LETTER TO GEORGE P. SHULTZ FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 4, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2011/06/06: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060002-2
Ccntral Intdligence Agency
4 February 1986
The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Based on our discussion at the seminar on January 24th and
your comments at the end of the seminar on Afghanistan, I am
concerned that we may be talking past one another on Gorbachev
and what the Soviets are doing. I have the impression you
believe we at CIA are too rigidly fixed on the notion of no
change in the Soviet approach to the US or their domestic
problems and, therefore, that we are missing the importance of
current developments and also misreading the shape of things to
come in the Soviet Union. (C)
We certainly agree with you on Gorbachev's toughness and
especially his extraordinary tactical flexibility, creativity and
boldness. But everything we have seen since Gorbachev took over
leads us to believe that on fundamental objectives and key
policies he so far remains generally as inflexible as his
predecessors. For example:
In the Far East, Gorbachev has taken none of the basic
steps with China that would allow that relationship to
progress significantly. In Japan, Shevardnadze's smile
compared to Gromyko's brush-off could not mask the lack
of change on basic issues, including the Northern
Territories.
-- As you accurately pointed out on -Saturday, there has
been no change in the Soviet position on regional issues
or their commitment to their clients.
Domestically, all of Gorbachev's moves to modernize the
economy have been within the framework set by his
predecessors -- he has tried to discipline the work
force and has altered some priorities (though, as Doug
MacEachin briefed you on Monday, military spending seems
to have been pretty well protected).
CONF1`IiENTIAL Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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The Honorable George P. Shultz
The Secretary of State
-- Finally, with the US, we believe we are observing an
attempt to recreate the detente atmosphere of the early
19709 on the same premises. And, as Paul Nitze
indicated, while tactically a clever stroke, the new
comprehensive arms proposal really did not change any
basic Soviet position on SDI or START or provide a
realistic approach to INF. (C)
Gorbachev certainly is determined to address his domestic
problems, but so far he seems very orthodox on the basics at home
and abroad. At the same time, his cleverness and boldness will
lead to a number of initiatives, like the arms control proposal,
that we will need to deal with adroitly on our own side. Some of
these proposals, like that related to INF, may offer us
interesting opportunities. (C)
One of our highest priorities is to identify at the earliest
possible time indications of real change in key Soviet domestic,
foreign and military policies and goals. While we-do not see
such indications now, we will continue to work this problem
open-mindedly. (C)
Sincerely,
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
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CONFIDENTIAL
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