OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS 1965 - 1970 VOLUME TWO CHAPTERS III-IV & SOURCE REFERENCES OSP-1

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• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2004
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• Publication Date: June 1, 1973
• Content Type: RP

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OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
1965 - 1970
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VOLUME Two CHAPTERS III-IV & SOURCE REFERENCES
OSP-l
by
Approved by:
Carl E. Duckett
Director
Science and Technology
June 1973
NRO review(s) completed.
HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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III. OSP Operations, 1965-1970
A. CORONA
1. 1965-66 Operations
In the early part of 1965, after Mr. Crowley
had been appointed senior CORONA project officer, he en-
countered some of the bitterest of the Air Force/CIA
squabbles which had been going on for some time with re-
gard to the management of the CORONA program. Additional
heat was engendered at that time by the competition between
the CIA
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The machinations by the Air Force and NRO Staff to squeeze
CIA out of the picture had brought relations between
Dr. Wheelon and Dr. McMillan almost to an impasse.
Mr. Crowley made'a very strong effort to
quiet dissension at the working level of CORONA, particu-
larly between the Air Force and
who were coordinating and continuing the
J-1 series of CORONA launches. Mr. Crowley worked closely
with Brigadier General James Stewart, then Director of
the NRO Staff, in order to smooth out misunderstandings
and to encourage their respective troops'in the field to
communicate more closely. One example of the types of
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friction stirred up resulted from a unilateral action by
General Greer's people in February 1965, postponing a J-1
CORONA shot because of the shelf life of the nosecone.
While this action was technically correct under Air Force
procedures, it was taken without prior consultation with
CIA, and as a result a row developed between Colonel Heran
and his SPO 241 group and the senior CIA officer at
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then Meetings among Agency,
the DNRO's insertion of
Air Force and manufacturer (GE) were held with a view to
establishing a more valid shelf life with regard to the
flightworthiness of the nosecone heat shield. During
this period of stress Mr. Crowley bent every effort to
bring calm and reason into the picture, making himself
available for meetings on the West Coast and at the manu-
facturer's plant, until the matter was settled. 103/
Other disagreements arose with regard to
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the CORONA West Coast set-up as systems engineers under
Air Force contract. CIA countered by advising the DNRO
and the subcontractors on CORONA that contractors would
respond only to written direction of the CIA Contracting
Officer. 104/
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The CORONA management problem was still
unsettled when the new NRO Agreement was signed in August
1965. With the promise of better relations still to be
fulfilled, Mr. Crowley, as the new Director of Special
Projects, presented a management proposal to the Chief
of the NRO Staff for consideration. He called attention
to the fact that, despite the ill-defined policies and
procedures for Government direction of CORONA and the dif-
fering interpretations placed upon them, there still re-
mained on the part of both groups a motivation toward
program success, as evidenced by accomplishments of
CORONA to date. He listed the various management struc-
tures which might be employed and gave his own backing
to a set-up with a CIA manager as program director, and
an Air Force manager as deputy. As a second option, he
recommended continuation of the present co-manager struc-
ture, but with specific responsibilities being more
clearly spelled out. 105/
Mr. Crowley's recommendations were based
upon CIA's performance and experience in conducting the
technical and on-orbit camera programming for CORONA and
its possession of the necessary and peculiar assets to con-
tinue the successful management of the program. He said
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... It is recognized that the primary mission is
the photographic collection of intelligence and
the overwhelming majority of commands are di-
rected to the Payload System while on orbit.
It therefore follows that the agency responsible
for the development of the payload is the most
intimate and knowledgeable with its character-
istics and performance capabilities and should
control not only the primary functions, but also
the secondary functions while in operation to
assure insofar as possible mission attainment.
This is particularly true when the Payload System
is undergoing continual development and modifica-
tion to improve the overall performance of the
Program. 106/
The working out of the management of CORONA
was a part of the whole problem of implementing the new
NRO Agreement, the initiation of the CIA-proposed CORONA
Improvement Program, and the assignment of other projects
under the NRP. On 22 September 1965 Dr. Wheelon, at the
D/SP's request, advised the DCI that settlement of these
interrelated NRP matters would be held in abeyance, due
to Dr. McMillan's unfavorable attitude toward the pre-
liminary joint solutions proposed, until Dr. McMillan's
departure and replacement by Dr. Alexander Flax, the new
DNRO, on 1 October 1965. 107/
Operationally, in 1965 CORONA launches
numbered thirteen J-1 (dual payload) photographic satel-
lites (or 26 buckets), of which all went into orbit and
all but one bucket were recovered; one additional camera
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malfunction caused loss of a complete film load, and with
other malfunctions reduced the usable film retrieved to
about 87.5% of the total.*
2. CORONA Management Directive of 22 June 1966
The long-awaited settlement of the CORONA
management problem was finally reached in April 1966
when Dr. Flax placed a draft proposal for that purpose
on the agenda of the NRP Executive Committee meeting of
26 April. The proposal was discussed and approved in
executive session, with the understanding that assignment
of the procurement of the Dual Improved Stellar Index
Camera to the Director of SAFSP would not give him the
right to make any changes in the specifications without
the concurrence of the CIA.**
A directive was issued by Dr. Flax on
22 June 1966 for the purpose of setting forth the arrange-
ments and assignments agreed to at the April meeting of
the Executive Committee, the principal features of which
were as follows:
*Appendix D, Tab 12.
**See III-A-3, below, "CORONA Improvement Program: J-3."
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a. The Director of SAFSP was designated
CORONA System Project Director (SPD) with responsibility
for over-all system engineering and system integration;
over-all system master planning, programming and budget-
ing; assembly and checkout of the system at the launch
pad; launch and mission operations; capsule recovery; and
delivery of film to DNRO-designated processing facilities.
The SPD's use of the services of
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a general systems engineering role was accepted with
engineers having free access to information and
data from the payload contractors but exercising no tech-
nical influence on matters wholly within the payload
sphere. Prior coordination with CIA of contacts with
contractors was stressed.
b. The Director of Reconnaissance, CIA,
was made responsible for direction and supervision of
the development and production of the CORONA Payload
Sub-Assembly (PSA), reporting directly to the DNRO. He
was to establish a CORONA Payload Sub-Assembly Project
Office (PSAPO) and designate a Director thereof, re-
sponsible through the Director of Reconnaissance, CIA,
to the DNRO for the total PSA development and production,
and to the SPD for over-all system matters.
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c. Additional specific responsibilities
were assigned to the SPD, including the Thrust-Assisted-
Thor and Thorad boosters; the Agena booster/spacecraft;
procurement of the DISIC; acquisition and operation of
system assembly facilities (excluding the Lockheed A/P
Facility) and launch facilities; on-orbit command and
control facilities; and capsule recovery forces and
equipments.
d. Specific responsibilities assigned
the Director PSAPO, through the Director of Reconnais-
sance, CIA, to the DNRO, for the total PSA development,
production (excluding the DISIC), assembly and test;
operation of the A/P Facility; adherence to master sys-
tem specifications, interface specifications, and master
project plans established by the SPD; provision of soft-
ware support to the Satellite Operations Center before,
during, and after missions; assistance to the SPD with
regard to pre-launch activities in the Payload Sub
Assembly area at Vandenberg, certifying to its readi-
ness and acting as principal PSA assistant to the SPD
during pre-mission planning, on-orbit operations, and
post-mission analyses.
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Since the PSA contained the key element of
the satellite system (i.e., the camera), its basic struc-
tural, dynamic, thermal, power and other requirements were
to be given proper weight in determining over-all system
configuration and characteristics. In trade-offs within
the system, the SPD was directed to attempt to resolve
problems with a minimum effect on the sensor. However,
both the SPD and the.PSAPO were directed to analyze their
interface and trade-off problems in terms of a successful
over-all system performance.
The CIA was to be responsible to the DNRO
for the subsystem engineering, technical direction and
contract supervision for the PSA (except DISIC). In
clarification of the division of responsibilities,
Dr. Flax's directive emphasized that each party must
honor the other's prerogatives, granting full and free
access to all data, and carrying on properly coordinated
informal and direct communication at all levels. In the
way of general guidance, Dr. Flax cautioned the two sides
Despite good intentions on both sides,
differences in interpretation of this man-
agement directive, the question of whether
or not a problem has interface implications,
etc., probably will occur periodically. When
such an instance arises and cannot be settled
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in the field, I desire that the problem be
called to my attention promptly for resolution.
The successful implementation of this man-
agement arrangement will require the wholehearted
cooperation of both CIA and SAFSP. I enjoin each
of you to insure that your respective subordinates
put forth every effort in that vein. 108/
It remained to be seen if the human factor in the rela-
tions between CIA and the Air Force could be "directed"
back to the truly cooperative spirit which had prevailed
during the very early days of this joint endeavor.
In order to strengthen the CIA management
team on the West Coast, Mr. Crowley appointed as over-all
program manager
as assigned as technical director, and
continued in his position as Operations
Officer. Some friction was generated initially due to
lack of communication and the giving of conflicting tech-
nical directions to staff and contractors ensued. A visit
purpose of
by the DD/SP, Mr. McMahon, was made for the
straightening out the lines of command within
the A/P Facility and placing it in its proper perspec-
tive under the new CORONA Management Plan. 109/
In 1966 the number of launches of CORONA
J-1 systems was reduced to nine (18 buckets) of which
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eight achieved orbit and were retrieved with a usable film
yield of about 87%.* On 9 August 1966, CORONA Mission 1036
became the first payload on which all payload readiness
work (including film loading) was accomplished at the A/P
Facility and the payload was shipped to Vandenberg in
flight-ready condition. (This speaks for the capability
developed by the CIA CORONA West Coast group to carry out
its responsibilities.) Mission 1036 was also the first
use of the Thorad booster and the first deployment on a
retrograde orbit. The 13-day life of this mission was
the longest to date for any reconnaissance satellite.
The 20 September 1966 launching of CORONA Mission 1035
was the first use of the Pan-Geometric Camera, and the
analysis indicated considerable improvement in the carto-
graphic coverage by the CORONA system. 110/
3. CORONA Improvement Program: J-3
As a result of discussions early in 1965 be-
tween Mr. Crowley and Dr. Fubini (then DDR&E), studies
were made of the weaknesses of the current "J" system and
several improved designs were investigated. Mr. Crowley,
with the technical assistance of
*Appendix D, Tab 12.
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initiated studies leading to
a program incorporating (a) development of a constant
rotator camera (Itek) to provide a capability for flying
the system at altitudes below 100 nautical miles; (b) im-
provement in V/H control, vibration, etc., to improve
photographic quality; (c) incorporation of the Double Im-
proved Stellar Index Camera (DISIC) to improve attitude
determination and allow better use of the system by the
mapping community; (d) development of the Mark VIII re-
covery capsule to provide a 300% increase in film recov-
ery; (e) on-orbit lifetime extension to 30 days to allow
efficient film utilization; and (f) use of the Atlas or
Thorad senior booster to provide the required weight
margin for the increased payload, and to allow for higher
inclination orbits (i.e., 96 degrees). 111/
The DNRO was briefed on the recommended
improvements on 21 June 1965; on 29 June he approved the
procurement of the constant rotating camera from Itek,
the improvement in V/H control and incorporation of the
DISIC (procurement of which was later awarded SAFSP);
however, he decided to stick with the Douglas Thor as
the booster, with a modest upgrading to allow for in-
creased payload weight of the new rotator and stellar
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index cameras. The reason for rejection of recommendations
d, e, and f, above, according to
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that official Washington held the view in June 1965 that
it was preferable to retain a launch rate of 12 systems
per year rather than increase the film capacity and mission
life, and reduce the launch rate. 112/ (This view was
modified for the sake of economy during the CORONA stretch-
out, 1968-70.)
Between summer 1965 and the end of March
1966, major progress was made on the design and development
of the J-3 constant rotator camera and all camera inter-
faces were completed. When the CORONA Management Plan was
approved by the NRP Executive Committee in April 1966 and
later promulgated by the DNRO, the final go-ahead was
given for the CORONA Improvement Program; however, the
delay in this action had caused the first expected launch
to slip from January 1967 to July 1967. The J-3 qualifi-
cation program went smoothly through to July 1967 when
first launch was anticipated. However, in thermal alti-
tude testing both the panoramic and stellar index cameras
had problems and therefore the first J-3 was delayed
another six weeks. The first J-3 launch (Mission 1101)
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took place on 15 September 1967, and recovery of both
buckets was completed on 28 September 1967. The J-3 was
considered an outstanding success from a technical stand-
point since all design goals were achieved. Problems ex-
perienced on the first mission were of a minor nature,
correctable without major rework before the next flight
of a constant rotator camera was scheduled. The perform-
ance was judged to be the best ever from a CORONA system.
The J-3 was able to fly a lower orbit and get better pho-
tographic scale and more information content per picture,
with a resolution of six feet being achieved. 113/
Seven successful J-1 missions (14 buckets)
were flown in 1967, and two J-3's (4 buckets), with re-
covery of almost 100% usable film. Of the Soviet SS-9's
and SS-11's identified during this period, about 72% came
from CORONA photography; also the detection of the first
Coverage was also obtained of the
Arab airfields damaged by the Israelis.
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ago
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of CORONA in order to obtain the broad search coverage
required
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1966,
On 20 September
the Director of Reconnaissance, CIA, that the DNRO's
recommended budget for FY 1968 had set a revised schedule
on the strength of the longer life of the current satel-
lite systems, as well as for budgetary considerations.
Rather than the launch-a-month coverage considered the
desirable number to meet requirements in previous years,
there were to be ten launches each in FY 1967 and 1968,
nine in 1969, and a reserve of six, to be launched in
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ten to eight, and further stretching out of the schedule
In OSP's FY 1969 NRO budget a requirement
was included for the procurement of three additional
CORONA systems
The DNRO preferred to stretch out the CORONA launch
schedule, and no provision was made in doing so for any
launch or system failures which might occur, and which
in turn would lead to a failure to meet search and sur-
veillance requirements. Two particular weak points in
the system were weight constraints due to use of the
medium thrust launch vehicle assigned to CORONA, and
the shelf age of system hardware. Early philosophy of
CORONA had been to schedule 13 flights to assure 12
successes, but in the critical overlap period now de-
veloping the DNRO called for a "zero defects" program
even though the demonstrated reliability to date for
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was about 85-90%. 25X
Mr. Crowley felt strongly that three more CORONA systems
should be procured while the contractors were still tooled
to supply them. 116/
1970. On the strength of its report, the Executive Com-
mittee decided to approve a recommended stretchout of the
remaining CORONA vehicles to allow for
and not to order any more CORONA sys-
tems but to reconsider the situation in December 1969.
The failure of the forward-looking camera
on J-3 Mission 1107, launched on 23 July 1969, heightened
the concern felt by Mr. Crowley for the critical aspects
of the CORONA phase-out period, particularly those of
personnel attrition at the A/P Facility, the quality
assurance program, and the availability of spares. A
meeting held on 25 July 1969 examined closely these three
problems and as a result the following actions were taken:
(a) a previously-planned reorganization was carried out
to integrate ORONA staffs into a
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the physical transfer of the A/P Facility from
Photographic Systems Division, effective 1 August 1969,
in order to make the most efficient use of the experienced
personnel available to the D/SP; (b) planning began for
in order to have available a sup-
ply of technicians to replace those
nicians who were leaving the program as they saw it moving
toward termination; because of labor union regulations
Lockheed employees could not be placed in the
facility; and (c) planning was initiated for the procure-
ment of spares and refurbishment of systems, including
cost and reliability considerations. 117/
When thel eview Committee was re-
convened in December 1969, the situation was considered
and the Committee recommended against further
procurement of CORONA systems. 118/ The DNRO on
2 February 1970 submitted the Committee's report to the
DCI and encouraged acceptance of the recommendation against
additional CORONA procurement. Mr. Helms replied on
5 February 1970 agreeing to the recommendation. 119/
The CORONA schedule stretchout as approved by the NRP
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Executive Committee in June 1969 had shifted from six
flights each in FY 1970 and 1971, to five each in FY 1970
and 1971, and two carried over into FY 1972. This was a
calculated risk, taken in the face of all relevant con-
cerns: the requirements, the cost,
Actual CORONA launches during calendar 1968
were five J-1's and three J-3 constant rotator cameras,
all successfully airsnatched, with 97%o to 99% usable film
recovered. In calendar 1969, the last three of the J-1
systems and three J-3's were launched and retrieved, al-
though several malfunctions which occurred caused the
usable film recovery to fall to about 83% for the J-3's
and 94% for the J-l' s . *
A series of important tests were run in
conjunction with the flights of the first five J-3 sys-
tems. These were the culmination of efforts begun at the
instigation of TJSIB, which in February 1966 had directed
CIA to develop techniques which would enable estimates
of crop yields to be made from satellite photography.
The payloads of J-3 systems one through five were speci-
ally instrumented and contained in some cases tag-on
*Appendix D, Tab 12.
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lengths of special camouflage detection color film, or
high speed, high resolution black and white film. The test
series accomplished its fundamental purpose of demonstrating
the J-3 camera's capability to handle some new photographic
techniques due to the added flexibility of having two change-
able filters and four changeable exposure slits on each cam-
era, which allowed the use of mixed film loads and/or
different filters. None of the missions concerned had their
main intelligence purpose degraded by the conduct of these
tests. 120/
At the instigation of Mr. Crowley, a CORONA
J-3 Ad Hoc Committee was informally convened by the DNRO on
4 December 1967, and formally constituted in February 1968.
Its purpose was to analyze and evaluate the experiments
conducted on these five test flights. Specific findings
of the Committee included the recommendations that further
testing of color films and techniques should be conducted
against specific intelligence requirements; that a special
subcommittee of the U.S. Intelligence Board's Committee on
Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) should be
constituted to evaluate the utility of satellite color pho-
tography; and that a well-planned color collection program
be worked out with the close cooperation of the system
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program offices, the SOC, the intelligence analysts, and
the photointerpreters. 121/
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IV. OSP Achievements in Satellite Reconnaissance
A. A Century (and More) of CORONA*
On 24 January 1968 the 100th satellite in the
CORONA series was fired from the Pacific Missile Range
at Vandenberg Air Force Base and its two film buckets
were successfully airsnatched on 1 February and on
8 February 1968, respectively. Congratulatory messages
were exchanged between the Director of CIA and the
Director of NRO on the accomplishments of this unique
satellite reconnaissance program which had been the
first to recover objects from orbit; the first to recover
intelligence information from orbit; the first to develop
a satellite-borne, panoramic, stereoscopic, photo-
reconnaissance system; the first to locate the Soviet
ICBM deployment; the first to extend mission life and
add multiple re-entry vehicles in one mission; and the
first to complete 100 missions (three out of four of
which were successful in the retrieval of payloads).
The contributions of this program to intelligence in the
*This section is based on a paper prepared by the OSP
Staff, titled "A Century of CORONA," and sent to the
Director of NRO by Mr. John J. Crowley, Director of OSP,
on 11 December 1968, as
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uncovering of the unknown, and the contributions to the
state-of-the-art of photo-reconnaissance in technical
advances make it difficult to overstate the importance
of this pioneer program.
The technological improvements engineered under
CORONA advanced the system in eight years from a single
panoramic camera system having a design goal of 20 to 25
feet ground resolution, to a twin camera panoramic system
producing stereo-photography at the same ground resolution;
then to a dual-recovery system with an improvement in
ground resolution to approximately 7 to 10 feet, and
doubling the film payload; and finally, to the J-3 system
with a constant rotator camera, selectable exposure and
filter controls, a planned orbital life of 18 to 20 days,
and yielding a resolution of about 7 feet.
Appendix D to this history contains charts and
statistical tables, among which the following are of sig-
nificance with regard to the accomplishments of the
CORONA program.
Tab 9 - Specifications of the various CORONA
camera systems.
Tab 10 - A mission-by-mission listing of all
CORONA flights from 1959 through 1970.
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Tab 11 - A chart of total film buckets launched,
orbited, and recovered by series and by years.
Tab 12 - A chart by mission type and by year of
the amount of usable film recovered from orbit.
Tab 13 - Chain of events and average time for
return to ZI and processing of exposed CORONA film.
Tab 14 - Map display of photo-coverage of Asian
land mass accomplished in a six-month period from
December 1969 through June 1970.
CORONA satellites had photographed all existing
Soviet ICBM bases (25) by June 1964; the information thus
The CORONA coverage of Soviet rail networks has
been relied on to discover any new ICBM complexes since
all known ones are served by rail. The program's ability
to discover and identify new Soviet silos was unchallenged
by any other means of intelligence gathering. CORONA
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coverage has also played a significant role
Since the last mainland China overflight by the
ith a U-2, on 16 March 1968, CORONA
has been virtually the sole contributor to the national
imagery data base on China. A wide variation of standard
and special priority requirements have been levied for
target coverage for China including area search for stra-
tegic missile deployment, monitoring of nuclear and arma-
ment producing facilities and status of armed forces,
and surveillance of key installations and communications
lines. Coverage of China still falls short of the
USIB/COMIREX requirements, particularly in the South
China area. Satellite photography of this region is the
most difficult to obtain of any area of the Communist
world due to its being cloud covered approximately 70%
of the year,I
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NIPE Staff,
On 1 May 1969, the China Coordinator for the
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the Chairman of COMIREX for improvements in the photore-
connaissance coverage of China.
CORONA coverage of the Middle East during the
June 1967 war was of great value in estimating the rela-
tive military strengths of the opposing sides after the
short combat period. Evidence was produced of the ex-
tensive damage inflicted by the Israeli air attacks by
actual count of aircraft destroyed on the ground in
Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The claims of the Israelis
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might otherwise have been discounted as exaggerations but
for this timely photographic proof.
Again in 1970, CORONA was called on to provide
proof of Israeli-Egyptian claims with regard to cease-fire
compliance or violation. CORONA Mission 1111, launched on
23 July 1970,. successfully carried out the directions for
this coverage, which brought the following praise from
Dr. John McLucas, Under Secretary of the Air Force and
Director of NRO, who said in a message to Mr. Crowley on
25 August 1970
I extend my sincere thanks and a well done
to you and your staff for your outstanding
response to an urgent Intelligence Community
requirement.
The extension of KH-4 Mission 1111 to
19 days, without benefit of solar panels, and
the change in the satellite orbit to permit
photography of the Middle East on 10 August
provided information which could not be ob-
tained through any other means. This pho-
tography is being used as a baseline for
determining compliance with the Suez ceasefire
provisions. 252/
At the end of 1970 (the cut-off date for this
portion of OSP history), the tried and true CORONA system
was still, after a decade as the "workhorse" of the
National Reconnaissance Program, providing an extended
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C. Support to National Policymakers
In placing a value on the intelligence obtained
by the US through its photographic and Sigint reconnais-
sance satellite programs between 1960 and 1970, a first
consideration, on the positive side, would be that it
had made it possible for the President in office to react
more wisely to crucial international situations when armed
with the knowledge provided by these programs. Conversely,
it can be said that without the intelligence which these
programs have furnished, we might have, misguidedly, been
pressured into World War III.
The intelligence collected by OSP's reconnais-
sance programs makes a vital contribution to the National
Intelligence Estimates upon which the defense of the US
and the strategic plans of the military services are
based. Principal among those Estimates are the NIE-il
and the NIE-13 series with regard to the Soviet and Chi-
nese Communist strategic weapons, space, and nuclear
energy programs.
The intelligence from overhead reconnaissance
counts heavily not only in planning our defense, but in
programming and budgeting for it. It helps to avoid the
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kind of wasteful floundering about such as that which
occurred during the time of the projection of the "Mis-
sile Gap." Without the kind of intelligence which the
National Reconnaissance Program is providing, the US
budget for the defense of our own territory, and for
military assistance to our allies, would doubtless be
increased by billions.
In the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, begun
with the Soviet Union in Helsinki in November 1969, the
verification of each country's compliance with the terms
of any agreement reached is one of the thorny questions
which must be settled, and our photographic and Sigint
satellites are among our most important assets upon
which verification can be based. Although the US has
hopes of negotiating supplementary arrangements in sup-
port of verification, including possible selective
on-site observation, it may be that only "national means"
(i.e., the type of technical collection systems now in
use) will be available under whatever agreement is finally
reached. In any case, the value of our reconnaissance
satellites to the top policymakers in formulating nat-
ional security policy will not diminish with an arms
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limitation agreement with the Russians, and it will
be necessary to maintain and advance our capabilities
in this area; also, it will be necessary to continue to
protect the security of our sensitive collection sys-
tems. It will also be vital to obtain either a formal
or tacit understanding with the Russians that neither
side will interfere with the other's "national means"
of verification. 260/
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SOURCE REFERENCES
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1. Record of Actions, NSC 502nd Meeting, 10 Jul 62, TS.
2. Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, Memo to DCI,
3 Jun 63, sub: Basic Authority for CIA Conduct of
Overflight Reconnaissance Operations, I IS.
3. Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, Memo to DCI,
1 Nov 63 sub: Authorization for CIA Functions,
S.
4. John A. McCone, Memorandum, 2 Feb 65, sub: Principles
to Guide the Preparation of a New NRO Agreement,
TS.
6. Amron H. Katz, "The Reconnaissance Satellite," S-81,
U.S. Air Force Project Rand, 24 Feb 58, pp. 49-51, S.
8. R. M. Bissell, Jr., Memo, "Proposed Advanced
Reconnaissance System," 19 Nov 57, TS-164671.
9. John D. Morris, "Air Force Plans 'Seeing' Satellite
by Spring of 1959," New York Times, 15 Jan 58, p.1,
col. 5.
10. CORONA Cover Plan, 8 Dec 58, COR-0160, TS.
11. Project Outline of CORONA, 15 Apr 58, COR-0013, TS.
12. Ibid.
13. Arno H. Luehman, M/G, USAF, Director of Information
Services, "Information Plan," Undated, COR-0104, S.
14. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Memorandum, 5 Nov 58,
sub: Security of CORONA, COR-0159, S.
15. John W. Finney, "Pentagon to Fire Heavy Satellites,
Animals in Some," New York Times, 4 Dec 58, p. 1,
col. 1.
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16. CORONA Staff Meeting Minutes, 10 Dec 58, COR-0277, TS.
17. Telegram
to AFBMD, Attn: Col. Sheppard,
29 Jan 59, S.
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18. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1959, Political and
Security Questions, Documentary References, pp. 28-29.
19. UN Registration of Space Vehicles: Chronology of
Events, DD/S&T Retired File entitled "Outer Space,
Mar-Jul 1962," Job 66-R-638, TS.
20. NYUSDEL Telegram 3556 to Department of State, 26 Apr
62, sub: Outer Space, S.
21. Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Memo to DCI, 27 Apr 62,
sub: Ambassador Stevenson's Telegram, TS-155854.
22. New York Times, 18 Apr 62, p. 14, col. 4.
23. Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memo
to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, 10 Apr 62, sub: Interaction
of US Action in the UN with US Satellite Reconnais-
sance Activities, S.
24. Herbert Scoville, Jr.,DD/R, Memo to DCI, 28 Jun 62,
sub: Report of NSAM 156 Working Group, DD/R-295-62, S.
25. James. R. Killian, Chairman, PFIAB, Memo to President
Kennedy, 16 May 62, TS.
26. John A. McCone, DCI, Memo to DDCI, 22 May 62, sub:
U.S. Position in UN Outer Space Committee, ER-62-
3520, S.
27. Marshall S. Carter, Lt. Gen, USA, DDCI, Memo to DD/R,
29 May 62, sub: Formulation of Policies on Outer Space,
Ref: NSAM 156, S.
28. John L. McLucas, D/NRO, Memo to EXCOM Members,
7 Oct 69, sub: Guidelines for NASA Earth-Sensing
Activity, ITS.
29. Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Memo to DCI, 30 Jul 58,
sub: CORONA and 117L Financing, COR-0063, S.
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30. USIB-D-33.6/7, 27 Jun 60, S; USIB-M-105, 28 Jun 60,
31. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Draft Paper, 24 Jan 63, sub:
Brief Summary of Development of Satellite Reconnais-
sance Program, TS, Unno'd.
32. Albert D. Wheelon, Draft Paper, "A Summary of the
National Reconnaissance Problem," 13 May 65,
S.
33. Letter Contract of CIA with LAC/MSD,
29 Apr 58, COR-0025, S.
34. Contract SC-28, between Itek and FCIC, 25 Oct 58,
for the development of a photographic subsystem.
35. Daniel M Kelly, Contracting Officer, DPS, Memo for
Record, sub: Itek, 16 Sep 58, COR-0141, S.
36. Contract SC-100-9, LAC/MSD with Itek, 17 Nov 58, for
design and fabrication of a photographic subsystem.
37. Contract SC-100-8, LAC/MSD subcontract with General
Electric, 2 Jan 59, for "Advanced Recovery Vehicle
and Associated Ground Support Equipment."
38. Memo for DD/P, 4 Mar 59, sub:
meeting on cost overrun by GE, COR-0364, S.
39. Final Audit by USAF Auditor General, Eastern District,
of Contract SC-100-8, General Electric Company,
11 Jul 63.
40. Contracting Officer, OSA, Memo
for Finance Officer, OSA, 14 May 63, sub: Contract
RT-100, COR-2075, S.
41. USAF, Chief, Ops, DPS, Trip
Report, 25 Nov 58, CO -0238, TS.
42. "Satellite Reconnaissance Programs: LMSC, Itek and
GE Contracts," 9 Feb 63, TS.
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43. Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Briefing Memo for
Director, 3 Oct 62, sub: NRP, I ITS.
44. Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R "Summary of NRO
Activities," 14 Jun 63,1 ITS.
45. Stanley W. Beerli, Col., USAF, AC/DPD, Memo for
DD/P, 18 Jul 61, sub: Access to T-KH Material for
Itek Reps, COR-1224, S.
25X1 46.
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Contracting Officer, DPD, Memo
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for Record, 17 May 61, sub: Contract No. BJ-1937,
COR-1147, S.
47. Albert D. Wheelon Memo to DDCI,
29 Jan 65, sub: History of the CORONA System,
48. Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Memo to A/DCI, 1 Sep 62,
sub: Delegation of OSA/DD/R Contracting Officer
Authority, ITS.
49. Wheelon/4
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op. cit. (No. 47, above).
50. Herbert Scoville, Jr., DD/R, Memo to Under Secretary
of the Air Force 5 Apr 62, sub: Management of
LANYARD, ITS.
51. Wheelon op. cit. (No. 47 above).
52. Definitive Contract DM-2616 between CIA and LMSC,
for "J" System, 12 Jan 63.
CORONA J-1 Era,
DCI, 23 Oct 69, sub:
55. DC/Ops/DPS, Trip
Report, 26 Sep 58, COR-0161, S.
56.
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57. USIB M-159, 13 Jun 61, S.
58. First CORONA Schedule, 23 Jun 58, COR-0054, S.
59. Eugene P. Kiefer, Special Asst. for Technical
Analysis, DPS, Memo for Record, 26 Aug 58,
COR-0123, S.
60. Ibid.
25X1 61.
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6 Feb 59, COR-0334, TS.
DPS Ops, Trip Report,
62. Chief DPS Ops, Trip
Report, 25 Nov 58, O - - 8, TS.
63. Dep. Chief, DPS Ops,
Trip Report, 23 Oct 58, COR-0192, TS.
25X1 64.
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I Dep. Chief, DPS Ops,
Trip Report, 25 Feb-577-CUR-0602, TS.
65. DPS Ops, Telegram to
LMSC, 3 Apr .
66. New York Times, 12 Aug 60, p. 1, col. 8.
67. New York Times, 20 Aug 60, p. 1, col. 1.
25X1 68.
Development Div., DPD,
Trip Report, 29 Oc , -7417-59, S.
69. Edward Green, Eastman Kodak Company Project Offi-
cer, Trip Report, 3 Dec 60, COR-1029, S.
70. "Status of CORONA," 17 April 60, DPD Unnumbered
Document in OSA retired files, S.
71. Eugene P. Kiefer, Special Asst. for Technical Anal-
ysis, DPD, Memo to DD/P, 18 Jul 61, COR-1228, S.
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74. Letter Agreement on Management of the National
Reconnaissance Program, 6 Sep 61, signed by
Lt. Gen. C. P. Cabell, DDCI, and
Mr. Roswell Gil atric Deputy Secretary of
Defense, TS.
75. Agreement between Secretary of Defense and DCI
on Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance
Office, 2 May 62, ITS.
76. Joseph V. Charyk, DNRO, Memo for NRO Program Di-
rectors, 23 Jul 62, sub: Organization and Functions
of the NRO, TS.
77. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T Memo to DCI, 18 Nov 63,
sub: CORONA Management, ITS.
78. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T Memo to DCI, 10 Dec 63,
sub: CORONA Management, ITS.
79. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to DCI, 11 Jun 65,
sub: Technical Direction of On-going CORONA
Payload Contracts, ITS.
80. Albert D. Wheelon, op. cit. (No. 77, above).
81. John A. McCone, DCI, Memo to DNR 22 Oct 63,
sub: CORONA Improvement Program, ITS.
82. Classified Message,
10 Apr 64, S.
(from
83. Albert D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memorandum for the DCI,
13 Mar 64 sub: Dissolution of CORONA Project
Office, TS.
84. Jackson D. Maxey, Chief, Special Projects
0/DD/S&T Memo to the DDCI, 29 Mar 65,
IS.
Staff,
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85. A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to DCI, 20 Jul 64,
sub: Perspective on Aerospace, S.
86. J. A. McCone, letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense
Vance, 6 Oct 64, sub: Assignment of Mr. Crowley to
the West Coast, S.
87. John N. McMahon, O/DD/S&T, Memo for Record, 22 Jan 65,
unnumbered, sub: Meeting with Gen. Stewart re CORONA
Agreement, S.
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88. A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, op. cit (No. 79, above).
89. A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to DDCI, 26 Feb 65,
sub: Establishment of a Satellite Office Within the
S&T Directorate, (Appendix A, Tab 22). 25X1
90. Actg. DD/S&T, Memo to DCI 7 Jul 65,
sub: Satellite Operations Center,I S. 25X1
91. Chief SIGINT Committee (former
DDNRO), "DDS&T Relations with National Reconnaissance
Office," April 1970, 0 unnumbered (Appendix D,
92. L. K. White, ExDir/Comptroller, Memo to DD/S&T,
15 Sep 65, sub: Establishment of an Office of Special
Projects, ER-65-5310, S.
Tab 78, DD/S&T History), S.
93. A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, op. cit. (No. 89, above).
94. A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to AD/SA, 8 Sep 64,
sub: A ort to Special Projects Staff,
Is.
95. John N. McMahon, DD/SP, Memo for Record, 29 Sep 65,
sub: Meeting with OSA Relative to Transfer of OSA
Positions to OSP, unnumbered, S.
Chief, Project Administration
Division, OSP, Memo to Ch/PPS/DDS&T 13 Jan 66,
sub: Review of FY 1967 Budget, S.
97. John N. McMahon, Memo for Record, 12 May 1966,
sub: Briefing of DCI by OSP, unnumbered, S.
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98. John J. Crowley, D/SP, Memo for Acting DD/S&T,
17 Oct 66, sub: Comments Regarding Personnel
Ceiling Cutback in OSP, S.
99. John N. McMahon, DD/SP, Memo to EXO DD S&T 2 Dec
66, sub: Personnel Reductions, S.
100. L. K. White, ExDir/Comptroller, Memo to DD/S&T,
29 Dec 67, sub: 1968-1969 Personnel Ceiling Allo-
cations, ER-67-6017/2, S.
101. Chief Admin. Support Staff, DD/S&T,
Memo to DD T, 11 Jul 68, sub: OSP Staff,
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102. J. J. Crowley, D/SP, Memo to DD/S&T, 24 Se 65
sub: Funds for OSP's FY 66 Activities, IS. 25X1
103. J. J. Crowley, Notes of Telecons with B/G James
Stewart, Chief NRO Staff, and F_ I 25X1
Chief SPO 241, 4, 10, and 16 Feb 65, and 4 Mar 65,
Unno'd, S. (OSP Chrono file).
104. Jackson D. Maxey, Chief SPS, Memo to DD/S&T,
sub: Backgrou
21 May 65,
Conflict, S
105. J. J. Crowley, D/SP, Memo to Chief NRO Staff,
16 Sep 65, sub: Management Organization and
Control, CORONA, S.
106. Ibid.
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107. A. D. Wheelon, DD/S&T, Memo to D 22 Sep 65
sub: CORONA Improvement Program, fS. 25X1
108. Alexander H. Flax, DNRO, Memo to Dir/Recon, CIA,
and Director of Special Projects, SAF, 22 Jun 66,
ci,h- CORONA Management Plan and Organizational
109. J. N. McMahon, DD/SP, Memo for Record, 10 May 66,
sub: Trip Report to West Coast, Unno'd, S.
Appendix A, Tab 29).
Responsibilities, STS/CORONA (see 25X1
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TS; OSP Activity Report, 30 September 1966,
TS.
111. SP Technical Officer, Mem for D SP
16 Feb 70, sub: The CORONA UTB Program, 25X1
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113. "The CORONA Improvement (J-3) Program Development
History," 27 Oct 67, COR-6148-67, TS.
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NRO 114. Memo to Director of
Reconnaissance, CIAY 20 Sep , Unnumbered, S.
115. J. J. Crowley, D/SP, Memo to DD/S&T. 23 Jun 69
sub: Excerpts from DCI Reports,
116. J. J. Crowley, D/SP, Memo to DD/S&T, 7 Jan 69,
sub: Potential Need for Additional CORONA Systems,
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117. J. J. Crowley, D/SP, Memo for Record 29 Jul 69,
sub: CORONA Program Planning, 25X1
119.
120. Final Report, CORONA Photo raphic Experiments
Committee, June, 1969,
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110. OSP Activity Report, 31 August 1966,
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