PFIAB DISCUSSION OF OXCART PHASE-OUT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP89B00980R000600060021-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 17, 2006
Sequence Number:
21
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 13, 1967
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Aar
Approved For Reffirse 2006/09126: CIA-RDP8100980R009600060021-0
13 October 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : PFIAB Discussion of OXCART Phase-out
1. This memorandum is for your information only.
2. The following points are considered appropriate
for use in your meeting with PFIAB on the OXCART
phase-out issue.
a. The OXCART vehicle has performed
most effectively in thirteen missions over
North Viet Nam and thus is a known, reliable
reconnaissance capability.
b. It is difficult to make a one-to-one
comparison between OXCART and the SR-71 since
they were designed for two different missions.
The SR-71 is a two-man aircraft built primarily
for post strike reconnaissance purposes, whereas
the OXCART was designed for the type of mission
it is now flying.
Declassification Review by NGA
copy_o f_7
Approved For Release 2006/09/26 : CIA-RDP89600980R000600060021-0
Approved For-Relesere 2006/09/26: CIA-RDP89B00980R0Q000060021-0
e. The OXCART has an inherent altitude
advantage over the SR-71 which is also a factor
in its ability to survive over denied areas.
3. In addition to these technical factors you
may wish to mention the difference in use of a
military aircraft versus a civilian espionage
aircraft, but I recognize this is an argument which
is difficult to make and may not be desirable to
raise. I do feel that the type of command control
exercised over OXCART, specifically that it is
literally controlled from Headquarters and not by
a field commander, is important but of course it may
be contended that such control could be exercised
over the SR-71.
4. As to the financial situation, we have
indicated that we could operate for the remainder of
FY 1968 for an additional I 'dollars. Also,
it may be well to note that we believe we could
rate on a continuing basis for a cost of about
per year, although that figure would vary
somewa year to year, depending on improvements, etc.
We have just completed- our first cut costing for the
three months extension discussed at EXCOM and by really
tightening our belts we think we can get by for
something under I I The figure we are
proposing to submit to
CARL S. DUCKETT
Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology
Approved For Release 2006/09/26: CIA-RDP89B00980R000600060021-0
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