SECURITY CONTROLS ON THE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01354R000100170012-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 20, 2009
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 7, 1984
• Content Type: REGULATION

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE '
SECURITY CONTROLS ON THE DISSEMINATION OF
INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (U)
(Effective 7 January 1984)
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Ex-
ecutive Order 12333, Executive Order 12356, and implementing directives thereto;
policies, controls, and procedures for the dissemination and use of intelligence
information and related materials are herewith established.
1. Purvose
This directive establishes policies, controls, and procedures for the dissemination
and use of intelligence to ensure that, while facilitating its interchange for intelligence
purposes, it will be adequately protected. This directive amplifies applicable portions
of the 23 June 1982 Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Directive No. 1
which implements Executive Order 12356. Additional controls are established on the
dissemination of intelligence to foreign governments and to foreign nationals and
immigrant aliens, including those employed by the U.S. Government. Policy and
procedures governing the release of intelligence to contractors and consultants are set
forth in Part II of this directive. As this directive prescribes security controls on the use
and dissemination of intelligence information, it bears the overall classification of
CONFIDENTIAL in the aggregate. Selected paragraphs may be excerpted for use at
the unclassified (Official Use Only) level by Senior Officials of the Intelligence
Community (SOICs), their designees, or security officers of Community organizations
when considered appropriate.
2. Definitions
a. Intelligence information and related materials (hereinafter referred to as
intelligence) includes the following classified information:
- foreign intelligence and counterintelligence as defined in Executive
Order 12333;
- information describing U.S. foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
activities, sources, methods, equipment, or methodology used for the
acquisition, processing, or exploitation of such intelligence; foreign
military hardware obtained for exploitation; and photography or record-
ings resulting from U.S. intelligence collection efforts; and
- information on Intelligence Community protective security programs
(e.g., personnel, physical, technical, and information security).
b. "Need-to-know" is the determination by an authorized holder of classified
information that access to specific intelligence in his/her possession is
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required by another person to perform a specific and authorized function to carry out
a national security task. Such persons must possess an appropriate security clearance
and access approvals.
3. General Applicability
a. The controls and procedures established by this directive shall be applied
uniformly in the dissemination and use of intelligence originated by all
Intelligence Community components.
b. The substance of this directive shall be promulgated by each Intelligence
Community component, and appropriate procedures permitting prompt
interagency consultation will be established and promulgated. To this end,
each Intelligence Community component will designate a primary referent.
4. Use By and Dissemination Among U.S. Intelligence Community Components
Executive Order 12356 provides that classified information originating in one
U.S. agency shall not be disseminated beyond any recipient agency without the
consent of the originating agency. However, to facilitate use and dissemination of
intelligence within and among Intelligence Community components and to provide
for the provision of intelligence to consumers, the following controlled relief to the
"third agency rule" is hereby established:
- Each Intelligence Community component consents to the use of its intelli-
gence in intelligence products of other components and to the dissemination
of those products within the Intelligence Community, except as specifically
restricted by this directive.
5. Use By and Dissemination to U.S. Components Outside the Intelligence
Community
a. Classified intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings,
will not be released in its original form to U.S. components outside the
Intelligence Community without the consent of the originator.
b. Any component disseminating intelligence beyond the Intelligence Commu-
nity assumes responsibility for ensuring that recipient organizations agree to
observe the restrictions prescribed by this directive and to maintain
adequate safeguards.
6. Dissemination to Foreign Nationals or Contractors
a. Intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings, will not be
released to foreign nationals or immigrant aliens (including those employed
by, used by, or integrated into the U.S. Government) without the permission
of the originator.
b. Release of intelligence to a foreign contractor or company under contract to
the U.S. Government will be made according to the provisions of paragraph
7 below through the government under which the foreign contractor or
company operates. Direct release from the U.S. Government to a foreign
company or contractor is prohibited.
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7. Dissemination to Foreign Governments
a. Intelligence, even though it bears no restrictive control markings, will not be
released in its original form to foreign governments without the permission
of the originator.
b. Information contained in intelligence of another Intelligence Community
component, which bears no restrictive control markings, may be used by
recipient Intelligence Community components in reports provided to
foreign governments provided that:
- no reference is made to the source documents on which the released
product is based;
- the information is extracted or paraphrased to ensure that the source or
manner of acquisition of the intelligence is not revealed or cannot be
deduced in any manner;
- foreign release is made through established foreign disclosure channels
and procedures as set forth in the DCI Directive on Intelligence
Disclosure Policy.
c. RESTRICTED DATA and FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA are prohib-
ited from foreign dissemination under the provisions of Sections 123 and 144
of Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
8. Authorized Control Markings and Their Use
a. "WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS IN-
VOLVED" (WNINTEL)
- This marking is used to identify classified intelligence whose sensitivity
requires constraints on its further dissemination and use. This marking
may be used only on intelligence which identifies or would reasonably
permit identification of an intelligence source or method which is
susceptible to countermeasures that could nullify or reduce its
effectiveness.
- Classified intelligence so marked shall not be disseminated in any
manner outside authorized channels 2 without the permission of the
originating agency and an assessment by the SOIC in the disseminating
agency as to the potential risks to the national security and to the
intelligence sources or methods involved. In making such assessment,
consideration should be given to reducing the risk to the intelligence
sources or methods which provided the intelligence by sanitizing or
paraphrasing the information so as to permit its wider dissemination. To
avoid confusion as to the extent of dissemination and use restrictions
governing the information involved, this marking may not be used in
conjunction with special access or Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) controls. This marking may be abbreviated as "WNINTEL" or as
..WN."
' Unless otherwise specified by the Director of Central Intelligence in consultation with the National
Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) or as agreed to between originating and recipient agencies, authorized
channels are the Intelligence Community, as defined in Executive Order 12333, and Intelligence
Community contractors and consultants and officials of agencies represented on the NFIB as determined on
a "need-to-know" basis by recipient SOICs.
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b. "DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CON-
TROLLED BY ORIGINATOR" (ORCON)
- This marking is used to enable continuing knowledge and supervision by
the originator of the use made of intelligence. This marking may be used
only on classified intelligence which clearly identifies or would reason-
ably permit ready identification of an intelligence source or method
which is particularly susceptible to countermeasures that would nullify
or measurably reduce its effectiveness. This marking may not be used
when an item of information will reasonably be protected by use of any
other markings specified herein, or by the application of the "need-to-
know" principle and the safeguarding procedures of the security
classification system.
- Information bearing this marking may not be disseminated in whole or
in part through briefings, incorporation into reports, or in any other
manner outside the headquarters elements' of the recipient organiza-
tions, or used in taking investigative action, without the advance
permission of, and under conditions specified by, the originator. As this
is the most restrictive marking herein, agencies will establish procedures
to ensure that it is only applied to particularly sensitive intelligence and
that timely procedures are established to review requests for further
dissemination of intelligence bearing this marking. This marking may be
abbreviated as "ORCON" or as "OC."
c. "NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS" (NO
CONTRACT)
- This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that shall not be
released to contractors or consultants (hereinafter "contractors") without
the permission of the originating agency. This marking may be used only
on intelligence which, if disclosed to a contractor, would actually or
potentially give him a competitive advantage which could reasonably be
expected to cause a conflict of interest with his obligation to protect the
information; or which was provided by a source on the express or
implied condition that it would not be made available to contractors.
These restrictions do not apply to consultants hired under Office of
Personnel Management procedures, or comparable procedures derived
from statutory authorities of department or agency heads, and who are
considered to serve as extensions of their employing offices. This
marking may be abbreviated as "NOCONTRACT" or as "NC."
d. "CAUTION-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED" (PROPIN)
- This marking is used, with or without a security classification, to identify
information provided by a commercial firm or private source under an
express or implied understanding that the information will be protected
as a trade secret or proprietary data believed to have actual or potential
value. Information bearing this marking shall not be disseminated in any
form to an individual, organization, or foreign government which has
any interests, actual or potential, in competition with the source of the
information without the permission of the originator. This marking may
' At the discretion of the originator, the term "headquarters elements" may include specified subordinate
intelligence-producing components.
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be used in conjunction with the "NOCONTRACT" marking to preclude
dissemination to any contractor. This marking may be abbreviated as
"PROPIN" or as "PR."
e. "NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (NOFORN)
- This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that may not be
released in any form to -foreign governments, foreign nationals, or non-
U.S. citizens without permission of the originator. This marking may be
used on intelligence which if released to a foreign government or
national(s) could jeopardize intelligence sources or methods, or when it
would not be in the best interests of the United States to release the in-
formation from a policy standpoint upon specific determination by a
SOIC. SOICs are responsible for developing, publishing, and maintain-
ing guidelines consistent with the policy guidance herein for use in
determining the foreign releasability of intelligence they collect or
produce. These guidelines shall be used in assigning NOFORN control
markings, and by primary referents (paragraph 3.b. above applies) in
responding to inquiries from other organizations on application of this
control. This marking may be abbreviated "NOFORN" or as "NF."
f. "AUTHORIZED FOR RELEASE TO (name of country(ies)/international
organization)" (REL)
- This marking is used to identify classified intelligence that an originator
has predetermined to be releasable or has released, through established
foreign disclosure procedures and channels, to the foreign country(ie-
s)/international organization indicated. No other foreign dissemination
of the material is authorized (in any form) without the permission of the
originator. This marking may be abbreviated "REL (abbreviated name
of country(ies)/international organization)." In the case of intelligence
controlled under DCID 6/2, authorized distribution indicators, pub-
lished separately, may be used instead of the "REL" control marking.
9. Procedures Governing Use of Control Markings
a. Any recipient desiring to use intelligence in a manner contrary to the
restrictions established by this directive shall obtain the advance permission
of the originating agency. Such permission applies only to the specific
purpose agreed to by the originator and does not automatically apply to all
recipients.
Originators will ensure that prompt consideration is given to recipients' requests
with particular attention to reviewing and editing, if necessary, sanitized or para-
phrased versions to derive a text suitable for release subject to lesser or no control
markings.
b. The control markings authorized above shall be shown on the title page,
front cover, and other applicable pages of documents, incorporated in the
text of electrical communications, shown on graphics, and associated (in full
or abbreviated form) with data stored or processed in automated data
processing systems. The control markings also shall be indicated by
parenthetical use of the marking abbreviations at the beginning or end of
the appropriate portions. If the control markings apply to several or all
portions, the document may be marked with a statement to this effect
rather than marking each portion individually.
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c. The control markings in paragraph 8 shall be individually assigned at the
time of preparation of intelligence products and used in conjunction with
security classifications and other markings specified by Executive Order
12356 and its implementing ISOO Directive. The markings shall be carried
forward to any new format in which the same information is incorporated,
including oral and visual presentations.
10. Obsolete Restrictions and Markings
The following markings are obsolete and will not be used subsequent to the date
of this directive: WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS INVOLVED, CONTROLLED DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGEN-
CIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CON-
TROL, NO DISSEM ABROAD, BACKGROUND USE ONLY, NO FOREIGN
DISSEM, USIB ONLY, and NFIB ONLY. Questions with respect to the current
application of control markings authorized by earlier directives on the dissemination
and control of intelligence and used on documents issued prior to the date of this di-
rective should be referred to the originating agency or department.
11. Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures
Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in
unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intelligence of another shall be reported
to the Director of Central Intelligence through the DCI Security Committee.
12. Policy and Procedures Governing the Release of Intelligence to Contractors
and Consultants
a. Intelligence Community components may release * selected intelligence 5 to
contractors and consultants (hereinafter "contractors" 6) without referral to
the originating components provided that:
1) Release is made only to private individuals or organizations certified by
the SOIC (or his/her designee) of the sponsoring organization as being
under contract to the United States Government for the purpose of
performing classified services in support of a national security mission;
and as having a demonstrated "need-to-know" and an appropriate
security clearance or access approval. If retention of intelligence by the
contractor is required, the contractor must have an approved storage
facility.
Release is the authorized visual, and, or physical disclosure of intelligence.
8 The term "selected intelligence" excludes Foreign Service reports and SCI. Foreign Service reports may be
released only with the permission of the Department of State. Release of SCI is governed by agreements and
advisements between Intelligence Community components.
Non-Intelligence Community government components under contract to fulfill an intelligence support role
may be treated as members of the Intelligence Community. In that event, release will be solely for the spe-
cific purpose and will not include authority to disseminate intelligence further. Government-owned,
contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories performing classified services in support of the intelligence
mission of an Intelligence Community component, and which are designated as authorized channels by an
SOIC or his/her designee, are not considered as contractors subject to the provisions of this directive.
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2) The SOIC of the sponsoring agency, or his/her designee, is responsible
for ensuring that releases to contractors are made pursuant to this
policy statement and through established channels.
3) The sponsoring agency maintains a record of material released.
4) Contractors maintain such records as will permit them to account for all
intelligence received, disposed of or destroyed, produced and held by
them for the duration of the contract, and to permit identification of all
persons who have had access to intelligence in their custody.
5) Contractors do not reproduce any intelligence without the permission of
the sponsoring agency, and classify, control and account for reproduced
copies in the same manner as for originals.
6) Contractors destroy intelligence only according to guidelines and by
standards set by the sponsoring agency.
7) Contractors make provisions to ensure that intelligence in their custody
is not released to foreign nationals, whether or not they are employees
or contractors themselves, except with the permission of the originating
agency through the sponsoring agency, and then released through
established channels.
8) Contractors receiving intelligence do not release it: to any of their
components or employees not directly engaged in providing services
under the contract; or to any other contractor (including subcontrac-
tors), without the consent of the sponsoring agency (which shall verify
that any second contractors satisfy all security requirements herein).
9) Any SCI released to contractors is controlled pursuant to the provisions
of DCI "Security Policy for Sensitive Compartmented Information",
effective 28 June 1982.
(10) Contractors agree that all intelligence released to them, all reproduc-
tions thereof, and all other material they may generate based on or
incorporating data therefrom (including authorized reproductions),
remain the property of the US Government and will be returned upon
request of the sponsoring agency or expiration of the contract, whichev-
er comes first.
(11) Sponsoring agencies arrange for and contractors agree that, upon
expiration of contracts, all released intelligence, all reproductions
thereof, and all other materials based on or incorporating data there-
from, are returned to the sponsoring agency; or all or a specified part of
such items are retained by the contractor under all applicable security
and accountability controls when the contractor has a specific need for
such retention that is validated by the sponsoring agency.
(12) Sponsoring agencies delete: the CIA seal, the phrase "Directorate of
Operations," the place acquired, the field number, the source descrip-
tion, and field dissemination, from all CIA Directorate of Operations
reports passed to contractors, unless prior approval to do otherwise is
obtained from CIA.
b. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), Special National Intelligence Esti-
mates (SNIEs), National Intelligence Analytical Memoranda and Interagen-
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cy Intelligence Memoranda will not be released to contractors. Such
materials shall be marked NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/
CONSULTANTS. However, information in them may be made available to
contractors, without identification as national intelligence, by the SOIC of
the agency authorizing its release.
c. Intelligence which by reason of sensitivity of content bears control markings
"CAUTION-PROPRIETARY INFORMATION INVOLVED," "NOT
RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS," or "DISSEMI-
NATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY
ORIGINATOR," as specified in Part I of this directive, will not be released
to contractors unless special permission has been obtained from the
originator.
d. Intelligence Community security policy requires that the government
maintain control over sensitive intelligence and release to contractors only
that information required to perform tasks beyond the capability of the
government. The DCI has determined that there are significant risks to
national security in contracting out support services or functions such as
operation of telecommunications centers, automated data systems or other
facilities when this permits broad contractor access to all-source or other
sensitive intelligence information. Accordingly, Intelligence Community
departments and agencies are cautioned fully to consider the consequences
of contracting out these services pursuant to Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-76, or similar guidance, in cases where the government's
control of sensitive intelligence would be substantially diminished or where
contractor access to such data would be unnecessarily expanded.
13. Interpretation
Questions concerning the implementation of this policy and these procedures
shall be referred to the DCI Security Committee.
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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