COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SECURITY COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01354R000400550010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 27, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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IBSEC-CSS-M-18
27 January 1970
COMPUTER SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE
Minutes of Meeting
Held at CIA Headquarters
Langley, Virginia
27 January 1970
1. The eighteenth meeting of the Computer Security Sub-
committee was held on 27 January 1970 between 1330 and 1600
hours in Room 4E-64, CIA Headquarters. In attendance were:
Mr Ric-hard Kitterma-n State Member
Mr. Thomas A .Eccleston, Army Member
Mr. Robert B. Cameron, Navy Member
Mr William S Donaldson Air Force Alterrate
Mr. Raymond J. Brady, AEC Member
Mr. Donald R. Roderick, FBI Member
Mr. Alexander S. Chodakowski, State
Mr. Conrad S. Banner, FBI
2. The security level of the meeting was announced as Top
Secret COMINT.
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Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
SECRET declassification
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3. Approval of Minutes: The minutes of the 13 January 1970
meeting were approved without amendment.
4. Security Labeling Standards: The Chairman reported
that a meeting had been held on 20 January of those involved in the
security labeling standards project. Copies of the Task Team's
report of this meeting, prepared by were distributed STAT
to members. The results of the 20 January meeting reflected
agreement to defer decision of the question raised by DIA as to
whether illegal security and dissemination "flags" should be included
in the Subcommittee's product of this effort. In the collection phase
of the project, a necessity was recognized for including all classifi-
cation and dissemination caveats utilized in the Community with the
exception of those limited to use within an individual agency. The
Task Team's meeting also reflected an approach to the collection
and compilation task.
5. The Chairman outlined this approach in requesting all
Subcommittee members to compile a listing of dissemination con-
trols and distribution indicators utilized within their separate
organizations. It was suggested that the Service representatives
coordinate their submissions with the DIA member.
6. It was agreed that the NSA member would compile and
provide the dissemination indicators utilized for COMINT,, sen'sitive
SIGINT, and cryptographic material. The Chairman will input the
control caveats utilized for TK and B material. The AEC member
was requested to furnish those applying to Restricted Data and other
AEC controlled material.
7. In discussion that followed the---Chairman suggested that
each agency submission not only list the caveats but also briefly
identify their meaning. Concerning specially controlled material,
the caveats should be annotated with reference to their classification.
Included in the listings would be any dissemination indicators or
special control systems not previously discussed at the Task Team
or Subcommittee level, including special indicators for SEATO,
NATO, etc.
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8. In developing agency submissions, the following guidelines
were provided:
A. Exclude indicators peculiar to a single agency,
as material bearing such indicators is not
disseminated outside of that agency;
B. Include a brief definition for each indicator;
C. Show what "'clearances" are required for access
to material bearing each caveat;
D. Include synonyms used for indicators, where
applicable;
E. Emphasize that the Subcommittee is not studying
the problem of illegal caveats, but merely
attemptinggto develop standards for the trans-
lation of security "flags" used in the Community.
Members were requested to submit their replies on this project to
the Chairman on or before 24 February.
9. Incidental to the above discussion, members were furnished
a copy of IBSEC-PR./45 dated 16 January 1970, a joint memorandum
for all Security Committee and IHC members outlining the approach
being taken with reference to the problem of standards for security
classification and dissemination control indicators in Community data
bases.
10. Training Course Task Team: Mr. Cameron reported that
this Task Team had not met since the previous Computer Security Sub-
committee meeting; he advised that a meeting was planned before 6
February. The Army clarified the earlier report from the Army
Security Committee member with reference to Army participation
in a DoD Computer Security Course. Mr. Eccleston indicated that
the Department of Army is not participating in the developin4nt of
such a course, but along with other Service representatives had been
solicited for comments concerning the security training requirements
involved in the implementation of the National Military Command
Center. No dltplication of effort with Computer Security Subcommittee
plans to develop a computer security training course is indicated.
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11. Multilevel Operations: The Chairman again reminded
the Army and Navy members that he had not yet received their
submissions for the proposed Subcommittee consolidated report on
key protection features useable in multilevel systems. The Navy
representative submitted an interim response at the instant meeting
indicating that a survey of Naval commands is in process, but not
yet completed with respect to this project.
12. The Chairman also reported that he had been invited to
a meeting scheduled for 11 February of the COINS Software Security
Panel which was scheduled to discuss a proposal for addressing the
"need-to-know" problem in the operation of that network.
13. To permit the basis for later discussion, during the
instant meeting the Chairman presented some thoughts concerning
basic requirements for the operation of a multilevel computer system.
He opened these remarks with the personal comment that there
appeared to be hope for permitting the operation of a time sharing
computer system in a multilevel security environment provided that
this environment was "benign". In this context, a "benign" environ-
ment was defined as one where all personnel having access to the
time sharing system would hold Top Secret security clearances, and
the compartmentation problem for the multilevel operation was limited
to one of compartmentation of specially controlled groups of data. A
classic example of such an operation would be a system storing and
processing collateral and compartmented intelligence data in which
all personnel would hold Top Secret clearances, but not all would
have access approvals for the compartmented material.
14. Recognizing the problem as one of compartmentation,
the Chairman expressed his thinking that a few basic security factors
built into the operation of such a system might suffice to provide an
adequate assurance that compartmentation could be controlled by the
system itself. For discussion purposes, he proposed four basic tools
for controlling this compartmentation:
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A. A software based user identification and authenti-
cation routine, in which each user would have a
unique authentication code, and by which a user
would be identified as being authorized for general
or limited system access and his identity authenti-
cated;
B. Keyword protection of files by which a capability
would exist to limit access to designated files to
those persons knowing a specific password, which
would be changed periodically;
C. Basic physical security and access control procedures
to protect the computer center itself and its remotely
located terminals as well as interconnecting links;
D. A working audit trail capability which would generate
a system log of all queries to the system, identify-
ing the user, the terminal involved, the time, the
files accessed, any incorrect or invalid query
attempts, etc.; this log would have to be reviewed
regularly both by the individual assigned the respon-
sibility for system security and by (in part) the moni-
tor of each terminal location, as a check to insure?
against unauthorized terminal access.
15. The Chairman emphasized that the four, features outlined
above were not meant to be comprehensive but rather basic require-
ments under which a given system could be approved to operate at
different security levels in a "benign" environment. Discussion that
followed recognized additional features, some of which might be con-
sidered as mandatory for multilevel operations, including read and/or
write protection, automatic log off procedures, etc.
16. No prolonged discussion on this topic was had at the instant
meeting. Nevertheless members were requested to give thought both
to the problem and to the specific concepts outlined, since the Sub-
committee will be addressing the overall multilevel problem in con-
siderable detail in the months ahead.
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,
17. Computer Security Threat Analysis: The Chairman
referenced the discussion at the 19 January 1970 Security-JCommittee
meeting predicated on the request of the Army member that it would
be appropriate to analyze and evaluate the threat posed by the
vulnerabilities of Community computer operations. The Security
Committee discussion of this issue reflected agreement that the
CI Staff of CIA be tasked to report any known cases where opposition
Services had attempted to exploit the vulnerabilities of computer
operations for intelligence purposes; in addition the Subcommittee
was tasked to study and report on the postulated threat in the computer
environment.
18. The Subcommittee Army member clarified the earlier
request presented to the Security Committee, indicating the Army's
desire to limit this threat analysis to the CI Staff action noted above.
Subcommittee members unanimously agreed that a study of the
postulated threat posed by the Community's use of modern computing
equipment was superfluous, since this threat is already well defined
and recognized both in the Security Community, the ADP technical
environment, and by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board.
19. The Chairman announced that he had already initiated
action requesting information on known computer espionage cases
from the CI Staff of CIA. Members were requested to solicit the
same type of information from appropriate components of their own
organizations and to submit reports to the Chairman on or before
the 9 February Subcommittee meeting. It is anticipated that a con-
solidated report will be prepared for submission to the Security
Committee at its 16 February meeting.
20. Other Business:
A. Security Evaluation of Community Systems: The
Chairman introduced the necessity for the Sub-
committee's eventual consideration of the problem
Of evaluating the security protection features of
modern computer systems. He outlined the need
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for system evaluation in quantitative terms as a
basis for system security certification. Such
evaluation addresses the effectiveness of
security features in the hardware, software,
and basic physical and procedural security
aspects of system operations. As an intro-
duction to this topic, the Chairman announced
his plan to have a representative of CIA's
Office of Research and Development brief the
Subcommittee at a future meeting on a recently
completed contract to assess the security of the
hardware of a specific IBM system;
B. Change in Meeting Time: At the request of the
NSA and AEC members and with the unanimous
agreement of the Subcommittee, the time of
future Subcommittee meetings was changed to
Mondays at 0930 hours.
21. The next Subcommittee meeting was scheduled for 0930
hours on 9 February 1970.
C,hairman
Computer Security Subcommittee
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