WEEKLY ACTIVITIES AND STATUS REPORT FOR DD/ICS--15 JUNE 1983
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP89B01330R000200380013-1
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count:
16
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 24, 2011
Sequence Number:
13
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Publication Date:
June 15, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
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The Director of Centra' Inie:hoence
Washington. D C 20505
Critical Intelligence Problems Committee
,00 AV - 14
Weekly Activities and Status Report for DD/ICS--15 June 1983
CIPC Organizational Activities
? The monthly Committee meeting will be on 20 June at 1030 hours. The agenda
has been developed (attached) and will be forwarded, by special courier, to
the members along with other background material on Wednesday P.M./Thursday
A.M.
? John Guenther, USMC, reported that he would be attending the 20 June
meeting; however, he will be delivering a letter appointing BGEN Smith as the
primary CIPC member and Guenther would be the alternate, effective
immediately.
? We have taken a straw poll on the feasibility of continuing a Monthly
Activities and Status Report for the Committee members. This report would be
in addition to the minutes and not a substitute for meetings. The report
would, however, provide the members an insight into some of the staff 25X1
activities not discussed at meetings. There appears to be overwhelming
support to continue the report. (Straw poll attached.)
WORKING PAPER
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25X1 25X1 2bAI 25X1 L~.)^I
TOP SECRET 25X1
25X1
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Personnel
? CIA Career Trainee, recently visited us and
expressed a desire to fulfill her final interim (three months) on the CIPC
am coordinator ,
h
er progr
staff. She has discussed this possibility with
anrl ho whnleheartedly concurs. is presently working in
nnn/MESA on npFC issues. She knows the D/ICS--she attenoeo
talked to both and her DDO supervisor and,
we
W
i
e
on.
recommendat
with your concurrence, would like to invite her to join us for her final CT
tour. She is slated for DDI SOVA upon completion of the CT program.
? has been security-approved as of 10 June 1983. However,
Contract Personne has not yet received this notification but when they do the
processing will be completed. With luck we should have on board in a few
days.
Orientation Briefings and Visits
? On 13 June,
staff on future imagery exploitation planning.
were briefed by COMIREX
? On 15 June, NPIC is scheduled to brief CIPC staff on resent ima er
capabilities to
? is off to Brookings for the week.
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TOP SECRET
Intelligence Collection Activities Against China:
? We have now received responses from all of the CIPC members. is
reviewing these responses and will be providing us within a week a
recommendation on how next to proceed. This subject is a candidate agenda
item for the July meeting.
Imagery Exploitation Planning
? As noted earlier, the CIPC staff was briefed by the COMIREX staff on 13
June. Their briefing indicated that considerable exploitation planning is
under way at the national level and in various stages. However, we plan to
continue looking into this matter, and several tutorial briefings and visits
are being scheduled. We will be visiting NPIC in the near future.
Chemical Warfare Study:
? We have been in contact with ACDA and STIC regarding this subject and have
advised them we are presentl ex loring what might be done by the CIPC in
response to their request. has had conversation with various experts
around town and has scheduled a briefing by NPIC on imagery applicability to
this subject. is also developing a recommended course of action for the
CIPC and we should have this ready by next week.
Narcotics Projects and Activities:
? The Working Group met on 14 June and, among other things, reviewed the
staff recommendation resulting from our trip to Miami. These recommendations
will be tabled at the Committee meeting on 20 June.
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- The recent GAO report is being closely reviewed. It contains some
very interesting recommendations. (Executive Summary attached.)
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TOP SECRET
- The Miami trip report is in final preparation (preliminary copy
attached).
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Distribution:
Orie-DD/]CS
1-C/CIPC
1-VC/CIPC
1-ES/CIPC(Chrono)
1-CIPC Subj
1-CIPC Staff w o Atts)
DCI/ICS/ES/CIPC I(15Jun83) 25X1
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C 20505
Critical Intelligence Problems Committee
Preliminary Agenda
MONTHLY MEETING*
20 June 1983- 103n Hnitrc
1. OPENING REMARKS/ANNOUNCEMENTS
DCI/ICS 83-3802
CIPC A-03
(5 Mins.) Chairman
II. BRIEFING ON THE INTELLIGENCE (35 Mins.)
PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMS CONTROL
PROCESS
- Organization
- Key Issues
III. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
COORDINATION AND COLLECTION
STUDY
Status Report
Review and Discussion
Overview of CIPC Staff Visits to
South Florida Task Force (SFTF)
- Discussion: Selected Issues
IV. STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILE STUDY
- Status Report
- Review and Discussion
V. OTHER BUSINESS
Monthly Report for the Members
Chairman's Notes
Chief, Arms
Control, Intelli-
gence Staff, CIA
(40 Mins.) Working Group
Chairman
Members
Chairman/Members
Working Group
Chairman/
Members
Chairman/Executive
Secretary
rcutive Secretary
*Attendance is limited to Principal Members or designated Alternate.
**Classification of briefing.
Note: If you have questions regard
the A enda or attendance lease
contact the Executive Secretary on
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STAT
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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION
TO THE CONGRESS EFFORTS NEED STRONG CENTRAL
OVERSIGHT
Drug abuse in this country is a persistent and
growing problem. Interdiction of illegal
drugs, one component of Federal efforts to
reduce the drug supply, has had limited impact
on the drug flow. Despite increasing resour-
ces for interdiction, only a small percentage
of drugs entering this country are seized.
WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE
GAO conducted this review because of the sig-
nificant increases in resources devoted to
drug interdiction programs and because of the
continuing vast amounts of drugs smuggled into
the country. GAO's objectives were to eval-
uate the results of interdiction programs, the
extent of cooperation and coordination among
the various agencies, the role of intelligence
in interdiction efforts, and the ability of
the military to assist in drug interdiction:
INTERDICTION--ONE PART OF
THE FEDERAL DRUG STRATEGY
Federal efforts to attack the supply of ille-
gal drugs have three major components: inter-
national programs aimed at drug-producer coun-
tries, interdiction of drugs at the border,
and domestic law enforcement.
Federal interdiction efforts include inspec-
tions of international travelers and cargo by
the U.S. Customs Service inspectors, air and
marine interdiction efforts of Customs patrol
officers, and sea interdiction by the U.S.
Coast Guard. The Drug*Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) supports interdiction through the
provision of intelligence and by investigating
and presenting interdiction cases to U.S.
attorneys. (See pp. 4 to 7.)
Tear Sheet i (GAO/GGD-83-52)
JUNE 13,1983
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INTERDICTION RESULTS
REMAIN LIMITED
Federal resources devoted to drug interdiction
more than tripled from 1977 to 1982--from $83
million to $278 million. The Coast Guard's
drug interdiction program comprises the major-
ity of this increase. Meanwhile, funds for
other facets of the Federal drug supply reduc-
tion program--international drug activities and
domestic law enforcement--remained relatively
constant. (See pp. 11 to 13.)
Despite these increases, only 16 percent of the
marijuana and less than 10 percent of heroin,
cocaine, and dangerous drugs that are entering
this country are seized through total drug
enforcement efforts. Also, 95 percent of the
individuals arrested in interdiction cases
are low level violators and when convicted
usually spend less than a year in jail. (See
pp. 14 to 19.)
Joint special projects conducted by two or more
agencies have proven especially effective in
attacking drug smuggling. Of particular note
are special DEA investigations that involve
Customs and the Coast Guard resources. (See
pp. 19 to 26.)
PROGRAM FRAGMENTATION LIMITS
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTION
EFFORTS
The authority and responsibility for Federal
drug interdiction efforts are split among three
separate agencies in three executive depart-
ments. Each agency has different programs,
goals, and priorities. And, although the level
of cooperation is increasing, especially in
South Florida, such fragmentation has a certain
amount of inefficiency and interagency conflict
built in. (See pp. 30 to 32.)
1These and other such estimates in the report
were developed by GAO analysis of Customs,
DEA, and National Narcotics Intelligence
Consumers Committee data.
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Congressional oversight and executive branch
resource allocation decisions relative to drug
interdiction are difficult under these circum-
stances. The budgets of the three agencies are
developed in separate departments,'reviewed by
different OMB branches, and funds are author-
ized and appropriated by separate congressional
committees. Also, very little information is
available, either by agency or in the aggregate
that can be used as a basis for evaluating pro-
gram results. Aggregate seizure statistics are
sometimes overstated when there is more than
one participating agency, and very little case
disposition information on arrestees is main-
tained. (See pp. 33 to 39.)
Another issue related to program fragmentation
is the lack of a definitive policy regarding
followup investigations of interdiction cases.
Under the current division of responsibilities,
DEA conducts followup investigations on the
Coast Guard's or Customs' arrestees. DEA
usually performs followup investigations only
if the cases (less than 40 percent) will be
prosecuted by a U.S. attorney. Consequently,
information which could be of value to future
investigations is not being obtained on the
majority of the interdiction cases. (See pp.
39 to 46.)
Fragmentation of Federal efforts has long been
recognized as a major problem. To help remedy
this situation, Congress passed legislation in
1972 and 1976 that requires the President to
develop a comprehensive national drug strategy
and to appoint a drug abuse policy coordina-
tor. While various drug strategies have been
prepared over the years, the most recent in
October 1982, none has adequately defined the
various agencies' drug interdiction roles.
Furthermore, the drug abuse policy coordinator
has never had the authority to exercise the
necessary policy and priority-setting oversight
of Federal drug efforts. (See pp. 46 to 51.)
The current administration has organized or
proposed several new groups to help coordinate
Federal drug efforts. The South Florida Task
Force, under the direction of Vice President
Bush, was an excellent example of a cooperative
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effort by all the major Federal agencies
involved in drug enforcement efforts. While
these efforts have certainly improved opera-
tional coordination among the various agencies,
these coordination mechanisms still do not pro-
vide a composite picture of all Federal resour-
ces devoted to drug enforcement or provide a
basis for allocating these resources in terms
of budgetary priorities. (See pp. 51 to 53.)
BETTER, MORE TIMELY
INTELLIGENCE NEEDED
The effectiveness of Federal interdiction
efforts depends a great deal on intelligence
support capabilities. Statistics on the use of
prior intelligence to support interdiction, as
well as certain special projects, indicate the
value of good, timely intelligence. (See pp.
57 to 59.)
Drug source and transit countries are valuable
sources of intelligence that can be used to
support interdiction efforts. However, Customs
and Coast Guard must rely on DEA to provide
this intelligence. Yet, the international
programs of DEA and the Department of State do
not place a high priority on supporting inter-
diction efforts. For example, a stronger in-
telligence program is needed in the Caribbean,
a major transit area for drug smuggling. (See
pp. 59 to 62.)
DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard all have
domestic intelligence programs, and some
intelligence processing and analysis has been
centralized at the El Paso Intelligence
Center. The Center can be more effective if
better supported and utilized by the agencies
involved in drug interdiction. Moreover, cer-
tain Customs and Coast Guard intelligence anal-
ysis functions should be transferred to the
Center. (See pp. 62 to 69.)
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
INCREASING
The military departments have provided some
limited assistance to drug enforcement agencies
over the last several years. Changes to the
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Posse Comitatus Act in December 1981, which
further defined the extent of allowable military
involvement in support of civilian law enforce-
ment, have resulted in a greater role for mili-
tary resources in drug interdiction. (See
pp. 73 to 79.)
Although military assistance can be beneficial,
it is also necessarily limited because
--major long-term commitments of military
assistance can adversely impact the mili-
tary's primary mission;
--military equipment is expensive to operate
and, for the most part, reimbursement is
beyond the financial capabilities of law
enforcement agencies; and
--disclosure of classified military systems in
court might be required and this could compro-
mise national security. (See pp. 79 to 86.)
RECOMMENDATIONS
GAO recommends that the President
--direct the development of a more definitive
Federal drug strategy that stipulates the
roles of the various agencies with drug
enforcement responsibilities and
--make a clear delegation of responsibility to
one individual to oversee Federal drug
enforcement programs. (See p. 54.)
This report also contains a number of recommen-
dations to the Director, Office of Management
and Budget; the Attorney General; and the Secre-
taries of Treasury, Transportation, and State
to accumulate drug enforcement budgeting data,
develop a management information system, and
strengthen drug interdiction intelligence
efforts. (See pp. 53, 54, and 70.)
AGENCY COMMENTS AND
GAO'S EVALUATION
The Departments of Justice, Treasury, Transpor-
tation, State, and Defense provided written
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comments on the draft report. The draft report
was discussed with OMB officials. The White
House Office of Policy Development and the Of-
fice of Drug Abuse Policy elected not to com-
ment on the draft.
With respect to GAO's recommendations to the
President, the Department-of Transportation
concurred with the recommendations; the Depart-
ments of Treasury, State, and Defense did not
specifically comment on the recommendations;
and the Department of Justice disagreed.
The Department of Justice pointed out a series
of actions taken by the Administration toward
achieving a coordinated national drug investi-
gative effort. The Department stated that cur-
rent efforts by the Administration, such as the
South Florida Task Force and the President's
creation of 12 new Drug Enforcement Task
Forces, are intended to foster even closer Fed-
eral agency coordination. The Department of
Justice also noted that legislation to create
an "Office of the Director of National and In-
ternational Drug Operations and Policy" was
passed by the 97th Congress. President Reagan
withheld his approval of this legislation not-
ing that such a drug program manager would cre-
ate a new bureaucracy in the Executive Branch
and compound the problems of coordination.
GAO believes, however, that the current ar-
rangements do not provide a mechanism for opti-
mizing coordination and implementing priorities
for the allocation of limited Federal drug en-
forcement resources within and across all com-
ponents of the Federal drug effort. Giving one
individual the responsibility to oversee the
entire Federal drug program, as GAO has recom-
mended, would be an extension of the efforts to
increase coordination already begun by the
agencies. Such responsibility, however, should
not extend to the day-to-day operations of the
individual agencies, because each agency is
best capable of managing its particular func-
tions within the context of its overall agency
mission.
Legislation to establish a drug operations and
policy office, similar to that passed by the
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Congress last year, has been introduced in the
98th Congress (S. 406). Although GAO has not
specifically analyzed this legislation, GAO's
findings support the concept of central drug
oversight, which is a major objective of the
legislation.
The Department's of Justice and Transportation
supported GAO's recommendation to develop a
management information system. The Department
of the Treasury did not specifically comment on
this recommendation. The Department of Trans-
portation concurred with GAO's recommendation
to accumulate drug enforcement budgetary data.
Other agencies and departments did not comment
on this recommendation. The Departments of
Treasury, Transportation, Justice, and State
pointed out in their comments that development
of intelligence is important to an interdiction
program. However, some of these agencies dis-
agreed on how to improve the intelligence pro-
grams.
The agencies' detailed comments on all of GAO's
recommendations are included in appendixes VIII
through XII and GAO's analysis is presented in
relevant sections of the report and at the ends
of-chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5.
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