CAPITOL HILL SECURITY TASK FORCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01356R000200320003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 6, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP89BO1356R000200320003-0
/-j-!C4-Q
6 November 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
CC M
SUBJECT: Capitol Hill Security Task Force
with the following persons in attendance:
1. On this date, the first meeting of the identified subject group took
place 1000-1100 hours in the CCISCMO Conference Room. presided
Steve Slaughter
Do E
CIA
CIA
OSD
FBI
CCISCMO
CCISCMO
Dan Jacobsen
Gene Walsh
25X1
25X1
Absent were participants from ISOO and NSA. IS00 has identified Ms. Ethel
Theis as their representative to handle Information Security. NSA has not yet
identified their participant(s) who will handle COMPUSEC and COMSEC.
is working with NSA on the latter.
2. provided the attendees with a summary of the background leading
to the meeting and current planning. He then outlined how he intended to
approach the tasks. He said he would himself compose a draft "security
manual" for the use of the House of Representatives generally, drawing to the
degree and as appropriate from some other works produced by persons who had
25X1 similarly looked at the Senate With respect to
the attendees, he expected them to handle the specific disciplines assigned in
25X1 outline of the survey, cryptically represented was given as follows:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP89BO1356R000200320003-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000200320003-0
SUBJECT: Capitol Hill Security Task Force
1. General Security Environment.
Written procedures and rules in existence ?
Penalties for non-compliance ?
Official and popular attitudes relative to security
Oversight and/or monitoring provided for ?; in practice ?
2. The Threat
Potential
Perceived
Actual
Countermeasures
3. Organization
Intra-relationships - Relative to classified activities, info handling
Inter-relationships - Relative to classified activities, info handling
4. Classified Information
Handling - receipt, transmittal, storage, destruction
collateral; SCI (limited)
5. Physical Security
Access control
Guards/Security Officers
Safes
Alarms, etc.
6. TSCM/Tempest no expanded topical
coverage due to absence
7. Computer Security of NSA personnel
8. Conclusions
25X1
25X1
25X1
9. Recommendations
3. then asked attendees to alert their principal officers in the
IG/CM( o e tasking. Whenever the request for the Armed Services
Committee survey comes in and is approved, 0 anticipated the job could be
completed in three weeks from conduct of survey to production of report. He
explained that participants would go separately to the Committee to keep a low
profile and to avoid disrupting office business. 0 said he would accompany
each person, at least on their first visit. He thought two or three visits by
each per mi ht be sufficient to gather the information necessary for their
report. explained that he would speak to the IG/CM(P) members
assemble at t eir next meeting on 10 November and would reiterate the need to
have the designated persons released b their principals for the irregular
specified periods to do this job. asked each participant to think
about how they are going to conduct the survey, what questions they would ask
and specifically how they would organize their respective portions of the
survey. He said he was not imposing a deadline but he hoped participants
would have their approach outlined in writing by the end of next week (13
November).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP89B01356R000200320003-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP89BO1356R000200320003-0
SUBJECT: Capitol Hill Security Task Force
25X1
25X1 4. Attendees provided their office telephone numbers which were given to
25X1 and they all have his. Aft rou departed with the understanding
they would be contacted in a week, and myself talked too
unavoidably in the presence of Dan Jacobsen SD). We expressed our
25X1 apprehension about Steve Slaughter named by DoE for the physical
security aspects of the tasking. remarked that he was a personal and
~'~~^
professional friend of Gene Bacher of DoE^and^he might be able to
25X1 needed him or, if Slaughter was too heavily burdened, then another
physical security specialist from DoE should be supplied. Slaughter has no
hack-uo in his job at DoE and is known to be overworked and has difficulty
attending other meetings to which he is committed.
5. Regarding the letter from the House Armed Services Committee which is
needed before the security survey can be conducted, we offered to make contact
25X1
with the Committee counsel, Mr. Hogan. 0 prefers to wait until he
addresses the IG/CM(P) and then he will likely contact Tom Latimer and tell
him the IG/CM(P) members have been apprised of the effort. Nothing firm is
25X1 established now but will likely call for another meeting on 13 November
or or early the following wee to review bidding and the task force members'
outlines of their approach to the survey.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP89BO1356R000200320003-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP89BO1356R000200320003-0
SUBJECT: Capitol Hill Security Task Force
CCISCMO/ICS
Original - Subject file
1 ~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP89BO1356R000200320003-0