ATTACHED ARE THE TWO THINGS YOU ASKED FOR EARLIER THIS WEEK FOR YOUR UPCOMING SPEECHES -- THE NUMBERS ON SOVIET AID TO NICARAGUA, ANGOLA, ETC., AND THE EVIDENCE ON SYRIAN, LIBYAN, AND IRANIAN STATE SUPPORT FOR COUNTERTERRORISM.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600740004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 5, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
5 November 1986
Attached are the two things you asked for
earlier this week for your upcoming speeches --
the numbers on Soviet aid to Nicaragua, Angola,
etc., and the evidence on Syrian, Libyan, and
Iranian state support for counterterrorism.
On the former, the authors tell me that
you could easily use the grand total numbers
on the two tables on an unclassified basis.
I have asked them to try to get you some
better numbers on the Turkish information.
On the latter, I think you will find more
than enough to indict. The CTC has mixed
unclassified with classified material, but
you will find that most of the sentences are
carefully marked. I suspect that much of
what they have classified is judgmental rather
than derived from specific reports.
Paul
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Deputy Chief
International Security Issues Division, OGI
Communist Aid to the Third World
Warsaw Pact Support for Nicaragua and Angola
The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have provided
substantial and growing military support to Nicaragua since
1982. Major equipment items delivered to Nicaragua include MI-8
and MI-17 transport helicopters, MI-25 helicopter gunships, large
quantities of jeeps, trucks, and other logistical support and
transport equipment. Communist countries have also become
Nicaragua's major source of economic aid in the 1980s as Moscow
and its allies have tried to shore up a Nicaraguan economy
deteriorating rapidly because of cutbacks in Western funding,
slumping industrial and agricultural production, and falling
export earnings. Since 1982, Communist countries have provided
an average of $300 million in economic aid annually, bolstered by
Soviet supplies of oil and products in 1984-86 valued at $300
million. Most of this aid must ultimately be repaid. Moscow
also has provided large numbers of trucks, agricultural vehicles,
and road building equipment, aid to hospitals, irrigation and
power development, gold mining and minerals prospecting, and
school construction. Cuba and East Germany have been heavy
contributors, each providing $200 to $250 million in aid since
1982; Havana has constructed a sugar plant, rail line, roads,
airfields, and oil storage facilities. Communist countries are
expected to provide three-quarters of all the aid flowing to
Nicaragua in 1986.
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SUBJECT: Communist Aid to the Third World
Angola has become Moscow's leading arms client in sub-
Saharan Africa through deliveries of MiG-23 and SU-22 fighters,
MI-17 and MI-24 helicopters, and a wide range of air defense
systems, such as the SA-13, SA-2, SA-8, and SA-7. Communist
economic 1 idf-oJ Angola has focused on the provision of
technicians (7100 in 1985) to help stem the critical
deterioration in Angola's economy. Luanda pays for these
technicians in hard currency, adding further to the country's
economic woes. Communist aid to date has not been able to keep
economic production at levels seen before the current government
took power. Aid disbursements have averaged only about $20
million annually, all of it in the form of loans. We expec
agricultural, and fisheries develo m t rojects under a $2
billion agreement signed in 1982.
SECRET
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Communist Arms in Grenada
Maurice Bishop and the other New Jewel Movement (NJM)
leaders sought to bring Grenada into the Soviet orbit. Bishop
signed formal cooperation treaties with Moscow and other close
Soviet allies such as Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, and North
Korea. Other secret agreements were also signed with these
countries providing counter-intelligence and surveillance
equipment, and military, political, and intelligence training.
Major military equipment items uncovered on the island following
the US intervention included at least 4 Soviet BTR-60 and 2 BRDM
armored vehicles, Soviet and Czech light anti-aircraft guns,
thousands of Soviet AK-47 and AKM assault rifles, large
quantities of Czech IFA and Soviet ZIL trucks, and several Soviet
ZIS anti-tank guns. Contract information revealed that equipment
on order would be sufficient to arm a fighting force of over
10,000 men. Grenada was awaiting delivery of the following
Soviet Bloc military equipment:
-- About 10,000 assault and other rifles.
-- More than 11.5 million rounds of 7.62 ammunition.
-- Some 300 portable rocket launchers with over 16,000
rockets.
-- Sixty armored personnel carriers and patrol vehicles.
-- A transport aircraft capable of carrying 39 special
forces paratroopers.
Warsaw Pact Weapons for Turkish Terrorists
A large number of Warsaw Pact origin small arms and other
weapons found their way via the gray arms market to Turkish
terrorist groups during the 1970s. Smaller amounts of such
equipment continues to turn up. Turkish security forces have
uncovered military equipment originating in:
-- Czechoslovakia. The CZ-75 pistol was popular with Turkish
terrorists in the late 1970s because it chambered the
same ammunition used in many of their submachineguns.
Turkish officials found several thousand CZ-75s entering
the country illegally during 1979. An arms cache
uncovered in Turkey in 1979 contained Czech VZ-58 assault
rifles.
-- Poland. Armenian terrorists used Polish WZ-63
submachineguns in attacks against a Turkish diplomat in
Lisbon in 1983 and in 1982 during a seige of the Esenboga
airport in Turkey. The WZ-63 is ideal for terrorist use
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because of its light weight--less than 2 kilograms--and small
size, measuring less than 33 centimeters with the stock folded.
Hungary. The Hungarian 9mm Walthum pistol was frequently
used by Armenian terrorists in the late 1970s.
Soviet Union. In 1981 Turkish officials uncovered Soviet
MAD bazookas, Soviet-origin AK-47 rifles, and F-1 hand
grenades in Armenian arms caches.
SECRET
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State Support for International Terrorism: Syria, Libya and Iran
State support constitutes a significant and lethal component of
international terrorism and has become an established instrument of foreign
policy of some Middle Eastern countries, especially Libya, Syria and Iran.
Evidence of Libyan, Syrian and Iranian complicity in acts of international
terrorism is clear and convincing, dating back in some cases to the early
seventies.
Libya, Syria and Iran support terrorism in several ways. All three
provide financial, logistical, propaganda, training, and communications
support as well as weapons to their terrorist surrogates. In some cases state
agents actually have planned, directed, and carried out terrorist operations.
These three states, however, largely use other groups as their surrogates to
conduct terrorism that the states can later deny having sponsored or
encouraged.
Libya
Tripoli is one of the more visible state sufi'orters of terrorism. In
keeping with its revolutionary philosophy Libya has provided aid to numerous
national liberation movements and almost every international terrorist group.
Qadhafi's largesse has extended to groups in Europe, Latin America, Asia,
Africa and the Middle East. Libya uses it Libyan People's Bureaus (LPBs) not
just to maintain formal diplomatic relations but as a focal point for Libyan
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intelligence and terrorist activities. Qadhafi's terrorist ire, however, is
largely reserved for Libyan dissidents living abroad, moderate Arab states,
and the United States.
Evidence of Libyan involvement in terrorism over the last two years is
sweeping and conclusive. Libyan assassins have been arrested at the scene of
the attacks; captured agents in foiled plots have confessed to links with
Libya; equipment used in terrorist operations has been traced to Libya; and
Libyan have been duped by sting operations into making incriminating
statements recorded on video and audio tapes.
-- An attack in April 1985 on a Libyan exile in Bonn--which resulted
in his murder and the wounding of two German bystanders--ended in
the arrest and subsequent conviction of the Libyan assassin
-- A Libyan Arab Airlines employee was arrested after he shot a
Libyan-born businessmen in Greece in June 1984
-- The Libyan assailant of a Moroccan citizen in April 1985 in West
Germany was captured at the scene of the attack.
-- In February 1985, Chad presented evidence to the UN Security
Council of a September 1984 plot to assassinate President Habre. A
Libyan-made attache case bomb was to be placed in the meeting room
of the Council of Ministers and detonated from a remote location
The detonating device was traced to stock purchased by Libya.
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-- Tunisian authorities in September 1985 anounced the expulsion of a
Libyan diplomat who had smuggled letter bombs through the
diplomatic pouch
-- According to Egyptian press, Libyans claiming diplomatic immunity
--but lacking proper accreditation--were discovered in August 1984
trying to smuggle boxloads of weapons into an unidentified Arab
country.
-- British police found weapons, ammunition, and body armor in the
Libyan People's Bureau after the UK severed relations with Libya
in April 1984. The diplomatic break was prompted by the killing
of a British police officer by a shot fired from inside the
LPB.
-- In November 1984, the Egyptians encouraged Qadhafi to believe that
his hired agents had assassinated former Libyan Prime Minister
Bakoush. The Libyan press claimed credit for the killing of
Bakoush, after which Egypt revealed that the four assassins
were in custody and pictures of the alleged victim were fakes
-- Egypt successfully infiltrated another plot against high-level
Libyan exiles in November 1985. Libyan nationals were among those
arrested. After the attack was aborted and arrests were made,
audio and video tapes incriminating Libya were played in Egyptian
media.
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Libyan Involvement in Hijacking of Egyptair Flight 648 and the Attacks on the
El Al Airport Ticket Counters.
Evidence of Libyan involvement in the November 1985 hijacking of Egyptair
Flight 648 and the December attacks on the El Al counters at the Vienna and
Rome airports is largely circumstantial. It is not clear whether Libya
participated in the planning or execution of the hijacking, but it certainly
moved quickly to exploit the situation. Evidence of Libyan complicity in the
airport attacks is more concrete, and we judge it likely that Libya played at
least a logistical support role.
Egyptair
While there is no "smoking gun" with which to convict Libya for the
hijacking, there is evidence of Libyan involvement:
the hijackers wanted to
be flown to Tunisia or Tripoli, Libya
-- The Libyan ambassador in Malta spoke with the hijackers at their
request.
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El Al Attacks
There is better evidence tying Libya to the Rome and Vienna attacks on 27
-- Tunisian officials reported that Libya provided the three
passports used by the terrorists in Vienna. Two had been seized
from Tunisians expelled from Libya last fall, and the third had
been lost by a Tunisian resident in Libya
-- While the Libyan press quickly provided supporting rhetoric,
calling the attacks "heroic operations", Qadhafi dissassociaated
himself from these comments after an international uproar.
Recent Libyan Activity
I,
one of the suspects arrested by
Pakistani authorities in connection with the attempted hijacking of Pan Am
Flight 73 has ties to Libya and that Libya probably provided logistical
support to the hijackers
Libya also has been implicated in a number of other extremely vicious
25X1 anti-Western attacks.
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On 5 April, Tripoli undeniably sponsored an attack--probably conducted by
Palestinians--against the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin, killing three
people including one American.
In response to the retaliatory airstrikes launched by the United States on
Tripoli and Banghazi on 14 April, Libya initiated a new round of terrorist
violence.
-- On 15 April a US Embassy communicator was shot and severely
wounded in Khartoum, Sudaircumstantial evidence points
strongly to Libyan involvement.
-- The British Government has publicly blamed Libya for the aq of
two British teachers kidnaped in West Beirut in late March. Their
bodies, along with that of American Peter Kilburn--a hostage
since December 1984 who may have been held by an independent group
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in Lebanon and "sold" to the Libyans--were found together on 17
Apri~~. ibya, therefore probably had a hand in Kilburn's death as
wele note accompanying the bodies said that they had been
executed in retaliation for the US raid on Libya.
-- On 18 April, two Libyans were apprehended as they approached the
US Officers Club in Ankara to launch an attack with six
Soviet-made fragmentation grenades they claimed they had received
from the Libyan People's Bureau in Ankara. Two other Libyans were
arrested soon afterward as possible accomplices.
-- On 25 April, unknown glen seriously wounded another US Embassy
employee in Sanaa, Yemen Arab Republic. The assailants are
believed to have been Libyan-sponsored
A growing body of circumstantial evidence also points to Libyan
sponsorship of the 3 August attack on the British base in Akotiri, Cyprus, in
which two persons were wounded.
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Syria
Syria long has used terrorist tactics to dissuade opponents and
recalcitrant allies from pursuing policies inimical to Syrian interests.
Support for terrorist groups costs Syria little but raises the cost to
participants of any peace initiative that excludes Damascus and serves to keep
Assad's regional rivals off balance.
Syria largely uses surrogates to mask its role in terrorist attacks and to
obtain leverage over the groups Damascus supports. Syria enables terrorist
groups to use Syrian or Syrian-controlled territory for base camps, training
facilities, and political headquarters and provides arms, travel assistance,
intelligence, and probably money. Some of the groups linked to Syria are the
Abu Nidal Group, the PFLP-GC, and Abu Musa's Fatah rebels
The recently concluded Hindawi trial in London, however, paints the most
damaging picture of direct Syrian involvement in terrorism since the early
1980s. The British investigation implicated top Syrian Air Force Intelligence
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officials, the Syrian Arab Airlines, and Syrian Embassy personnel, including
the Ambassador, in the plot to blow up an El Al jet last April carrying 340
passengers, 220 of whom were US citizens. Although we have no information on
the involvment of President Assad in the El Al plot, we believe that the head
of Air Force Intelligence, Muhammad al-Khuli, probably cleared it with him.
Assad, a former Air Force General himself, relies heavily on Air Force
Intelligence to implement terrorist policy, and al-Khuli is considered his
chief troubleshooter and personal emissary.
-- Nizar Hindawi, a Palestinian living in London, traveled to Syria
in January 1986 seeking funding for a new terrorist group in
Western Europe, the Jordanian Revolutionary Movement. He met with
several Syrian Air Force Intelligence officials, including
al-Khuli.F--]
-- In February, Haitham Said, second in command of Syrian Air Force
Intelligence, told Hindawi about the plan to place a bomb on an El
Al flight leaving London. He also gave Hindawi an official Syrian
passport with a false identity.
-- Back in Damascus, Said instructed Hindawi on how to use the bomb
and specified the flight on which it was to be placed. He
allegedly promised to pay Hindawi $250,000 one week after the
successful completion of the operation
-- On 5 April, Hindawi traveled to London and picked up the explosive
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/V
-- After he learned that El Al security had discovered the bomb in
his girlfriend's suitcase, Hindawi went to the Syrian Embassy.
The Ambassador told an embassy employee to accompany Hindawi to a
Syrian safehouse in West Kensington. Hindawi escaped the next
morning en route to the Syrian Embassy.
Hindawi's links to Syrian intelligence were at least partially confirmed
by the interrogations of his brother in West Berlin and his cousin in Genoa
-- Ahmed Hasi, the suspect in the bombing of the German-Arab
Friendship Union building last March, confirmed that Hindawi
traveled to Syria where he contacted intelligence officials in
January. Hasi also claims that Hindawi made arrangements for him
to pick up from the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin the explosive
device that subsequently was used in the bombing of the Friendship
Union building.
-- The arrest of Hindawi's cousin, Awni Hindawi, in Genoa revealed
that he too belonged to the Jordanian Revolutionary Movement. In
his apartment, police discovered a letter from Nizar in London
requesting that Awni contact Haitham Said in Damascus to help
secure his release from prison.
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Finally, evidence gathered in preparation for the upcoming trial of Ahmed
Hasi for his part in the bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Building early
last year almost certainly will tie Syria to the operation.
Syrian supported groups also were involved in the following terrorist
-- On 26 June, a bomb exploded in the hands of an El Al worker at
Madrid airport, and the terrorist arrested said he was a member of
the Abu Musa Group, an anti-Arafat Palestinian group headquartered
25X1 in Damascus.
-- The Abu Nidal Group was responsible for the vicious Egyptair
hijacking in November 1985 and also attacked the Rome and Vienna
El Al ticket counters on 27 December. The three attacks accounted
for nearly 200 casualties (killed and wounded) including more
than 20 Americans
-- A grenade attack on a Rome sidewalk cafe in September injured 38
tourists, including nine Americans. The Revolutionary
Organization of Socialist Moslems (ROSM)--another Abu Nidal
covername--claimed responsibility for the attack.
-- Nine days after the attack on the cafe, police arrested a
Palestinian in connection with an explosion at the British Airways
office in Rome that injured 15 people. The suspect claimed to be a
member of ROSM and was later identified by witnesses as the same
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man who attacked the Jordanian Airways office in Athens in March
-- In April rockets were fired at a Jordanian airliner leaving Athens
airport, and, one day earlier, a rocket narrowly missed the
Jordanian Embassy building in Rome. Black September claimed
responsibility for both incidents.
Iranian leaders are committed to the longterm goal of exporting the
revolution and many advocate the use of terrorism and political violence to
achieve that goalThe level of terrorism by Iranian supported groups has
declined over the past two years, however, and Tehran has not been directly
linked with any major terrorist incidents this year
Most of Iran's attention is focused on its war with Iraq, and Tehran
25X1
LOA I
ontinues to recruit, train, ana rinance Iraqi snia aissiaents wno are
dedicated to the overthrow of Saddam Husay .
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Lebanon has been the scene of most of the terrorism perpetrated by groups
that Iran supports. Tehran has ties to the radical Shia factions that have
kidnaped foreigners and are conducting terrorist operations against
Western--and particularly US and French--interests. The extent of Tehran's
influence over these groups, however, is unclear. There is no indication that
Iran ordered or assisted in the kidnapings or the attacks against the French
in Lebanon, although groups claiming responsibility for the operations alleged
they were done for Iran's benefit.
-- Iranian-backed groups in Lebanon may have been responsible for the
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abduction of two Americans and several French citizens this year.
Factions seeking to press Paris to improve relations with Tehran
claimed responsibility for the kidnaping of a French television
crew last spring, and two were released this summer when the
states were negotiati
teral issues' Iran probably did not
instigate the operations A little known group called the
Revolutionary Justice Organization claimed it had abducted Frank
Reed and Joseph Cicippio in early Septembele believe
Libyan-backed elements may have carried out the operations,
possibly with support from Hizballah supporters
-- A faction of Hizballah continues to hold two US hostages--Terry
-- Iranian-backed factions in Lebanon may also have been responsible
for the murder of a French military attache in Beirut in September
and for the attacks against the French contingent of The UNIFIL in
South Lebanon--]Iran opposes the presence of the UN force in the
south and probably was not directly involved in the
guerrilla-style attacks against the UNIFIL units, but IRGC
elements d have participated in the attacks in
the south.
Iran is trying to improve bilateral ties to Western Europe and the Gulf
states, gain international respectability, and expand commercial relations
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worldwide As long as these goals are given priority, Tehran is likely to be
cautious in providing support for terrorist operations, particularly where its
involvement might be revealed.
-- We believe, however, that Tehran will revert to active support of
terrorism if it suffers a serious setback in the war or perceives
that the Gulf states are increasing their support to Iraq
Iran will continue to recruit Shia dissidents from Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq, give them
military training in Iran, and try to send them back to the Gulf
They probably will be cautioned, however, not to plan spectacular
acts of violence now, but to concentrate on building local
networks
-- We also believe that Iran will expand its networks in Europe,
Africa, and Asia, using local Shia communities, religious and
cultural institutions, as well as its diplomatic service to
bolster its capability to conduct or support terrorist activities.
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