SECURITY AND COUNTERMEASURES: IMPROVING THE SIG PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000100070003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 28, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Executive Registry
86- 1870 /1
28 April 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Security and Countermeasures: Improving the SIG
Process (S)
1. We are under heavy pressure from the Senate Select Committee and
the NSC Staff to make improvements in the security, counterintelligence
and security countermeasures arenas. They and others believe that these
issues do not receive nearly enough attention of senior managers in
government, including the Intelligence Community, and that those efforts
that do exist are disconnected and proceed in isolation. They also
believe that somehow shortcomings in these areas contributed to the rash
of spies in the last year or so. They may be right. (S)
2. As a result of my examination of this problem, I believe their
concerns, particularly in the security countermeasures arenas, are
reasonably well founded; in addition, you and I perceive problems that
others do not.
Specifically, the division of labor between the Security
Committee and the IG/Countermeasures is totally ambiguous.
Essentially, there are two groups charged with responsibility for
the same problems. Where there is not inaction, there is
paralysis as a result of bureaucratic tugs of war and parochial
viewpoints.
The Security Committee has 10 subcommittees and half a dozen or
so working groups all involving people at the working level. As
noted above, parochialism dominates in this area (more so than in
any area I have ever seen).
Moreover, there is little contact or coordination among the
committees -- that is, across security disciplines (computer
security, personnel security, physical security, etc.).
The leadership of the Security Committee is competent but not
very aggressive and lacking a charter to attack some of the more
difficult problems.
S RET Cl By Signer
DECL OADR
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-- Simultaneously, the leadership of the IG/CM is weak and provides
little leadership or coordination.
-- A variety of ad hoc groups have sprung up, some from within the
Intelligence Community, others at the instigation of the NSC
Staff or others, to try and work around these problems. Mary
Lawton's group on personnel security is an excellent example.
-- The relationship between organizations in the Intelligence
Community or the SIG and nonintelligence organizations (such as
NTISSC) is ambiguous, and as a result there is little contact,
consultation or coordination.
-- There is no Intelligence Community organization to identify and
act upon leaks. (S)
3. In sum, the bureaucratic underbrush has grown so high it is
strangling efforts in the security/countermeasures area to address some
of the problems we face. There is a lack of coordination and sharing of
information, a prevalence of bureaucratic turf fighting, and a general
passivity in the entire structure. (S)
4. By contrast, all are in agreement that there has been significant
progress in the counterintelligence arena, particularly in the IG/CI
chaired by Judge Webster. He has provided effective leadership and as
Director of FBI and a member of the SIG has the clout to make things
move. In addition, there is now a group of people leading the
counterintelligence effort in the various agencies -- especially
in CIA andl lin NSA -- who are much more willing to
collaborate with their colleagues. In short, this is an area that I
think is working reasonably well. (S)
5. I suggest the following changes in structure and procedure to
address some of the problems above:
-- First, abolish the Security Committee and restructure its
activities under the auspices of the SIG.
-- Second, split the IG for Countermeasures into one that deals with
physical and personnel security and another that deals with
technical surveillance countermeasures, COMSEC, etc.
-- Third, consolidate the various committees and subcommittees under
SECOM into five or six broader committees operating under the
auspices of the appropriate IG for Countermeasures. These
committees should be chaired by a senior line manager from the
agency that has the largest equity involved in the subject (or
the best expertise) and the membership of each committee should
be comprised of, again, senior line managers from agencies that
have a useful role to play. The key is to involve senior line
managers who can make commitments for and deliver their agencies
so that the committee structure is not just a staff undertaking.
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Fourth, restructure the Intelligence Community Staff elements
involved in these issues to create a Counterintelligence and
Security Countermeasures Staff that would provide staff support
to the three IG's, house the Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis
Center, and the analytical capability to continue to perform such
ad hoc responsibilities as you assign as well as the Annual
Hostile Threat Assessment. This Staff will have the additional
responsibility of ensuring not only support for each of the
committees under the two Countermeasure IG's but also that the
results of each committee's work are shared with the other
committees and that there is a continuing consultation and
coordination among the various disciplines. This will require a
far more aggressive staff chief and staff than has been the case
in the past.
-- Fifth, the Chairman of NTISSC should be a member of the SIG to
ensure that issues on telecommunications and computer security
going beyond the Intelligence Community are coordinated with
efforts being taken within the Community. (S)
Recommendations
1. That you approve the above measures.
2. That you sign the attached memorandum forwarding these proposals
and associated organization chart to SIG principals for their
consideration.
3. That we schedule a SIG for the end of this week to get these
recommendations blessed.
4. That within a day or two of the SIG the new structure be
implemented. (S)
Robe M. Gates
Attachment:
As Stated
Dire'ttor of en r nt
Dist:
ig - ER File
DDC I
1 - ES
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2 8 APR 1986
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EXECUTIVE SEt..ETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
x
2
DCI
X
3
EXDIR
X
4
D/ICS
X
5
DDI
b
DDA
X
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
VC/NIC
16
17
C/SECOM
18
19
r
/
20
F
I
21
22
E i e r ory
2 April 86
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Reg"
86- 1870
28 April 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Intelligence Group (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: Changes in SIG(I) Structure (S)
1. As a result of work done in the preparation of the President's
Report that Dick Stilwell has underway and various studies undertaken
under the auspices of the National Security Council Staff, the
Intelligence Community Staff and the Oversight Committees, I have
concluded that improved coordination is needed in the Intelligence
Community on issues under the purview of the SIG(I). Uncertainty about
the respective responsibilities and authority of the DCI's Security
Committee and the IG/CM has proved an obstacle to effective action and
collaboration in a number of areas. The proliferation of committees and
working groups has inhibited cross disciplinary cooperation and
contributed to a growth of bureaucratic underbrush. Finally, as we have
become more aware of problems and shortcomings in the area of security
countermeasures in the Intelligence Community, it is apparent that the
range of problems and activities assigned to the IG/Countermeasures has
been far too broad. Finally, the SIG(I) itself has not been aggressive
enough in the countermeasures area and too many problems have remained
unresolved or untended at lower levels and unknown or poorly understood
at senior levels. (S)
2. To be more specific:
-- The division of labor between the DCI Security Committee and the
IG/Countermeasures is ambiguous. Essentially there are two
groups charged with responsibility for the same problems. There
is too little action and often paralysis as a result of
bureaucratic tugs of war and parochial viewpoints.
-- The Security Committee has 10 subcommittees and half a dozen or
so working groups.
-- There is little contact or coordination among the SECOM
Subcommittees, that is, across security disciplines.
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-- A variety of ad noc groups have sprung up, some from within the
Intelligence Community, others at the instigation of other
organizations, to try and work around these problems.
-- The relationship between organizations in the Intelligence
Community or the SIG and nonintelligence organizations (such as
NTISSC) is ambiguous, fragile or non-existent. As a result there
is too little contact, coordination and consultation.
-- There is no standing Intelligence Community organization with the
responsibility to identify and act upon individual leaks. (S)
3. Accordingly, I believe some organizational restructuring is
needed to clarify lines of responsibility and coordination, as well as to
give each organization an area of responsibility that is realistic in
scope.
-- First, I intend to abolish the DCI Security Committee and
restructure its activities under the auspices of the SIG(I).
-- Second, I propose to split the IG for Countermeasures into two
IGs, one that deals with physical, personnel, information and
industrial security and another that deals with computer
security, technical surveillance countermeasures, COMSEC, and so
forth.
-- Third, I propose to consolidate the various subcommittees of the
present SECOM into six broader committees operating under the
auspices of the appropriate IG for Countermeasures. The
committees should be chaired by a senior line manager from the
agency that has the largest equity involved in the subject (or
the best expertise) and the membership of each committee should
be comprised of, again, senior line managers from agencies that
have a useful role to play. The key is to involve senior line
managers who can make commitments for and deliver their agencies
so that the committees can act.
-- Fourth, I would restructure the Intelligence Community Staff
elements involved in these issues to create a Counterintelligence
and Security Countermeasures Staff that would provide support to
the three IGs, house the Unauthorized Disclosure Analysis Center,
and have the analytical capability to continue to perform tasks
such as the Annual Hostile Threat Assessment. This staff would
have the additional responsibility of supporting the IG
committees and seeing that the results of each committee's work
are shared with other committees and that there is a continuing
consultation and coordination among various security
disciplines. (S)
4. It is also apparent to me that more aggressive SIG(I) action and
involvement is needed, particularly in the countermeasures arena. Too
many issues that are the source of considerable controversy or conflict
among the agencies are being buried or not dealt with expeditiously.
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These differences and issues need to be surfaced more readily and brought
to the attention of senior line managers for resolution. (S)
5. The structure I have outlined is a tentative one and may require
further adjustment as it is implemented. I believe that these
organizational measures can be taken through my issuance of a DCID
eliminating the Security Committee and through the issuance of an SIG
Directive altering the structure of the IG for Countermeasures. (S)
6. For additional detail, I refer you to the attached notes and
organizational structure. The numbers in the notes correspond to numbers
on the organizational chart and provide additional explanation.
7. I am scheduling a SIG(I) meeting at 1400 on Friday, May 2nd to
address these changes and seek your views. I would welcome your
observations and suggestions at that time.
Attachments:
As Stated
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SIG(I) STRUCTURE
Counterintelligence
and Security SIG(I)
t
C
NFIB
Secretariat
ermeasures
oun
Staff
IG/CI IG/C
M(P)
IG/CM(T)
Personnel
Technical
Security
Committee
-- Physical
Countermeasures
(1) Committee (4)
Technical
Security
Committee
Informatio
Security
L-- NISAC (Nat
Industrial
Security A
Committee)
Surveillance
(2) Countermeasures
Committee (5)
n Research and
(3) Development
Committee (6)
ional NOAC (National
Opsec Advisory
dvisory Committee)
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Notes: IGs/CM
IG/CM(P) Chairman: DUSD(P)
1. The Personnel Security Committee supplants SECOM's Personnel Security
Subcommittee and the Security Awareness and Education Subcommittee
2. The Physical Security Committee supplants SECOM's Facility Protection
Subcommittee and the Security Advisory Group (USSR).
3. The Information Security Committee supplants SECOM's Compartmentation
Subcommittee. The Director of ISOO will be a member.
IG/CM(T) Chairman: ASD/C31
4. The Technical Security Committee supplants SECOM's Computer Security
Subcommittee and will have purview over COMSEC, COMPUSEC and TEMPEST.
5. The Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee supplants
SECOM's Subcommittee of the same name.
6. The Research and Development Committee supplants SECOM's subcommittee
of the same name and the Subcommittee on the Future.
-- Each committee will organize itself as appropriate, although each
should have an R&D Subcommittee.
-- Wherever possible, Committee Chairmen should be selected who have
parallel line or committee responsibilities outside of
intelligence in order to ensure that Intelligence Community and
non-IC efforts are congruent or complementary.
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Notes: Counterintelligence and
Security ntermeasures Staff
1. The Chief of the Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures
Staff (CISCMS) will report to the DCI through Director, Intelligence
Community Staff.
2. The CISCMS will support the SIG Chairman, IG Chairmen and the heads
of the subordinate committees. The staff specifically will:
-- ensure that information, policy issues and problems developed or
identified by one Committee are shared with others as
appropriate. A major responsibility of the staff is to promote
and facilitate cross-disciplinary coordination, consultation and
cooperation.
-- assist in preparing agendas, organizing meetings and keeping
records.
-- be organized to ensure that at least one professional is assigned
to each IG Committee.
-- assess the foreign intelligence threat to the United States and
assist the IGs in evaluating US counterintelligence and
countermeasure policies, priorities and activities.
-- assemble information concerning counterintelligence and
countermeasure budget and resources.
-- perform services of common concern as may be directed by the DCI
as, for example, the national registry of counterintelligence
publications and processing FISA requests.
3. The UDAC will identify on an urgent basis (daily) unauthorized
disclosures resulting in significant damage to intelligence sources
and methods and where there is some prospect of a successful
investigation. These will be reported immediately to the DCI/DDCI
with proposed letters requesting a prompt investigation to the FBI
and, where appropriate, the head of the agency or department cited as
the source of the unauthorized disclosure. The UDAC also will
maintain records of unauthorized disclosures and, in cooperation with
the National Intelligence Officer for Foreign Deception and
Intelligence Activities will carry out damage assessments on behalf
of the Intelligence Community as directed by the DCI.
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