ANTICIPATORY/SPECULATIVE PAPERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000100050030-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2011
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: November 3, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

7 5 Zr
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/25: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100050030-2
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM : NIO/USSR-EE
SUBJECT : Anticipatory/Speculative Papers
1. I endorse the idea of anticipatory papers prepared by the NIC or as
Interagency Intelligence Memoranda. I believe it would be a mistake, however,
to heap the NIC plate with three or four or five of these from each NIO and to
put them into some sort of formal listing. The only way papers such as these
will get done is by doing them one at a time and spaced over a period of time.
The danger with a large list that gets any circulation at all is that it takes
on the character of a major production program which, to eyes outside of NIC,
combined with the NIC's own special project program and the program of estimates
and SNIEs that have already been formalized, is that the NIC's reach will appear
to have exceeded its grasp. Moreover, it will suggest to the rest of the Com-
munity that we are shifting the basic focus of work by the NIC to a much more
speculative genre in which, in many cases, we will be asking the Community to
sign up--and my guess is their enthusiasm will be very limited. In short, I
see this exercise in preparing lists for you to be a private, internal NIC under-
taking to give you an idea of what is possible. You can use these lists in
working with the NIOs to get them started on one or another sooner rather than later.
But I urge you not to consolidate these lists, circulate them or make very much
out of them. For this NIC, it is still an experimental art form, and let's try
a few before we make much out of the idea. Per my memo to you of last week,
papers of this kind should not be so foreign to the Intelligence Community; never-
theless they are and we had best proceed with some care to avoid overloading the
circuits.
2. That said, have come up with the following proposals, 25X1
any one of which we could, o course, flesh out into some sort of an outline:
The Soviet/Libyan Connection: Until recently, the Soviets have
been fairly leery of the Libyans and of Qadhafi in particular.
However, in the last year or two the Soviets have shipped Libya
an enormous quantity of arms and Qadhafi has pursued foreign
policies that serve Soviet interests. In particular, his activities
in Chad, against the Sudan, and with Ethiopia and Yemen suggest
an effort to surround Egypt and to bring down its anti-Libyan,
anti-Soviet government. Libyan money is turning up in the hands
of terrorist organizations and various groups in widely scattered
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/25: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100050030-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/25: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100050030-2
arenas, often in circumstances that, again, at least parallel
Soviet interests. Finally, from the Soviet standpoint, Libya
is attractive because, rare among Moscow's clients, it can pay
its bills. It also can finance organizations of interest to
the Soviet Union, thereby relieving the Soviets of the necessity
to produce the cash. The addition of the Libyans to the Cubans,
Vietnamese, and others as Soviet surrogates/proxies would signal
a major new disruptive force in the Middle East and less caution
on the Soviets' part than they have demonstrated heretofore.
This paper would explore the implications of both.
Soviet Policy Toward a Marxist/Leninist Central America: The
prospect from this vantagepoint is that the Administration's
policies aimed at curbing Nicaraguan and Cuban export of revolution
in Central America likely will not be successful. The prospect
then is for the eventual victory of the insurgents in El Salvador
and during this decade further success in Honduras, Guatemela and
possibly Costa Rica. The ending of Cuba's isolation in the
Western Hemisphere and the existence of a substantial bloc of
radical states whose policies serve Soviet interests--a bloc that
could also include Panama, with obvious strategic implications--
would have profound implications both for the Soviet Union and
for the United States, as well as their relations with one another.
A speculative paper on these developments would explore these
implications and how the Soviet Union might seek to exploit such
developments.
The Soviets and the Disintegration of Iran: Charlie Waterman
listed this subject as one part of a paper that he might do. I
think it is too important a subject to subordinate. The dis-
integration of Iran at this point has marginal importance to the
United States except with respect to the Soviet reaction and how
the Soviet Union might seek to exploit such a disintegration. It
is only in the event of some Soviet military action, for example,
that the United States anticipates employment of the RDF in Iran.
Thus there might be some value in a speculative paper on the
options open to the Soviets and possible scenarios should the
Khomeini regime in Tehran completely lose control of the country.
Increased Military Role in Soviet Domestic Politics: Current
analysis holds that military considerations dominate the Soviet
policy process but that military men do not. The question is
whether such a high priority on military requirements will
eventually result in a greater role for the military in running
the country. In his Kommunist article Ogarkov has suggested the
need for regional GKOs, implying a military role in regional
political and economic affairs. Even more importantly, a Western
observer (Tatu) has predicted that the Soviet army may end up the
arbiter in the Soviet succession, with implications for its role
in Soviet politics. We might look at the probability of these
developments and some of their implications; i.e., what would
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/25: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100050030-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000100050030-2
SECRET
Soviet military rule mean for (1) domestic politics, the economy,
the nationalities, for (2) Eastern Europe, for (3) the strategic
competition with the U.S. A big question mark in this entire
scenario is the extent of factionalism in the military, particularly
Army-Navy relations.
-- Disintegration in Yugoslavia: Although the transition from Tito
to collective leadership went fairly smoothly, persistent regionalism
(e.g., Kosovo) exacerbated by economic difficulties place into
question the long-range viability of collective leadership. Such
leadership might also not be able to continue upholding a unified
foreign and military policy, particularly when MOD Ljubovic is
forced to retire. If such disunity arises, it opens up possibility
for Soviet inroads and for increased conflicts with neighboring
states (e.g., with Bulgaria over Macedonia).
-- Implications of Diminished Soviet Control over Eastern Europe:
Romania's maverick behavior, Hungary's economic reform and the
continued intractability of the Polish problem all suggest decreased
Soviet influence over events in those countries. How will the
Soviet Union adjust to these developments? Will it try to regain
its lost authority or will it accommodate to developments? What
are the implications of either course for domestic politics in the
Central European countries. How will their relations with Western
Europe evolve and what will be the effect of this evolution on
West European ties with the U.S. and on NATO?
3. A final thought. If you anticipate doing any of these kinds of speculative
papers as coordinated IIMs or SNIEs, I believe it would be useful for you to ask
the Director to foreshadow the occasional use of this new art form in his breakfasts
with Weinberger and Haig and thereby to gain their endorsement of the process. This
could prove invaluable in trying to bring the NFIB along on the value of doing these
papers now and then.
Robe r Gates
3
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000100050030-2