NITZE REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000100050007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 7, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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7 December 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Robert M. Gates
SUBJECT : Nitze Report
1. Attached is Paul Nitze's final report on Soviet perceptions of the
ability of their strategic forces to carry out their missions. It is an
interesting report, but one which is primarily quantitative and couched in
terms more congenial to the systems analyst than to the specialist on Soviet
affairs. At the outset, we agreed this project would pay for itself if it only
identified key gaps in our knowledge. It has done that and more.
2. That said, there still are substantial problems in the analysis. I
find myself, for example, in general agreement with NFAC's comments (which I
also have attached to this memo) and would make the additional points:
Beyond the stated assumptions of the authors, there is a
Team B mindset at work in the study that is not supported
by the numbers or evidence and the implications of which
are important. For example, on page 10, the report states
"The strategic superiority now enjoyed by the USSR is condi-
tional, not absolute." There are many who would argue that
in a report purportedly reflecting Soviet perceptions it is
not consistent with the evidence to allege that the Soviets
have "strategic superiority," even conditional. Indeed, one
could argue that from the Soviet standpoint, combining the
military forces (strategic or conventional) of all of the
USSR's enemies would confront the Soviet Union with a fairly
daunting prospect (especially since the Soviets, as the
report itself states, consider a broader range of capabilities
as strategic than do we and also do not differentiate between,e.9.,
the US, UK and France). Nevertheless, this mindset to the
problem tends to run throughout the report and probably skews
the outcome of the analysis even more in the Soviet's favor.
The question of the U.S. role, will and capabilities in Soviet
calculations is too often minimized. For example, on page 15,
the report states "Soviet military strength generally, and
particularly power projection capabilities, have permitted the
Soviet Union to engage itself in various Third-World areas...
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with little or no effective U. S. opposition." I would argue
that Soviet expansionism in the Third World since 1975 owes
less to growing Soviet military strength than to U. S. inaction
following our disastrous experience in Vietnam--a view their
activism in the early 60s in the Third World tends to substantiate.
Improvements in certain areas of Soviet military, such as airlift
and the navy, have facilitated their growing role in the Third
World but have not been responsible for it.
-- I have some problems with their use of evidence. For example
Perhaps more importantly is the reliance
in discussing Soviet military doctrine and policy on Soviet
writings in open literature and in some classified military
journals. I would argue that this literature gives us a great
deal of information about Soviet military science but does not
provide a great deal of insight into Soviet military policy--
that is, the views on these matters of the Soviet Union's most
senior political officials. While the writings on military
science, combined with exercise information and other sources,
are about all we have and must be used, we should be wary about
making a "leap of faith" that what we read in these writings
also is an accurate reflection of views held by Brezhnev,
Kirilenko, Tikhonov, and Ustinov. That would be like saying
that SAC exercises and the views of professors/students at the
National War College accurately convey the views of Ronald Reagan,
Weinberger, Haig and Casey. We need to keep our perspective.
Another example of an unsubstantiated presumption is found on
page 17, where it is stated "Assuming that the Soviets can
enforce a relatively quick, even if bloody, termination of the
Polish crisis, one can predict the patterns of behavior that
the Soviets are likely to follow in the 1980s." I would contend
that one cannot at all make that kind of an assumption, particularly
to the extent that it flies in the face of the experience of the
last year. Nevertheless, a view of how the Soviets conduct their
national security affairs, including the attitudes they bring to
questions of nuclear war, are premised in substantial ways in
this report on such assumptions.
Insufficient prominence is given to conclusions in the report
which have a critical bearing on understanding the quantitative
assessments that are made. To wit, the paper acknowledges on
page 50 that there are "important areas for which we have no
tangible appreciation of the Soviet understanding of U. S.
posture. These areas are critical inputs into any nuclear
exchange simulations...." One might include among these areas
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their likely poor understanding of how the U. S. political leader-
ship would respond in the scenarios set forth. The Soviets have
acknowledged on countless occasions how this country and its
leaders continue to baffle them. I believe this uncertainty
would weigh heavily in their calculations and in how they might
plan for nuclear conflict.
3. Despite important shortcomings, some of which are noted above, this
report is very worthwhile. It does present some new insights; it does represent
a different way of looking at the strategic equation, particularly from the Soviet
standpoint, and in these terms is successful; and, perhaps most importantly, it
identifies specific gaps in our intelligence to which both analysts and collectors
can now turn high priority attention. The Nitze project was an experiment, and
while it may have serious substantive flaws, as an experimental effort it makes
a useful contribution.
Robert Gates
SECRET
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