LETTER TO HUGH MONTGOMERY FROM ROBERT M. GATES
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060015-8
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 25, 2011
Sequence Number:
15
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 27, 1983
Content Type:
LETTER
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CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060015-8.pdf | 332.39 KB |
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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
27 September 1983
NOTE TO: Hugh Montgomery
Director, State/INR
The attached is the memo the Secretary
requested. I appreciate your help in
getting it to him as quickly and privately
as possible.
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence
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Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
27 September 1983
NOTE TO: The Secretary of State
As you requested last Saturday morning
after breakfast, I have jotted down some
thoughts along the lines that I was expressing
at the table. They are strictly personal.
I hope they are of some use to you.
Thank you for including me in the breakfast.
Robert Gates
Deputy Director f Intelligence
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S'CRET
27 September 1983
SUBJECT: US-Soviet Relations (Further on Breakfast Conversation)
1. It is probably true that US-Soviet relations are as
pervasively bleak now -- and prospectively -- as at any time
since Stalin's death. Yet while Washington typically regards
history as beginning with the last inauguration, the Soviet
perspective is longer. So should ours be.
2. From the standpoint of both sides, "detente" quickly
soured. As early as the 1973 Yom Kippur War, many in the US
judged that detente had not changed Soviet behavior much. From
the Soviet side, defeat of the US-USSR Trade Act in the US Senate
in January 1975 signaled trouble. Since at least the mid-1970s,
with only a few brief promising moments, the relationship has
deteriorated more or less steadily. The roll call of actions and
reactions on both sides during the past eight years adversely
affecting the relationship is impressive (and instructive).
1975: The Trade Act; Soviet intervention with Cuba in
Angola; massive Soviet help to Hanoi resulting in US
expulsion from Vietnam; cancellation of a range of
bilateral meetings; quarrelling over the meaning of the
Vladivostok Accords on SALT II; and the change in tone
at the end of the year in the US pre-election climate
amid charges of a sell-out in Helsinki at CSCE.
1976: Public abandonment by US of"detente" and
statement on bilateral issues during the US elections.
1977: The new US President's letter to Sakharov and
human rights offensive; US abandonment of Vladivostok
approach in SALT for a radical deep cuts approach; no
progress on arms control; Soviet support for
insurgencies in Southern Africa; intense Soviet
propaganda against deployment of the Enhanced Radiation
Weapon (ERW or neutron bomb).
1978: Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia; US
normalization of relations with China; MIG 23 in Cuba
issue; Korean airliner shootdown; first US measures on
technology transfer.
SECRE'. Cl By Signer
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1979: MX decision; Soviet brigade in Cuba controversy;
US Ambassador killed in Kabul; Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan; Soviet-Cuban support for Nicaraguan
resolution; NATO agrees to deploy INF; failure of
SALT II.
1980: US sanctions in response to Afghanistan; US
warnings on Poland; US promoted boycott of Olympics; US
election.
-- 1981-83: This period is more familiar and the list of
bilateral problems is long, culminating in the second
Korean airliner shootdown.
3. This long but still incomplete listing is offered to
make two points:
The halcyon days of US-Soviet detente lasted less than
2 1/2 years in the early 1970s and the trend in the
bilateral relationship has been generally downhill
under three successive Presidents of both parties.
(Some would begin the decline with the Yom Kippur War,
thus including a fourth President -- the one who began
the process).
Every time an opportunity to begin reversing that
downward trend has presented itself -- and there have
been some -- events or actions in Washington, Moscow or
in the Third World have killed the opening. In short,
the Soviets see their problems with the US as
transcending this Administration. And this makes
overall developments and the future all the more
worrisome to them.
4. There is no doubt they see this Administration as more
dangerous than its predecessors -- but less because of its
attitudes and rhetoric than the fact it has been more successful
than its predecessors in countering the USSR in at least three
major areas:
Defense. A massive US rearmament long feared by the
Sov ets threatens to offset their strategic gains 20
years in the making.
Third World. The US and its friends are causing the
Soviets real trouble in Afghanistan, Mozambique, Chad,
Angola, Namibia, Ethiopia, and Nicargua. The kind of
moves the Soviets made easily in 1975-1979 are now more
complicated and difficult. Momentum seems to be
changing.
INF. Defeat of ERW in 1978-79 was a major Soviet
victory, vindicating "differentiated" detente which set
the US aside and focused on the West Europeans.
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Deployment of INF will be a major Soviet defeat, far
offsetting ERW strategically and calling into doubt an
important Soviet objective of detente -- undermining
European commitment to strengthening NATO militarily.
5. All this has taken place against a backdrop in Moscow of
Brezhnev's long physical decline and Andropov's succession.
Despite a good deal of wishful thinking in the West, Andropov is
the first General Secretary to come from within the security
service-military sector; he shares their values and ruthlessness
and depends upon their political support. I believe that
Moscow's behavior in the Yom Kippur war and its turn to more
aggressive exploitation of Third World opportunities in 1974-75
was due in some measure to the elevation to the Politburo in 1973
of Andropov, Gromyko and Defense Minister Grechko (Succeeded by
Ustinov in 1976). Their influence in foreign affairs became
clearly dominant as Brezhnev's vigor declined in the mid to late
'70s. They now control that policy. While some point out (and
take encouragement from) broad "continuity" in Soviet foreign
policy since Brezhnev's death, I would suggest this derives from
Andropov-Ustinov-Gromyko domination of that policy before
Brezhnev died -- a policy of aggressive intervention in the Third
World, the opening to China, and brute force where deemed
necessary and low risk (as in Afghanistan). They are a very
tough bunch. And, as you noted at breakfast, Andropov's supposed
mastery of clever manipulation and political maneuvering has not
prevented them from some pretty ham handed efforts at bullying
and intimidation when a lighter touch would have paid them
important benefits (even as inspiring fear sometimes pays
benefits).
6. All that said, and despite the past eight years or so of
post-detente problems, the Russians -- in my view -- still
recognize the need to do business with the US and will do it with
this Administration, but probably not until 1985. They cannot
"write off" any Administration and are prepared to be patient for
the US side "to come around". A range of economic, political and
strategic motives impels the USSR to cultivate ties with the US,
though not at any price. The past eight to ten years repeatedly
have illuminated Soviet limits:
They will not abandon an active role in the Third
World, promoting radical causes and anti-Western
movements. Indeed, while they will move cautiously
where the US has great prepondance of military power
(e.g., Central America), their cost-benefit calculus
elsewhere probably has shifted toward greater risk-
taking.
They will not tolerate attempts to interfere in or
change their domestic policies, for example, on human
rights. They will, however, use Soviet Jews,
dissidents and political prisoners as bait or "trading
truck" with the US.
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They will not allow the US to use arms control to
restructure Soviet strategic forces; they will not
dismantle their heavy missile force to satisfy us on
throwweight.
They will not be cowed by threat of sanctions or of
economic warfare; they know the Europeans and Japanese
too well.
They will abandon none of their global pretensions or
ambitions; the best that can be achieved is a stable
stand off in Europe and between the US and Soviet
strategic forces (whether through arms control or tacit
arrangements), and some thawing in atmosphere --
reduction of tensions. Hopes for (and promises of)
more have contributed to bilateral tensions (and
political problems here).
7. Given the foregoing, what specifically can we expect in
the next year? The bilateral prospects are bleak. The KAL
shootdown makes it difficult for the US to initiate a dialogue at
least for the rest of this year. We will then be in the midst of
INF deployment and the Soviet reaction thereto. They will react
and I predict one or another of their early responses will
further worsen US-USSR relations. By then the US will be in the
middle of an election campaign, during which the Soviets will be
hoping with all their hearts for defeat of the President. Even
if they conclude he will be re-elected, it would come too late to
cut a quick arms control deal. In sum, I believe bilateral
relations will be in a deep freeze until 1985 when the US will be
in a position to seize the initiative. The Soviets probably will
make new offers in INF and START this fall, but they almost
certainly will not provide a basis for compromise or agreement.
Middle East: Syria holds high cards in Lebanon and the
Soviets will continue to stake Assad. They probably
believe the changes are good for eventual emergence of
a pro-Syrian government in Beirut. To bolster Assad,
the Russians could send a token detachment of troops to
Damascus, as well as new tactical surface to surface
missiles, pilots and more aircraft. They are helping
to rearm the PLO. They will not themselves militarily
challenge US and Israeli power in Lebanon, but no doubt
see opportunities to tie up American forces there
indefinitely -- with growing political costs in the US
and in the Arab world -- even as they work to block
negotiated outcomes. Their worries probably are that
Israel will re-enter the fray if Syrian or PLO role
becomes too threatening and that US power will somehow
induce Assad to compromise.
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Third World: The prospects are for greater military
and subversive intimidation of Pakistan's Zia and the
Iranians to reduce their support for Afghan insurgents;
continued indirect support of Nicaragua coupled with
warnings to both Havana and Managua that they not
provoke the US too seriously; greater attention to
opportunities in the Philippines, especially if the
situation there worsens, and in Chile; continued
support for Qadhafi's destabilizing efforts in Central
and West Africa; and continued efforts to improve
relations with China.
Europe and Japan: Once INF deployment begins, the
Soviet focus will shift to preventing full deployment
both diplomatically and by making deployment as painful
and costly domestically as possible. The FRG will be
the main target both for intimidation and persuasion.
The economic card will be flashed prominently.
Intimidation will be the order of the day vis-a-vis
Japan in an attempt to tone down or "de-fang" Nakasone.
9. In sum, the next year will see the Soviet Union pursuing
a continued aggressive policy in the Third World, taking a tough
line on INF deployments and waiting out the US elections in
anticipation of a change for the better in 1985 whoever is
elected.
10. Given this bleak forecast, how do we get through the
next year without a further dangerous increase in tensions? The
major foreseeable problem will be the Soviet response to INF and
the US response to that. Missiles in Eastern Europe are probably
the minimum possible Soviet reaction, perhaps with a periodic
deployment of cruise missile carrying submarines near US coasts
(analagous response). They cannot do this all at once, so it
would extend over several months. A matter of fact US response
to these long anticipated developments would help avoid an
action-reaction-action-reaction cycle that could get out of
hand. We need to keep our eye clearly on our political and
strategic objectives and not get caught up in one-upmanship.
11. Beyond this the relationship might be kept from
deteriorating further by proceeding with routine business and
meetings, making clear to Moscow our understanding that some
lines of communications must be kept open. An important role in
this can be played by Art Hartman in Moscow and State's dealings
with Dobrynin here -- no effusive warmth but correct, candid
conversations. As mentioned at the breakfast, a new initiative
on confidence building measures could form part of a substantive
agenda-for such conversations -- and be very consistent with
global concerns growing out of the KAL shootdown. A continued
business-like approach at START will help. These types of
actions, if done properly, need not involve the US signaling
eagerness to resume business as usual, but rather a need to keep
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talking to one another. Use of the Ambassadors is unobtrusive
and does not convey high level eagerness "to get on with it" that
some sort of senior private envoy or intermediary suggests. In
my view this sort of keeping the lines open is the best way to
get through the year and to set the stage for possibly some
improvement in the relationship in 1985.
12. A note of caution to close. I mentioned above the
times in recent years when promising dialogue has been cut short
by events. There are all too many places these days where such
events can take place. It will take considerable skill and luck
just to keep things from getting even worse during the next year.
STAT
U
(All portions of this Memo
are classified SECRET)
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