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December 14, 2016
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October 1, 2002
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March 14, 1960
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Approved For Release 2002/10/31: CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110.062-1 T 0 P S E C R E T SITtAATION ESTIMATE FOR PROTECT CHALICE FISCAL YEARS 1961 and 1962 DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0 r J DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS W c NEXT REVIEW DATE: RUTH: HR 70-2 DATE: ___ REVIEWER: CBAL-091A 4rcE{96O TOP S E ( R E T Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 :'CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1 T O P S E C R E T Introduction 1. Purpose 2. Background and History II Intelligence Requirements 1. Target Selection 2. Task 3. Targets 4. Corollary Tasks III Concept of Operations 1. Employment 2. Mission and Mission Planning 3. Utilization 4. Primary Mission Capabilities 5? Maintenance and Support 6. Control 7. Sortie Rate 8. Support IV Relationship to Other Forces 1. 2. Hostilities 3? Hostilities V Enclosures 1. Life Expectancy of the U-2 for Overflights 2. Utilization of Bases 3. Aircraft and Equipment Assignment 4. Estimated U-2 Flying Hours Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062=1 T 0 P S E C R E T I INTRODUCTION 1. PURPOSE a) To provide doctrinal guidance for the planning and conduct of. project operations during the FY 1961-62 time period. Due to current events the need for timely minor changes is recognized. This document will be utilized as.a_com mon reference and/or departure point for all concerned consistent with the above., b) Upon approval of the concept the document may be used as the beai:s for justification -of the budget . As such it:; will be reviewed and revised as necessary and no later than 1 June 1961`in order that it c again become the basis for budgeting and long range p]1anaing for F .'1962 and 1963: This to include gperational effectiveness4 the forma 2## on of policy, tactics 'and techniques, and the determination of operational and R & D requirements.. ;_ ... c) in addition, revisions Wbe made consistent with; the latest technological advancements, the current political and economic situation,.. asp new offensive and defensive concepts as pertains to the national socurity, in order to provide .timer and effective guidance 'or any follow-on program. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY a) At the time the Soviet Un cn and its satellites denied normal aOceso to its territory, the need fcr a method to collect all kinds of intelligence became readily apparent and the requirement. was of the highest: priority. The rapid technological advances of the Soviet Union indicated the-need for prompt abd aggressive action in order to obtain a capability"' which would satisfy the intelligence. requirements. b) At the request of the highest executive branch of the Government various studies were performed by the most capable scientific groups in the country All of the studies 'validated the requirements,' emphasized the need for prompt and aggressive action, and recommended the utilization, oP airborne platforms. c) To provide the capability for relatively safe overflights, the Ickheed U-2 was developed, in 19'"55. Built into the U-2 was an altitude capability of approximately 70,000 feet which, at that time, was considered a* st'certain to be in excess of the capability of the USSR to physically, interfere.- Initially, it was expected that, although the Soviets could not. intercept the U-2 with manned aircraft or missiles of any type, they might have a limited capability of tracking the U-2 with radar. This assumption later proved to'be correct except for the overly optimistic anticipation that Soviet radar capability would be "limited". Soviet ability to detect and track the U-2 on penetration and during virtually Approved For Release 200p?/60 31 gCyACRf?W91B0098OR00040A1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31: CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 its entire flight in denied territory was conclusively established early in the program and has continued to be the case to the present time It is reasonable to assume: that Soviet capability to inter- cept the.U-2 will increase during,. the period under discussion. However, it is believed that with careful flight planning and target. selection, the use of dispersal and deployment bases for deception, minimum time on the ground, at pre and post-strike.bases, and other tactics designed to decrease operational hazards, the~U-2 will continue to possess a significant overflight utility during-at least a portion of this period.* d) Diplomatic protests. which the USSR has made as a result of the AQUATO1E operations in the summer of 1956 and again in early 1958 make it inerative that Project CHALICE. operations be conducted in such a manner as to reduce the probability of protest. In the original protest of 1956, the violation of the air space over third countries was consid- ered to have been the primary motivation for the USSR protest. This view continues valid despite a Soviet protest in early 1958 concerning a flight which, although it did not violate a third country, did fly into its radar screen with the resultant possibility that the third country had knowledge that a penetration of the USSR had been made. In the period between the 1956 and 1958 protests...a total of 20, penetrations were made of the USSR and satellite countries without diplomatic protest from any source. In no instance, however, was the USSR and a satellite country penetrated on the same mission. Recorded reaction to these flights indicates that the violated countries were, in most instances, aware at the very least that a prohibitive flight was being made. it was further assumed that, in at least some cases, the USSR had equal evidence of overflight by U.S. aircraft as it had for both the 1956 and 1958 protests. It should be noted that the 1958 protest was not made *A separate attacrhment to this report entitled "Life Expectancy of the U-2 on Overflights" purposely has been omitted from general distribution because of its special classification. This attachment is available in the Intelligence Section on a "need to know" basis. cEAL 0914 g EE cc Cy of Approved For Release 2009/TO/31R 8A-RDP89B00980RUU W062-1 25X1 prover Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1 public. The resultant implication is that the Soviets lacking the physical capability to stop such overflights, are forced to use diplo- matic measures. In both protest cases, high U. S. political authority directed that the overflights be stopped immediately. The-reaction-- to the Soviet diplomatic action will probably continue throughout this period and will be taken into consideration for planning aril when submitting proposed overflights for political approval. e) It is felt that the use of dispersal and deployment bases in combination with the fast move concepts (maximum ground time 3 5 hours) will deprive the Russians of information concerning origin, termination, etc., and thereby. degrade and/or weaken an official protest. This would also allow for more plausible U.S. denial. II YNT ILIGENCE REQUIREMENTS 1. TARGET SELECTION Intelligence Requirements for penetration flights by Project CHALICE have been established by the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee which is composed of representatives of the Argr, Navy, Air Force, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Require- ments encompass the fields of photographic intelligence electronics intelli enee Basic to the requirement for early warning of the imminence of a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States is the requirement for reliable information on the present and future Soviet capabilities for such an attack. Such information is also critical to our national defense policy and planning. During the past four years CHALICE 7 TOP SECRET cHAL-O914 14 5M :c 6G Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1 Approved For Release 200.2/10/31: CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1 TOP SECRET coverage has been by far the most lucrative source of reliable information on Which we have based our estimates of the Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack. At the present time, there is an urgent need for CHALICE coverage of certain objectives and areas known to be, or suspected to'be, associated with the three major elements (ballistic missile, aircraft, and nuclear capability). a. The most critical intelligence problem at this time is the status of the Soviet ICBM program, an inherent threat of overriding magnitude. Studies over the past two years by the U.S. Intelligence Community have concluded that CHALICE provides the only available means offering reasonable assurance of obtaining on an immediate basis the required intelligence on the deployment of Soviet ICBMs. Certain rail lines which lend themselves to rail launch or logistic support for fixed sites and test sites are prime search-areas for this information. Increased urgency has been lent to the deploy- ment question by recent evidence of ICBM series production. Coverage Of the most suspect production facilities may help to, confirm this.* b. Other requirements (not in order of priority) for CHALICE coverage which are also critical to national security are set forth in the following paragraphs. (1) It is recognized that a part of the Soviet ballistic missile capability may be launched from submarines, nuclear powered or conventional. Our need, is to determine the possible modification of existing craft, construction of new ballistic missile submarines; and employment of both. CHALICE coverage offers the best available means of answering the questions. on production, characteristics, and employment of submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles. (2) The existence of a Soviet IRBM capability is recog- nized as a fact, although this capability is less critical to the United States than the ICBM. It constitutes an immediate and continuing threat to the West. CHALICE coverage offers the beat known means to answer the question of what is the deployment concept and should assist with information on the capability of these weapons as well as their production. *The Joint Priorities Committee agreed that the most critical question vas guided missiles, though they did not seem to feel it necessary to distinguish between IRBM and ICBM. Further, they rate research and development and production as much higher than deployment at this time since evidence on these would permit a judgment of whether there was indeed a threat in existence; current thinking does not put deploy- ment as probable in the case of the ICBM. TOP SECRET CRAL-0914 Z 10 ~ Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1 TOP SECRET -6- 25X1 3. T-A.22 the Photographic and electronic, objectives (targets) v are needs outlined above are set forth in separa constantly vender review and revision by the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee. COROLLARY TASK ?~ucts also can be anticipated as a b 5X1 x Valuable intelligence y P herein discussed. result of the coverage of the primary systems details of to can be expected to yield significant Route Soviet air iastal.tions, transportation systems, industrial ti and other economic and than the information we arrtici to on facilities. IRBM and ICBM installs' ranee only sli les military targets which could be of a sigaifi ob ectives. L This increase in F~-- ledge firmer ase or operational plans that involve employment of our nuclear strike force. It should also be noted that exercise of the CHALICE capability over otherwise bargely inaccessible areas of the USSR could reveal installations and activities of a completely UUjM0Vn but highly significant nature. As a specific byproduct, CHALICE photography yields terrain information from wthiion Bach accurate prediction radar navigation and target charts, and radar can be constructed. It is also anticipated that this photography will permit resolution of invaluable precise geodetic data which is so essential to the successful destruction of eneaf targets by guided missiles. a c~~-0914 o4 60 Wwr TOP SECRET 14 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 -7- III CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS --1.--EMPL' OIMMT a) In order to fully exploit the operational capability into the airframe of the U-2, considerable support will be maintained in the form of overseas and ZI bases, highly skilled personnel, and above all,. airborne. collection equipment. In order for Project CHALICE to have me.,dmim capability, permanent overseas bases will be . maintained in Europe at Adana, Turkey, and in the Far East at Atsugi, Japan. b) In addition, an air base facility within the ZI is necessary to carry on continuing research and development, and, for further perfection of equipment and techniques. Due to the fact that a follow- on aircraft will not be available for approximately 12 to 18 months every appropriate action will be taken to product-improve the existing capa- bility as pertains to aircraft performance. Primary mission capabilities product improvement will be in the form of increased reliability, weight reduction, quantitative and qualitative improvement relating to the end product. In order to offset "end product" degradation due to increased performance, every effort will be made to improve the existing . .and/or develop new, primary mission capabilities to the extent that the end products will be equal to or better than those now obtained. Therefore, the facilities presently in use at Edwards AFB (north base) will be maintained throughout the lifetime of the U-2. c) The support of the facilities win be required for the entire period. Increased acts y e to e follow-on program and product improvement of CHALICE will have to be provided for. d) Certain other facilities will be required for periodic staging and for ferrying of aircraft between the ZI and overseas bases. (Encl #2) 2. MISSION AI ]) MISSION PLANNING a) With reference to CIA's responsibilities as pertains to the National Security, the following primary and secondary missions are stated: CH--914 TOP SECRET 14ITro66ZY 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1 -8 1. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon- naissance (Photo and Elint) of the USSR and the USSR satellite countries in order to obtain adequate and timely intelligence consistent with the provisions mentioned in Section II "Intelligence Requirements". 2. To conduct overflight and peripheral aerial recon- naissance (Photo and Elint) on a world-wide basis in order to obtain adequate and timely intelligence which will uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the U.S. as well as safeguard the security of the U.S. b) To fulfil the above requirements the "operational Concept" will take cognizance of the latest political considerations and intelligence requirements as outlined by the ARC. The concept which has evolved from experience, and which will be followed during the period will feature careful selection of highest priority objectives and prudent application of all planning factors to minimize the probability of protest. During the period we have programmed a maximum of 35 photo-overflights. (20/1961-15/1962) However, a number which will actually be accomplished will be dependent upon executive approval. c) Since it is reasonably sure that the permanent overseas bases are known by the Russians, and their proximity to Russian territory allows for radar surveillance, and the fact that operations from these bases would necessitate penetration of heavily defended areas, extensive use"of staging bases will be required. In addition, it can be assumed that these bases are possibly under visual surveillance. All of which points out the need for greater deception and mobility during this period. It is planned that future Project CHALICE missions will be directed against areas in which the Soviets have the least radar tracking capability and in such a manner as to create maximum. difficulty for positive tracking. Selection of such areas will be consistent with highest priority target coverage requirements. In addition, every effort will. be made to avoid the involveim t: of third countries (specifically, Soviet Satellite Nations) either by . -Irflying them on penetration or withdrawal from the USSR, or by permitting them to become knowledgeable, through their radar defenses, that such a penetration is being made. In all operational planning and execution, the safety of the aircraft will be of primary consideration. 3. UTILIZATION a) Training should be realistic in that wherever possible the results obtained will be useful in the event that the bases and/or areas flown over are denied to the U.S. in the future. CRAL-091+ Cy TOP SECRET 14 _q, Of -If march ch 6, Q, Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1 r ^ TOP SECRET -9- 25X1 b) Training will include the exercise of mobility plans utilizing airlift to support staging to and from dispersal and deployment bases. Training exercises will be accomplished on the fast move concept with mini== U-2 ground time at ady of the bases utilized. c) The ,U-2 will be used in tactical situations and to accomplish peripheral electronic and photographic reconnaissance. The advantages in terms of training, econoiy, availability of a timely operational capability, have been demonstrated during the past years in such-areas as the Mtddle East, Indonesia, Indo-China and the Baltic. It is felt that we stand to lose more than we would gain by not'doing so. The relative value of the exercise we give the Russian radars does not outweigh the relative economic and operational reasons for doing so. The Russian radar operators are known to be proficient and the quali- tative technical characteristics of their equipment is such that the above-mentioned flights - per se - would not induce greater Russian technological efforts in the radar field. In addition, it is felt that ma,dmum utilization of the U-2 should be planned throughout the estimated operational life of the U-2 rather than wait for primary mission political approval that may never come. In addition, it is felt that knowledge of continued and current successful operations by higher level would be conducive to obtaining political approval. 5. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT a) In order to maintain the high reliability of aircraft and equipment, the concept of contractor mainteDance will be continued. In addition, processing of overflight photography by EK will be continued to insure maximum intelligence exploitation. (Personnel strength will remain as stipulated in current T0's, with possibly minor adjustments.) 6. CONTROL a) The concept. of overflights (and certain other missions) being controlled by Headquarters will be continued to insure efficient target coverage and compatibility of operations with national policy. q0of 1460 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/3,1 : CIA-RDP89B00980R000400110062-1 T 0 P S E C R E T 8.---SUPPORT - - 7. SORTIE RATE a) Estimated sortie rate and flying hours by type of mission will be as indicated in Enclosure 4. Approximately 4076 flying hours will be required to acconplish 1057 sorties in FY 61 and 3800 flying hours to aeconplish 968 sorties in FY 62. a) Support will be required from the following echelons as indicated. This support will be in accordance with current directives and agreements. 1) Headquarters USAF for military personnel, como logis- tics, special airlift, and to serve as intermediary on liaison matters. AFCIG-5 Will be the channel for support to all sabor- dinate headquarters. 2) Theater Co=anders for air base facilities, logistic support, airlift requirements and for special liaison. 3) Strategic Air Command for certain air base facilities, personnel, logistics support and liaison matters. 25X1 25X1 5) Headquarters Air Weather Service for Weather support. 25X1 8) Department of State for negotiation for use rights to operate from certain foreign countries. IV RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER FORCES CHAL-0914 CYC 14. 1960 Approved For Release 2002/10/31 : CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 Approved For Release 2002/10/31: CIA-RDP89B0098OR000400110062-1 2. Pre-HOSTILITIES PERIOD a) if international relationships deteriorate to a point where hostilities are considered imminent, Project CHALICE will conduct penetration and peripheral photographic and ELINT sorties at a msminum rate 'which available personnel, aircraft and equipment can support. Although the.ndlitary services have photographic and ELINT collection capabilities in the overseas theaters, the U-2's of Project CHALICE are the only capability in place overseas able to penetrate deeply and with,.0onparative physical immunity. b) During this period it will be essential that the mud