ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 29, 1983
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060016-7
- ET
Prepared by Robert M. Gates/29Dec83
Accomplishments in the Improvement of Analysis and Estimating
One of the President's major national security objectives
has been to rebuild and strengthen the nation's intelligence
capabilities. An important component of that program has been
the improvement of the quality of intelligence analysis. There
has been substantial progress toward achievement of this goal.
The effort to improve CIA analysis has focused on three broad
areas: change in organization, change in the process of analysis
and research, and change in the preparation of national
estimates.
Organizational Change
Less than ten months after the Administration came into
office, the most far reaching reorganization of CIA's analytical
element was undertaken. For the first time in the Agency's
history, the analytical effort was organized essentially along
regional lines, with area specialists, economists and military
analysts making common effort on a given problem.
The reorganization provided for the first time that analysis
would be integrated at the outset -- that the political, military
and economic facets of a problem would be examined
comprehensively. The result has been the production of a number
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
SECRET
of significant papers that could not have been produced before
the reorganization on subjects such as technology transfer, the
military implications of Soviet economic problems, the political
aspects of West European economic relations with the Soviet
Union, the national security implications of foreign industrial
competition, Soviet activities in the Third World, political
instability, Third World economic problems and their political
implications, Japan's economic and industrial policies, and so
forth.
The reorganization of the analytic component also served to
expose weaknesses in resources, particularly on the Third World,
that had been hidden by the functional organization. The change
in structure also contributed substantially to improving the
timeliness and relevance of intelligence analysis in that it
created a single point of contact in the analytical element of
CIA for senior policymakers and enabled the development of much
closer relationships between senior analytical managers and their
counterparts in the Departments of State and Defense and at the
National Security Council Staff. Senior CIA analytical managers
now meet with their Assistant Secretary counterparts in State,
Defense, NSC, Treasury and Commerce every two weeks to discuss
new requirements and issues needing CIA analytical attention.
Other organizational changes that have contributed
significantly to improving the intelligence product have
included:
-- The creation of new analytical centers for high priority
2
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
SECRET
issues, including technology transfer; terrorism,
insurgency and political instability; and foreign
counterintelligence analysis. Creation of these centers
has made possible the preparation of assessments such as
the Political Instability Quarterly, which every three
months examines some 30 countries against more than 100
indicators of possible trouble; studies of Syrian and
Iraqi supported terrorism; the monthly Terrorism Review;
case studies of insurgent successes and failures;
examination of insurgent progress in El Salvador,
Guatemala and the Philippines; papers on the role of
in technology transfer to the 25X1
Soviet Union; a number of studies of technology transfer
to the USSR and China; an entirely new series of
assessments on Soviet camouflage, concealment and
deception; and, finally, an exhaustive study of Soviet
acquisition and exploitation of information on US
technical collection systems.
-- CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff has been revived
and strengthened. It had slipped into a reactive mode
that was slow to respond to requests and unimaginative
in helping policymakers deal with new arms control
issues, both on Soviet negotiating behavior and on
monitoring issues. New leadership of the staff from
within CIA as well as expanded resources have turned
this situation around and given the staff a key role in
3
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7 . ,
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
SECRET
helping to articulate intelligence implications of US
and Soviet proposals as well as providing additional
support on compliance and negotiating behavior issues.
Finally, a substantial effort has been devoted to
strengthening the analytical resources of CIA. The
budget of the Directorate of Intelligence is 40% larger
in FY-84 than it was just in FY-82. Personnel strength
has risen
It is meeting new challenges and will continue
to do so through more effective use of existing
resources, its entry into the computer age, and greater
use of carefully monitored contract expertise in the
private sector. Such expertise has contributed
substantially, for example, to our work on subjects as
diverse as Soviet ICBMs, the Egyptian
economy and foreign oil resources.
The new personnel resources in particular are being
used to rebuild CIA's analytic capability on the Third
World and on the Soviet defense industries.
The Agency's capability to track
the use of Western technology in Soviet defense
industries, the impact of Western sanctions on the
4
SECRET
25X1
25X1
225X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
SECRET
Soviet economy, and the linkages between East and West
European trade with the Soviet Union had substantially
disappeared. We are rebuilding these capabilities.
Similarly, as long ago as the early 1970s, resource
shortfalls in the analytic area brought about the
dismantling of a substantial portion of CIA's analytic
effort on the Third World. Substantial new resources
have been directed to this problem, permitting us to
carry out long range studies on key countries
We now have the resources to begin
reestablishing in-depth information on many Third World
countries, but in other -- such as in Central America --
new resources have simply permitted us to stay on top of
vastly expanded current analytical needs.
Changes in the Analytic and Research Process
Past experience in CIA demonstrated vividly that
organizational change unaccompanied by changes in the way the
analysts actually go about their business would have little
impact and would in fact result in business as usual under
another name or organization. As a result, the second broad
effort to improve analysis was a series of changes in the
process. These changes include:
5
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
Completely restructuring the research effort of the
analytical directorate, involving the development for
the first time of a comprehensive annual research plan
identifying in consultation with policymakers key issues
and problems to be addressed during the coming year;
specifying the subjects to be addressed to tackle such
issues; identifying and setting aside the resources to
carry out the research; and integrating research carried
out inside the Agency with that being funded
externally. This also involved for the first time a
comprehensive examination of research being carried out
on key national security issues in universities and
thinktanks as well as in other agencies of the
government in order to draw on that research and avoid
duplication. A copy of the 1983 research program is
attached; the program for 1984 is being published this
month.
A massive effort to put CIA analysts in touch with
experts in the private sector, universities, thinktanks
and wherever else they may be found. In many of the
areas CIA is now being asked by policymakers to examine
analytically, great expertise exists outside the
Intelligence Community. A broad program has been
established to consult with outside experts, to have
appropriately cleared experts critique draft CIA
analytical papers and to bring them to Washington to
6
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
SECRET
participate in CIA sponsored conferences on substantive
issues. Some 70 such conferences have been held in the
past two years on subjects such as Afghanistan, Mexico
and the Philippines.
Expanded training and education for analysts. A
requirement was established for the first time that all
analysts who had completed their three-year probationery
period must participate in outside sponsored conferences
or seminars or take refresher courses in advanced
university programs in order either to refresh already
existing skills or to expand their knowledge into new
areas. Approximately 75% of all analysts in the
Directorate have completed this requirement within the
last two years.
-- Keeping better track of analyst's performance, including
accuracy. Again for the first time in Agency's history,
files of each analyst's work were established to enable
managers to determine over time whether an analyst is
improving, overall accuracy, analyst skill in
identifying key issues and problems in advance, and an
analyst ability to prepare well sourced, logical, and
insightful assessments. These files are now being used
in analysts' evaluation and promotions.
7
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
Intensification of the review process. Management in
the analytic directorate had lost sight of the fact that
the quality of the intelligence product was their most
important concern. Now, each of the four levels of
supervision reviews the substantive work of all analysts
under their purview. It is time consuming but has
played a substantial role in weeding out mediocre or
poor assessments. It also has conveyed the message to
the entire organization that the substantive product is
the principal task for everyone in the organization.
Improved understanding of the US policy process. CIA in
the past has had the capability to understand and
describe accurately how foreign policy is made in every
country of the world except the United States. Because
the US policymaker is the principal focus of our entire
effort, rising senior managers in the Directorate of
Intelligence are now required to spend a one year
rotational assignment in a policy agency learning both
how the policy process works and also how intelligence
is used in that process. Some three dozen officers have
now participated in the program.
Moving CIA analysts into the computer age. Three years
ago only technical analysts in the military and weapons
area and a few in the economic area had ready access to
computer terminals. The program to place a computer
8
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
terminal at each analyst's elbow was foundering
hopelessly. Today, more than 400 terminals have been
installed for analysts; that number will grow to well
over 500 in FY-85 and will continue to grow until all
analysts have the needed capability. It is only through
the use of these machines that the analysts can avoid
being overwhelmed by the massive amounts of data that
new technical collection systems and expanded human
collection are providing and will provide in the
future. It is also the only way that the same number of
analysts as there were in CIA in 1960 can cope with the
far broader intelligence challenges of the 1990s.
-- Expanded use of both internal and external evaluations
of the quality of analysis. Again, for the first time,
an internal evaluation staff was created not to look at
specific intelligence publications but rather to examine
broad categories of analysis to determine whether the
needs of the policymaker had been met and the quality
and objectivity of the work. Such evaluations have now
been carried out on CIA's analysis of Central America,
the Falklands War, the Soviet Gas Pipeline, and Third
World Military Conflicts. These have identified both
substantive and bureaucratic shortcomings to be remedied
as well as identifying positive aspects of performance
that should be emulated.
9
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
SECRET
By the same token, CIA commissioned a Panel of some
of the most distinguished experts on Soviet military
economics in the country to examine over a six month
period all of CIA's work on Soviet defense spending.
While the Panel endorsed the quality of CIA's work, it
also made a number of recommendations for further
improvement of that work which are being implemented.
Finally, CIA devoted enormous effort to positive
cooperation with the PFIAB-originated, Department of
Commerce-implemented review of CIA's work on the Soviet
economy. Again, this evaluation strongly endorsed CIA's
effort but made a number of recommendations for
improvement.
All in all, the Agency has opened itself to
critical examination by outside Panels, including the
PFIAB, in an unpredecented way in the past three
years. It has worked positively with these groups, has
generally received good marks, but at the same time has
received many useful suggestions for further improvement
to its work. I believe this kind of voluntary openness
to constructive criticism and to self criticism in a
serious way is virtually unique in Washington.
-- Experimentation with new approaches to analysis, such as
the recent formation of a special small task force
that brings together experts in several
disciplines and a retired former Chief of Station in
10
SECRET
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060016-7
SECRET
to take a fresh look at a country about 25X1
which many in and out of government are deeply
concerned. The task force will last just four months
but will travel and consult widely
before submitting its report. If the approach is
successful, it will be used on other problems to ensure
that CIA's analysis does not get bogged down in
conventional wisdom.
-- Strengthening ties between analysts and collectors.
This effort has included, for example, expanded analyst
travel
frequent joint meetings
of analysts and case officers
exchange programs with NSA;
rotational assignments of analysts to the clandestine
service;
periodic joint assessments by analysts and DDO
officers; and tutorial instruction on technical issues
such as nuclear energy and economics by analysts for
case officers.
In addition to these efforts, analysts are being judged by
sterner measures of effectiveness and new criteria that are
consistently impressed upon them, including:
11
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
SECRET
The need to identify alternative outcomes to a given
situation, particularly when a less than likely outcome
might pose dangerous consequences for the United States.
-- The need for timeliness and relevance.
-- Far more detailed use of the evidence and providing
information on the nature and reliability of the sources
we use.
More tough minded and open minded approach, particularly
to new developments.
-- Greater attention to scientific developments and future
technologies that could threaten US security.
-- Greater involvement in the development and critiquing of
covert action, particularly with respect to the
identification of vulnerabilities of targets. (Indeed,
relationships between the analysts and the clandestine
service are closer than ever before.)
Encouragement for analysts who hold unorthodox views or
minority views to forward those views directly to the
top of the bureaucratic chain without fear of penalty.
12
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060016-7
SECRET
Greatly expanded analyst travel to countries of their
expertise either to acquire or expand that expertise.
The final component in this program is the quality of the
analysts themselves. The purging of the clandestine directorate
in the late 1970s has received a great deal of attention. What
has been less evident to the public and even to officials is that
during that same period morale problems and general
dissatisfaction led to a massive departure of professionals from
the analytical side of CIA as well. Over one-third of CIA's
analysts are still in their three-year probationary period.
Nearly one-half have less than five years experience. Most of
the new analysts are extremely talented and have sacrificed
higher paying opportunites for the opportunity to serve in CIA.
At the same time, some new analysts as well as some of the more
experienced ones do not meet the new standards of excellence. As
a result, in the last two years literally scores of marginal
performers have been removed from their positions and either have
left the Agency or have gone to other areas of the Agency more
appropriate to their talent and skills. This same rigorous
personnel review is continuing.
Changes in National Estimates
13
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89G00720R000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
As of 1980, the national intelligence estimate had reached
the nadir of its fortunes as a means of conveying authoritative
intelligence community views for policymakers to the President,
the National Security Council and other senior policymakers on
key issues. As few as 12 national estimates a year were being
completed The estimates were long in preparation, long in text
and played virtually no role in policy formulation.
As of the end of 1983, this situation had been turned
around. In 1983 more than 75 NIEs, SNIEs, and interagency
intelligence memoranda were published. The preparation time on
key special national estmates on time-urgent subjects was reduced
to as little as a few days. The estimates are timely, policy
relevant and address issues -- such as Lebanon, the Persian Gulf,
El Salvador, INF and narcotics -- of key importance to the
President and his senior advisors. Estimates have been prepared
on subjects such as arms control monitoring that have not been
addressed in national level intelligence publications in fifteen
years. Some subjects, such as the Soviet reaction to INF
deployment, have been addressed quarterly for over a year by the
Community. Other improvements include:
The team of National Intelligence Officers now
represents a more desirable blend of senior officers
drawn from the Department of Defense, the uniformed
military, CIA's clandestine service, NSA, the private
sector and CIA's analysis directorate.
14
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
SECRET
-- There has been great stress on the presentation of
differences of view rather than lowest common
denominator compromise language. Differences of view
are all treated equally in the text of estimates rather
than minority viewpoints being relegated to footnotes.
Such differences are encouraged.
In order that senior policy officials can be informed of
the results of key estimates quickly, the key judgments
are now prepared separately and forwarded to the
President and members of the National Security Council
the day after NFIB approval. This results in the
unusual (and not altogether unwelcome) situation that
key figures are informed of the conclusions of important
estimates before their subordinates.
Estimates on many subjects (such as Soviet energy) now
include a list of indicators so that policymakers as
well as other readers can see what developments the
intelligence community will be looking for as evidence
that developments are proceeding as projected or
according to some other scenario.
Most estimates now carry a short bibliography of single
agency intelligence publications on the issue being
addressed so that senior staff at Defense, State and NSC
15
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
SECRET
know where to look for additional detailed information
or for further elaboration of different points of view.
As suggested by the foregoing, a great deal has changed in
CIA's analytic efforts in the realm of intelligence analysis and
estimating in the last three years. Indeed, it is amazing that
there has been so much change and yet so little outside attention
to this revolution. I think the reason for this rests in the
fact that (1) many of the professionals in the analytical and
estimating business recognized the need for change of the kind
that has been undertaken (2) the implementation of the change has
been carried out by CIA professionals who have been given the
opportunity to make changes long needed and who have had the
strong support of the DCI and the Administration to make those
changes, and (3) analysts and their managers have seen that
improved quality has greatly increased the demand for CIA
analysis and has enhanced its importance and influence.
There is still room for improvement. Additional analytical
resources are needed. Senior managers must still struggle daily
against analytical narrowness, excessive caution, preoccupation
with a single conclusion when in fact several possibilities are
equally likely, and there remains a diminishing but still extant
blend of arrogance and timidity. But I am convinced the
analytical and estimative side of intelligence is on the right
track and that while we have already seen substantial benefit
16
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7
from these changes, the truly dramatic effect is still to come as
the relatively new people mature under a different culture,
expectations, and standards than existed in the past.
17
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/21: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000100060016-7