CIPC STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01330R000400750015-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 24, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750015-6
The Director of Central intelligence
Washington, D.C 20505
Critical Intelligence Problems Committee
DC1/1CS 86-3728
24 April 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, Critical Intelligence Problems Committee
FROM: Eloise R. Page
Chairman
SUBJECT: CIPC Study of Intelligence as a Force Multiplier
1. The UC1 has asked the CIPC to review and develop the concept of
intelligence as a force multiplier, i.e., the role of t enhancing
the effectiveness and efficiency of US military forces.
2, will serve as Chairman of the Task Force to which
each interested member organization is invited to name a representative.
Please have your representatives, principal and alternate, pass their names
and clearances to the CIPC Staff before 1 May.
3. Please address any comments or questions on the subject to the CIPC
Executive Secretary ial, or
oise Page
Attachment: Terms of Reference
This document is EC
upon removal of attachment
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750015-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89B01330R000400750015-6
INTELLIGENCE AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER: THE ROLE OF THE NFIP
IN ENHANCING US MILITARY CAPABILITIES
TERMS OF REFERENCE
1. BACKGROUND
A. The concept of intelligence as a force multiplier is of growing
interest largely because of concern about sustaining the ability of
technically superior US and allied weapons systems to compensate for numerical
force disadvantages. In situations where the quantity of opposing forces
cannot be fully offset by the quality of weapons systems, ways must be found
to improve efficiency and effectiveness of US military forces.
B. For warfighting, strategic and tactical intelligence can multiply, or
enhance, the combat effectiveness of military forces by enabling deployments
and maneuvers that take maximum advantage of the situation (battle management)
and by quickly and accurately locating hostile units for attack (targeting).
These functions apply to all levels of warfare in all theaters and in all
operational environments, not just to the dominant scenario involving NATO
defense in central Europe against numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces.
C. While there is a general perception that national intelligence assets
are of significant value to military operating forces, there is also a certain
apprehension about their actual availability to these forces. This is a
central issue which must be squarely addressed.
D. In peacetime and in support of deterrence, the force multiplier effect
contributes to the planning and management of US forces and the acquisition of
weapon systems. Intelligence defines targets and threats and provides
technical signatures data for the design of weapon systems.
11. PURPOSE
The study will explain the general principles underlying the concept of
intelligence as a force multiplier, using both logic and historical anecdote.
It will discuss the warfighting intelligence requirements of US ground, air,
and naval forces for battle management and targeting purposes at all levels of
conflict; assess the effects of the multiplier for deterrence and in weapon
system acquisition; identify the contributions of military intelligence assets
toward meeting these requirements; evaluate the potential of NF1P resources to
narrow gaps which remain; and recommend DC1 actions accordingly.
111. STUDY OUTLINE
? Concept of Intelligence as a Force Multiplier.
- General principles (i.e., the logic) underlying the concept.
-- Multiplying the combat effectiveness of US military forces
for battle management and targeting.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89B01330R000400750015-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750015-6
SECRET
? Contributions toward Offsetting Numerical Force Disadvantages:
- Improving the efficiency of force employment (i.e.,
supporting the theater commander's warfighting intelligence
needs).
- Deterrence--defense planning and management.
- Weapons systems design and acquisition.
- The kinds of potential intelligence contributions having force
multiplier effects including 1&W.
? Illustrative Situations for which the Principles Apply.
- For the various levels of warfare from contingency operations to
strategic nuclear war.
- For the various warfare theater (e.g, EUCOM, PACOM, etc.) and
operational environments.
- As applied to general purpose around. air, and naval forces
and to strategic forces.
? Intelligence Requirements/Needs of the Various Military Forces.
- Perspectives of the C1NCs of the various unified and specified
commands and of other military leaders.
The Theater Intelligence Architecture Program of the OSD/D1A.
- The Allied Command Operational Intelligence Requirements (AOIRs).
- The Defense-wide Intelligence Plan (D-W1P) for supporting
warfighting capabilities.
? Contributions of Intelligence for Satisfying Requirements.
- Assets controlled by the military forces--general assessment.
- Tactical intelligence programs of the individual military
services (TIARA).
- Intelligence processing facilities in the various
theater/unified and specified commands.
- NFIP resources and programs:
-- Collection (all sources.)
-- Analysis and production.
SEAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750015-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750015-6
SECRET
-- Dissemination and other matters pertaining to the availability
of and access to intelligence (the roles of the Senior Executive
Planning Committee, the TENCAP organizations of the services,
and the NF1P/TIARA Review Board).
-- Special issue: The availability of communications for
intelligence support.
9 Narrowing Gaps and Recommendations.
- Concerning improvements in the contributions of NFIP
resources and programs.
-- By the various intelligence oisciuline-~
-- Organizational arrangements.
9
Co
ncerning appropriate ways to reflect the findings of the study in
th
e generation of the NFIP budget.
IV. ADMINISTRATION
A. This study will be conducted by a task force consisting of selected
intelligence Community representatives. its Chairman will be responsible for
conducting the study and ensuring that the report is submitted to the
Executive Secretary, CIPC, by the end of July so that the study may be
reviewed at the August meeting of the CIPC.
Chairman, Critical intelligence Problems Committee
Chairman, Critical intelligence Problems Committee Date
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750015-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750015-6
SECRET
SUBJECT: CIPC Study of Intelligence as a Force Multiplier
Distribution: DCI/ICS 86-3728 w/attachment
1 - CIPC/Subj (orig)
1 - Ea. Mbr/CIPC
1 - D/ICS
1 - DD/ICS Chrono
1 - VC/CIPC
1 - ES/CIPC
1 -=CIPC
1 - CIPC/Chrono
1 - ICS Registry
1 - Chmm/COMIREX
1 - Chmm/SIGINT
1 - Chmm/HUMINT
1 - D/PPS
1 - D/PBS
1 - Chmm/IHC & FIPC
1 - VC/NIC (H. Ford)
DCI/ICS/CIPC (15 Apr '86)
retyped/24Apr/gr
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/01: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000400750015-6