PROJECT RAND SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 27 SOME ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS IN USAF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00708R000500050002-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2009
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 31, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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PROJECT RAND
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 2/7
SOME ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE
PROBLEMS IN USAF (U)
A. H.' Katz
M. E. Davies
31 January 1955--
Copy No. I
SERIES G .
Assigned to
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This publication is made available to a limited number of authorized persons
or agencies for their use. Further. dissemination. is not not'
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to abstracting agencies is not authorized
? sarily reflect the official views or policies of the United States Air Force.
RADING BY
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NOTICE
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TRIBUTION by authority of the Deputy Chief of Staff,
Development, HqUSAF, because of the nature of the data or
information it contains. Transmittal and circulation to individ-
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SUMMARY
This is the first of a series of reports on some aspects of
technical intelligence.
The collection, evaluation, and use of technical intelligence,
although an established practice in industry (in both its covert and
overt aspects) is a relatively new operation in the USAF.
Discussed herein are problems of technical intelligence known to
the authors or brought to their attention by the Air Force Air Technical
Intelligence Center (ATIC) at Dayton, Ohio. To facilitate the investi-
gations of these problems the subject matter was divided into three major
categories:
1. MOSCOW AIR-SHOW PHOTOGRAPHY
2. GROUND LOROP ACTIVITIES (LONG-RANGE OBLIQUE PHOTOGRAPHY)
3. UTILIZATION OF U.S. EMBASSY AIRCRAFT
No attempt is made in this document to evaluate the importance of
technical intelligence. It is assumed, however, that cognizance of
intelligence requirements and the present day deficiency of adequate
information will be understood by most readers. This will be particularly
true of those readers who are able to facilitate the suggestions contained
herein.
That the sense of urgency has pervaded all phases of this study will
be found reflected in the discussions of photographic collection measures
which can or are being accomplished right now. Interim steps utilizing
present photographic equipment (with and without modifications) which will
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aid in achieving the required prompt actions are also examined, and
suggestions for changes or innovations, in either instrumentation, techniques,
or schemes of operations, are made. A description is included of a research
and development activity which, it is urgently felt, should be initiated and
maintained until the interim measures can be superseded. Finally, it is
shown that this program can be put on a long and firm footing providing a
continuous flow of valuable information.
Other memoranda to be published at later dates will discuss the subjects
of collecting intelligence of Soviet guided missiles and the possible utility
of overflight operations.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY ...................................................... iii
I. ATIC PHOTOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS ............................... 1
II. MOSCOW AIR-SHOW PHOTOGRAPHY .............................. 3
General..*..**..**.* ... 0 ............................... 3
Embassy Photographic Problems .......................... 6
III. GROUND IAROP ............................................ 12
ST. LAWRENCE ISLAND PROJECT ............................ 12
OPERATION FEZ .......................................... 17
Surveillance Aspects ................................ 18
GENERAL REMARKS ON GROUND LOROP ........................ 21
IV. UTILIZATION,OF U.S. EMBASSY AIRCRAFT ..................... 23
General Discussion ..................................... 23
Visual Observations .................................... 24
Photographic Observations .............................. 25
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I. ATIC PHOTOGRAPHIC PROBLEMS
Studies of ATIC's technical intelligence problems reveal certain phases
of the intelligence collection operations which seem to be most significant.
This first report is limited to the field of direct collection of intelligence
data by photographic means. Certain impressions and observations by the
authors were inescapable. They are listed briefly only as background context
for this report.
First, direct photographic collection of technical information is, in
essence, peacetime reconnaissance and, as such, falls within the scope of
both scheduled and presently operating peacetime reconnaissance systems and
activities. Reconnaissance is unique among normal Air Force combat activities
in that it is the only one of such activities which can (and must) be oper-
ational during peacetime.
Next, it is fairly obvious that the direct type of intelligence col-
lection is more satisfying than, and appears to be far superior to, the
inferences, hunches, extrapolations, calculations, and guesses which (by
default) make up a too considerable bulk of intelligence reporting.
Further, we were thoroughly impressed with the (deplorable) fact that
the Moscow air show photography is our major source of information about new
Russian aircraft. This source of data, controlled as it is by the Russians,
is not giving us sufficient, timely, or detailed information.
The above are impressions. Against them must be posed the depression
and frustration brought about by considering the limitations, difficulties,
and technical obstacles in the collection business. The meager collection
that results under these constraints is, therefore, understandable.
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Fortunately, even with these limitations and constraints, improvements
may be possible. It is with these that this report is concerned.
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II. MOSCOW AIR-SHOW PHOTOGRAPHY
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One of the better known and more valuable opportunities available
to collect direct and useful intelligence on Russian weapons of interest
to the Air Force, in particular aircraft, is the Moscow air-show series.
There are three air shows per year, exclusive of the practice flybys
associated with these air shows. These are, the annual Air Force day air
show, the air parade on May Day, and the show on the anniversary of the
revolution, November 7. The Air Force show takes place at Tushino air-
field some distance from the center of Moscow. The other two air parades
pass over the Kremlin and Red Square areas, and thus are more or less
visible from our present Embassy location.
The assumption of these notes is that significant data are obtain-
able at these air shows. An interesting series of observations relating
to these air shows is contained in R. L. Garthoff!s memorandum, RM-1327,
titled "Some Observations on Soviet Disclosure of New Aircraft." This
memorandum contains a discussion of intentional and unintentional dis-
closure, but as noted immediately above, this type of discussion is out-
side the province of this particular technical note.
Sufficient has been learned from the various air shows to indicate
that most new Russian prototypes or pre-production models are displayed
at the air-shows. Clearly it would be desirable from the intelligence
viewpoint to be able to photograph these new models of military aircraft
at an earlier stage of their construction and development. In general,
however, these opportunities have been denied.
Cameras mounted with, or disguised within, binoculars, small hand-held
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amateur cameras and other such gadgetry as may be permitted a pedestrian
observer, have been used to obtain aircraft photos; but there is little
question that the major (and by far best) way of getting photographs of
these aircraft is from the roof of the Embassy building.
The American Embassy has lately been moved a rather considerable dis-
tance (from the photographic viewpoint, at least,) from the flight line
which passes over the Kremlin and Red Square. A very rough map measure-
ment indicates this distance (that is, from the present Embassy building
to the line of flight) to be on the order of 4700 feet; and this is the
closest distance to that flight line. This fact makes photography of a
type useful for technical' intelligence purposes difficult, and poses the
immediate and obvious requirement for the use of precision, long-focal-
length lenses. Forty and eighty inch focal length lenses, on which are
mounted Leica-type cameras, were used. In fact, the pictures taken at the
last May Day show in 1954, and which are generally acknowledged to be the
best yet obtained of Russian aircraft, utilized these lenses. The very
narrow angle of view (a film size of 1 inch by 1 1/2 inches on an eighty-
inch camera is an angular coverage of approximately 0.70 x 1.00) makes
the problem of aiming these camera, keeping the aircraft in view, and
during all this, focussing the cameras, a difficult bit of practical pho-
tography. An alternative way of describing this very narrow field of an
eighty-inch lens on a Leica camera is to note that at a distance of one
statute mile the 1 inch by 1 1/2 inch field of the camera on an eighty-
inch focal length lens covers a field of but 65 feet by 100 feet. This
certainly indicates the difficulty of the aiming problem. Further, and
fairly obvious, is the requirement to get the entire aircraft being photo-
graphed on one frame. Camera systems which could photograph but part of an
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aircraft may be of some interest and applicability for detailed study of
particular parts of the aircraft. But for any type of measurement or over-
all analysis, it is imperative that all of the airplane be on one photograph.
A word is in order about the potential intelligence yield from analysis
of aircraft. Given fairly accurate information on aircraft shape and size,
number and size of engines, an able analyst can make useful and significant
statements about performance of this type of photographic operation. Cer-
tainly and obviously the pictures obtained must be clear, sharp, and of
sufficient scale and definition to permit observation of details and to make
measurements. Second, and perhaps more difficult, there must be obtained
sufficient data to enable the making of accurate measurements. This photo-
grammetric data must include such information as range, angle of aircraft
flight line to line of-sight,, and other data which will enable complete
geometric orientation of the aircraft with respect to the observers. In the
past, because of limitations of equipments and techniques used in acquiring
this air show photography, data on size of the aircraft under study was ob-
tained from consideration of sizes (presumably known) of an accompanying. or
nearby aircraft. Unfortunately, making such arrangements is a matter which
is in control of the Russians and not at all within our control. It would
appear useful, therefore, to devise a system which gives us what may be called
photogrammetric capability on an autonomous basis. We must be able to deter-
mine the angles and dimensions without reference to accompanying aircraft or
to analogies. It is, therefore, to these two problems: (a) getting high
quality photography of sufficient detail for analysis and (b) getting such
information as will permit absolute measurements of size and shape, that this
phase of the memorandum is addressed.
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EMBASSY PHOTOGRAPSIC PROBLEMS
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It is impossible to consider this problem in a realistic framework
without a good feel and understanding of the limitations and difficulties
of the Moscow operations. Fortunately, the authors were able to talk to
the two sergeants who acquired and produced the last air show photographs.
In addition, meetings were possible with the technical people at ATIC who
are most intimately involved in this collection phase of the operation.
It appears that large, obvious and highly technical equipments can-
not be erected on the Embassy roof.. Such equipments as are used are semi-
concealed. By this it is meant that an attempt was made to conceal the
apparatus but it appears that these are motions which are designed as to
not constitute an obvious affront to the Russians; they undoubtedly know
full well what is going on.
The first topic of discussion is the measurement problem; that of
obtaining range from the camera site to the aircraft being photographed
as well as the angle between the line of sight and the aircraft flight
line. Several systems were considered briefly and all but one were rejected.
An obvious suggestion for this sort of problem is the use of a stereo
camera arrangement where the full length of the Embassy building might be
considered for the stereo base. This means having a camera at each end
of the building; both cameras trained on the same object, and then making
measurements of absolute parallax to determine range. The difficulties of
performing this operation in such a fashion as to yield good, hard, precise
numbers are enormous. The major problem is that of having and maintaining
camera axes exactly parallel or, if not parallel, at known and slight angles
to each other. This does not seem practicable within the limitations imposed
by the operation. On the other hand, this technique might yield interesting
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views of the aircraft, which, while not useful for measurement purposes,
might still be of interest for just visual examination of the aircraft
and its structures. But fortunately this is perfectly possible from one
camera station, so there is no need for actual stereo photography. As
the aircraft under observation flies along, it obviously presents different
views to the roof-top observer. Hence, successive pictures of the aircraft,
or certainly selected pictures spaced properly could be examined stereo-
scopically on the assumption that there is not too violent a change in
angle of view from one to the other. This is exactly the way in which stereo
photographs are accomplished from the air. The aircraft flies along with
one camera taking successive pictures from somewhat different viewpoints of
objects on the ground. These photographs can then be examined stereoscopi-
cally. The only requirement is that there be two photographs of each object.
This is performed in the case of aerial photography by cycling the camera at
an (easily determined) interval which will accomplish this end.
The problem in the present case is exactly the reverse of this one. Of
course when taking single narrow angle shots of an aircraft proceeding along
a flight line the successive pictures, because of changing range, will in
general be of somewhat different scale, making stereoscopic viewing more dif-
ficult. If the scale change is considerable, say 10 per cent, this makes
stereoscopic viewing practically impossible. On the other hand, photographs
can be so enlarged or reduced as to reduce the photography to the same
effective scale, thus making stereoscopic observation very simple. This then
eliminates the requirement of direct stereo photography from two spaced
cameras on the Embassy rooftop.
Another suggestion which was examined briefly would have required the
use.of two buildings. The second building in this case would be that of a
friendly embassy such as the British or Canadian Embassy. This would have
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required simultaneous photography (in this case synchronized photography
is meant) from both stations which could be accomplished only by some sort
of electronic or telephonic link. This too seems to be unnecessarily com-
plicated and unreliable for the problem and the conditions which obtain in
that area. Too many people, too much coordination, too many possibilities
of malfunctioning, add up to a low evaluation of any such system.
The system which is proposed here for experimental evaluation employs
an army-type range finder of 1 meter base. It is suggested that the range
finder be firmly and securely mounted on an axis perpendicular to that of
the long focal length camera axis, thus simplifying the aiming problem.
Assuming that nominal range of say 1 mile is preset. into the range finder,
we would then photograph the range finder images and simultaneously take
photographs of the aircraft by a synchronized camera system, all of which
could be easily arranged. The range finder photographs would show an
image of the aircraft, or rather two images, out of coincidence because it
would be extremely unlikely that the aircraft would be at the preset':range,
except by luck, and certainly for no more than 1 or 2 photographs. It
appears not unreasonable to expect an accuracy of measurement of about 1
percent under these circumstances. It can be shown (below) that three pho-
tographs of the aircraft equally spaced in time, together with the three
corresponding and separate range determinations, are sufficient to obtain
complete data on flight line direction and angles of viewing line to this
flight line direction. This data will permit nearly complete photogrammetric
reduction. One further angle is really needed and this is the elevation
angle of the camera. It seems that if this is obtained to 1 or 2 degrees
(as can certainly be done by an observer making notes at the time of the
photography) this would effectively eliminate the residual small error which
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would accrue if we ignore this effect. Thus, three selective photographs
equally spaced in time yield a complete solution for the problem of range
and measurement determination. An incidental by-product of this data will
be aircraft speed. Speed measurement does not seem to be too important,
but might prove useful if correlated with other data secured from other
devices such as an acoustic analyzer. It is suggested therefore that steps
be taken to procure a 1 meter base army range finder of the M-1916 type (or
its successor) for example, and perform such experiments as will enable
practical feasibility of this suggestion to be tested. The intervalometer
which could be used for this operation would be a 24-volt operated instru-
ment and could be obtained from the Aerial Reconnaissance Laboratory or
Air Force stock. Thinking here is of the B-5 basic type intervalometer and/
or its successors. It is not necessary that the time between successive
pictures be known to great accuracy unless it is-desired to determine air-
craft, speed. It is important that the time interval between pictures be
very closely the same and for this job this intervalometer is particularly
suitable, for it has greater. precision (repeatability) than accuracy (true
value). However, it can be calibrated easily if aircraft speed determination
is deemed worthwhile.
The basis for our earlier discussion of one-station photogrannnetry is
found in the simple drawing below.
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CAMERA STATION
A, B, C are the three equally spaced aircraft positions. (These are not
necessarily successive exposures.) We assume that ranges a, b, and c are
furnished from analysis of range finder data.
Since all angles are determinable by elementary trigonometric methods,
when all sides are given, we need only give the solution for the A B distance.
This is x in our diagram, and is the advance of the aircraft on its flight
line. It is easily shown that
a2 + c2 - 2b2
N 2
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To determine scale in one of the aircraft photographs, the range must be
used and corrected for the angle between line of sight and line of flight.
It is believed that this brief exposition of the essentials is sufficient,
and that the people doing this analysis can pick this up from here.
In response to requests from ATIC to recommend sources, organizations,
and people who can work in the areas discussed above, the following
suggestion for the more immediate Moscow air show problem is offered.
An ideal group, well equipped with clearances, background experience,
optical, shop, and all other required facilities and know-how, is the Boston
University Physical Research Laboratory at 700 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston
15, Massachusetts. This organization is highly recommended by the authors.
Minims requirements for the Moscow photography are:
a.. Obtaining the range finder from the Army.
b. Experimenting with photographic recording of the range finder
images.
c. Coupling the range finder and camera axes at a fixed 900 angle.
d. Synchronizing the range-finder -recordings caera and the main
camera, and operating both off intervalometer control.
e. Developing techniques for use of this equipment.
There are numerous other minor recommendations and suggestions to be
made with respect to camera techniques, focussing procedures, tripod utiliza-
tion, film choice, development techniques, and mechanical and optical aids
to analysis. Because of the dearth of time, in contrast to the requirement
to get something started soon, this particular report is being issued in
(regretably) an incomplete state. The points raised above will be discussed
separately in other memoranda and reports, which should be forthcoming soon.
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III. GROUND LOROP
As explained above, LOROP means Long Range Oblique Photography. The
word was coined by one of the authors several years ago to define and lend
dignity to the specialized operation implied by the meaning. This word is
now in generally accepted use in reconnaissance. Long range is purely
relative to conventional routine ranges. As now used in USAF, it means
photography of targets 20 to 100 miles or more away with lenses whose focal
lengths are at least 100 inches. Two interesting problems in this category
are discussed below.
ST. LAWRENCE ISLAND PROJECT
The first problem to be discussed under this general heading is photo-
graphy from St. Lawrence Island of Russian shipping traversing the narrow
straits off the Chukotski Peninsula. It appears that Russian northern
bases are supplied by ships going around this peninsula, and that an ac-
curate and continuous surveillance of this shipping, if done with sufficiently
powerful equipment, might permit the inspection of deck cargo, note frequency
of passage, and in some measure get a rough idea of the amount of activity.
This project and the ideas behind it were called to the attention of the
authors and discussed with them by Colonel M. D. Seashore of ATIC, who visited
this region recently.
From a 700 ft. high vantage point on St. Lawrence Island, one can sur-
vey (according to the rough formula for horizon distance and neglecting
refraction, which works in our favor) out to some 33 statute miles. The
closest distance from St. Lawrence Island to the Chukotski Peninsula is
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about i.0 miles. It is not clear what the habits of Russian shipping are;
that is to say, whether or not they stay close enough to shore to be below
our horizon distance. This is a point which must be investigated further.
The photographic equipment contemplated by ATIC at this time for this
job is a 200 inch f/25 camera. While this is undoubtedly a fine piece of
equipment, it is the feeling of these writers that it is not quite adequate.
Ships can be photographed, but examination of deck cargo seems below the
resolution threshold.. Fortunately, from the photographic standpoint, (if
not the climatic) this particular problem is a photographer's dream. The
island is ours, the equipment is ours and presumably we are in friendly
territory. The limitations imposed are those of nature only and are not
at all 'comparable to the type of limitations imposed by use of aircraft or
by the requirement of having to accomplish this photography in otherwise
unfriendly areas or in a covert manner.
These factors mean there should be no real limit imposed on the kind
of photographic equipment to do this job, if the job is worth undertaking
at all. This simply means that the cost of transporting anything up there,
the rigors of the climate, the loneliness of the outpost and the unrelieved
monotony of the task are initial costs of a very large amount. Taking all
of these circumstances in consideration it seems advisable to go a little
further and procure equipment which will really pay off.
On the assumption that the shipping will be 33 miles away (horizon
distance) one may readily calculate that with a 200-inch camera, a scale
number of approximately 10,000 is obtained. This is 833 ft. to the inch.
A 500 ft. long ship-would be roughly .60 inches on the photograph. It is
unlikely that sufficient detail to permit accurate identification of deck
cargo will result from such photography.
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It seems to these writers that a focal length which would be more
applicable for this job would be of the order of 500 inches. This should
not cause undue alarm in the unwary reader. Modern cameras, similar to
those used in special reconnaissance activities, are usually of the
telephoto design. The over-all length of such systems, from the front
lens to the focal plane, is approximately half the total focal length.
Furthermore, these cameras are easily folded optically so that their total
bulk is much less than may be imagined from looking at the number 500 inches.
Considerable and valuable design experience with modern cameras (both
ground and air) has been accumulated; this means that the problem at hand
is capable of neat solution.
It appears likely that with a 500-inch focal length camera mounted on
the island and mounted suitably so as to be free of vibration wind currents,
extreme temperature gradients, and other factors which degrade quality,
should be capable of yielding'a minimum resolution on standard film of
at least 10 to 12 lines per.mi1limeter. This corresponds to an angular
resolution of about 2 seconds of arc. This figure, which we will use
hereafter for working purposes, is a factor of 5 or so below the theoretical
limit of a moderate aperture photographic telescope of 500 inches. In this
case we are talking about a camera with an f/number of about 25 or 30.
Theoretical resolution of a lens of this type, (which could well be realized
with a properly designed instrument) is of the order of 50 or 60 lines per
mm. The resolution of the film we might employ for this test should be
higher than this lens limit. Because we are not intending to use this
camera in the air or to photograph a high-speed target (let us assume a
ship's speed of about 15 knots or so) it is clear that we could use fairly
slow shutter speeds, accompany this with high resolution fine grain film
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having good micro-contrast characteristics and achieve superb results. To
go back for the moment to the question of shutter speeds and image speeds,
if we assume as we did immediately above that the ship's speed is of the
order of 15 knots, this speed at the focal plane of the camera (consider-
ing that we are reducing this speed by the scale factor of 4000) will give
us an image speed or blurring effect of about 1.75 mm per second. This
image speed has its effect on the image, of course, only during the exposure
time and its effect is cut in direct proportion to shutter speed. Assum-
ing again that we will use shutter speeds of the order of a fiftieth of a
second, (not out of reason for the conditions of the problem at hand) the
result will give us a blurring or image motion which is of the order of a
twenty-fifth of a millimeter. Fortunately, for reasons having to do with
threshold effects and the sensitometry of the film, this amount of motion
should permit resolution of the order of thirty-five or forty lines per
millimeter. It should be clear now that the kinds of numbers we have in
mind for this system for focal length, shutter speed, lens aperture, film
speed, etc., make for a balanced system.
One of the fortunate aspects of this operation is the requirement or
need for but a small angular field on the camera. The aerial cameras
discussed earlier all require relatively large angular fields. Thus, the
smallest airborne 240-inch camera in use or proposed would have a field
format no smaller than 9 by 18 inches; and cameras of this size with much
larger fields have been used. On the other hand, any ship at the target
distance of 30 odd miles presents a very small target. (A 500-ft. long
ship, at a scale of 4000, is but 1.5 inches on the photograph.) The con-
sequent reduction in optical design problems is enormous. Thus, we could
easily (and undoubtedly with benefit to the optical designer, the operator
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in the field, the man in the processing laboratory, and all who subse-
quently handle the film) standardize on the film size of perhaps 4 by 5
inches, a standard, commonly available, and easily handled film.
Besides the large camera, we should have a visual spotting aid, a
telescope of perhaps 50 to 60 power which could be used in aiming the
large camera and making the small angular correction movements we might
anticipate. Unfortunately, an elegant camera such as this one and, in
fact, any photographic piece of.equipment, is useless during obscurity
like cloud or darkness (unless the ship mounts ome strong lights). To
this end it is suggested that a relatively simple radar be used for
ranging in the daytime (it would not have to be used except on a very
infrequent basis for this purpose). The main use of this radar would be
to count traffic during those portions of the day or weather spectrum
which are closed to photography by the large camera. Clearly it would
avail us little to have fairly decent information about the cargo and
type of a particular ship and at the same time be uninformed by several
hundred per cent about the number of ships which have gone by in whatever
direction. Thus the use of .a radar at night might do simple census taking
or gross count, and use of the camera in the daytime would nicely supple-
ment the radar by permitting detailed inspection on a sampling basis. Of
course some of the questions raised here, involving use of a radar, cannot
be answered from this end. Clearly, the radar, being an active device,
might be a security giveaway, or might otherwise be regarded as an
impracticable component of this operation. At least this suggestion may
be regarded as simply a suggestion for analysis and evaluation of ATIC.
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OPERATION FEZ
Operation FEZ, as understood by the authors, is the securing of photo-
graphy of Russian areas from high vantage points on the Turkish side of the
Turkey-Russian border. This photography is accomplished by U.S. personnel
equipped with relatively long-focus cameras - cameras of the order, 80 to
150 inches focal length. Fortunately for our purposes, and in fact that
which makes the operation both possible, and useful, is the presence not
far from the common border of interesting Russian areas. The cities of
Batumi and Yerevan, with their associated airfields, are of obvious and
immediate Air Force interest.
Conversation with responsible officers at ATIC has revealed that this
operation is a very difficult one logistically, involving as it does the
climbing of mountains, and the packing in of heavy, cumbersome and delicate
camera gear. Furthermore, and for obvious security precautions, the people
who do this work must climb these mountains and be in place during hours
of darkness so as to (hopefully) prevent detection by observers on the
other side of the border. Another condition which makes this at best an
uncomfortable operation is the fact that best photo conditions usually
occur after a rainstorm and this is undoubtedly not the most pleasant time
to climb a mountain. Photographic conditions following a rainstorm are
usually good because the rain clears the air of dust particles and other
vision-obstructing and contrast-reducing effects in the atmosphere. The
net result is that the photography can be secured either at greater dis-
tances or at greater contrasts for the same distance. Thus the recipe for
good photography does not quite coincide with the recipe for pleasant
mountaineering.
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Surveillance Aspects
As we look at this operation, we see several points that must be
noted. First, ground photography-. secured in this operation by ATIC should
be compared for yield and quality with corresponding photographs obtained
by the Air Force from the air. In this way, at least, the value of Operation
FEZ as a pioneer tool can be assessed. The way in which the word "pioneer"
is used here refers to securing original or relatively fresh coverage of
the airfields and other areas of interest. Surveillance is, however, an
entirely different matter from pioneer reconnaissance. If surveillance of
the several observable areas is indeed an important aspect of Operation FEZ,
then the surveillance aspect alone will serve to justify this type of
mission, together with its physical and technical hardships.
What we are saying is simply this. Inasmuch as U.S. reconnaissance
aircraft have secured pioneer coverage of this area, in fact coverage which
undoubtedly extends considerably deeper than is possible to secure from
ground cameras (if the aerial photographs are better than the ground photo-
graphs, as we suspect), then this pioneer aspect of Operation FEZ should be
minimized and attention paid to the surveillance aspect. Quite obviously,
surveillance on a weekly, monthly, or some intermediate basis by means of
our aircraft is not possible at this time. On the other hand, this is
certainly possible albeit difficult by means of ground photography. It is
therefore perhaps this aspect of Operation FEZ which should be exploited and
developed the most.
Photographic equipment used in this operation to date, while undoubt-
edly of high quality cannot be regarded as other than amateur equipment.
By ''amateur equipment" we mean simply equipment more or less available on
the open commercial market and not developed for the job. Equipment
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consists of Leica type cameras (Leica or Exakta) mounted on very long
focal lenses such as 80-inch or 150-inch telephoto lenses. Lenses used
have been made by Bouwers in Delft, Netherlands, at the Old Delft
Optical Company, and by Frank Back at Zoomar, in Glen Cove, Long Island.
Investigation by the authors reveals that the Zoomar lenses are essentially
identical in design and outward physical appearance to those made by
Bouwers. Whether this is coincidence or otherwise has not yet been
determined but is under minor and low priority investigation. It is
entirely possible that detailed study will show that these lenses are not
too far from optimum for this type of mission required in Operation FEZ.
Were more weight, size and other concomitants of good photography permitted
in this situation one could undoubtedly exceed the performance achieved by
the present systems - and this with no regard to potential improvements in
.film choice, development methods and other handling techniques.
Dr. James G. Baker, whose name is invariably associated with the out-
standing optical work done in this country for the past decade or more, has
recently told the writers about a 400-inch mirror system which would be
quite light and small in over-all dimensions. This particular design
takes advantage of a material whichkns not yet been elsewhere used in optical
design. This material is foamed quartz, and is made by Corning Glass Company.
It is the impression of these writers, who are now getting further data
from Dr. Baker on this system, that the expected weight of this optical
system will not exceed 10 lbs. nor in length exceed 30 inches. The angular
field of this system will probably be that which will cover a 2 x 3 inch
area. Use of a rigid tripod during Operation FEZ is not only desirable
but mandatory. This should make use of this relatively slow system
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possible and it should succeed in securing far more detail than is possible
with the present systems.
Recalling the concept of this operation as one primarily useful in
surveillance, it seems that further exploration of the surveillance aspects
might turn up possibilities of watching military operations in detail on
the several fields which can be observed from the Turkish side of the
border. We have in mind here the observance of operations which could
not be studied from aerial photographs secured on a one-time fly-by,:such
as turn-around time of MIG's, general operating, timing and scheduling of
aircraft movements, engine maintenance and replacement practices, and
operations of this general character. This type of requirement might
indicate the profitable use of a motion picture or a sequence camera with
careful timing control. This might permit us to make fairly complete time
and motion analyses for some of these operations. (It should be pointed
out that this particular area is one of the few places in the world where
we can look directly into Russia from a friendly area. Here certainly we
don't go through hundreds of miles of satellite and buffer states.) The
type of sequence camera intended here is one which can be pulsed at con-
trolled intervals and which records time, so that the pulsing rate (which
must depend very directly on the kind of operation under study) can be
varied at the choice of the operator. There are numerous and excellent
commercially available cameras of this type, which, when attached to a
very high quality lens, would make a powerful combination.
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GENERAL REMARKS ON GROUND LOROP
There appear to be some further side advantages to this kind of
proposition. Were the camera systems described briefly above designed,
constructed, and installed in both the northern and southern areas, we
could well use these operations as excellent training grounds for general
and further world-wide operations of this character. It is certainly true
that one can do long-distance photography under closely simulated circum-
stances in this country. By the same token it appears difficult to simu-
late the rigors and difficulties of an actual field operation without
doing it in the field. In any event, in this case there is no need to
simulate it, because we have the site and are intending to perform the
operation. It seems clear that long focal length, large cameras of this
type will become an increasingly more prominent feature of ATIC's world-
wide activities. It is entirely possible that there are numerous other
areas throughout the world which afford us the same benefits of close-at-
hand observation permitted in this instance by the presence of St. Lawrence
Island in the one instance, and Turkish mountains in the other, so close
to the Russian mainland.
A casual look around the map of Asia indicates at least one other
potential source of data similar to that which is being obtained from the
Turkish boundary. This is at the point at which Norway abuts the Murmansk
Peninsula. Whether or not useful intelligence data could be procured about
the Murmansk area from some vantage point on the Norway side is not known
to these writers at this time, but can and should be investigated.
A leading photographic worker in the Royal Swedish Navy, Captain Ragnar
Thoren, has for many years been experimenting with long focal length photog-
raphy from ground positions. One of the writers has had extensive discussions
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with Captain Thoren in years past and was left with the impression that
Sweden is undoubtedly doing some of this type of LOROP operation right
now. Brief study of the map of Europe does not clearly indicate what
could be observed from the Swedish coast or its islands that might be of
interest and available to ATIC. But this point is one which ATIC can
investigate easier and better than we can here at RAND. There is more
than a distinct possibility that Sweden may be doing some work of this
nature from its ships. We have in our possession a photograph showing a
10 ft focal length camera mounted on a Swedish ship. This photograph and
some of the uses of such equipment are described in a fairly recent and
available article by Thoren.
One important and oft-overlooked thought must be inserted at this
point, following the hardware discussion above. Items of physical hardware
are but one component of a successful operating system. Techniques for
successful exploitation and use'of the hardware must be developed, not only
for the collection tools but for the physical reduction and analysis of
data. Such processing equipment and techniques, as well as such gear as
may be useful in reduction and analysis of the data, must, in all fairness
to the collection gadgets and the lonely crews sitting in remote out-
posts, be of comparable quality to the camera itself. The laboratory in
the home office is no place to degrade data. Whatever data is gathered
by the camera must be preserved and transmitted without further loss
through the rest of the system. And, of course, people must be suitably
trained and in place to operate equipment to its best performance level,
as well as others to process the raw data obtained so as to wring the
utmost from the data for intelligence purposes. These subjects must be
deferred for further and detailed discussion in subsequent reports.
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IV. UTILIZATION OF U.S. EMBASSY AIRCRAFT FOR OBSERVATION
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Because we do not now have many friendly aircraft flying over satel-
lite and Russian territory, it should be important to exploit to the limit
the possibilities afforded by the one aircraft we know about. This is the
aircraft assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Limitations are imposed
by Russian air rules; the fact that this aircraft carries women and child-
ren, and is under full control of our ambassador, makes using this plane
for military purposes a risky business.
We have heard that the U.S. Embassy aircraft is a C-54, and that it
makes approximately one trip per month between Wiesbaden. and Moscow. It
appears further that this aircraft carries two Russian observers (picked up
en route in Berlin) who act as navigator and radio operator during the flight
over Aatellite and Soviet areas. It is our understanding that this aircraft
is neither searched, inspected nor at any time entirely in Russian hands. It
is guarded and maintained by our own people.
There are several stages of aerial reconnaissance permissible from this
airplane. First, and most obvious, there is simply visual observation from
the passenger compartment of the airplane. This is probably done now,but
because those visual aids which could be of tremendous help in such work
have only recently come under development, this type of surveillance is probably
low in effectiveness, relative to its potential. Next, we may consider photo-
graphy from the aft compartment with small hand-held cameras. Highest on the
list of reconnaissance techniques is photography employing concealed cameras.
For example, small, automatically operated cameras could be installed in the
baggage.compartments. We will discuss these in the order listed above.
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VISUAL OBSERVATIONS
For the case of visual observation, the performance of the eye can almost
always be improved by the use of a visual aid such as a low power monocular or
binocular. The major difficulty in using standard binoculars, for example,
6 x 30, 7 x 35, 7 x 50, (the most popular and readily available sizes) for
aerial observation has been that aircraft vibration is transmitted to the
instrument, and magnified in proportion to the power of the binocular, thus
destroying image quality and inducing eye fatigue. Under severe vibration
conditions it is entirely possible to induce nausea in the observer. For
exactly this reason the use of an internally stabilized binocular, stabilized
in such a way to exclude aircraft vibrations from affecting image quality,
would be uniquely valuable and immediately applicable in this very rare op-
portunity for the U.S. to survey Russia from the air. Such binoculars have
been under development for the last year or two by the Aerial Reconnaissance
Laboratory at WADC. Nonelectronic or electrical gadgetry is employed; the
binoculars are stabilized optically, and all parts are inside the instrument.
The authors have seen and tested these binoculars briefly. The perform-
ance of the experimental models in stabilizing the visual image is truly
amazing. Much more extensive tests have been accomplished by numerous Air
Force personnel who have had occasion to actually use these binoculars in
the air. One of the several available binoculars of this type is now being
used by USAFE for corridor observation in Europe. There is little question
that this fairly inexpensive, readily available and altogether remarkable
device would aid considerably in observation from the aft compartment of the
C-54. In sum, therefore, if visual observation from this aircraft is at all
useful, (as it certainly appears to be) the use of this aid should multiply
its effectiveness by perhaps a factor of 3 or 4. Further details about this
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instrument and its availability, can and should be secured directly from the
project engineer at the Aerial Reconnasisance Laboratory, Mr. Richard Nierenberg.
PHOTOGRAPHIC OBSERVATIONS
Photography with small hand cameras could be accomplished from the pas-
senger compartment of the C-54, especially if this compartment is not visited
by the navigator and the radio operator. It would appear that there is
little question that the Russians assume we are doing this anyway. If this
is true, we might as well do it efficiently. One of the authors has had well
over a hundred hours photographic experience from C-54 aircraft. It makes an
excellent photographic platform, especially if one or two of the round ports
(say, one on each side) are designed so as to be easily removable. Photography
through the plexiglass windows leaves much to be desired in the way of quality.
This particular bottleneck can easily be eliminated by making the windows re-
movable or by enlarging the center plug. We have in mind here photography
with cameras of the Leica type. Some experience with these cameras is neces-
sary before these cameras can be successfully used with long lenses such as
4 or 6 inches in focal length (which could serve to record items of military
interest several miles away). On the other hand, this experience is easily
obtained and more easily learned via competent instruction.
Of course, any such photography would be almost valueless if it proved
to be impossible to identify the spot at which the photography was taken.
This implies that anyone doing such photography must keep careful record of
time of the photography and this record must be coordinated with the notes,
log, and memory of our Embassy pilot. It is understood that in general the
Russian navigator flies the airplane on some sort of dog-leg route, which is
not known to the American pilots and crew ahead of time; further, the route
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is seldom the same from trip-to-trip. On the other hand, it should prove
possible to make and keep a record of the route flown. This latter statement
is a suggestion only; the implementation must be left to the American crew
aboard, who can probably devise a perfectly adequate scheme. The change of
route guarantees more coverage than possible from a fixed and oft-repeated
route.
Photography from the Embassy airplane using concealed cameras operated
remotely is entirely another matter. The technical feasibility of this pro-
posal has previously been looked into at some length by two Air Force person-
nel known to one of the writers. They are Major Charles B. Randall at Head-
quarters USAFE, DCS/Intelligence, and Major Fred Yochim of the Aerial Recon-
naissance Laboratory at WADC. In the summer of 1953 when Major Yochim was in
Europe, he and Randall did some experimental work using special Leica cameras
obtained directly from Leitz, at Wetzlar, Germany. From what we hear, these
results were interesting and promising. They showed what could be done with
very small cameras, skin-mounted in airplanes of the type in discussion. Ad-
mittedly, this is a matter of considerably greater gravity than the use of a
personal camera, which can be put in baggage or otherwise concealed. It seems
to these writers that this should not be attempted until the use of a hand-held
camera by trained personnel demonstrates either the limitations of that method
or the potential advantages of the concealed camera mounted within the air-
craft.
As a parenthetical comment on the state of our intelligence stockpile, and
the devious methods by which we must pick a crumb here and refine a piece of
ore there, this particular discussion of possible use of the Embassy aircraft
is noteworthy. It is only because of the dearth of fresh intelligence, and
the consequent necessity to explore every possible method of obtaining needed
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data that one would even consider such a proposal. We may contrast this with
the easy photographic opportunities afforded by passengers on U.S.A. airlines.
R. B. Murrow of The RAND Corporation has pointed out very effectively that
.proper scheduling on commercial airlines would take a casual visitor over more
than 90 per cent of our SAC bases. Unfortunately, we do not have such op-
portunities in Russia.
In order to properly evaluate this particular method of collection for
our intelligence purposes - that is, visual and photographic observation
from the monthly Embassy aircraft flights to Moscow, it will be necessary,
(a) to examine the types of reports now made from visual observation from
this airplane, (b) to get some idea of the variation in routes actually flown
so as to estimate the total area coverage by this airplane, and (c) to obtain
information on types of targets which are likely to be seen from this aircraft.
This type of. study must await further visits and consultation with ATIC people.
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