USSR INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000100030026-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: December 24, 1980
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24 :CIA-RDP89G00720R000100030026-9
CASEY BRIEFING INPUT
24 December 1980
R. Gates
USSR Intelligence Issues.
1. Representatives of all intelligence agencies met under the auspices of
the NIO/USSR on 17 December to discuss possible "tests" of the new Administration
by the Soviet Union. The Community representatives unanimously agreed that the
Soviets almost certainly will not confront the Administration with a test of strength --
such as an aggressive military move in the Third World -- or will in its early days.
Indeed, the Group expressed the view that the Soviet leaders will try to avoid such
provocations at the outset of the Administration.
2. The Community representatives also agreed, however, that the Soviets would
be "testing" the new Administration in other, subtle diplomatic ways. For
example, we expect the Soviets to consider the Administration's initial moves on
SALT, trade, and the grain embargo as important "tests" of future intentions and
policy -- and such early moves will thus have considerable weight in terms of
Soviet perceptions of the new Administration.
3. In terms of diplomatic initiatives, reporting to date suggests that the
Soviets will wait for the new President to make the first move.
Current Crises.
1. Poland: The Soviets are militarily prepared to intervene on short notice.
However, the internal situation has remained relatively calm for nearly a month
and, in the absence of a serious provocation by Solidarity (and further concessions
by Kania), we would not expect a Soviet military move into Poland. The situation
in the country remains very unstable, though, and any of several events -- food
riots, new strikes, interference with lines of communication, further disintegration
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SECRET
of party control or unity, etc. -- could trigger coercive measures.
2. Afghanistan: No significant change in Soviet policy toward Afghanistan
or their military campaign there is anticipated between now and spring.
3. Iran-Iraq War: The Soviets are seeking to shore up their position with Iraq
after several weeks of leaning toward Iran. They still will try to maintain a
balancing act between the two as the war drags on -- probably satisfying neither and
antagonizing both. A Soviet diplomatic initiative to mediate and end the fighting
is possible, but Moscow's standing in both Baghdad and Teheran is such that the
effort would almost certain fail.
4. Middle East: We believe the Soviets have tried to tamp down the tension
between Syria and Lebanon. While the USSR will not cooperate in US efforts to keep
or restore ceasefires, their own equities with the Syrians and PLO -- as well
their desire to avoid conflict between Syria and Israel -- will prompt them to act
independently (and in ways to maximize their own influence) to keep the lid on
in the eastern Mediterranean.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24 :CIA-RDP89G00720R000100030026-9
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24 :CIA-RDP89G00720R000100030026-9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/24 :CIA-RDP89G00720R000100030026-9