DDCI BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600680003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 8, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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NIO/Africa
8 July 1986
DDCI BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SOUTH AFRICA
I. Introduction
e one commorl~perception that policymakers, intelligence analysts,
legislators,J'bd informed American public opinion can all agree on is
that South Afri
widely differing
importance, as to h
years in South Africa,
importance to the United Stites. There are
observers as to the principal nature of this
is are 3'kely to unfold over the next several
pursue to protect and adv
Africa. I propose to share
as to what liciesrthe United States should
ith you the apprecia
een by oir principal ant
importance of South Africa a
Soviet Union, and what they are ingto advance their intereit~q The
Intelligence Community has been sei d with the question of how events
are likely to unfold over the next se ral years in South Africa, and I
will give you the Community's es imate o the most likely course of
events over the next four year and beyond. I will give you our
appreciation of who the majo actors are comp ting for power, finishing
with a look at the African ational Congress an its prospects over the
next two years.
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IV. The Intelligence Community Assessment
While a period of dramatic political change has begun in South
Africa, the Intelligence Community believes that the white minority
government, relying primarily on the coercive actions of its security
forces, will remain in power for some time. Over the next four years, i
-fit--j-u4g.e i that Pretoria's political, economic, and military resources are
sufficient to avert a collapse of the white regime. However, the black
townships will remain tinderboxes of dissent and antigovernment
sentiment, which combined with increasing socioeconomic pressures will
result in a continuing pattern of violence. While there is no agreed
Community view beyond four years, CIA analysts believe that by the year
2000 the transition to majority rule will be well underway, if not
complete.
W,L
-fins-der. i y believe\ that Pretoria's program of incremental and
closely controlled reform from above is unlikely to register marked
success in either coopting large numbers of blacks or significantly
reducing violence. Reasons for this include:
-- Botha's insistence on incremental change and seeking the
concurrence of the majority of Afrikaner people, thus
guaranteeing a slow pace of reform.
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-- The stigma of "collaboration" attached to any black opinion
leader participating in limited power-sharing on government
terms has increased, and the Botha government is unlikely to
find many serious black leaders to cooperate with his reform
efforts. Polarization and radicalization of moderate or
apolitical blacks will continue to increase.
-- The economy--which will suffer in part from the effects of
sanctions and diminished investor confidence--is unlikely to
grow beyond 3 per cent a year, a rate which cannot support
comprehensive new government programs for black services and
which will not cope with the growing black unemployed rate.
At the same time, t4e6emffl y do%*. not believe the onset of
widespread violence since 1984 heralds a convulsive, violent revolution
any time soon. Reasons for this include:
-- The pervasive police/security coercive power of the regime,
reflected most recently in the firm declaration of a national
State of Emergency which appears capable of suppressing major
outbreaks of violence and opposition activity.
-- The continuing lack of organizational unity among black
protesters. Ideological disputes, tribal splits, a wide
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generation gap, urban-rural divisions, and government divide
and rule tactics all are potent factors which will inhibit the
ability of these groups to challenge the government.
-- The still limited capability of the ANC to conduct
paramilitary warfare or orchestrate political action within
South Africa.
LA__
The most likely scenario see\ over the
next several years is an increasingly isolated and beleaguered South
Africa, but with a determined and ruthless white regime aggressively
wielding its police powers doggedly pursuits own incremental
ULK
policy of reform despite its broad nonacceptance.' recognize\ that
a dramatic change in the government's attitude toward reform, an
unexpected collapse of white resolve, or a major expansion in the E"tttwe
at level of b aT-ck jnres ou chan a his es~'i a e
V. The Contenders for Power
The thred\most conspicuous trefs discernable with South Africa
A broadenin of white recognitio that classic apar heid is a
ailed polite al blueprint and the search for a new olitical
cture preserving white privilege\and power.
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-- The politication and growing radicallr'ation of the black
population.
These trends define the major political actors on the South African scene.
The South African Government and the Nationalist Party have been
seized with the need of reforming the sociopolitical structure as has
much of the white electorate. The leadership of the party and government
has been unable to come forward with a clear vision of a new political
system, due, we believe, to its unwillingness to abandon either white
socioeconomic privilege or ultimate white control of the national
government--again, reflecting the views of two-thirds or more of the
white electorate. P. W. Botha himself is likely to leave the political
scene by 1989 if not sooner, but his most likely successor,
F. W. deKlerk, shares the same fundamentally limited agenda as Botha.
While opposition from the white radical right concerns the Nationalist
leadership and will provoke policy adjustments regarding the scope and
pace of reform, we do not see the likelihood of the right-wing opposition
parties bringing down the Nationalist control of government over the next
few years.
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Tne duel phenomena of black politicization and organization has
s
resulted in an explosion of black organization, with hundreds of
A
issue-oriented and community groups emerging in the last few years.
These groups have begun to aggregate themselves into nationwide
organizations with nervous South African Government acquiescence. The
two most dynamic aggregations of black organization are the United
Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU). Two other significant aggregations which antedate the UDF and
COSATU are the black power groups and the tribal homeland leaderships.
The most visibly dynamic black grouping is the young "comrades"
responsible for most of the township violence of the last year.
The UDF: The\l1DF is a loose federation of overt separate and
widely d sarate organizations with both national and region'al
leader ips and a Maimed membership of some 2 mil'*Mon. The UDF's
political platform closely resembles the ANC's Freedom Charter and many
UDF leaders have had strong ANC connections. The ANC probably has
substantial influence with the national UDF leadership, some of the
regional leaderships such as the Natal and West Cape UDF organizations,
and reportedly directs a small number of the component organizations.
Nonetheless, we do not credit either South African Government or ANC
claims that the UDF is an ANC surrogate. The UDF is a loose organization
and the large majority of its component organizations are autonomous
actors and not controlled by the ANC. Many of these groups are issue
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oriented and are willing to act contrary to ANC wishes in negotiating
with the South African Government or "establishment" entities to obtain
real reforms or benefits for their members. The UDF's future is cloudy.
The organization has become more radicalized in recent months as newly
formed community and youth groups, often dominated by violence-oriented
radicals, claim allegiance to the UDF while more conservative,
reform-oriented groups and leaders, including religious groups, have
fallen silent due to lack of results from their efforts. The UDF appears
a specific target of government suppression and, given the disparate
nature of its constituency, it is questionable whether the UDF can
survive concerted government suppression.
COSATU: The most dynamic and growing trade union group is the
660,000 member Congress of South African Trade Unions. A federation of
some 33 unions, COSATU includes the pragmatic mainstream black unions and
17 more politically activist unions affiliated with the UDF. We expect
the Congress to retain formal independence of all political groups.
Various COSATU leaders have met with ANC representatives outside South
Africa on at least two occasions and most Congress leaders recognize the
ANC as the preeminent liberation group. Nevertheless, some union leaders
any contact.
NC does not act in the interests of workers and oppose
-wi COSATU and individual trade unions
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strictly economic issues. The detention of over 900
unionists during the present state of emergency now has moved COSATU and
its member unions directly into political confrontation with Pretoria.
The government can be expected to suppress union leaders with an
excessively political agenda while tolerating occasional one-day
political stayaways. On balance, we see a gradual rather than headlong
radicalization of the black trade union movement.
Black Consciousness Groups: The National Forum is an attempt by
various "black consciousness" groups to create a rival grouping to the
UDF. Their ideological predecessor, the now-banned Black Consciousness
Movement, provided the dynamic for the 1976 Soweto riots. Black
consciousness groups believe blacks should win their own liberation, and
reject white domination or participation in the struggle. The leading
member group, the Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) which has about
20,000 members, criticizes both the ANC and UDF on a number of accounts,
most vehemently by accusing the ANC of being controlled by white and
Indian communists. Most National Forum groups are dominated by
intellectuals, internally divided, and are increasingly in violent
conflict with the UDF. Despite the fact that the National Forum group's
ideology appears closer to the views of many township radicals than that
of the ANC or UDF, we expect continuing defections from this group to the
ANC and UDF.
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Tribal/Homeland Groups: The "homeland" governments have all
organized tribally oriented political movements with government
acquiescence or encouragement. We believe that tribal loyalties and
rivalries are still prevalent, especially among the 14 million rural
blacks, and thus susceptible to exploitation by these groups. The Zulu
movement Inkatha, led by Chief Buthelezi, represents the most dynamic of
these groups, with a claimed membership of over 1 million. These groups
will come under increasing attack by activist opposition elements as
"sellouts," spreading the factional violence now occurring in the urban
townships into the homelands.
The Township Militants: The most visibly active grouping within
South Africa are the mostly unemployed and young township
militants--called "comrades"--who are responsible for much of the
violence. The township militants appear to lack coherent organization or
serious affiliation with other groups. In general, they favor violence
against "collaborators," the "establishment," and feel that only by open
violence can they bring down the system of white rule. Various groups
claim allegiance to the ANC, UDF, or AZAPO but evidence of serious
organization or incorporation is lacking. Violence often seems random
and nihilistic. The ANC, UDF, and AZAPO are making efforts to recruit
and control these groups but with only limited success to date. The very
amorphousness of these groups prevents comprehensive government
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SECRE1
suppression of them. As economic conditions in the townships worsen and
recruitment efforts on the part of the ANC, UDF, and AZAPO intensify, we
envision some more structured organization of these elements developing,
particularly in townships and parts of townships where the government has
abandoned all attempts at control. The ANC has a marked advantage in
recruiting these groups by means of its supply of arms and will likely
make the most headway, but we envision much of the township violence
continuing to come from ill-organized and largely transitory groupings.
We also see interfactional violence between differing elements of these
township militants on the rise as rival groups feud. This intracommunal
violence will be at times encouraged by the South African Government.
The reduction of influx control and the anticipated new waves of
rural-to-urban immigrants will provide all factions with fresh manpower
for more violence and feuding.
The latest South Afr an Government dec ration of a State of
Emergency and the detention of over 2,000 position activists reflect
Pretoria's growing perception that its limited reforms and relatively
restrained use of state power nei\her produce international gains nor
domestic tranquility. While the AN mnd UDF appear to be the major
targets of security action, COSATU n other groups have also had leaders
detained. The OF regional and tiona leaderships seem particularly
vulnerable, but the South Afr' an Governme t will have considerable
di i ulty in attempts to r ress black trad unions beyond the short
term. We believe that th 4security crackdown ill continue for some
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Question: IS THE ANC A TERRORIST GROUP?
Although the ANC remains in a distinctly different category than
European groups such as the Red Brigade or Lebanese terrorist groups,
its military wing recently has conducted more indiscriminate attacks
than in the past with mounting white casualties in particular. Until
last year, the ANC generally tried to avoid injuring civilians during
its bombing attacks on government targets. Exceptions usually were
unintentional or were justified as retaliation for South African raids
against ANC targets in neighboring states. Following a major
conference last summer, the ANC said it would continue to strike at
government targets but would be less concerned about civilian
casualties. Most ANC bombings since late last year, however, have
been directed against civilian targets--shopping malls, bus stops,
restaurants, and isolated farms. ANC leaders may have decided that
attacks on government targets alone are not sufficient against a
backdrop of the worst domestic unrest in South Africa's modern
history. Alternatively, but less likely in our view, the new trend
may only reflect independent acts by renegade ANC guerrillas inside
the country.
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Question: IS MANDELA A COMMUNIST?
Mandela almost certainly is not a Communist, although he worked
closely and formed strong friendships with many SACP members before
his imprisonment in 1962. During the mid-1940s, both Mandela and
Oliver Tambo were virulently anti-Communist, and even created the ANC
Youth League in part as a base to work toward driving Communists out
of the parent body. Mandela's view apparently changed over time as he
began to appreciate the vigorous antiapartheid efforts of many
Communists. He has maintained consistently that he is not a Communist
and was acquitted on that charge in a South African court. During his
trial in the early 1960s, he stated that ultimately, Communists and
black nationalists such as himself would find themselves on divergent
paths when a black government comes to power, but could work together
until then against a common enemy.
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JGlinG J.
Question: WHAT WOULD MANDELA DO IF HE WERE FREE?
We think it unlikely that South African government will release
Mandela with the intention of negotiating with him on the country's
political future. Pretoria, however, might release Mandela into
exile, if only to prevent his death in prison. Mandela probably would
then resume a leadership role in the ANC and be a highly visible
ambassador for the group internationally.
To release Mandela within the country would be viewed as very
risky by the South African government because of his immense
popularity among blacks. A general strike personally called by
Mandela probably would draw an unprecedented response. Because he is
strong-willed, however, Mandela--if allowed to remain inside the
country--might confront the government immediately upon his release in
a provocative manner (he has told journalists that if freed, he would
expect to be back in jail within 24 hours). Scenarios in which
Mandela travels around South Africa Gandhi-style and marshals black
support for a powersharing arrangement with the white government
ignore, in our view, Mandela's militant, activist background and
Pretoria's record of intolerant behavior toward threats to continued
white control of the country.
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