MOVIE - 'A POINT IN TIME' - THE CORONA STORY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00980R000300100009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 115
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: November 10, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Electric Company
Valley Forg a is
Attention:
Itek Corporation
Lexington, Massachusetts
Attention:
Eastman Kodak
Rochester,
Attention: I
I
Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc.
Sunnyvale, California
Attention:
~ursJuc;r: Movie - "A Point in Time" - The CORONA Story
Enclosed is a print of the movie "A Point in Time"
which your personnel participated in producing. This print
is furnished primarily to allow those personnel who assisted
in the movie to see the fruits of their labours. It may be
shown to other personnel, however, provided that appropriate
security requirements are met. The security ground rule for
these oth
er contractor personnel is tha individuals must
hold a
current
Each contractor is to retain the print for a period
not to exceed one week and is asked to forward it directly
to the next contractor on the list. Receipts should be
obtained from the industrial security officer listed. Follow-
ing use at Lockheed, it is requested that the print be
NRO review(s) completed.
Attachment:
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S E C R E T
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THE MUSEUM DEDICATION
SPEAKERS Carl Duckett
Richard Helms
CONTENT - Duckett
Introductions (i.e. Master of Ceremonies)
Background
Program Historical Significance
U-2/Sputnik
Missile Gap
Recognition of Personnel
Bissell
Ritland
Land
etc.
Humorous Anecdotes
Introduction of Helms
CONTENT - Helms
Program Importance to Intelligence
Success Story with Anecdotes
Firsts and Accomplishments
Recognition that Success Due to Personnel
Recommend late afternoon, if possible, followed by
cocktail party at Naval Gun Factory
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VOLUME I THE CORONA STORY
A narrative version of the history with a few
key pictures and numerous humorous happenings.
VOLUME II THE GOVERNMENT
Part 1 The management organization: Includes
Air Force and NRO organization and the
period of strife.
Part 2 Cover and security: Includes policy
on disclosure.
Part 3 Contracts and cost: Includes Air Force
cost data.
Bibliography
Appendix A
Copies of historical documentation
VOLUME III THE PAYLOAD INTEGRATION
Covers the LMSC facilities, personnel and contracts.
Includes a complete pictorial record plus description
of the major technical problems.
VOLUME IV (DETAIL AS IN VOLUME III)
Part 1 The RV
Part 2 The DISIC
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HISTORY (Continued)
VOLUME V (DETAIL AS IN VOLUME III)
Part 1 The Panoramic Camera
Part 2 Film Manufacture and Processing
VOLUME VI A PICTURE BOOK OF THE J-1 AND J-3 SYSTEMS
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Classification and titles will be contained on a header which
uses corona marking made on SO-180 ^by. the KH-4B system as a background.
A presidential statement (providing it can be obtained) would
provide the most effective setting for the documentary.
The introduction is proposed as a film clip of speech by
Mr. Carl Duckett at the Museum dedication. Included in the speech
would be reference to the intelligence need for the system and require-
ments generated by the missile gap controversy of 1959/60.
The narrator could begin the story telling portions at this point
using background movie coverage from the U-2 Program, the Vanguard
failure, the ballistic missile development and the Kennedy "Missile
Gap" speeches of 1959.
Against this background, the organization of CORONA can unfold
with a filmed interview with Dick Bissell and facility films from Itek,
GE, EK and LMSC.
The development story could best be told by a spliced together
dialogue involving Jim Plummer (LMSC), John Wolfe (Itek), Mark Morton
(GE) and Ed Green (EK). Included should be the problems of the acetate
base film, the SRV spin system, the Agena power system failures and
corona marking. If a film clip of the "Douglas Daredevils" can be
located, it should be added to the discussion of the early failures.
Success--the story of Discoverer's XIII and XIV are well docu-
mented on film with only the significance of D XIV (Mission 9009)
missing. For the significance of Mission 9009, we recommend using a
speech by Art Lundahl which can be obtained at the presentation of the
RV Punchbowl. This presentation could be made in Art Lundahl's office,
perhaps on the same day as the Museum dedication. As an alternative;
the presentation could be made at Headquarters, adding a CIA Headquarters
touch to the film.
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photography
The narrator, supported byescanning and focusing on portions of
the Museum display and models, can tell the story of the transition
from an interim gap-filler to a long-term system. The "C," the "M,"
the "J-l" and the "J-3" periods are covered photographically in the
Museum display. Here we believe some mention needs to be made of
the 1963/64 "period of strife" in order that it be an accurate docu-
mentary.
The J-3 development allows a "return to harmony" in the program
and, with it, the narrator should mention the Agency medals which were
awarded, the program firsts and the importance to further developments
in space.
As the finale, we suggest a return to the Museum dedication ceremony
for the introduction of Mr. Helms and a film clip of his remarks on
the importance of the program.
The end can be accomplished with closing remarks by the narrator
and perhaps a film clip of Foothill Observatory and a star field shot.
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Ge.neM 2 Lundahe
Harold, thank you ion this oppoAtun.i ty to respond to yow. genenos.c ty, and
as the V-vc.ee ton o4 NPIC 4on the yeau beione the Corona Pnognam and in the yeatus
dwr ing it's ope ation and since that time, perhaps I may be petemc tied a {yew
obseAvatLows about this Ptcognam which I think wooed be worth seconding.
F.vust oi4, this has been the single largest Lntettigenee and most suceess6u2
L tee.P.igenee program the United States has even accomptizhed. Histon.Lans ob the
4wtuAe and the present wilt neeond this as being ban mane signijicant on the impact
of owt time than the Anp of gun powder was on wai wte of ,Ltz time. It didn't
come easy -- it came with a ppedt,g Lour amount o6 speed. So in making these
eompaxizonz, I'd tLtze to show Uorth some of the things that have happened to us here.
Bebone the eatrey J-i Les, the Cewtttae Intett genee Agency had no pho.ogtcaphLc
inte..e2Lgenee activity at att. We started with a hand6ul ob people and one o4 the
gn.ea-t consequences ob the Pnognam L6 the enormous hush o4 growth that it has clceated
in owc own photognaphLc -.ntettigence rezowcces, where now the national P.I. Centex
is probably the &vgest, or one of the lahgest, photo -Lntetti.genee activities in the
wo-' 2d. Cetctai.nly the largest in the West. But when we stoutted we had less than
th' teen people; we had less than 800 square fleet of door space; we had a budget
ob less than a hundred thousand dofeates a yeatc. Here in 1972, Jael, we have mare
than 4 4teen hundred people dedicated to the explo.i tct ion o4 these products; we have
a budget each yeatc which is pretty close to we have over 25X1
400 thousand square {yeet ob Moon space and a program that is no way yet topped o44; NRO
Lt's steadity growing.
Now #Lttee did we tea.Uze what was going to develop so quickly, when on the 1.8th
o4 August in 1960 this 4iAzt satte2,ite was succetssbu..eey tet ieved. It 4lew ion only
one day and had 16-17 passes, eight o4 them oven the Soviet Union, and 20 pounds o4
6itm carne back. And with that 6-Lfr in hand, we twined to, and in less than seven
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days, we had produced 130 pages o4 text; we had 1.5 mWion square mites ob coveage
o6 the Soviet Union. This was the harb.Lnge that warmed us of what was coming and
as we wee suddenly g ean,Lng up and .t& y.Lng to get heady 6o,% what was coming, 4 or the
instrumentation and procedure and data handt.ing products, the 4itm was {towing .in.
By the time the Program ended we wee deatLng with 4Lkm that was coming in at
the rake o4 32 thousand instead oJ 36 hundred t.inean beet peat mission. We had
covered aver 520 mi2Uon .aquane mites ob reat estate; we have produced m.ittiows oiS
pages ob reporting and we wee .involved in a22 the major issues o4 our time. Att
the ICBM's in the Soviet Union,-the comptexed-have been d.iscoveed, .$or example:
by 1964 a22 .the'n' SAMi-s.ctes, a22 theiar. aiA 6.Le2d6, a.22 the.itt nuclear weapons testing
and storage sites, aU o6 their "V" etas subma.& .nez, alt thevt enigmatic problems --
we weate tight on top o4 these and we wee -.nvotved in the major decision making o4
our times. It was a tremendous demand upon the people in this cente, and as you
know so weft Harold, this cente is not manned sote2y by CIA pesonnel. And we have
enjoyed a coopvwtive retationsh.Lp with the contractor, which is second to nothing
in the Washington a,%ea, .Lt's a unique organization. When I wanted to ta2fz to somebody
at Eastman Kodak, at ITEK, at Lockheed, at SAMSO or at General Btec ttLc, or wheeve
it happened to be, they wee as close as the telephone and they wee thee within
houats on the problems that we wee .Lnvotved with. It was a tremendous demonatAatLon
o6 how men commonly dedicated to a great cause could be made to work togethe and
could indeed achieve something As we grew, we wee involved with the great issues
of our .tine. Thee was no s.Lngte -issue that we we're not .intimatety .involved with and
abundantly .Lnvotved with the bAie{.ings with the President; each and evey one o6 them
had his moments with hire.
I remembe weft my br.Le.{Lng with Pre-.dent Kennedy; When he had trouble unde-
4tand.Lng the magnitude o{y the 4itm that was .involved and he said to me, "Lundahl, give
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it to me in some s.Lngte example which I cowed recaLe." Wet Mr. Pres.Ldent,
,c (thus
is one ob the eatrey Corona missions), I said, ".L you tike, think ob it as.a s.Lngte
photograph, which is wider than the tight hand side ob the breeway and extending
brom Washington to Fa t imore and we photo- inte' .pre teu , aLL 66 us, ate c)uzWting a!o ng
on out hands and knees between Washington and Ba timore Looking bon objects about
the d.Lze ob the things on out watch." He said, "That's a wondetbwe example, I'd tike
to use that." And every once in a white theteabter at the White Howse he'd tale me
in -- he'd have Newry Ford on somebody there, Ed Land,- and he'd say, "teU them that
story about cltawt.Lng along the breeway tom Washington to BaetLmore."
Later on, ob court e, we bxiebed President Johnson who was so catvLied away by the
scope ob the Progtam and the citeat.Lon that it had made he t teta?2y stunned aU ob
us when he stepped both bebore the press ob the wotLd and said, "In the total Ame ican
Space Program, the value ob the photography atone bat exceeds its worth ten times as
much as the total cost ob the Program." We-LL we made a hasty caJcu ation; the total
cost ob the program at that time had already tapped
Let's get the ciphe/ stna.Lght, and the President ob the United States
is writing up the value ob the Corona photography at something ten times that tact.
Wert to each and every one who had a hand to bear in th-L4 program he has had a
smatt b.LngetpnL t on G tory and indeed as we prepare to guide outs LeadeAzh.Lp in the
event ob watt, at the same time out Leadership had a bat more visionaty process in
mind, and that was to Lead us eventually today to peace which is what we're ate
seeking 4m and L,i tt2e did we %ea Lze that the tremendous accomp1ti6hment that it ob-
beted to the totae .Lntett gence p,Letwte here was going to be zupetuseded by another
accomptishment which is now gwLch.ey bebore us.
This was in the Sttateg.Lc Arms Limitation area. And as we brit t owes e eves up
we didn't reaP.ize what we were bwi 2ding to. In those eaney days we had LLttte
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stexeos copes that were worth ten do22wus. Now days we have s.Lngte stereo viewing
devices that are wotrth we have developed a ptethona o4
ha dwaxe,-computer automatic data hancLUng egwLpment,-which is now in Ju?,2 and
complete demand to handle the needs os the Stxateg.Lc Arms Limitation Treaty peop.2e.
And I can't think o4 any other way, in conc&udAng my response .to you Hanotd, but
to read to you something which has just come out as the latest statement by the
D.vr.ecton o4 the Ahmed Contxo2 and DJwunament Agency in h.is latest speech, and I
head to a22 who would 2-isten and .Ln4onm them hene.in o4 the .Lmpontance o4 what you
have helped to ctceate. He says, (this is Ambassador G.iAand Smith), "In thus connection,
one key 4eatuxe o4 the SALT agreement .us an undentakJ.ng by the United States and the
U.S.S.R. not to .intex4exe with .the nat.Lona2 techn.%ca2 means . " Thus means Corona and
its successorus . A ven i$,LawUon: Thiz would jot example, pnah.Lb.Lt inteAjeAence with
4atte2-ute in onb.ct used {yon veni LcatLan o4 the agreement. The two countx.Les have
also agreed not to use de2.Lbe w..te concealment measuxez to impede vent Lcat.Lan of
natLona2 technLca2 means.
These undentafz,Lngs axe o4 4an teaching .cmpontance. They tie at the hewn ob owc
con4.idence in the viab.i.2.i ty o4 the agreement. They should 4acit Late 4uxthen agnee-
menu which axe in our nat.Lona2 -.merest. Without owc nat.Lona2 techn.Lca2 means of
velr.Lb.LcatLon, the SALT agreement would not have been pass.Lbted Thanks to a great
extent to the ejjoiL of some ob you here today and to a number of the angan.i.zat.Lows
nepnes ented here, the United Status has the won2d's finest technical ven.ij.icat-Lon
mac uineny. The countxy awes a debt og gratitude eon this which has made the SALT
achievement pass-Lbte. No more e2oquevt.t y could it have been said stated, and I
would arty say "Amen" to what he has said here and hope that we continue to beak the
txust which has been placed upon us. Thank you very much HaxaLd, bon the opportunity
to be here.
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As the Director of NPIC for the years before the CORONA Program, in
the years during it's operation and since, perhaps I may be permitted a
few observations about this Program which I think would be worth recording.
This has been the largest and most successful single intelligence
program the United States has ever accomplished. Historians of the present
and future will record this as being far more significant on the impact of
our time than gun powder was on warfare of its time. It didn't come easy,
but it'came with a predigious amount of speed. In making these comparisons,
I'd like to show some of the things that have happened to us here.
Before the early fifties, the Central Intelligence Agency had no
photographic intelligence activity at all. When we started we had less than
thirteen people, less than 800 square feet of floor space and a budget of
less than
a year. One of the great consequences of the Program is
the enormous rush of growth that it created in our own photographic intel-
ligence resources. Now the National Photographic Interpretation Center is
probably the largest, or one of the largest, photo-intelligence activities
in the world; certainly the largest in the West. Now, in the fall of 1972,
we have more than
people dedicated to the exploitation of these products;
we have a budget each year which is pretty close to
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square feet of floor space and a program that is steadily growing.
Little did we realize what was going to develop so quickly when the first
satellite was successfully retrieved on August 19, 1960. It flew for only one
day, had 16 or 17 passes -- eight of them over the Soviet Union -- and 20
pounds of film came back. With that film in hand, and in less than seven days,
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As the Director of NPIC for the years before the CORONA Program, in
the years during it's operation and since, perhaps I may be permitted a
few observations about this Program which I think would be worth recording.
This has been the largest and most successful single intelligence
program the United States has ever accomplished. Historians of the present
and future will record this as being far more significant on the impact of
our time than gun powder was on warfare of its time. It didn't come easy,
but it came with a predigious amount of speed. In making these comparisons,
I'd like to show some of the things that have happened to us here.
Before the early fifties, the Central Intelligence Agency had no
photographic intelligence activity at all. When we started we had less than
thirteen people, less than 800 square feet of floor space and a budget of
.less than year. One of the great consequences of the Program is
the enormous rush of growth that it created in our own photographic intel-
ligence resources. Now the National Photographic Interpretation Center is
probably the largest, or one of the largest, photo-intelligence activities
in the world; certainly the largest in the West. Now, in the fall of 1972,
we have more than
people dedicated to the exploitation of these products;
we have a budget each year which is pretty close to
square feet of floor space and a program that is steadily growing.
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N
Little did we realize what was going to develop so quickly when the first
satellite was successfully retrieved on August ]9, 1960. It flew for only one
day, had 16 or 17 passes -- eight of them over the Soviet Union -- and 20
pounds of film came back. With that film in hand, and in less than seven days,
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we produced 130 pages of text and had 1.5 million square miles of coverage
of the Soviet Union. This was the harbinger that warned us of what was
coming and as we were suddenly gearing up and trying to get ready for the
instrumentation and procedure and data handling products, the film was
flaws in.
the time the Program ended we were dealing with film that was
r~ in at the rate of 32,000 instead of 3,600 linear feet per mission.
We had covered over 520,000,000 square miles of real estate, produced
millln of pages of reporting and were involved in all the major issues of
a time... All of the ICMB complexes in the Soviet Union had been discovered.
Far example: by 1964 all their SAM sites, all their air fields, all their
mmv=Ite weapons testing and storage sites, all of their "Y" class submarines,
all their enigmatic problems -- we were right on top of these'and were
imamIlvse in major decision making.
There was a tremendous demand upon the people in this Center, which is
not manned solely by CIA personnel. We have enjoyed a cooperative relation-
ship with the contractor which is second to none in the Washington area; a
ma?cgp organization. When I wanted to talk to someone at Eastman Kodak, Itek,
Ikackheed', SAMSO or at General Electric, they were as close as the telephone
and they were there within hours on the problems we were involved with. It
was a tremendous demonstration of how men commonly dedicated to a great cause
cau1d work together and could indeed achieve something.
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AFs we grew we were abundantly involved in briefings with the President(s).
Each and every one of us had our moments with him. I remember well my briefing
wmt% President Kennedy. (This was one of the early CORONA missions.) When
k hail tmauble understanding the magnitude of the film that was involved, he
_%miid1 t= ma,. "Lundahl, give it to me in some single example which I can recall."
"W ML Mt.. President," I said, "if you like, think of it as a single photograph
whiaihh i wider than the right hand side of the freeway, extending from Washington
ttm Bhhtiiaore, and we photo-interpreters, all of us, are crawling along on our
Boni& a knees between Washington and Baltimore looking for objects about the
si aff the things on our watch." He said, "That's a wonderful example; I'd like
ttmaus that.." And every once in a while thereafter at the White House, he'd
?aIlII me-iir.-- he'd have Henry Ford or Ed Land or somebody there -- and he'd say,
"rI1.IIll them that story about crawling along the freeway from Washington to
Bali.. "
Mw r_-on, of course, we briefed President Johnson who was so carried away
Fri the, scope of the Program and the creation that it had made, he literally
stumrer# all of us when he stepped before the press of the world and said, "In
the t l American Space Program, the value of the photography alone far exceeds
its worth-. ten times as much as the total cost of the Program." Well we made a
$aaty-calculation. The total cost of the program at that time had already
land the President of the United States was writing
up trh-a value of the CORONA photography at something ten times that fact.
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Each and every one who had a hand to bear in this Program has made a
sx1T fingerprint on history. Indeed as we prepared to guide our leadership
Ern the event of war, at the same time our leadership had a far more visionary
gimai.ss in mind, and that was to lead us eventually to peace, which is what
w are all seeking. Little did we realize that the tremendous accomplishment
the Rrogram offered to the total intelligence picture was going to be super-
sae:by another accomplishment now before us.
",This was in the Strategic Arms Limitation area. As we built ourselves
ug~,we didn't realize what we were building to. In those early days we had
Mu=le stereoscopes that were worth $10. Now we have single stereo viewing
dies that are worth) I We have developed a plethora of hardware,
am3puter automatic data handling equipment, which is now in full and complete
diced to handle the needs of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty people.
II ar't think of any better way in concluding, than to read to you something
which has just come out as the latest statement by Ambassador Girard Smith, the
doctor of the Armed Control and Disarmament Agency, in his latest speech. I
man: it to all who would listen, to inform them herein of the importance of
w you have helped to create. He says, "In this connection, one key feature
a the SALT agreement is an undertaking by the United States and the U.S.S.R.
not to interfere with the national technical means" -- this means CORONA and
successors. This would prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit
use for verification of the agreement. The two countries have also agreed not
tre,use deliberate concealment measures to impede verification of national
technical means.
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These undertakings are of far reaching importance. They lie at the
art of our confidence in the viability of the agreement and should
4Timii1?iitate further agreements which are in our national interest. Without
our-national technical means of verification, the SALT agreement would
natthave been possible. Thanks to a "great extent to the efforts of some
off ymi here today and to a number of the organizations represented here,
titer Uk ted States has the world's finest technical verification machinery.
Tha country owes a debt of gratitude for this, which has made the SALT
1tnielnement possible. t No more eloquently could it have been stated, and I
want only say "Amen" to what Ambassador Smith has said and hope that we
atmtdinue to bear the trust which has been placed upon us.
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Richard Helms
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
W 000406220
Good morning ladies and genteemen. For a moment, let as think back to a point
in time,to October the 24.h, 1957 to be precise. On that date the President's Board
o6 Covsu.Ptants on 6ore.ign .Ln.ettigence activ.L Q-submitted its repoitt to President
Eisenhower on the status o6 the .LntelUgence communct;Le's cottectLon capab- L tLes.
With strong urging 6,tom Dr. Ed Land, the Board called jor a reassessment o6 the
A.'t Farce's SAMOS satettite reconna.~,s.eance system then under development by the
A, /L Force. This was a compUcated system based on e2ect'icat tAansm,ission
images 6,tom space. At the same time the A4.2 OXCART reconnaizzance aVAakajt.
proposed by CIA was given a ca,%e1ut evatuatLon. The Board held that white both were
prom,i4.Lng programs the c n i tLcat need 6or .intetZig ence at that point in time wa~rAanted
an .Lnte'tim photoreconna,ussance system that could get into operation eattier than the
SAMOS could be ready. This .uS a 4 ign%6#Cant dec Ls.Lon par LcutaAty Sor that era.
Just twenty days be6ore, the Soviet Union had orbited the world's 6-Lk4C sa.etZite,
#rom the
Sputnik I ATywcatam range. The United States was ..tit three months away 6,tom
2aunch.Lng its 6iAzt smatt satellite. But the need sor ice Lable .LnteLUgence on
Soviet m.ussLee deployment was becoming mare and more urgent. The so-cat2ed m-csz to
tag debate ways already under way when the Senate prepared a sub-committee hotd.Lng
hea Lngs on .this -issue.
The White Hawse responded rap.Ld2y to the Board's recommendation. Dr. James
Ki ?L&n who had just assumed his new position as Special Assiztant to the President
4or Science and Technology, amanged a meeting, 6or the 6.ucst weelz o6 December among
the President, the Di,%ector o6 Cev cat Inte _Ugence, Mr. Atten Du2tes, and the Deputy
Sec tetoAy o6 Debense, Mn. Donald Quanta. At .his meeting, oney eight weeks a{.ter
Sputnik I, the President decided to procede with the joint CIA:-Ai ,% Farce .interim
photoreconna issance sa ett.ite program to answex the c&iti a2 .intat.igence quest i,ov,6
about Soviet mi 4Lees . The system was to be based on phy4 scat recovery o6 6L2m
6,tom the space veh.ic2e. This dec.io.Lon manfs the 6.vvs.t o6 the %ematkabze Corona
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Projects. The butt import o4 the deciz.Lon however, can be comprehended only .i.4 we
neca22 the p' nu tLve natuwe o4 out undenstand.Lng o4 space technology and the
cluWcat need ban hand .LntettLgence .LnbormatLan which exL fed at that Point in Time.
The statwaAt6 ob the Corona management team were Dick &. 6,6e ?., CIA's development
Pna jec t,s Stabb and Ormond Roland ob the A.Ltc Force Bat eist c M,L6zite Development
Command. The two had worked ebbeatLvely together in the c.kash development ob the U-2
several yeax6 eajrUen. Within on.2y a bew months they put together a ptognam
owttine bon Pnojeet Corona which showed remanfzabte bares.Lght. One vent' c' tLca2
decision made duty i,ng this pee od concerned means ban necoven.Lng the b.i.2m beam the
Corona vehicle. Genera Eleatn-La was abs.Lgned the .Catck ob devetop.Lng the watr.2d's
b.vust space tecoveAy capsule. In boat it was to be many yeand bebore the numenoud
di66 cu -t technology problems ob eleatnan.Lc read-out were to be salved. Without
4.L2m tecoveAy, none ob the photographic neeonna i.ssance systems openatLonal today
would have been pass.Lbee.
It wars also decided to implement a rad.Lca.U.y new panonam.Lc camera device. The
basic concept had been developed by a spin-o44 group beam Boston UwLvetus.cty which
bounded the new corpora-.Lon carted Itch. Taking obb {nom Iteh's concept, Lockheed
cahtr i.ed the pro f eat bonwand by deve2op..ng a ztabetized space platborm and integrating
the camel a and re-entry vehicle into a wanting photoneconnai.6sance zate ? to system.
This .us the design that M. Bliss ell pees ented to the President in h.L6 Prat eat owtLLne
o4 Ap it .25th t958. Within two weeks, on the ba6-c,6 o6 this plan, the 6i z t Carona
contract was negotiated between CIA and Lockheed. I am happy to see here today several
ob the men who, as ean2y pnagram managend, played such key tales in making Corona a
,success.
It was not an easy success de.sp-cte the pnom.vs.Lng stout I have just deseiLbed.
Thane were the days ob the space p- once when the soZutLon to last month's baiZune
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only sw.baced new pnob.2em6 bon which engLneeni.ng sofutc;ons must be bound, and rapLdty.
Thejte just was not time bon tong development spawn .
We oj cowuse continued to think about and woih toward tong range solut..ons, but
many oj the early problems had to be met with Yankee ingenuity. Fan example, there
was a problem with an on-pad payload covet.. We had a good one on the dnaw..ng board,
but we could not wait bon it. So bar the next {LLght we babt icated a shroud out oj
such maten,%a2 as ping-pang batZ6, brown paper and piano w te. We tested the LnteAim
design, - I may ca22 it that, with a high speed sports can. on the Bays hone breeway.
Unbontunatety the highway patAol responded with a speeding ticket bon the test
eaig- neen.. This design was phased out abteir. one b.t.Lght!
Far two oj the hey development problems, the ean2y solutions seemed to be b.vtst
rate and continued throughout the Program. One oj these solutLond was the use ob
cold gas bon the utit cat ne-entAy veh tc2e spin system. There was a2do that "dry
leaves" bLtm problem which was solved by Eastman Kodak's breakthrough in coating
emutzion onto a mylar base. The development ob mylan, base 4itm was essemtia.t to the
success oj space neconnai6sance.
V scovel.eA I was launched in Febnua.y t959. It was a long 18 months however,
bebore we successbutty recovered the 4i& 6t batch oj (Ltm bt.om D,i,scovenen 14 in
August 1960. Meanwh ee the miz4Lee gap contAovers y had peached a boi_Ung point
dwr i.ng the prepana .i,on ob the national ..ntett igence estimate on guided mizzitu in
the ba.P.t oj 1959. The vani.ow ,intelligence agencies held widely dbvensed views on
Soviet m,uss.i2e strength and the ,i.nbrequent U-2 b.2ightz had yet to photograph an
opet.at.i,ona2 Soviet stnateg-.c m .6.6ite launch site. 1960 wa6 an e2ecti.on year in which
the min zite gap had become a grave potitica2 .issue. Moreover, the Pnestident was
scheduled to meet with Soviet leaden, in summit ta2hs that spring without, it appewtz,
the beneb-i t ob had inteigence data. 7 Then came May Day ob 1960 and the tragic lass
ob the U-2 aver Svendlov.6k. The summit talks wen.e cancelled, but the muss,i ea gap
debate(went on a pace.) We had last the U-2, our only capability 4ot obtaining
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ne.P.iab.2e inte.2Ugenee atom Soviet m Wire deployment. This eapabL2ity was not only
Aeztoted but dnamatLca2Ly incteased on August 19, 1960. On that day D.useovenen 14
4suece/ssjuely completed the won2d'd 6ix6l zate.PL to teconna-issance mission-.- Mission
9009, as it was caeled. This a-.ngle mission gave us mote pho.togtaphLc cove/age of
the Soviet Union than the U-2 ptogtam had ptovided since its inception in 1956.7 The
success 04 Mission 9009, coupled with the technical di44 icuttia ob the Adtc Eotce
SAMOS program, signaled an extension 4ot Corona and a,-'; J'L'on teatizatc:on o j the -c npottanee
ob the exceptional in-tettigenee advent. We soon .improved the camera design and then
added the .stetr.eo eapabttity. The tingle teeove'Ly capsule was tep!aeed by two and
b inatt y both camera and system were upgraded to what wad ca,Ued the J-3 payload.
I think it is most important to remembetc that in the 7 Lnat anaey4L it was
the people -- Ait Eotce, Agency, and Conttcactot who were the key to the success o4
this program. The ea ty Corona successes came beJote the Agency began its awards
progtam, but 6evetat key OSP o44-.cetvs received the Inte,2ligenee Medal of Metric jot
the A outstanding eonttr i.bwUond to later system development and -c.mptovement. There
25X1
wene no e2abatcate 6ar-Uit i.ed . The work was done in a da.vcy 4atm bust tLng in Boston, NRP
Even - the cost had been latget, the savings wowed have been gteatet. Without
Cotona, the m.ito Lte gap con tcovets y might welt have continued through the decade
with the debende budget based on j eat rather than on Knowledge. We ate well into the
Space Age now -- man has been to the moon and back -- when he wen-,howeve/L, he tool
with him a tepackaged vetrzion of the Corona cameras with which to map the 4w L ace of
the moon; and when he came back he was recovered (tom otb.it by the dame technology
and ptoeedwtces developed dot Ptojeet Corona. The .2L6t of b.ctr6t6 #ot this Ptogtam is
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a tong one. The world's 4-out recovezy 7rom space; the wontd's 4.vust aetua2 recoveLy;
the 4.vust mu tLp.te recovery system. 165 success4w? tecovui.ez, are mane than the
total o6 att the other united States programs combined. These were aeso 6.rtust6 in
spacectra4t eontroPs and ee:ai.n-y not Beast, the photography brom space. Corona
provided photogtcaphi.c coverage o4 oven 500 mr,2P,,i,on square mites o4 the earth's
surf ace; a dramatic achievement in 'L-to et4. 713ut the cue .importance to NatLona t
Seewrity was the -.nte.2P,igence produced by #L4tLng the curtain ody secAecy that
'sutvcounded the Soviet Union. In contrast to the 4rusttr.a.tLon which existed in the
-thte.2tigence community at the point in time that Corona was undertaken in 1957, we
had by 1965 photographed aee ob the Soviet ICBM eompeexes then in existence. The
value o4 the Program to the United States inteUi.genee e&trt is given dimension by
this statement in the Agency's 1968 report. "No new ICBM eomp.texes have been
estabtushed in the U.S.S.R. dwring the pact year." Such an unequivoeae
statement cowed be made only because o4 the eon{idence heed by the ana2yst,6 that e4
the m. zzite sines were indeed there, Corona photography wowed have d.I c 2os ed them.
It was eon{ dence in the ability o4 #ntettLgence to mon. ton. Soviet comptLance
to the committment that enabeed President Nixon to enter into the Strategic Arms
Limitation ta.tFus and to sign the Arms Limitation Treaty. Much, but by no means
att, o6 the -'.ntett gence necessary to ver i.jy Soviet compt i.ance with. SALT wilt come
tcrom photoreconna.uisanee sateee%tes. Corona program which pi.oneeced the way in
satellite reconnaissance desewes the peace in h.istony which we are prese wing through
this sma t Mwsuem d-us.peay.
"A Decade o6 Geary," as the disp.tay is entitled, must 6or the present remain
ctazs4Led. We hope however, that as the would grows to accept &ate2e to reconno.Ls-
sance, it can be trans6eviced to the Smithsonian Institute. Then the Ame Lcan public
can view this work and then the men o6 Corona, #Lfze the Ul Lght &.otheus, can be
recognized sor the roee they peayed in .the shaping o4 hA tory. Thank you.
I hereby dedicate this Corona d.%sptay which wilt take its tight4ut p.tace in the
Agent M. H,ustotr i.ca.t Museum Program.
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E-P--13Y -GNR2J F1(5 L~A S VP CFnlrY 1 -
=J1i 6PWU
~T THE 0 eD- cA-7" syt/ 0 P-
Wi5 j0~i~12 MUSS /aii
2S ?C~ Gr_Jz-- 1971
For a moment, let us think back to a point in time to October 24, 1957
to be precise. On that date the President's Board of Consultants on foreign
intelligence activity submitted its report to President Eisenhower on the
status of the intelligence community's collection capabilities. With strong
urging from Dr. Ed Land, the Board called for a reassessment of the SAMOS
satellite reconnaissance system then under development by the Air Force.
This was a complicated system based on electrical transmission of images
from space. At the same time the A-12 OXCART reconnaissance aircraft
proposed by the Central Intelligence Agency was given a careful evaluation.
The Board held that while both were promising programs, the critical need
for intelligence at that point in time warranted an interim photoreconnaissance
system that could get into operation earlier than the SAMOS could be ready.
This was a significant decision particularly for that era.
Just twenty days before, the Soviet Union had orbited the world's first
satellite, Sputnik I from the Tyuratam range. The United States was still
three months away from launching its first small satellite. But the need for
reliable intelligence on Soviet missile deployment was becoming more and more
urgent. The so-called missile lag debate was already under way when the
Senate prepared a sub-committee to hold hearings on this issue.
The White House responded rapidly to the Board's recommendation. Dr.
James Killian, who had just assumed his new position as Special Assistant to
the President for Science and Technology, arranged a meeting for the first
week of December, among the President, the Director of Central Intelligence,
Mr. Allen Dulles, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Quarles.
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Ebr-a moment, let us think back to a point in time to October 24, 1957
ftlacbx-, precise. On that date the President's Board of Consultants on foreign
1THt nce activity submitted its report to President Eisenhower on the
status of the intelligence community's collection capabilities. With strong
u from Dr. Ed Land, the Board called for a reassessment of the SAMOS
sarx0111i te. reconnaissance system then under development by the Air Force.
Utii% was_a complicated system based on electrical transmission of images
:space. At the same time the A-12 OXCART reconnaissance aircraft
by the Central Intelligence Agency was given a careful evaluation.
Thm &iard held that while both were promising programs, the critical need
$a= imtlligence at that point in time warranted an interim photoreconnaissance
systUw,that could get into operation earlier than the SAMOS could be ready.
Th*is was-, a significant decision particularly for that era.
JILst twenty days before, the Soviet Union had orbited the world's first
saftr] Sputnik I from the Tyuratam range. The United States was still
tt1t months away from launching its first small satellite. But the need for
1'ah-le intelligence on Soviet missile deployment was becoming more and more
unt.. The so-called missile lag debate was already under way when the
.prepared a sub-committee to hold hearings on this issue.
Tbe: White House responded rapidly to the Board's recommendation. Dr.
.Iam Killian, who had just assumed his new position as Special Assistant to
tthw Wr!esident for Science and Technology, arranged a meeting for the first
w:-E- December, among the President, the Director of Central Intelligence,
Mir.. Mien Dulles, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Quarles.
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At this meeting, only eight weeks after Sputnik I, the President decided to
procede with the joint CIA-Air Force interim photoreconnaissance satellite
grogram to answer the critical intelligence questions about Soviet missiles.
The system was to be based on physical recovery of film from the space vehicle.
Thli?: decision marks the first of the remarkable CORONA Project. The full
import of the decision, however, can be comprehended only if we recall the
primitive nature of our understanding of space technology and the critical
nod for hard intelligence information which existed at the point in time.
The stalwarts of the CORONA management team were Dick Bissell,,CIA's
IIIrelopment Projects Staff, and Osmond Ritland of the Air Force Ballistic
141ss.ile Development Command. The two had worked effectively together in the
ooh development of the U-2 several years earlier. Within only a few months
ttiy, put together a program outline for Project CORONA which showed remarkable
f'resight. One very critical decision made during this period concerned
means for recovering the film from the CORONA vehicle. General Electric was
assigned the task of developing the world's first space recovery capsule. In
fact it was to be many years before the numerous difficult technology problems
acE electronic read-out were to be solved. Without film recovery, none of the
photographic reconnaissance systems operational today would have been possible.
It was also decided to implement a radically new panoramic camera device.
The-basic concept had been developed by a spin-off group from Boston University
which founded the new corporation called Itek. Taking off from Itek's concept,
Llonkheed carried the project forward by developing a stabilized space platform
and-integrating the camera and re-entry vehicle into a working photoreconnais-
sance satellite system. This is the design that Mr. Bissell presented to
the.-President in his Project outline on-April 15, 1958. Within two weeks,
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th-e_basis of this plan, the first CORONA contract was negotiated between
the Mand Lockheed. I am happy to see here today several of the men who,
as eariy program managers, played such key roles in making CORONA a success.
Ut was not an easy success despite the promising start just described.
'IIfba were the days of the space pioneers when the solution to last month's
ffdhim only surfaced new problems for which engineering solutions must be
zaghdLy-found. There just was not time for long development spans.
We,-of course,continued to think about the work toward long range
s tdioms, but many of the early problems had to be met with Yankee ingenuity.
Far example, there was a problem with an on-pad payload cover. We had a good
on on-ithe drawing board, but we could not wait for it. So for the next
g
ffld4ft fabricated a shroud out of such material as pin-pong balls, brown
and piano were. We tested the interim design with a high speed sports
a om the Bayshore freeway. Unfortunately the Highway Patrol responded with
qwmffing ticket for the test engineer. This design was phased out after
an flight I
F"or two of the key development problems, the early solutions seemed to be
mast rate and continued throughout the Program. One of these solutions was
tth us of cold gas for the critical re-entry vehicle spin system. There was
mllsncthat "dry leaves" film problem which was solved by Eastman Kodak's
1nea-kthrough in coating emulsion onto a mylar base. The development of mylar
bane film was essential to the success of space reconnaissance.
Discoverer I was launched in February 1959. It was a long 18 months however,
buRrm-we successfully recovered the first batch of film from Discoverer 14 in
August 1960. Meanwhile the missile gap controversy had reached a boiling point
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during thee preparation of the national intelligence estimate on guided
mmssiies in the fall of 1959. The various intelligence agencies held
w&dk Ir di-versej views on Soviet missile strength and the infrequent U-2
Mgftts had yet to photograph an operational Soviet strategic missile launch
sxitte_ L bO was an election year in which the missile gap had become a grave
nIiitti al issue. Moreover, the President was scheduled to meet with Soviet
] I r a i r.summit talks . without the benefit of hard intelligence data.
Thwt came May Day of 1960 and the tragic loss of the U-2 over Sverdlovsk.
The summit- talks were cancelled, but the missile gap debate went on. We had
last the U.-2, our only capability for obtaining reliable intelligence from
Svviet mt=cs le deployment.
Th?s capability was not-only restored but dramatically increased on
Ott 1:x,.1960. On that day Discovered 14 successfully completed the world's
fin tt satellite reconnaissance mission -- Mission 9009, as it was called.
Vils s to:mission gave us more photographic coverage of the Soviet Union than
the tt-Z program had provided since its inception in 1956. The success of
Missncnr 9-009, coupled with the technical difficulties of the Air Force SAMOS
pmrr,,signaled an extension for CORONA and a firm realization of the
z set
nmpo rce of the exceptional intelligence We soon improved the
ue design and then added the stereo capability. The single recovery
a sure-was replaced by two, and finally both camera.and system were upgraded
tm what was called the J-3 payload.
II think it is most important to remember that in the final analysis it
was the people -- Air Force, Agency and Contractor who were the key to the
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mss. of this program. The early CORONA successes came before the Agency
bits awards program, but several key OSP officers received the Intel-
Bice. Medal of Merit for their outstanding contributions to later systems
d:opment and improvement. There were no elaborate facilities. The work
w dbne in a dairy farm building in Boston, an A & P warehouse in Philadelphia
25X1
NRO
Qven if the cost had been larger, the savings would have been great.
Without'.CORONA, the missile gap controversy might well have continued through
tfim d Cade with the defense budget based on fear rather than on knowledge. We
well into, the Space Age now -- man has been to the moon and back. When he
however, he took with him a repackaged version of the CORONA cameras
wft6ffihw'hich to map the surface of the moon; and when he came back he was
eFred from orbit by the same technology and procedures developed for
F=jet CORONA. The list of firsts for this Program is a long one. The
waa.'s first recovery from space; the worlds first aerial recovery; the
fiiins,Lmultiple recovery system. CORONA's 165 successful recoveries are more
than the total of all the other United States programs combined. There were
a cfirsts in spacecraft controls and certainly not least, the photography
#no~.space. CORONA provided photographic coverage of over 500,000,000 square
millIn!q of the earth's surface; a dramatic achievement in itself.
But the true importance to National Security was the intelligence produced
Uy'l ing the curtain of secrecy that surrounded the Soviet Union. In contrast
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to the frustration which existed in the intelligence community at the point
in ttim that CORONA was undertaken in 1957, we had by 1965 photographed all
mff the Soviet ICBM complexes then in existence.' The value of the Program to
tth Uh :ted States intelligence effort is given dimension by this statement
iim tt1 Agency's 1968 report. "No new ICBM complexes have been established
iim tthe LL:S.S.R. during the past year." Such an unequivocal statement could
F mad only because of the confidence held by the analysts that if the
sites were indeed there, CORONA photography would have disclosed them!
ftrwas confidence in the ability of intelligence to monitor Soviet
Ica-to the committment~that enabled President Nixon to enter into the
Arms- Limitation talks and to sign the Arms Limitation Treaty.
Mtn ? hint by no means all, of the intelligence necessary to verify Soviet
ammffWEance with SALT will come from photoreconnaissance.satellites. The
AF.pr_ogram, which pioneered the way in satellite reconnaissance, deserves
thine gihce- in history which we are preserving through this small Museum display.
"A-.Decade of Glory," as the display is entitled, must for the present
maizr classified. We hope however, that as the world grows to accept
artte >e reconnaissance, it can be transferred to the Smithsonian Institute.
lhesn tile: American public can view this work and then the men of CORONA, like
the Weight Brothers, can be recognized for the role they played in the shaping
off his&tory. Thank you.
B hereby dedicate this CORONA display which will take its rightful place
: m tthe A'gency's Historical Museum Program.
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IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII
14 00098009D
This past month out Agency ee.bebtated 25 years of
service to the Nation. We had just cOmp.eLe.ted out tenth
anniversary in 1957 when on October 4, 1957 the Soviet
Union #aunehed Sputnik I into orbit, and opened an eta
which has come to be known as the Space Age. Tmmed.Latety
jottowtng Sputnik, the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee
had initiated an investigation into the "-miss.Ue tag" and
Lt Was against this background that on October 24, .1957,
20 days aitet Sputnik, atmost 15 years ago today that the
Ptesidenttis Boand of Consuttan.ts on Foreign Intettigenee
Activities, submitted acts nepot.t to President B.Ls enhower .
on the status of the InteUU.Lgence Communities cottection
cap0t.t. Ue4, , With strong utg.Lng by Vt. Ed Land, the
Board noted the vu.bnerab.LL.LUy o, the Agency's U,2 program,
and caned Jot a te-assessmen-t ab the AAt Fotee's WS117L
Saxettite Reconnaissance System then under development and
the CIA's proposed new high pergormance A-12 teconna.Lssance
aitctait. The Boand Jet that white both WS117L and OXCART
were po-tent.Latty prom L4.Lng programs, that the cr.ct.ccatLty
of the tntettLgenee need at -that 'Po.LWt in Time wattan-ted an
.Ln.tetim phototeconna.Lssance system to bridge the gap.
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Response came napidLy 1nom the white House, where
Vn. Jame4 Kttti n had just assumed hid new position as
Speck. Assistant to the Pne4ident bon Science and
Teehnotog y, A meeting was caned bon the 6inst week of
Vecemben between the Ptce4ident, the Vinecton o5 Centnat
Intettigenee, Mn, AUten Vuttes, and the Deputy Sec&etaty
of Ve6en4e, Ma, Vona.ed Quan.2e4.
Bean in mind now that this meeting was head only eight
wee&4 a6te4 Sputnik I and a Jutt eight weeks be5o4e the
United States would ptaee its jinst earth 4ateULte in orbit;
yet at that meeting, a decision was reached to pnoeeed with
a joint CIA-At Ponce interim photoneconnaissance sate.t to
pnognam to an4wen the eniticat intettigenee question of the
mi4site gap. The President's decision manfzed the birth of
the aemaxtzabte CORONA pnognam. To JuttV appneeiate the
decisions a44ociated with the initiation of Project CORONA;
however, it i4 neee44any to comprehend both the primitive
nature o6 out understanding ob space teehnotogy, and the
enitieat need Jon hand intettigenee inLonmation which existed
at that Point in Time.
The stalwarts of the Corona management team were Dick
Bissell of CIA's Development Projects Staff and Osmond Ritland
of the Air Force's Ballistics Missile Development Command. The
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two had worked very effectively together in the crash
development of the U,2 several years earlier. Within only
a few months, they put together a program outline for Project
Corona which showed remarkable foresight. One very critical
decision made during this period was that of devising means
to physically recover the Corona film. To General Electric
was assigned the task of developing the world's first Space
recovery capsule. Although readout systems which were the
main thrust of the Air Force WS117L program looked promising
for the future, history would show that i'ithout film recovery,
Another important decision was the implementation of a
radically new panoramic camera design. The basic concept
had been developed by a spin off group from Boston University,
who had founded a new corporation called Itek. Lockheed was
selected as the "prime" contractor and was given the job of
developing a stabilized space platform and integrating the
camera and re-entry vehicle into a working photoreconnaissance
satellite system. This was the design that was presented by
Mr. Bissell to the President in his project outline of 15 April
1958. Ten days later on the basis of this plan, the first
Corona contract was negotiated between the CIA and Lockheed.
I'm happy to see here today, several of the men, who as early
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program managers, played such key roles in making Corona a
success.
Of course, it wasn't a success that easily. These
were days of the space pioneers, where the solution to last
month's failure only surfaced new problems for which engineer-
ing solutions must be found today. And finding them today
meant little time to look for optimized solutions requiring
long development spans.
Optimized solutions were carried out in parallel, but
for the next flight, the problem was solved with Yankee
ingenuity. A prize example, was the solution to security's
requirement for an on-pad payload cover. While design of a
frangible shroud was eventually completed, the interim
solution prepared for the next flight, consisted of ping pong
balls, brown paper and piano wire. The test vehicle selected
for the interim design was a high speed sports car on the
Bayshore freeway. Unfortunately, the highway patrol responded
with a speeding ticket for the test engineer, and this design
was phased out after one flight.
For two of the key development problems, the early solutions
proved near optimum and continued throughout the program. Such
was the case with the cold gas solution for the critical re-entry
vehicle spin system problems; and the "dry leaves" film problem
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which was solved by Eastman Kodak's breakthrough in coating
emulsion onto a mylar base. The development of mylar base
film was essential to the success of space reconnaissance.
It wa4 a tong 18 montha.. between the Discoverer I Launch
to February 1959 and Diaeoverer XIV in Auguat 1960. The
m,caa.cte gap eontnovera y had reached a bo.cting point in the
pnepana.t. on o6 the Nationat Intettigenee EatAmate on Guided
M-L44-Lte4 in the 6att of 1959. The var4ou4 .LntettLgenee
Agenciea hetd wJdety d.ivenae viewa on Soviet m-:ea1:te atrength,
and the .cnjrequent U,2 4tighta had yet to photograph an
operatt;onat Soviet strategic mtiaaite Launch sate. Nineteen
Sixty ushered in an etection year in which the m-:aaite gap
had become a grave pottttcat .c.44ue, and the President was
a eheduted to meet with Soviet Leaders in a umm.it tatfzs that
apr.cng, w.cthout,.ct appeared,the beneJ.ct o4 hard .intettigenee
data, Then came May Day aj 1960 and the tragic toga of the
UT2 oven Svendtovafi the aumrn t tatka were eaneetted but
the itame4 o6 the miaaite gap debate were Lanned by the
iattcng U-2.
f'inatty, on August 19, 1960, the Wortd's jArst 4atettite
neeonna.c4aanee miaa~000300100009-2
90. (Continued)
in a space environment was not known
until it was accidentally. duplicated
during a series of component tests. The
culprit turned out to be the formulation
used in certain rubber*parts and once
identified could be re-formulated to
eliminate the problem.
91. STOCK An earlier, far more serious "film" pro-
Eastman Kodak research
on film base. blew was solved by Eastuan Kodak researchers
who developed a new polyester base to replace
the brittle, weaker acetate film. And again
CORONA scored a technological "first" by
employing the thinner base material and
ushering in a new era of film technology.
Polyester film development solved one of the
major space reconnaissance problems. By
1960 the new film was being used on every
flight.
92. STOCK The year 1961 was the time for the maturing
A series of launch
scenes of Agena "B" of CORONA. With each series of launches
circa 1961.
increasing sophistication was added.
4rr tP ,20Q3 1.019 IArRDF?89l3.-0.0980.E OpA3001A.0Q0:9?
Discoverer XXI proved the feasibility of
re-starting the Agena engine in space--a
technique to prove useful to later CORONA
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92. (Continued)
DISSOLVE TO:
93. INTERIOR DAY
MS Mr. Morton
Then on August 30, 1961 the missions began
to carry an improved camera system. A mapping
capability was developed, re-entry programming
debugged and additional launch vehicle
difficulties worked out. Slowly but surely
the problems were solved but it often seemed
that when one was laid to rest, another rose
to take its place.
MORTON:
I think one of the important points we can
observe-from the program is the tremendous
dedication, resolve and.purpose that the
CORONA team had--government agencies, the
service, industry, all up and down the line--
to get this thing accomplished. I don't think
it could have been done in today's climate.
We probably wouldn't have been allowed to go
beyond the 6th flight before the program
would have been canceled rather than go 12
flights before a successful one on the
thirteenth.
That isn't to say we didn't have our dis-
couraging moments and our frustrations. I
remember some time along mid-stream--I guess
about the 8th or 9th flight--when we didn't
get it back and one of the members of the
team opined at one of our meetings that
perhaps there was some fundamental reason
why something couldn't come back into orbit.
Which just shows the direction of thought at
the time. It didn't make much difference and
we went right along with accomplishment.
We also had a lot of fun with this incident
later when we had the thing back in our
hands.
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of CORONA test device. ... Today when we've landed men on the
moon several times and we're about to drop
94. INTERIOR DAY WOLFE:
MLS Mr. Wolfe in front
a lander on Mars and we've done do many
other incredible things, it's a little hard
to believe or get the feeling for 13 years
ago and how relatively unsophisticated we
we were, how little we knew about all the
intricate things that had to be done to
make a space system work. We ask ourselves
today, after the fact, why this program
worked so well and particularly what the
operating environment was like--how we got
along with the other companies in the field,
how we got along with the Government and they
with us? I think to understand why it worked
so well you have to remember that we were
a small army in the first place and we were
an army banded against a common enemy, namely
the apparent impossibility of doing what we
were about to try to do.
"C"
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(Continued)
It's really very difficult to convey,
particularly to a young person today who
has lived the last 10 or so years with
all the space achievements which are so
common. It's difficult to realize that
we were all operating in those days in
a field in which we didn't really feel
it could be done--we were just going to
try and under those conditions the way
in which a company or a team works is really
different.
95. INTERIOR DAY
MS Plummer summarizes.
not achieve proper velocity; we had a capsule
which was ejected from the vehicle but
went off into a new orbit instead of into
I have a list of the flights that were
conducted on the CORONA program. Many
people referring to the program remember
the large number of failures which preceded
the final success in Discoverer XIV. In
fact, there were a large number of failures.
We had a launch attempt aborted on the pad;
we had a capsule that was impacted into
the earth in the wrong area; we had an
unsuccessful launch where the vehicle did
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95._ (Continued) - the earth's atmosphere; we had power
failures; we had thermal problems; we
had procedural problems and so forth.
But while these were a lot of failures,
they were also the necessary development
to get us to eventual success. For
example, we did prove the booster: we did
prove the ground control system; we did
prove orbital operations; we proved the
camera, the re-entry body and finally we
proved the overall system.
But, of course, to all of us who worked
closely with the program--Government and
contractors alike--we did not consider the
program a success until we returned exposed
film to Washington, D.C.
96. STOCK MUSIC: In and under.
Mission Control scenes
from Discoverer days. NARRATOR:
With the beginning of 1962, the Discoverer
series came to an end. After 37 attempts
the'cover story was simply worn out. With
the improved record of success and the
near-certainty of continued success, there
were too many launches to suggest a con-
tinuing scientific program. So beginning
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96._ (Continued)
97. STOCK
Montage of scenes depict-
ing 1959-1962 operations.
98.3 STOCK
Capsule air snatch
recovery, circa 1962.
99. PHOTOGRAPHS
Stereoptic views from
a two camera system.
DISSOLVE TO:
with the 38th launch on 18' April 1962,
all CORONA missions were announced merely
as secret Air Force missions.
In the first two years, only 7 missions
had returned film. But what those yielded
is an indication of.what was in store.
Most of the areas of vital interest had
been covered--some 25 million square miles
and had yielded many times the number of
images of all previous reconnaissance in
history. By now the most apparent limitation
was the length of missions and the amount of
recoverable film. So an extensive R&D effort
had produced a two camera system known as
MURAL.
The MURAL series produced more film coverage
but more importantly literally added
dimension by taking two photographs of the
same area from slightly varying angles. This
allowed photointerpreters the advantage of
looking at photographs stereoptically and
thus allowing a third dimension and the ability
to accurately measure heights.
This intelligence ....
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