,. consisting of balloon, load straps, rotator, bar assembly, parachute,-luster, water-..statior. DMQ-1, thermal package for electronic gear, and two ballast boxes.(C~ 2. A 24 foot emergency parachute was rigged between the gondola and the balloon to prevent free fall of any portion of the vehicle in the event of balloon failure during ascent. (U) 3. Four packages of chaff were attached to the bar assembly and rigged in such a manner as to be automatically dispersed on bar separation. The purpose was to provide positive fixing of termina- tion position by radar. (C) 4. A radiosonde unit was attached to the system to provide information on level-off altitude if the ascent were successful, or to give a positive indication if failure occurred within approxi- mately two hours of launch. (S) F. Tactics: Because of the relatively inflexible nature of the the balloon system and the fact that maximum altitude had been prescribed, few t.:ctical decisions were necessary. Those found necessary are described briefly below: (S) 1. Based on meteorology, radio transmitter turn on 'times were established to insure that regardless of wind speed encountered (within reasonable limits) the transmission would begin prior to arrival of the balloon in the recovery area. (S) 2. Camera turn on times were -to be delayed long enough in each case to avoid the possibility of photographing friendly territory. (S) 3, The 66CT balloons were to be launched from t`- t'ro German sites so as to penetrate the border during hours of darkness. The 128TT was not restricted as to hours of darkness, nor was the 66CT when launched from the other three sites. (S) 4. To obtain sufficient balloon life expectancy (7-8 days) and stay within the prescribed altitude ceiling, the 66CT balloons were prepared for a planned initial altitude of approximately 46,500 feet and a ballasting altitude of 40,000 feet; 128TT balloons were prepared for an initial altitude of 50,000 feet and a ballast- ing altitude of 45,000 feet. (S) 19 D-582. 7Op SECS Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOp ?RFET L V. OPERATIONAL PHASE, PRIMARY MISSION: A. General: By 1 December 1955, the established date for commencement of operation, all units were in place and operationally ready. Pending receipt of an execution order command post exercises, Moby Dick Far East, and other training in mission accomplishment continued. Also advantage was taken of this period to continue the distribution of additional production material to the overseas locations. (C) 1. The mission was ordered executed on 10 January 19560 Eight effective balloons were launched on that date. (S) B. Launching: 1. Subsequently, balloons were launched daily at rates consistent with the directed limitations except as further limited by political considerations .^nd surface weather. Launch teams of the 1110th Air Support Group turned in exceptional performances, demonstrating on some occasions capability to exceed the maximum launch rate proErarnmed. (S) 2. The limitation to 10 effective launches per day continued in effect until 17 January when it was increased to 20 per day. On 25 January it was increased to 30 per day; and to 40 per day on 28 January. (S) 3. Although experiencing their worst winter weather for several years at the launch sites, pre-mission predictions of percentage of weather favorable for launch were found to be quite accurate. As expected, from standpoint of surface weather,CEvantonJ was the poorest site and [Adanj the best. The original concept in regard to weather was that balloons could not be launched in the presence of any precipitation, fog, or icing. Because such restric- tion would have an adverse effect on capability to meet daily quotas, it was decided to test feasibility of launching under these condi- tions. From these tests it was concluded that balloons can be successfully launched during periods of fog and light precipitation in the absence of severe icing conditions. Weather criteria for launch were changed accordingly. (TS) 4. LDue to reasons unknown to 1st Air Division, the Br.iti,;h administration had failed to notify the Air Ministry that operations at Evanton were authorized. For this reason, no launches from Evanton could be made until late on 11 January 1956, when approval to launch was granted. Again, on 4 February 1956, the British Government, through the Air Ministry, requested that launches at Evanton be restricted to only those which would not overfly East Germany. It was estimated that this restriction would prevent launch 20 D-582 7 a P 8EtT Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 Op 8 E CH_", E 7 approximately 25% of the time, which, when coupled with unfavorable ground weather and unfavorable upper air trajectory, practically eliminated Evanton as a productive launch site. (TSU 5. [operations from the two launch detachments in Germany were suspended for 36 hours on 23 January 1956, due to a formal protest to ICAO by Czechoslovakian CAA claiming that the lcool program constituted a hazard to air navigation and as a consequence had grounded all night flights of Czech airlines. CINCUSAFE, through the German ATC notified Czechoslovakia that balloon operations from Germany would be suspended for 36 hours pending Czech presentation by documented evidence that the balloons were in fact flying at altitudes where they constituted a hazard to air navigation. Launchings from the two German sites were resumed after a 36 hour stand-down. (C2J 6. Balloon launchings at Gardermoen, Norway, were suspended at the request of the Norwegian government on 18 January 1956. This request was based on (1) Swedish protest of balloons constituting a hazard to air navigation, (2) "free falling objects" reported from the vicinity of the launch site, (3) the injury of a Norwegian boy by the explosion of a squib on a downed gondola. Approval to resume operations at Gardermoen was granted on 31 January 1956 after lengthy investigations into failure cause factors] Launches were permitted only under conditions most favorable to successful ascent and flight. Launch operations were resumed on 3 February when the required conditions existed. (Because of poor trajectories and surface weather at Gardermoen during he first week of operation, and the requirement to stand down for two weeks for political reasons, only a token number of balloons were launched from that site. (TS2 C. Tracking: Tracking detachments obtained 22,867 bea'T'ngs which were used in plotting balloon positions during the operation. This does not include the many singe bearings which were obtained on transmissions from balloons which were heard at least one time, since such bearings could not be used for position fixing. Often only an initial transmission would be received, after which the balloon was not heard from again; further, some of the initial trans- missions were termination signals which indicated loss, either by a system failure or unfriendly countermeasures. A deficiency was noted in the tracking capability over the Bering Sea and Northwestern Alaskan area. To offset the deficiency, a detachment was formed from in place resources and located at Nome. The detachment became operational after termination of the operations; as a result, it did not contribute to the mission. \In addition, a survey of Formosa was conducted with a view to determining feasibility of`operating a tracking detachment from that location should it be required. (TS) 21 ~0P 3E ?R LAY Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 DEC Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top M D. Recovery,. Recovery activity functioned smoothly and effectively. With few known exceptions balloons were tracked prior to arrival and were terminated. As expected, arrivals occurred at night and during adverse as well as good weather. The average speed of trar,el in the recovery area was close to 100K. The requirement fc'* ground cut-down stations was fully justified under these conditions because it was necessary to terminate 14 balloon n skits by this method. Thirty seven were terminated by aircraft, several expired normally in the recovery area, and one was terminated by a friendly fighter. Due to weather and other operational considerations, the C-119 aircraft had an opportunity to recover only 19 gondolas from the air and were successful in 16 attempts. (TS) 1. Surface recovery support in the FEAF area was a source of great satisfaction. The 3d Air Rescue Group did a fine job in both locating and recovering downed packages. To date a total of 28 packages have been recovered through all agencies participating in the surface recovery support plan. (TS), 2. Procedures established for the return of recovered gondolas to the ZI via MATS after collection and processing b FEAF were very effective. The average time required for delivery from ]to the 15th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron at March Air Tokyo Force Base was 75 hours. (C) E. Major Problems,. 1. The UHF locator beacon failed to operate on the first few systems which terminated in the sea in the recovery area. This led to a series of tests, both by the manufacturer on recovered beacons, and at launch sites by launch personnel to determine cause factors. Those returned to the manufacturer from the recovery area were found to work unless too badly damaged. Aside from occasional equipment breakage in launch, no reason for beacon failure could be determined, and it was concluded that the fault was in the floating attitude of the gondola to which it was attached. Unless it floated so that the battt,.y was under water, the battery would not be activated. Action-.'-,s taken to correct the floating position to insure best chances for beacon operation. (S) 2. The water ^'~c, ti.on, although it had never 'been fully tested and proven, was rigged for operation on all of the initial flights; however, since the locator beacon did not function on the first few gondolas which went down in the water, these gondolas were not located by project aircraft and there was no opportunity to use the water station. On those which were picked up by boat there was no indication that the water station had erected. Soon after D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 ~/~ Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOp SECG3E T commencement of operations, a friendly national was injured while tampering with the water station activation squib found on the gondola of a balloon which had failed in the launch area. Sub- sequently, the squib was removed as a hazard, and this rendered the water station incapable of operation. However, it was necessary to continue attaching it to the gondola be ..use it's weight was needed to cause the gondola to float with the beacon battery under water. Development of a means to insure.p_?oper floating attitude without this piece of equipment was initiated-immediately since it was thought that complete removal of the water station would reduce radar sighting capability. At time of suspension of operations a suitable method had been devised and tested, but it was never used. (S) 3. An analysis of balloon profiles taken from date-' recorded by recovered gondolas disclosed two significant factors. First, balloons were not approximating their estimated life expectancy. Instead of expending ballast equal to 7% of gross load per day, the average expenditure was about reducing life expectancy from 7-8 days to 4-5. It appeared that atmospheric dist~,`)ances caused variations in floating altitude that resulted in two, and sometimes three, ballasting periods during 24 hours rather than the one ballasting period expected. The necessarily narrow spread (5-6000 ft) between initial altitude and ballasting altitude is thought to be contributory to this phenomenon. Secondly, it was found that balloons spent considerably more time at the ballasting altitude than was anticipated. It was thought that with sunrise the balloon would make a fairly rapid ascent to its maximum altitude, and that it would remain there until late afternoon when it would descend because of cooling. Thus, for most of the day it would be high enough to reduce vulnerability to a minimum. Periods of greatest vulnerability would be early morning and late afternoon. This was found not to be the case. Although'it rose rapidly in early morning, it began to cool and descend very shortly after noon; arriving at ballasting altitude with several hours of daylight left; and of course was mc:,;vulnerable during that time. Undoubtedly, there is a close relationship between this phenomenon and the, one previously discussed in regard to over-ballasting. :.th factors significantly reduced the chances of any balloon to irssfully make the trip to the recovery area, either because of reduced normal life or increased vulnerability. Both were, however, operationally inescapable within. the range of altitude to which flight w. .a united by directive. (TS) 4. As previously stated, at the start of operations lst Air Division had approximately 1300 128TT balloons and 1500 of the 66CT type. To get an early indication of which type would be most effective operationally, both types were launched in approximately equal numbers at the beginning of operations. Moby Dick Hi results had indicated Top SEC? Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7Op [ET that the 128TT ascent success rate to be expected would vary from about 80% success with higher serial numbers, to 50% with lower serial numbers; the break point being at or near serial number 1000. In order to pin down within the number of 128TT balloons available a point below which the failure rate would be excessive, it was decided to launch in serial number blocks of 100, starting from the highest numbered balloons and launching in numerical progression downward at each site, except thatCaat Evanton and Giebelstadtl a test quantity of low serial numbered balloons would be launche to determine if failure rate confirmed the Moby Dick Hi findings. After several days of operation, the ascent success rate of the lower serial numbers was found to be 47% as compared to 83% for the higher serial numbers. A decision was then made that all 128TT balloons with serial numbers lower than 950 would. be set aside and not used. This resulted in a reduction of the useable balloon inventory by approximately 700 balloons and left a deficit of 500 which would be required if the mission objective of launching 2500 was to be achieved. To eliminate this deficit, a requirement was stated for delivery by 1 March of balloons of a new type which would combine the strength of the 66CT and approach the altitude capabilities of the 128TT, at the same time providing more operational flexibility. Such a balloon was designed (the 83CT) and a few were test flown by AFCRC. Procurement was on schedule for delivery in March 1956, but was halted when operations were suspended and none were ever delivered. (S) 5. Since the decision to set aside the low numbered 128TT balloons left only a limited number in the inventory, it was decided to conserve these for a later period when their use might be manda- tory to avoid attrition by flying at higher altitudes. (The 66CT was not capable of use at higher altitudes without drastic reduction in life expectancy). Accordingly, only 66CT balloons were launched beginning 22 January 1956. (TS) 6. By 3 February 1956 it became apparent that attrition was unacceptably high at the lower altitudes and 128TT launchings were resumed using slightly higher altitudes than previously (5.4,000 ft initial floating altitudes; 50,000 ft ballasting altitude). This was maximum possible altitude under the existing directives, and Headquarters USAF was asked to raise the ceiling to a minimum of 60,000 It, or to el.'.minate it entirely. (TS) F. Suspension of Operations On 6 February stand-down of all launches was directed. (C) 1. An appraisal of the situation at this time indicated that one of two courses of action should be followed in the event resumption of operations was authorized. One was to launch all 24 D?.582 7 Op 8 E C~R Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOp ?EET C usable balloons (including the supplementary 83CTts) at maximum rate possible and at maximum altitude. The objective would be to saturate or avoid defenses and end the mission on the earliest date possible. Capability to complete entire mission by mid April existed if operations were resumed prior to'15 February. The alternative was to continue only with the remaining 400 high serial number 128TT balloons which could possibly be flown above defenses. ?Tq-:increase the difficulty of detection, water stations would be removed and the maximum altitude would be flown. Through these measures it was thought that the operation might attract less -attention and thus be acceptable. These proposals were made to Headquarters USAF on 9 February 1956. (TS) 2. Headquarters USAF favored the alternate proposal (launch only the 400 128TT balloons) if operations were to be resumed, but removed altitude restrictions entirely for only 10% of the number. The re, ining 90% were limited to a maximum of 58,000 ft. On 24 February, Headquarters USAF advised that a proposal for resumption of operations under these ground rules at the earliest possible date had been sent to the Secretary of the Air Force. (TS) '~? Termination of Operational Phase: 1. Informally on 29 February and by message on 1 March 1956, USAF directed termination of the operational phase of the project, except that search for and recovery of unaccounted for gondolas would continue. (S) 2. By Headquarters USAF directive, 1st Air Division.and Strategic Air Command relinquished operational control of operational, units to parent commanders on 26 March 1956. (Redeployment of these units and disposition of surplus materiel became a responsibility of the parent commands and Air Materiel Command.) (C) VI RESULTS: A. During the operational period, 516 balloon systems were launched. Of these systems 399 were considered to be operational; there were 117 known failures, and 12 of those considered operational were later recovered from friendly areas without having entered the target area. Of the remaining 387 operational balloons, 144 were later heard to transmit, of which 123 were tracked, and 21 were termination signals heard as the first transmission; 243 were never heard from after launch. Of the 123 which were tracked, only 67 entered the recovery area. 57 of these were terminated and 44 of them had been returned as of 5 March 1956. Of the 13 which were terminated but not recovered, 4 have terminal positions on land, 9 in the sea (7 Pacific, 2 in Sea of Japan). The 10 which arrived but were nottermi- nated are presumed to be down in the Pacific or in the Polar regions. Although termination was attempted on 6 of these, all attempts were un.. %successful, presumably because of failure of balloon electronic gear to 25 D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 Op 8 E ?ET respond. Four entered the recovery area only by definition,. since they were too far to the north for interception. (TS) t. Fifty-eight balloons heard to transmit, were tracked, but never arrived. These were functioning systems and from all indicu?ions most of them should have been blown into the recovery area. However, the vast majority of them ceased their trans- misLiron prior to their seventh day of life. One cluster of eighteen balloons was being tracked across the North China area heading directly for Japan, - only three actually arrived and nothing more was heard from the remainder. There are several possible causes. Electronic malfunction could have resulted in cessation of transmissions; over-ballasting, as previously discussed, could have resulted in premature flight termination behind the lines; they could have been terminated by enemy action; o,. their trajectories may have been such as to carry them beyond listering range. (TS) C. Two hundred forty three balloons were never heard from after launch. This means that they were either travelling in the wrong direction completely; they experienced complete failure of the HF transmitter; or they failed to live until their programmed turn on time. Since many of these balloons were launched close in time to balloons which later arrived, trajectory is thought to be responsible for only a small percentage. From Moby Dick Hi statistics it was reasonable to assume that 85% of the transmitters would function properly. This leaves the vast majority in the category of not having lived long enough to transmit. It is reasonable to assume that some launches which were considered successes, in actuality were not. Perhaps the launch personnel were unable to monitor the flight long enough to observe failure; perhaps minute holes were in the balloon allowing the gas to leak out over a period of hours; perhaps the ballasting mechanism failed and caused the balloon to descend to the ground. Although over-ballasting is known to have shortened balloon life to a degree, this degree was not such that a large number would expire for this reason prior to turn-on time. Although no exact values can be placed on any of the above factors; even in combination, it is considered unreasonable that they could have oxen responsible for early termination of such a large number of u..`loons. It is concluded, then, that the major contributing factor to loss of these balloons was attrition by enemy action. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, enjoying the ele:er:, of surprise, balloons launched prior to 26 January were fairly successful; however, of 184 balloons successfully launched on and after 26 January only 28 were heard to transmit and only two were recovered. This indicates that after two weeks in which to react, the USSR had come up with an exceptionally effective defense. Contrary.to the radar tracking capability demonstrated in the Z I during Moby Dick Hi, 12th Air Force radars were able to track balloons IrOp ?EEET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 C Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top SEPIDET up to 150 miles across the line; it is assumed, therefore, that Russian radars were similarly capable. The length of the metal cross-bars and the metal water station increased radar vulnera- bility. It was known b?,forehand that Russian fighters were capable of attaining the altitudes to which the balloon flights were restricted (55,000 ft). Vulnerability was certainly-affected by balloon behavior, P,, previously discussed, in descending to ballasting altitude (4C9000 to 45,000 ft) shortly after noon. (TS) 1. As the effect of attrition became noticeable, such steps as were possible were taken to minimize the vulnerability, Altitude was increased to the limit possible within the directed ceiling and radio turn-on times were delayed to deny use of these signals as an aid to the enemy. Plans were made to remove the water station entirely, in order to minimize radar detection; removal or raising of altitude restrictions was recommended to USAF; balloon transmitters were not to be turned on until the very last day of programmed life. Operations were suspended before all of these measures could be placed into effect. (TS) D. All systems launched carried the DMQ-1 (photographic) gondola. No DMQ-2 (electronic ferret) packages were launched since this type of equipment was not perfected in time. (TS) E. A summary of photographic accomplishments processed b'? the Aeronautical Chart and Information Service as of 30 March 1956, is as follows: 1. Total number of missions from which photography was obtained - 40. (TS) 2. Total number of usable exposures - 13,813. (S) 3. Gross statute miles of charting photography - 1,984,173. (S) 4. Net statu+- miles of charting photography - 1,661,869. (equal to approximat 3 y'51% of the Continental United States) (S) 5. Gross square statute miles of charting photography for Sino-Soviet area - J,388,745. (TS) 6. Net square statute miles of charting photography for Sino-Soviet area - 1,116,449 - (equal to 37% of the Continental United States, or approximately 8% of Sino-Soviet area). (TS) 7. Cost per square mile (net) $48.49. (U) 27 D-582 1L. Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 DO P 3 E C IHII E Y 28 D-582 Top SLR? 'ET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 Oo F., 9 E?RT I. CONCLUSIONS: It is concluded that: A. Weapons System 119L was a reasonably effective means of obtaining pioneer reconnaissance at comparatively small cost. (TS) B. The predicted upper air trajectories over the USSR and its satellites was as accurate as could be expected. (TS) C. The delay in commencing the operation (from 1 December 1955 to 10 January 1956) compressed the project, time- wise, to within a very short period of favorable winds. However, the operation could have been completed (2500 launches) by 1 May 1956, if project had been permitted to continue. (S) D. The element of surprise contributed appreciably to the successful results obtained during the initial days of the operation. (C) E. Vulnerability to unfriendly countermeasures and over- ballasting were the two factors contributing most to failure to transit the target area. (TS) F. Ground termination stations are a mandatory back-up for other recovery techniques. (S) G. Deficient polyethelyne and manufacturing defects caused a deficit of approximately 700 balloons in the operation- al inventory. (C) H. The type of photography obtained affords an excellent source for pioneer reconnaissance, but due to limiting factors, detailed analysis of new intelligence is difficult. (See Tab "J", Chapter III) (S) I. The findings of the Moby Dick Hi vulnerability tests, involving the Air Defense Command, were misleading, Since 12th Air Force radars (MSQ-2) were capable of tracking balloons at high altitude and at ranges up to 150 nautical miles, it is concluded that Soviet rada:?s have similar capability; therefore, in design of any future system for this purpose, care should be taken to minimize radar reflective surfaces and materials. (TS) J. More specific knowledge of balloon performance must be obtained, and design influenced thereby, in order to obtain every-thing possible from this weapons system. (C) 29 D-582 TOP SEC Inn) EY Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOP ~C~(~G~3ET K. The C-119 aircraft: 1. Is useful to perform air-to-air electronic cut-down, however, this could'be accomplished by several other aircraft types. (S)- 2. Is too slow to overtake the balloon due to approxi- mately equal groundspeeds of the balloon and aircraft under certain jet stream conditions. Success was assured only when the aircraft could assume a position ahead of the balloon. (C) 3. Air-to-air recovery capability was dependent upon the existence of daylight and VFR conditions. (S) L. Surface recovery of all packages should be planned as the primary method of recovery with a suitable and fc,)l-proof method of locating the package, such as a beacon capable of operating on land and water. (S) M. Due to excessive ballast rates, duration was marginal. The reconstructed profiles indicate that the life expec- tancy is somewhat shorter than the theoretical average of 7 and 8 days for the 66CT and 128TT respectively. See Tab "Na, Chapter III. (C) D-582 1A Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 To S REY D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 Op 3 E 6G?3E y 32 D-582 Top SECKILEY Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top SECRET I. DEPLOYMENT: This part is subdivided into three major paragraphs for presentation of information pertaining to the deployment of 1st Air Division subordinate units. Paragraph A contains comments applicable to the overall deployment, paragraph B contains information pertinent to each subordinate unit and paragraph C contains general supporting infL,:Lmation (See Inclosure 1 this Part for graphic presentation of de- ployment) (C) 1. Operational units of 1st Air Division were deployed to three major geographical areas. Detachment 1, 1st Air Division and the 1110th Air Support Group, providing the launch capability, were deployed to the European area. Units of the 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile) and 456th Troop Carrier Wing (M), providing the tracking and recovery capability, were deployed to two areas: the Far East and Alaska. (See paragraph C for Force Distribution.) (S) 2. Initially, planning to transport personnel and equipment for the 1 November 1955 implementation date dictated the need for airlift of all personnel of the 1110th Air Support Group and the 456th Troop Carrier Wing, and the majority of the 456th Troop Carrier Wing equipment, which was required in the Zone of Interior to complete operational training. This posed a major problem in that, during the scheduled deployment period, the Air Force was supporting Army world wide troop movements,, such as Sage Brush, and airlift was not available for the timely deployment for an operation of this magnitude. The problem was primarily resolved by the non-operational status of the 119L Weapons System which delayed the project "go-date" to 1 December 1955. This interim period was used to continue operational training for applicable units to the extent that certain equipment and personnel could be released for surface shipment to forward locations. 'With this added time, a revised deployment program, including transportation requirements, was finalized in Headquarters United States Air Force c,_)nference on 9 August 1955. Detachment 1, 1st Air Divisio.:, b;;ing a small force of 10 officers and 3 airmen, activated from Head- quarters 1st Air Division, were transported to their forward location by 1st Air Division aircraft on 30 June 195'. De- ployment of the 6926th Radio Squadron (Mobile) was handled on a PCS basis by United States Air Force Security Service through routine shipping channels and offered no particular problem, (S) 3. The final stage of unit deployment was effected with United States Air Forces in Europe, Far East and Alaskan Theater Air Commanders as applicable. This stage provided for 33 D-582 SOP SECaET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top SECRET the transport of personnel and equipment from ports of debark- ation to the operational sites. The wide-spread operation within each geographical area and the close schedule for in- place dates of units required theater airlift in many instances. This mammoth task was readily and efficiently accomplished in all theaters. Evaluation of this basic deployment of personnel and equipment revealed that no operational delays were ex- perienced through lack of transportation supporting the deploy- ment. (U) 4. A recovery unit was originally scheduled for Iwo Jima; however, typhoon "Louise" destroyed all operational facilities on Iwo Jima and the decision was made to move the recovery unit to Itazuke, Japan. The base at Itazuke was pre- pared in a minimum length of time and no delay in the operational capability was experienced. (S) B. Detailed Deployment Information: 1. Detachment 1 - 1st Air Divisions This unit, consisting of 10 officers and 3 airmen, was activated through Strategic Air Command resources on an as required basis. Initial increment of Detachment 1 personnel departed for the European area on 30 June 1955 with a 1st Air Division Survey Team. Purpose of this survey visit was for United States Air Forces in Europe, 1st Air Division and Detachment 1, 1st Air Division to conduct on the spot coordination of launch sites and promote a thorough understanding of requirements and anticipated problem areas. After completing the survey, Detachment 1, 1st Air Division personnel established a command post at High Wycombe, England, on 28 July 1955. (S) 2. 1110th Air Support Group: a. Authority for deployment of the 1110th Air Support Group, was contained in Headquarters Command Movement Order, 1110th Air Support Group, 23 June 1955, as supplemented by 1st Air Division Operations Order 227-55, 31 August 1955. b. In planning the deployment of the 1110th Air Support Group, consideration was given to providing the maximum training time possible in the Zone of Interior, yet insure that the organization was in place at operating locations 30 days prior to the project implementation date. Establishing 1 November 1955 as the in-place date, a phased deployment of personnel and equipment was programmed. By deploying shall increments of selected personnel and certain equipment to each site at an early date it was possible to retain the main body of the 1110th Air Support Group in the Zone of Interior 34 D-582 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Q; Top SEIFIFOIET for a longer period of operational training than originally. anticipated. In support of this plan the phased deployment of personnel.: and equipment was accomplished as follows: (C) Phase I. II. III. (1) Personnel: Identifi- Number Depart Arrive Operating cation Personnel Cargo Z.I._ Mode Area Preparatory 5 Officer 30 Jun A/L 28 July 1955 Echelon 4 Airmen 1955 Advanced 4 Officer 18 Aug A/L 23-30 Aug 1955 Echelon 88 Airmen 93,000# 1955 Main Body 43 Officers 384,000# 5 Oct Sur- 1 Nov 1955 and UME 569 Airmen 1955 face 30 Civilians Note 1: Representatives for each launch site were included in each phase. Note 2: Cargo for Phase II includes 67,000 pounds for advanced echelon plus special test and teletypewriter equipment of 25,800 pounds. Note 3: Civilians indicated were Technical Representatives. Note 4: Preparatory echelon accompanied 1st Air Division staff on site survey and returned to High Wycombe, England, to establish an 1110th Air Support Group Command Post adjacent to Detachment 1, 1st Air Division. (C) (2) Equipment: Identifi- Arrive Phase cation Amount Depart ZI Mode Destination I. Grand 27,000,000# 1 Aug 55 Sur- 15 Oct 55 Union face II. Homing 75,000# 1 Dec 55 A/L 3 Dec 55 Beacons Note 1: Grand Union equipment was shipped by Air Materiel Command. Note 2: Homing Beacons were procured late in the program and shipped by 1st Air Division as separate items. (0) 35 D?.582 Top SEPIDIET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 Op ~E C G~3E Y C. Intra-theater deployment of launch units to. operational sites was accomplished as scheduled with exception of Detachment 3. Due to political implications certain restrict- ions were imposed by Norwegian officials. It was determined :,hat: (1) total Unites States Air Force military and civilian errsonnel ibould iot exceed 100 (2) that a roster, indicating individual names, would be provided three weeks prior to arrival of the unit a: (3) -for security purposes, Detachment 3 would be deployed to Norway on 3d Air Force Headquarters orders. The problem onco untered; due to Norwegian restrictions, was the reduction of .atachment strength from 128 to 100. Negotiations provided for a ; ;orkable solution by (4) Norway providing qualified civilian replacements for the 28 personnel reduction or (5) if qualified civilian replacements would not be provided then United States Air Force total personnel complement could be increased as applicable for operational support. Coordination for re- solving these restrictions delayed the intra-theater deployment for Detachment 3 for approximately two weeks. However, Det- achment 3 arrived in time to meet a 1 December 1955 operational ready status. During conduct of the operation the lack of certain qualified Norwegian civilians raised the United States Air Force personnel total to lCv,. (TS) d. In total, the 1110th Air Support Group deployed 743 personnel and 477,000 pounds of equipment with an additional 27,075,000 pounds of equipment being deployed by Air Nhteriel Command. The personnel total consisted of 52 officers, 661 airmen and 30 civilian Technical Representatives. (U) 3. 456th Troop Carrier Wing (M): a. Authority for deployment of the 456th Troop Carrier Wing (M) was contained in 18th Air Force Movement Order 456th Troop Carrier Wing, 23 June 1955, as supplemented by 1st Air Division Operations Order 226-55, 1 September 1955 and 456th Troop Carrier Wing Operations Order 1-55, 22 August 1955. (C) As indicated for the 1110th Air Support Group, operational training time in the Zone of Interior -;as at a premium. To provide maximum training; time it Tans decided to waive the req ir~ment for recovery units to be in place 30 days prior to implementation date of the project. This decision was influenced by: (C) (1) Completing training in the Zone of Interior and standing down for aircraft maintenance, the 456th Troop Carrier Wing would be. oper ational on arrival at forward location. (U) 36 D-582 70P SECRUT Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 Oo P S E 6G?3E T (2) Operational activities would not commence until "go-date" plus travel time of the balloons to recovery area. (C) (3) Less problems were anticipated in shake down period Ater unit arrival. (U) With above in mind, 20 Novembe' '.1 955 was established as the in-place date to become operationally ready, In support of this date, a phased deployment of personnel and equipment was accomplished as follows: (U) (1) Personnel: Identifi- Number of Number of Depart Phase cation Personnel Unit Aft Cargo ZI Mode "rive I Advanced 143 1 88,147,/ 2-10 Aug A/L 3, -22 Echelon Aug II lain Body 1217 320,2501 5 Oct to Sur- 12 Oct 12 Nov 55 face to 20 Nov 55 III Tactical 349 49 0 Acft and Crews IV Rear 49 Echelon 1--15 Nov A/L 4 to 20 Nov- 26, OOO1 20 Nov A/L 1 Dec 1955 Note 1: A period of days shown for departure or arrival indicates first and last day personnel of that phase departed or arrived. (C) (2) Equipments Identifi- Phase cation Amount Depart ZI Node Destination I i{lyaway c.s 733,910 15 Sep 55 Surface 1 Nov 55 II Power Packs 342,OO0;` 1 Sep 55 III Propellers 72,000# 1 Sep 55 IV ME 1,168,371 15 Sep 55 Surface 2 per no Surf a c e 1 Nov 55 Surface 1 Nov 55 (U) . 37 D-582 Top SEP Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 C\ TOp 111IFY c. In planning for :aointenance support tactical aircraft movement, the main body of the 45( top tL, h Tr-?ap Carrier Wing was subdivided into three increments. 4. '1.70 of these increments comprised the maintenance capability. This maintenance unit accomplished the _= equired inspection for air- craft deployment during the firs- part of October 1955. On 26 October 1955, one increment of the maintenance unit deplcys_l. by surface to Adak and Kodiak, Alaska, to provide enroute main;; enance for tactical aircraft as required. The remaining increment performed maintenance support at the home station until all to_cal aircraft departed. This unit was deployed with tho rear aahelon by Tactical Air Command C-124 aircraft. The remaining increment comprising a majority of the main body deployed by surface shipment departing Zone of Interior home station on or about 5 October 1955. (C) d. In total, the 456th Troop Carrier Uing deployed 1763 personnel and 2,751,290 pounds of equipment. The personnel total consisted of 239 officers, 1459 airmen and 15 civilian Technical Representatives. (C) 4. 6926th Radio Squadron Mobile: a. United States Air Force Security Service retained responsibility for deployment of the 6926th Radio Squadron Obbil Their purpose was to deploy personnel on PC3 status with she vi_n inte,?J ?:nt.in.a personnel in United States Air Force Security Service orIanisations, as applicable, on completion of the operation. Specialized equipment was also handled by Security Service. Head- quarters 1st Air Division assisted United States Air Force Security Service -:There possible in the deploy en-t of personnel and, equip- ment. (0) b. Deployment of personnel and equipment ~.r s accomplished as scheduled with the exception of 35 commun_i.c^ti.~ns specialists. 15 of these 35 specialists were provided on 15 August ann the remainder on 1 September 1955. In addition, certain items of equipment scheduled for in-place date of 20 July 1955 did not arrive until 1 September 1955. (U) c. Overall, the delay of specialist personnel an-n items of equipment did not preclude United States Air Force Security Service from attaining an operational ready status as scheduled on 1 September 1955, although some D/F sites were on'a limited operational capability until arrival of personnel and equipment. (C) d. In total, United States Air Force Security ' Service deployed ed 725 personnel and 1,280,000 pound;, of equip, ment. The personnel total consisted of 30 officers, 685 airmen. TOp Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 w F r and 10 civilian Technical `presentatiaes. (U) C. Force Distribution: Orznnizat.ion AutStrength i Location Officers Airmen Civilians No Acft 1. Hq 1AD 'HS 40 62 6 3 Offutt AFB, Naar. (U) Det 1, lAD (143" *10 3 1 tt4cl High '.Iyco::ib- , RU' Statior, England. (C) Only six (6) officers and three (3) airmen were assigned for initial operation. The other positions ,,ere `filled on an as required basis. **C-47 aircraft based on Bovintcn, England. 3. Hq .,1110th ASG 17 63 2 High RAF, En-land Det 1 7 119 6 Ober; feff n-- hofen, Germany Det 2 7 119 6 Adana Air Base, Turkey Det 3 7 i16 5 ;~-Gardermoen RNAF Sta, Norway Det 4 7 119 5 Evanton RAF Sta, Scotland Det 5 5 1.20 6 Giebelstadt, - Germany Total 52 661 30 *3 *Buc .e burg, Germany C-47 aircraft based at Bovington, England. (U) sf~ 100 United States perso.Lmel ceiling imposed by Norway. (95 United States military personnel and 5 civilian technical representatives, which was ultimately raised to 106 total because of mission requirements.) Remaining 22 United States Air Force milit,a.ry personnel of Detachment 3 were assigned within .1110 th Air 3' ipport Group units. (TS) ***Alternate launch site. (U) 39 D-582 Top S ECRC T Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 ^Jrgan izat_on 4. Recovery: Officers Civilians Iiq - 456th TC'. 20 59 55 74''tll 7U0S 209 ',5 745th TCS 44 267 '``5 746 ~.h I'C'S 44 267 5 2 0 iiot.~ l NAS; 1 r ,S :a.4--1 1Y.~,~ 44 20"-) 2 0 lt,:I ZJ:..lpa'. 745-1 TCJ 44 209 'S 7 2C^ 41 209 .:~ r ~ - , ~ ., 2 ~ moo.... ,o. 'LB, Total 2`',`9 1429 50 .. ... -? ,. - , :1 ?E it men I0 to 456th r1 oop Car:'ior tt :.tc n 7 Co_ (C) :ircral bra:;ad a , Joh~nr,on Air _...,., , J~ an. (U) ***ilternnite Recovery Bases. (C) 5. Trac'.king: Hq .- 6 926th i~~.'.. 10 160 Shia of ..... e 14 2 2 5 1. r. r . i. "hi.?oi JLl : r 40 D-532 Top SECREY, Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 L Organization Auth Strength Location Officers Airmen Civilians No. Acft Det 5 2 54 1 Yontan AB, Okinawa Det 6 2 54 1 _ Pyongtaek, Korea Det 7 2 54 1 Chitose X13, Japan Det 8 2 50 1 Midway Island Det 9 2 55 1 Shemya AIM, Alaska Det 10 2 51 1 *Elmendorf AFB, Ala ska Total 30 635 10 # 1 officer and 19 airmen withdratirn for activation of the HF/DF site at Nome, Alaska. (C) (C) D. Conclusion: 1. The controlled utilization of Military Air Transport- Service overseas airlift capability precluded aerial deployment of the major portion of personnel. The result was that Zone of Interior training and preparation was compressed time ,wise to meet surface port calls. Early expression of airlift requirements apparently no effect on the long range projection of airlift utilization (th requirement was stated in May for deployment in October). The situation was further complicated ~., ^ delay in designation of the means of deployment trans por L%-tior resulting in e:,:traord.inary efforts by support and units to _Jeodline dates. (U) 41 D-582 Top SV`~O JE7 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOp E?RIET .h1,9S7tz,-.2 SC/,lEDULE MO>3Y DICK-Al TRN& DEPLOY GO e- PEKS CARGO ,~~~ GEP oq NOV DEC ADVANCED 148 88,147 2 --^ ECHELON S 931 S 134,250 MAIN S 114 S 62000 BODY A 172 A 124;000 II 2? 4 TACTICAL 349 0 5 AIRCRAFT ro WNG 8: S 49 26, 000 25 ~t REAR ECH _ y -_ FLYAWAY 0 733,916 ED , , ? .; T KITS rr,. "%"'lf G POWER 0 3422000- PACKS PROPELLERS 0 72,000 U M E 0 121632997 15 ADVANCED ECH 92 67, 700 FT. 20 & EQUIP TEST EQUIP & 0 V 25 , 362 TELETYPEWRITERS ll~: O MAIN BODY 642 384 000 10 qu GRAND UNION (t A o include test 0 27,000,000 ' equip) ~ -- MARKER BEACON 0 75,000 ' G92.6 PERSONNEL 725 11280,000 E ADINES ? RSM & EQUIP DATE. ISE U TEAMS S 9 2 TEST PERS 8 4, 000 5 & EQUIP FOLLOW ON o A 30,000 1 /, 5 PEN S 170.000 RETURN TEST PE 8 42000 I5 20 M & EQUIPMENT REDEPLOY TEST 5 42000 10 -1 5 PERS & EQUIP F- RETURN LAUNCH 18 71,000 26~ TEAMS E EPLOY LAUNCH RED 11 0 TEAMS LAUNCH CO ' N s~ - - - -- -- - T RACKING and COi~f' 'ET. $Y'', '15 AtlG CONTROL CENTER RECOVERY 'fr ^ ETLi13Y% j I sE? TR/~NSPORTA7IOt4 5UMMCRY d preparatory echelon 1110th :S'i deployed_30 Jun 550 and 7 Go P SUP IN PLACE PRZOGZA MM E Q TOT A . TYPE PERS~_.~_. CARGO PERS tA O PERS CARGO AIR 507 728 147# 694 35 5 2 1201 . 1, 0` 4, 709 SURFACE 677,000 372 1576 30,142.1 19 30 1,18 NOTE: Det 1, lAD Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 VIP SE6V3E P C 43 D-582 Top SECRET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 Op 8 E (~G~3E Y A. The Moby Dick Far East program provided tracking training for the 6926th Radio Squadron Mobile and 456th Troop Carrier Wing. Two launch teams and required equipment were deployed by 1st Air Division Operations Order 225-55 dated 2 August 1955. One team was placed at Chitose, Japan, and the other at Kadena, Okinawa. Each team consisted of 13 personnel and 138,000 pounds of materiel. Five of these personnel plus 19,000 pounds of-materiel were deployed by surface transport and the remaining personnel were airlifted by Military Air Transport Service (MATS). This initial deployment provided a capability to commence launches at each site on or about.7 September 1955 and continue until approximately 100,000 pounds of equipment per site was received by follow-up surface transportation. (S) B. After a representative number of launches had been made from Chitose it was determined that more realistic trajectories, therefore better DF training, could be obtained by moving the launeh operation to K-6, Korea. This generated surface and air transport requirements which were met within resources available to Far East Air Forces (FEAF). (C) C. The Moby Dick Far East system consisted of a 37.1+ foot diameter polyethylene balloon to which was suspended either a Moby Dick package or a modified 119L gondola. (:3ee inclosures contained in this part). On the first 25 flights launched by each team, the Moby Dick packages were used. An abnormally high number of electronic failures occurred. These were attributed primarily to metallic corrosion of the electro-mechanical control equipment. This corrosion apparently resulted from the humid conditions at the two original launch sites and from inadequate waterproofing of these packages for surface vessel shipment and the subsequent short storage time. Corrosion on the 119L electronic equipment was negligible. The first 25 flights made had the duct of the balloon cut-off so as to lower the altitude to approximately 30,000 feet, Since a high rate of failure was encountered during ascent, the duct was not modified on late Lllghts. With a load of 350 pounds, the system then floated at 39,000 feet. The first launched used the vertical launch method. All remaining launches were accomplished with the "covered wagon" inflation method. The covered wagon appeared to be the most suitable method due to the consistently high surface winds in that area. (See inclosures 2 and 3, this tab). (C) D. The following is a break-down of equipment which comprised the Moby Dick Far East system: (C) D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOP SEPUIRET 1. 124A balloon inflated with 6,000 cubic feet of hydrogen. 2. 24 foot safety chute which doubled as a load strap. 3. Sub-bar from 119L Moby Dick Hi system. 4. Ballast hopper from 119L Moby Dick Hi system.' 5. Electronic package from 119L Moby-Dick Hi system. 6. 120 pounds of 119L ballast. 7. Hydrogen trailers or individual bottles for hydrogen storage. 8. Launch cart and covered wagon locally manufactured at Lowry AFB, Colorado. E. Moby Dick Far East was scheduled to terminate on 1 December 1955 so as not to interfere with the primary mission 119L systems that were scheduled to be launched on that date. Due to the delay in the execution of the primary mission, several of the Moby Dick Far Jast vehicles were held in reserve and provided a continuous, though sporadic, balloon launch capability and training capability in the area until actual execution of the primary mission. 211 of the scheduled 230 Moby Dick Far East vehicles were actually launched with a 98.4 percent launch success rate and average flight duration of 40 hours. An average of 27 position fixes per 24 hour period were obtained on these balloons. Recovery aircraft interceptions were successfully accomplished on 11 of these flights. The final Moby Dick Far mast launching took place on 27 December 1955. The remaining Moby Dick Far mast balloons handily met the short notice requirement to commence launching additional balloons for the purpose of providing cover for the primary mission. These cover launchings, nicknamed White Cloud, commenced on 9 January 1956 using the Moby Dick Far East equipment remaining. (TS) F. For the conduct of operations during Moby Dick Far East the following weather service was required and was provided as indicated below: (U) 1. The 1st Weather Wing operating location at Shiroi provided forecasts of surface weather and balloon trajectories to the Recovery Control Center as required for control purposes. (S) 2. The base weather stations at Chitose AB, Kadena AB, and at Pyongtaek (K-6) provided the required forecasts of surface weather conditions for plannin and conducting balloon launching operations at those sites. (U) 45 D-582 Top SECR-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 70p SE(~G?3EY 3. When the various squadrons and detachments of the 456th Troop Carrier Wing were in place and began practicing intercepts on Moby Dick Far East balloons, forecasts were required for these missions. Weather liaison officers were deployed from the 7th Weather Group for service with the recovery units at Adak and Kodiak where the weather si,.,i,ort was provided by U. S. Navy aerological units. Weather liaison officers for recovery bases in the Far East area were-;."assigned from among the weather personnel of the Air Weather Service Detachments at those bases. ?upplemental weather support as required at the recovery bases was provided over project communication facilities by the 1st Weather Wing operating l.-)cation at Shiroi. (S) G. A Recovery Control Center (RCC) was established at Shiroi AB, Japan to direct, monitor and control all simulated recovery operations. Balloon fixes were passed to the Recovery Control Center where the current position, track and forecast trajectory of each balloon was maintained. The control center staff, based on all known information, directed missions and dispatched recovery crews for intercept. Crews were standing by on 30 minute alert or participating in realistic patrol, intercept and simulated recovery missions. (S) 1. Recovery crews began Moby Dick Far past training on or about 14 Novermber 1955. As each recovery unit arrived at a forward base, they were dispatched on training missions. Units at Kadena, Adak and Kodiak were unable to accomplish desired training on Moby Dick Far East balloons, since the majority of these trajectories were over the northern part of Japan. This was overcome by placing the same 4X equipment in a recovery aircraft as was carried aloft by Moby Dick Far East balloons. The "balloon, aircraft" flew a designated route and recovery crews were scrambled on patrol, intercept and simulated recovery missions in the same manner as on Moby Dick Far East balloons. (S) 2. To safeguard recovery aircraft operating on 119L missions in area adjacent to Communist territory, a line was established beyond which r~:overy aircraft would not operate. This geographical restr'^--Ifrn was established at sufficient distance from Communist held territory to avoid "incidents" or inadvertent violation of such territory and, at the same time, did not unduly restrict recovery operat'.,)n :;hepter III Tab G, par I,H. 3. Each recovery unit, through the local air traffic control agency in conjunction with adjacent air defense facilities, developed expedited departure routes to be used by recovery aircaft scrambled on recovery missions. Also, procedures were developed whereby recovery aircraft operating on recovery missions in critical areas close to Communist territory, would be kept under continuous 46 D-582 Top Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOP SUPOG?3E ri radar surveillance and advised of current pc::.tion and track. While operating within these areas, the aircraft commander was required to maintain voice contact with designated Air Defense Radar facilities. (S) 4. Moby Dick Far East training period was used to finalize detailed operating procedures to be used during the primary mission for notifying and monitoring the activiti- of supporting recovery forces. This was accomplished through tL_'~ }d Air Rescue Group, which had been appointed executive agent of Far East Air Forces for this purpose. Although this system was partially exercised by simulations during Moby Dick Far East, the Japanese were not involved for security reasons. (S) 5. Moby Dick Far East statistics are contained on the following page. (U) H. Cost for the continuous TDY of the Moby Dick Far East personnel was estimated at ;88,100 e funds were provided by Headquarters Command. The cost to Headquarters Command for transportation of 2 hydrogen trailers to the Far East was $510.00; the transportation for the other 4 hydrogen trailers was provided by Al,11C. Funding for commercial hydrogen and normal base support was provided by Far East Air Forces. The unit cost of the 124A type balloon was ?;180.00. 47 D-582 7 Oo P 9E IC191 f~E r, Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 ' Bhp QE ?1ET r? 0 N ,_. N O a' ? CO r-1 r -I 0 O\ 0 lam- co r? N N - N 1a O 0 0 4) W -1 0 0 0 M n r-4 0 M M o U 0 0 0 U A a\ ON 0 O O` tr) r-) rl 0 d\ N r l (` N O O f W l`- -' - zt 4. O 0 N N o ~l ul rn co m N El CM 0 O 0 W ? O ? CM 0 . 0 ON -1' N trr . ul '.O N -4 u rn co d n o a o o cr) CO .? A (1) f3 o w O\ co co r CU -4 - c ti O Cr4 00 N z U r~i N 0 0 1? Q?1 4.4 O N c r) .d b -4 41) .0 W ~O 0 H M 0 ?a U U 0' 0 M a a a) [ 0 z7 N - N .-1 r A CO O1% N' H 0) a) ~' cd O +- N rd U x = a) , p ate) y o `~- 4-3 -1 -1 Q) +3 r. a) U 3 (0 +3 a) O ca co F4 tN co = a 4 ~ fti $4 1.4 14 Ia ? 0 4) 0 x F.4 + 1 ~a O~ v H agc are mounted the HF and VHF radio antennas, with the Viii ,!',Dole antenna underneath and HF antenna reel on a b?acket attache' to the package side. Note figure below. (U) E A~tTEI i ? VHF k1ATEt~11~-A DIMLIUSIOIUS -24x18 'x 37" W GT. - 175 83 Top S[ wE T D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 7 a P 3 E Ir-*,, R, E T a? ".ci,le this ,? t , ,_ :ac :ec1. the atte ,y box tl), tY rater-bottle box (2), and the tray (3) with the iJ..,,,.__ _C?I:LT':l,CG:Ln; cable rUr?:ir:, inside corners, Note d 4f iY~ below a?.1 ' b? The batter box ,ontains four zinc? ilv::- peroxide bo tt ,ries .filled with potc,ssioia hydroxide -,n,-! j< !] riate bottles. jf1{.t.l -Che e,.? ~_.-uc_t,-'t~. , ..,0. r,~ ~.; % all pci'i'.r:.L is furnished troth this batteery box. (U 3 iti.E:S and c ,i :'~li ' IICISTRUW NT,TRr 4 COwTtt4%- UMnT t .QT-- qG VHf TRNWSWITE 84 D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top SVC~ In., FT 85 H, E 7 D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOD SECr_"Fr, '?__. ?0 1h-J diai_l-LicL"'?r .,2i? ' __. ... ; *IIn- r, ._-- 1titl:Lde 0,7c-rated s ifety' device YThich ,:t 2- ;:?.i:'e~.'rliltree-- -, L. Of the 'ale G'%udOla without parachutes shocad balloon failure occ coo11. after rr?ined 'i launch and abo''e a pre-d t,e 4ltitude? ~ It accor^?~Jlish by ('isj'csini of the contents of the ballast hoppers and by se, par_ ating the bars in the suspension system to pe- -it the para- chute;' to the electronic and miss ion equipment. dc'wi sdfely lowers. the rupiui-d ball.:-_, -1:..r bar t31r1 ballast hoppers. unit includes a tl c , 1-t " tUd::- r -ti,+.ited (:one: ? 1?'~ Lhc Circuits ) a tulle-ur i_ay for SW1?;^-:^:I.?"tC t'i d f ' r iode to prevrer1'; h launch ..: fro o ^ -' l _riggs i.l~ this device, The 2G-P0 safety unit is moui:"tad on the undo S-idC Ot' ?~,:`_ , r:'_ '..:n bar of the 119L system., ne r the rub-bar at ";r.':nt and at . O v.'(1,_. 1-)11 pack ace. Power is provided from the electronic pa^.t:ca e battery Pack., but otherwise the unit operates independently of the est of 're 119L sys~ em? Aneroids are adjustable for altitsde d are set b-,11- hazed with simple., gau e-type tools. The ,s di?ae. nsicllh. are X 34s1 x ,it and it wr:Ag1i;3 a total of 11 :;ou11d;- m P ., :' functions i i 3ii0 i'Ti1 in 'tom: f Co - t t? -lit - s.ecy ..."i`1 r~.?, on ah a t 1 (.on :Lneo J. this Tab; how-;ever, it was never flown in actual opJsration due to ecesaticn of operations :riot r to rvCJ~1?~ t in '12i? ?.1~:.1.,_. tC% Unit, 1113-E57 , _.rovides cGt__.'o? of a the 1.19L y stem t1!.C'ouLh a Tee ;,l?1i?1'i; Of itc has, odometer-operated micrr, j-t an fi l t ero cvcl--'.~ by me ac Hof 0 L!?1. 3. 25 January through 27 January 1956 - 30 Balloons. 4. 20 January to termin.a:.ton - 40 Balloons. D. In general, the weapon;, system, d.eva3.oped throu`'_ tho Operational Suitability Test 11i`4ob;y Dick Hill was similar to tha flown during the primary mission. Deficiencies were encountered prior -to launch operations and resolved by system modifications as noted. in previous parts of this report. In addition, the actual operation revealed the necessity for other changes detailed below. (3) 111 D-582 Top SECaET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top SEC~~Er, 1. It was originally planned to utilize a 251 foot load strap connecting the balloon to the gondola. Upon testing, it was determined that the end of the 128 TT balloon would be 10 inches from the cradle of the Fisher Launcher and could possible sustain fabric damage during cross wind launches, A 25 foot extension, consisting of 10,000 pound test nylon coreless.cord- ing, was attached between the standard load strap and the gondola. This made it possible to maintain the balloon train on as near as possible a horizontal plane to insure accurate scale readi z-, and facilitate launch release. Since the smaller 660T balloon had b.-en added to the weapons system as an alternate vahi:- it as also necessary to increase its train by the addition of a 75 foot, 10,000 pound test nylon coreless cording, extension. \ This extension was connected in the same manner described above. ( ) 2. The proper leveling of the fiberglass box prior to flight and the assurance that any out of level conditions durin flight is at a minima,: are very critical. The mounting and installation of the water station and locator beacon .Tith battery on the original harness and cable suspension system of the fiberglass box unbalanced the assembly to such a degree as to eliminate the possibility of re-balancing the leveling. To overcome this difficulty and to allow for further adjustnent to balance for true level, three turnbuckle barrels on the original assembly were replaced with three new turnbuckle barrels which were 1 3/4 inches longer and allowed greater adjustment. The turnbuckle barrels replaced were those three which were .keeled on the side of the harness or box farthest away from that aide upon which the water station and locator beacon power pack were mounted. (C) 3. During tests conducted by Air Force Cambridge Research Center, there was an indication that during inactive storage the probability existed of partial activation of the XCRC-lA delay battery used to cause erection of the water station. Partial activation of these batteries would affect their ofc ciency in electrical urrent output during use. It was therelule deciuea to cu., l 2 XCRC-lA batteries in parallel. `Leas satisfactorily indicated that this system would produce more than sufficient electrical current needed to fire the S--63 squib. Immediate procurement action was initiated to obtain a new improved water activated battery that would perform the necessary function. (C) 4. Exposure time of system cameras was changed from the originally established 1.2-4- minutes to 6- minutes to provide z;' 4 continuous overlapping photo coverage when operating at lower altitudes and higher ground speeds. (S) 112 D-582 Top SM-11-Er, Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top E?T 5. Operation of the cameras was changed from the original 24 hour continuous system to a daylight only system, since results obtained from night operation during the Moby Dick Hi Operational Suitability Test were nil. This provided a greater yield in terms if footage of film expended and useable frames obtained, and also provided additional film sup ly for increased rate of film comsumption. ;wee paragraph 4 above). (S 6. An additional power source was added to the DMQ-1 package. This was to insure that in case of continuous camera cycling, due to either a malfunction or film supply expenditure, the resultant power drain would not be from the 119L system electrical power source. This modification was not made to packages flying Bill Jack cameras as a difference in camera design made it unnecessary. (S) E. Initially all balloons were launched with a recommended 7% free lift so as to preclude underinflation. Actual free lift was ascertained from the lowest reading of the scale located on the launch platform. Other operational criteria for initial launch operation were as follows: (C) 1. 66CT: a. Evanton - Initial floating altitude, 45,300 feet with a night floating altitude of 40,000 feet and ballast for 7 days. (S) . b. Oberpfaffenhofen, Giebelstadt and Gardermoen - Initial floating altitude of 46,400 feet with a ni ht floating altitude of 40,000 feet and ballast for 7 days. (TS) c. Adana - Initial altitude of 46,400 feet with night floating altittc': of 40,000 feet and ballast for 7 days. (TS) a. All launch sites - Initial floating altitude of 50,000 feet with a ni ht. floating altitude of 45,000 feet and ballast for 8 days. (S) 3. A cartoon placard, multi-language placard and Russian language placard were affixed to the camera package. The Russian language placard was affixed on 23 January 1956, 13 days subsequent t) mission execution. (TS) 4. The top half of each of the wide sides of the camera package were painted with international orange paint. (U) 5. The line numbers used to identify the instrumentation of the individual package (see 1st Air Division Manual 55-9) 113 D-582 7 Oo p S E C~~E T Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 yOp SECRET were painted on the upper half and lower half of the camera package. (C) 6. Camera turn-on time was determined by the Launch Control Center, High Wycombe, En?=and, based on forecasted.. penetration. However, every reasonable effort was extended to avoid photographing friendly ar:ezs. In no case was the camera turn-on time to be such as to photograph the immediate launch area and permit identification of the launch site. (TS) 7. Balloon launches were not scheduled when forecast trajectories indicated a return to the European area or excessive flight time prior to penetration of the target area. It was directed that launches would be accomplished if forecast trajectories indicated penetration of meridian 45E within the time periods indicated for sites as follows: (TS) a, b, c. d. e. Oberpfaffenhofen - Adana - Gardermoen - Evanton - Giebelstadt - 60 hours 24 hours 48 hours 72 hours 60 hours (TS) 8. HF and VHF radio-on time specified for each launch was as follows: (TS) a. Standard Setting: (1) Germany sites - 80 hours (2) Adana - 50 hours (3) Gardermoe'.. - 84 hours (4) Evanton - 90 hours (TS) Top SEC~dT D-5.82 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Top SECRET 9. Balloons which failed during ascent oar at altitude and descended within friendly borders were recovered by United States Air Force in Europe units under instructions contained in the United States Air Force Stray Recovery Plan. (S) 10. Balloon ascent and flight at floating altitude was monitored by MSQ-2 radar, radiosonde, theodolite and visual means. (S) 11. The two German sites and Gardermoen were located in close proximity to unfriendly borders. 66CT balloons were launched from these sites so as to penetrate the target area during hours of darkness (or in daylight if above 48,000 feet), since the initial altitude of this balloon was approximately 46,000 feet. (TS) 12. Based on expected success rates due to trajectories, priority for launching by site was established as follows: (TS) a. Priority 1 - Gardermoen b. Priority 2 - Giebelstadt and Oberpfaffenhofen c. Priority 3 - Adana d. Priority 4 - Evanton (TS) F. After the start of the operation, it became evident that, to accomplish our primary mission, an intensive program of system refinement was necessary. The many problems that arose through restrictions to launch operations from the standpoint of weather, civil reactions and system malfunctions necessitated field test, (which are discussed in detail under Tab "C"), and changes to our original launch criteria. A brief summary of these actions are as follows: (S) 1. With a late start in actual operations, it was readily discerned that immediate advantage would have to be taken of any favorable trajectories. It was decided to waive the previous policy of restricting launches wneiiever unfavorable surface conditions were prevalent, therefore balloons were launched successfully during ground fog or light icing conditions, but not heavy precipitation. Due to the civil situation existing in Norway, a special set of launch restrictions was placed on the Gardermoen detachment. (S) 2. In consonance with Moby Dick Hi findings and after an adequate sampling had been obtained during the primary mission, it was. determined that balloons with serial numbers of 115 D-582 40p 3 E 6Inn) E T Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 40P 4F ?IET 949 and below would produce an unacceptably high failure rate. Therefore, it was directed that only 128TT balloons with serial numbers of 950 and above would be launched. All 128TT's with serial numbers of 949 and below were set aside. (S) 3. After 21 days of operation, it was believed that excessive losses were attributable in part to the capability of unfriendly'forces to track the balloons through their HF transmissions. Consequently, on 31 January 1956, twelve hours were added, and on 3 February 1956, eighteen hours more were added to the radio turn on times for all sites, except Adana. (See paragraph IC3 Tab F, Chapter III) As of the stand- down date of 6 February 1956, radio turn-on times were as follows: (TS) a. Germany sites 11.0 hours b. Adana 50 hours c. Gardermoen 114 hours d. Evanton 120 hours To deny tracking of balloons by unfriendly forces, a few balloons were launched from Adana with the HF transmitter silent. VHF turn on was bessd on the established time settings outlined above. Results were inconclusive, however, if operations were renewed, it was desired to fly all systems with silent hW until the finai day of expected life (i.e., 5, 7, 72, or 8 days). 4. Reports arriving from the recovery area. indi. a..F:d that the water stations and locator beacons were not functioning as anticipated. The failure of the water station, coupled with a report of personnel injury by the explosion of a portion of one of the downed gondolas, resulted in the :immediate de- activation of all water stations. Since the water station was deactivated, a test program was immediately initiated to determine If the water station could be removed without influencing the water floating position of the DMQ-1 package. In the interim period, the water station was left attached to all, gondolas but was deactivated and had the squib, deployment bag, and pickup rope deleted from the system. (S) 5. Subsequently, as a result of specific 'testing in the field, it was determined that some of our previous launch criteria would have to be amended as follows: (U) a. 128TT - Free lift, formerly 7%, was changed to a minimum of 5% and a maximum of 10%. Desired free lift 7 percent. This insured that balloons would ascend under adverse weather conditions, cover personnel computation errors and still. 116 D-1:82 Top S~? ETA Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 40p E?RET not endanger the balloon. (C) b. 66CT - Free lift, formerly 7%, was changed to a minimum of 7% and a maximum of 15%. Desired free lift was 10%. This insured same advantage as for 128TT's. (C) c. Adana - Initial altitude of 49,000 feet with night floating altitude of 44,000 feet and ballast for 5 days. (TS) d. 128TT: All Launch Sites - The initial altitude was changed to 54,000 feet and the night floating altitude to 50,000 feet. If operations were renewed after launches were terminated by directive on the 6th of February 1956, it was desired that these balloons be flown with initial altitudes of 60,000 and 76,000 feet with a night floatin altitude of 55,000 feet. (See Chapter I, paragraph V F2.) (S) G. Inclosures 1 through 5 contained in this Tab depict the locations where the balloons that failed upon ascent or soon after attaining floating altitude were recovered. Inclosure 6 this Tab, depicts the locations where the balloons that accom- plished successful flight without known penetration of the target area were recovered. (S) H. Conclusions: 1. The delay in commencing the operation (from 1 December 1955 to 10 January 1956) compressed the project, time- wise, to within a very short period of favorable winds. This, together with a restricted launch rate may have precluded launch of the total 2,500 systems during conditions of most favorable winds if the project had been continued. (S) 2. Deficient polyethelyne and manufacturing defects caused a deficit of approximately 700 balloons in the operational inventory. (C) 117 D-5d2 TOP 8E?Rr Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOP SECRET (Format for 8x10 1/2 pa )ex. ) TOP SEC D-.582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 TOP SECRET LOCATION WHERE KNOWN FAILURES WERE RECOV 2ED (Format for 8x10 1/2 paper.) 119 TOP ECRET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Incl 3 (Format for 8x10 1/2 paper.) TOP SECRET TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 .~.~.. .?.,.>? i. G?i? it%` 't 1.= t this :,,=?1.f ; acticil occurred d !.iri:i` __'. : L? c . .ri with d cecr orcscl ?t r'.tio G1cL.Ia. notbc::r 11c.?:il. rr, ' nu. is: :1ctitiCe to the oar ~4 % =''i?o1'tc, _'li,ii' G~;.C:y,'_'1~" i'? '.. ._. _., .. ? ((% J.c:' it ic:' 1 ';11 ? icns hewed N :1J": II18! _ iac Vii:: :.__a 1 _. _.._u ? s]'_,G{ er 1C c C. 01 -? :1_., V Cr.'_1#' c of il 1 :Ylf't?iCi1C are ac 1. 1_:1G?rn, f 0?. ver, ! e 1J._. li{it=;ii ~1_`:ii\_ ..,1;:- _`^t:~G1_ .;~? .._. _~ Ciii!?~~t1i~,I:: we 111.7 . L 11;S, l tU, Laces 01 ...:'l:` o or1;;.7 ~... '.evore _ iii; to C'iF.' i':.~;-1 ? Lo ires ~~.. i~PGy~ ~'Y? Ili=.~ ~L~E c:.~. U;; i;.~:.c.at ,. 7-slaSt?'.ai7 C 1~'. )l E'i,. ce 1t5.r 6 `_ act ro )o 1~ ...11~3t..~-.~. '.'!c!L' _ _a1 172 D-582 up ~E?RE Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 F. Ths mod if:.~.cation to limit 'sy; te^Y cpr u..ic- : c C /'1_Z~1t hours c!+.~lked 1t1 ii '_ t~='L1 j~. C l 1r c_~: _a _._ IJ Y'? recovered which had boc:Y. nodifi ed to "trcvide a scaara tc LL~-l power soure These systems o erated roi?^.c,11y. (C) G. Condensation of moisture on the. inside the dal -&-'. recorder !,az: 1 Port obsc',_:rcd do '"i 1 jr, `,C'' of the total hazel film 1roeessed, Inecaciusi~io c' 7: h ne ixL!icate that this condensation may not occur tr ;.n ..,_c:os ivc degree when '1-'he desiccant has boon pi7 ctuo t. his 1 {:~~;~.tt;iC Lb i1:l.tic.Ut;e: .:ii,,,C'ilt ~i1G y).PL J?.e"Va \- / e._ ...r':. ....:~ -a. C: Fi. Al]. photo cc: ;;e~ra~e rer:eivec. by '_c~rcl: -.~t ...~r' 5 n. I::I1~_.?.:..a.tlfi:! Center as, of 1 ?'w,.h l9:J-) 1'lci.o :.::`.'.ti ;.,~:Cu`_'1?..t.J J lotto'. The following is quoted from a report, on an ova11;; 'ton of the eographic positions computed by :;erenau ice.l Chart and Information Center from hazel data: (S ) 111. Computed hazel coorc inates were to f i_.a1 hole i r1e: eu coordjnates and differences of position recorded. Results were grouped as io'_l, C.'11E'1CR I Cc.-m-) uta.tions with lees Phan ~'Ylls ~ ` _: e% error. CATE_'UZY II Cr,^.:,,_. :iJYl with 1a_- i1 1a.. / .,l , e ti rnn r . l,l l ) . Cfi"''D-.C?Y III _1:?--?- de reel e ro (iclu,I'._ T j 7 ) . C.:! r'.EC CRY IV C.. with less ",'-all e "7:'Dr (ineJ_J(:il_v C_L_.T?i. TLE T, TI _.nd III) . 1. t`a tat T? 8 ?ULET c ? , , , tM1 ,fit, { ., CIi AECC Y III 9 `' C.''.TrGC''Y IV 9 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 173 D-582 Approved For Release 2011/06/01: CIA-RDP89B00708R000500040001-0 VOp ?EIET The acc);r? cy of hazel computations dopee c c?a `he 1Cy to ~.~ d e. the ..,: z y 9s ~!.a,- nui J '.'. ability e~.ii~ _i.. ~,.,, :1?'.?.~i.t:c:, ~. ~~.