CIA PRESENTATION TO THE BAKER PANEL ON NRO ACTIVITIES, 1 APRIL 1964 (GENERAL DOOLITTLE, DR. BAKER AND MR. COYNE REPRESENTED AT PFIAB)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B00980R000400120005-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 7, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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1 Odd
SXMOMAIDUM FOR: Di te4r of Central Intelligence
SIBINFAICTs
CIA Presemtation to the Maker Fasel on
KW Activities, 2 April 1004
(General Doolittle, Dr. Baker sad
Kr. Coyne represented at PFIAII)
1. As follew.op to our previous
the Maker Subcomsittee, we had request
to present the CIA attitude for the prosiest RO debate.
Sines General Carter and Mr. Kirkpatrick were out of tows,
I appeared alone before this group to present the CIA case.
Kr. Massy of my staff Joined as sad took notes.
2. I opened the discussion by asserting that the
present problems ran far deeper than the mere transfer
of CORONA from the Agescy to the Air Toro*. I stated
that the basic workability of the MO as a Joint vesture
concept was is serious question. However, I stated that
an even more important question was whether CIA would
remain in the recommaissance program.
3. I assorted that the complete budgetary and program
authority new vested in the DKBO represented an esermese
power, a power which multi biased to alma.* progress out
of one agency to the other or vice versa. This power is
now vested in the Secretary of the Air Marco who thereby
tacos an unparalleled conflict of interests. He is supported
in this enterprise by a staff which is primarily Air Verne
at the decisive making level. It is a *toff which has
resisted any real approach to the Joint staffing from the
CIA. The enmities is complicated by the fact that the Air
Force candidly admits that they feel that the Agency should
Leave all of the reconnaissance program to the Air Force.
It was pointed out that the Air Force officers in charge
of the KW staff met look to the same Air Force for their
career development potential sad maturally mum* feel a
tremendous pressure. I stated it* candidly that if I
NRO review(s)
completed.
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were in the Air d p
that the Air Pero? should bear t
indicated that it is a aational decision
oar that should be as in this respect,.
A. The followleg question was thou Now has
the UMW performed with this Air 'Ore. $t*tf and with the
obvious, pressure presented by his dual resposeibi try'
I said that the record shore that be has cessietea ly
favored the Air Nero is matters which arose for decision
by the two groups ever the past two yeas". It was stated
that I had raised this amble" with McMillan when I first
took over this responsibility; sad hchilllan had candidly
agreed that this was accamste but that he had had good
and sufficient ressoes for 4lech one of the isdividual
decisions made. I told the group that this might is fact
be the case, but that it certaialy raised gumption" *bout
the conflicting iaterests. It was then pointed out that
McMillan had made it quite clear in statemsmts to Kiefer
sad as and with his actions that he favors giving all the
satellite programs to Greer. I offered that this was the
real basis for the CORONA costrovormy am4 not me of unique
Air Force capability to manage the trIsSrum. I said that if
I mere is kciallaa's shoes 1 would probably find it easier
to here one component de the satellite merit but that larger
issues of managemest were involved here. It was pointed out
that McMillan bad stated quite plainly to labial sad aywoU
that he was reluctant to assigniag a largo development
respeasibillty at say kind to CIA until it had demonstrated
a significastly *proved performs's*. I said this was hardly
berme out by the record et successful CIA development end Air
Force difficulties.
ix view
7, but
a parochial
3. It vas pointed out that Melanin sad the MAO staff
bed gives vastly preferential treatment to Ledford In review.
lag his budget sad had devoted a great deal of attention and
time to the details of his program,. I said that this detailed
latereet in the CIA portiea of the proms was sot paralleled
by similar enamiaation of General Greer's large 114P budget
which was established
11,1WMPAM any *Jeer statement of its purpose and operates with
only a minium" amount of direction. It seems to us that
this clear diaereses, in the approach of the N*0 staff to
the OA and Air Force programs respectively, bespeaks
genuine distrust of the Agency 'a ability to successfully
prosecute these programs. I then went on to point out
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the McMillan bad $owerai tires undercut Ledford with
Ma cootrecters which I coasidered absolutely umbeeeptable.
The first case oceurred duriag the Prolimaloo of the INA
budget submissiossOs 41CAST and other programs. We learned
Later that SW:Allan hod thee gone back to Lockheed and
Pratt gad Whitney to persuade Chem to reduce their budgetary
eetimates to Ledford se be could in tura eat Ledford's budget
further. I told the group that when I raised this problem with
McMillan he agreed that At was undesirable te oestaet the
contractors without Ledfore, that this was undercutting
Ledford'* vanities, stud that be mould desist fres this is
the future. The group vas told quite frankly that I was
only ralmiug the problem with the besause YeMillan
had done exactly the same thing in the last three reeks in
connection with the surfacing brie: lag by Melly Mumma
is which he had made a 'Glut of sending his aides. Colonel StVIIn
sod Colonel Geary, to Xelly Johnson's facility so ss to broker
SD agreement without Ledlerd's knowledge and oitimbet usim6
his normal cossusication facilities. I told the group that
wben I horsed of this I called VeMlllaa *gals and be apologised,
but I have no ceetidence that he would net do this aSsIs or
that he has sot deee it previously vibes we have not detected
it. I said this was abeolutely imensweable because it made
Ledford"s already difficult job essentially ispeosible.
6. I them stated quite clearly that I felt that the
only possible cemcluslea le that the MO staff and its
director are la fact the Air Pore* sad that the enormously
difficult Gaullist of istereots has net been resolved.
It was stated gaits clearly that everyone is CIA has agreed
that if the Agency is to stay in the receessissanoe business,
a taudaseatal ohmage in the ARO is rewired
7. I thou welt on to say the problem is broader than 25X1A
Ledford's eigsaisation and affects the whole Viability Of
WSW itself. This is
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404 not be the proper leeg range divis en of effort
within 141/S&T amd thatl land ether activities sight 25X
play a ma3or role, but for the present this was a pragmatic
deseriptios of our activities. If we vets to get out of
the reconnaissasoe business it would require a very major
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peso
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reth .4)100t/StiT i*iae10 and etaffl Maher
broke in at this point to say that X Quid not hinge my
partic patios is the intelligence community, which they all
held in the highest possible regard, on reconnaissance
responsibilities for DB/SAT and hoped that I would continue
to render my talents to the intelligence problem no natter
how the desist,' ease est. I glanced off at this point
and reiterated that DD/SAT was now founded squarely on
reconnaiesaarre and that everyone connected with it would
have to make a sew assessment if the Agency's role in this
field were set strongly resifirmed. 25X1A
1. I than indicated that niece I had takes over DD/SkT
we had mode a very 101140r, and I thought successful, effort
to strengthen the technological capabilities of the argent**.
out that
had alma*, bad a
I said it use Wiped that
squared bat that of and by
additive to oar capability.
longer satisfied to conduct the security and contract portion
of the programs, and that we expected to carry the teebalcal
responsibility in those programs for vhish we were responsible.
I also said I was determined insofar as possible to remove the
Ageacy from seemrity end contracting reepaseibility for orgael.
mations in Which it did mot carry the teshalcal respessibilities
They nodded their heeds 'wisely. I stated that the nest styli..
ficant contribution these new people had made so far was to
take an agnostic look at the intelligenee seeds in eenjunctio*
with the technical opportunities offered by mew systems, and
that this new technical strength provides the basis for such
developments.
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represented a major
the Ageacy was no
9. I then explained that it was my practice at much
discussions to mown my convictions, demesetrate and reamer
them. It wes stated that my goals sere fivefold.
a. MILO an the competitive Air torn
element in AF tu of vim and to try to convert
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1 c
titian into a working partnership again.
that I was talking about separate bedrooms
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1*1 to de1,at. both
11)iltUes for d.velop-
aencjes ol L _.
bSA,
t we cannot e to pro e
t of the office of the Inder ecr.tary
Ulan the satellite development
1 to the Air Force or give CIA
*Med by COUOMA, ARGO* and
CIA unit responsible for all NiO programa
scat either have its own mource of feeding is the CIA
budSot or a clearly equal voice in preparing the NW
budget followed by a lump sus transfer each year to
CIA for its owe expenditures,
e. te suet clarify the covert overfilght
franchise either giving it to the Air Force or the
Agency. My strong recommendation is for CIA in view
of its deepastrated sophistication.
10. I then seat on to discuss satelll op*
in a brief way. It was stated that I thought it was no,
general agreement that a single launching, tracking and
recovery authority should be established to eupport all
launchings. ** agreed that the 6564th 'Satellite Test
wing sow represents such a capability. I said that I
understood your position that he wanted to have a single
individual who can be held accountable on all launches.
I then stated that there was a difference between U4D and
operational launch**, and that the real responsibility fell
on the test director. In the case of 260 Launches, l said
that the test director oust be the payload developsent tear
chief while in the case of operational laaaches of proven
payload it suet be the test director drawn fres the 6594th.
I stated that the payload development teams suet be an active
Part of the laanching and in-flight monitoring operations
even for operational Launches since no two payloads are the
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same and we will probably never be able to write a service
manual tor them device, which a person not connected with
it can fellow. I propose that the Space Sys ems Division
buy all booster AOEMLe and launch facilities. I stated
strongly that the developmeat teams should continue to buy
the payloads even through operation launches and delivery
et them to the lamaching authority to go with specialist
teems who coo support their operation. I said it was
ingoesible to write two contracts with ITU, one for
comma procurement and the other for COADMA improvements.
This is especially true is view of the different ways the
Air Puree and CIA operate. In the discussion which followed
it ems clear that Doolittle did met agree with this view and
wanted the Air /ere, to buy payloads from ITIDi hoping somehow
that CIA amid stimulate their improvement by a contract at
ITU. Daher realised the philosophy of this argumest but
was not prepared to commit himself.
11. 1 thea turned to aircraft operation as reflected
is *overt overflights over a denied to:glittery as opposed
to overt flights over military sitastioms. The group was
reminded that the Air Force had repeatedly stated they felt
the overnight job of the 11.2 was theirs and that it was
BACs job. 3.100 had begun an increasiagly strong competition
between the Air Fierce and the CIA for specific missies'.
This competities to on major proportione in the CIA/Air
Force hassle ever Cuban overflights in October 1960. It 25X1A
wheal loss seeded
ring which time both CIA and She deployed
The Air Pores Wattles was glaringly
deployed three V.'s and seven eremmea to
day a decision was to be made on 96C
Vietnam. I told the group that this was
t time this had bees discussed with the
tumuli that
ass sa555555SUDOVIOnlal somarransmest and that tie planes
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had had to be quickly withdrawn 'Wore they could be
based I I The group had mot knows of this and were
quite geoais.ly surprised by the pre.sapelee mature the
ceapetitios bud assumed. I then deecribed the beilillan/Lekay
propo.sj.1 I It
was poi* eu umw wua gals propose/ has bees scrubbed at the
last minute. Prier to that, no coordination with CATA/State
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41b 11010.7.
soot
treat
statea Clearly Lxn x sx 000 A sweaa
to use these planes agaiat ary Shags* but
hare bespoke either a naivete or pro.
intent.lye I stated *gala that I did not blame the
A ?orce their desire to take on this charter, but that
cit it was a matter for the President, tile DCI sad the
Sesr*tsry of Delouse to settle and not a matter for unit
commanders and middle level bureaucrats to deal with in
Whabludtes. 1 voluted out that this problem is surely
being aggravated by the 15 Air Force aft47s which really
have no mission amd would be further aggravated by the
If they do net receive a clear
cut overnight mission over the Soviet Union. 1 made
second plea tar a clear resolution of this for whomever
gets the job ces establish an adequate structure to insure
that we can perform overflights of all sorts for the next
five years and got on with the Job.
12. It was then voluted out that the franchise could
only be givou to CIA or the Air Force; that it should be
reviewed by each aor President but ono* reviewed, should
stay put. I potato(' out that the equipment available to
both orgenizatises is essentially the sone. I offered that
I put very little stock in the plausible denial argument
and felt the deetsion should be made es the basis of opera
tional eophistication sad who could do the Job with the
least amount of fanfare. I said that the Stat. Department
and the CIA both felt that the CIA had clearly demoestrated 25X1
the beet pertereass? and\
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program would ha exploited it the Air Pores teak over t
franchise. I then said that the job was a delegated ose and
that CIA had the only deseastrated shill In the
operations with any degree of finesse. I said that mere
important than assigning it to CIA or the Air Perm is the
need to assiga it clearly to come Ageacy. I said the eseential
thing is to establish a consistent and controlled capability
to perform covert overflights is denied territory sad
emphasized the word "controlled- several times.
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13. 1 thea tureed to
CIA hoping to mak* a major input i tereso
and creative efforts thus far. I voluted eat that 1 bad
had negligible %A.0 support for research and dovolvaproat
aotiottidos in CIA, that almost all o/ the money soot for
procurement and operational programs, sad that I booed to
change this pattern in the future by establishing large R&D
line items in the CIA portion of the 1R0 Widget similar to
those now enjoyed by 'ileveral Omer.
1
14. I said I was particularly proud of the job our
group bad done in developing the OXCART supermarket of
sensors and jammers. I stated that we felt this capability
would eller OSCART to fly successful though detected missies*
over the Soviet Vnion. I seated that it wee a refreshing
isteractios between the intelligeet appreciatiom of Soviet
defenses, the operational consideration el Ledford 's group
and the new development capability we have established
within CIA. I poisted out that the most refreshing part
vas that it had been done quickly mind effectively and
convinced ne we were well along the reed to invigorating
and enhancing the traditioe in CIA development programs.
13. It was pointed out that I wished to talk tomorrow
only about satellite programs. I said that my first step
bad boom to establish last summer the Systems Analysis Staff
whose purpose it was to try to establish clear qualitative
appreciations of both the needs and capabilities of their
systems. I said that they had established coot vs. value
trade-offs for a variety of new systems and had identified
the critical research areas to bring these developmento into
being. They have successfully analysed all of the aspects
of real operatives in conjunction with our operations people
and have prepared jointly systems desige tor three new systems.
I added that it was our SAS that had clearly defined the CORONA
improvement problem and had sponsored the Drell/Chapman inquiry
into the distribution of CORONA resoluties. I pointed out
that this group is at the beginning and at the heart of our
on-going programs and introduced rr. Ramey as its head.
ter. tansy then spoke warmly for several minutes about the
used for appreciating the real value of taprogrod resolution
in the photo interpreters. theirintelligesee analysts and
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the questioning his had done as the comcort offectiveuess
of mew systems vs. their potential vales to the intelligence
community. Ur. Baker responded immediately to this and said
this entire reamming had ones bothered the MIAS and was
glad to hear the intelligence comsualty was finally addressing
themselves on a ocetinniag basis to this problem. I frankly
had trouble taraimg this off and getting the subject hack
on schedule
le. I then described and showed them ma a bl
25X1 the satellite matrix showing smirch, spotting indica
NRO I 1 'elated out that COMM mow fil
test sears& seed and that McMillan's proposals were the
25X1 possible socceemors for our next neraties I said the 25X1
mpottins ranuiromast
1.11NTAID and that
NRO I 1a/tholes* Iwk.* little of 25X1
At. A volute? Ont that we have sot yet satisfied ourselves
that we could de the isdicatiess pheterspby job with the
satellite but were working on this is 4tai1 under the
which was founded under SRO in CIA at the
Of I I satatad mat that the
I
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17. I them launched into a di en of the
systma pointing out that the original COMMA solution had
been an easy ems in that any photography of the Soviet Vnion
had been a tremendous windfall. I stated, however, that the
meet step was a difficult one because COMMA had grew* to
be a very effectiVe system. I said it was by no means
clear to us what a given system improvemeat would buy in
terms of a mama capabilitv and were imalimad ta
koala be desirable adjuncts
to an improved pasoranic caner. *vets'. I told them that
ImmLemmLblve study coat with Lou approximately
I' I was psYisg for out of CIA funde to explereNmi
Tim payouts of these various sensor eperstions and that we
would probably have an initial system description by
I pointed out that there was a parallel effort done WW1 25X1
in-house group to evaluate the various trade-offs. orbital NRO
wmtch, targetiag techaiques and repeated coverage of the
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target so
we said we thought vs 5ouI4, be
hardware *welcomes* prograse some
said that while it was too early ts
system it now looked like the system
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weather.
with 25X1
ral
I
specif NRr)
dal `-1
I mud f thought it was absolvtely mumatiol to couple this
deliberation with COWS& se as sot to place am unduly high
premium on developing of new systems. I reminded the group
that the Purooll Panel had recommended smbotantial improve-
ment of COAOMA before starting large scale development of
a new system, amil that while we might be inclined to modify
this recommendatios now we felt it was sound to proceed from
one search spotem to another. I stated *site clearly that
this continuity of understanding and development was wy
choice for insisting that CIA control both the COWNA and
it it is to be IA the satellite business
at all.
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L8. I was about ready to discuss the
satellite symtea and the
when the DC1 appeared for his presentation. I was forced 25X1A
to postpone a detailed discussion of why CORONA should go to
CA rather tkan the Air Peirce and wee not able to indicate
the effect that separate funding would have on the CIA
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budget. Neither was l able to recapitulate points.
but I do not think it wee necessary. It was quite
iseppropriate to fellow Mr. McCones remarke with further
detailed presentations and we settled ter a is formal
exchange of views for ease tine as we prepared to leave
Grocers' carter
Ur. Kirkpatrick
Mr. Drees
Distribution:
1 - Addressee
2 - General Carter
3 - Mr. Kirkpatrick
4 - Mr. Bross
5 - Dr. Wheelon
6 - ADW Chrono
7&8 - DD/&T F1es
25X1A DD/S&T:Wheelon Ibb
tote rod &Lt Wot
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UMW L111121LOM
Deputy Director
(Science sad Teohacolea)
Me circumstances of the 25X1
dietetics here bees 4019111111014
la a Sete tree 1 to 25X1
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The contents of the attached memorandum
were dictated in my presence by Dr. Wheelon
enroute from Washington to New York City
on 2 April prior to his departure for
II have asked Mr. Maxey to review
the transcription and make minor alterations
to insure the correctness of the context.
However, it does not represent the final
prose or grammatical standard which
Dr. Wheelon would desire.
NO/DD/SAT
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