GLAD TO BE HERE PRES OF ITALY CHAN OF GERMANY MOYERS - CAN'T HEAR YOU HAK - POPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600810002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MISC

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The Chicago Committee
Sponsored by The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Remarks by Robert M. Gates
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
5 May 1987
CIA and American Foreign Policy
Introduction
I want to speak to you this afternoon on a subject of
endless fascination to Americans and others all over the
world: the role of CIA in American foreign policy. Never, in
any field of human endeavor, has so much been written by so
many that has been so wrong. Public views of CIA for years
have been shaped primarily by movies, television, novels,
newspaper accounts or allegations of misdeeds, headlines
growing out of Congressional inquiries, grandstanding public
figures, exposes by former intelligence officers, and studies
by experts who have never served in American intelligence.
While we can sometimes publicly refute false allegations of
wrongdoing, often we must remain silent to protect sources and
methods. Also, we have neither the resources nor the
inclination to answer all the criticisms and allegations
against us.
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The result is a contradictory melange of public images of
CIA ranging from diabolically cunning to hopelessly
incompetent, from clever manipulator of other agencies and the
Congress to a hamstrung and near paralyzed bureaucracy, from a
fiendishly clever and cynical fixer or destroyer around the
world to a bunch of bunglers whose incompetence cnd
over-caution have eviscerated key foreign policy initiatives
and resulted in missed opportunities, from expositors of an
exaggerated military threat and manufacturer of international
tension to soft-headed liberals who have consistently
underplayed the dangers facing America, We are said to be an
invisible government and yet are the most visible, externally
supervised and written about intelligence service in the
world,
Today, I would like to lift the curtain a bit on the
reality of CIA's role in American foreign policy. Let me start
with a few facts to give you some perspective, Given the
media's attention to covert action, I would like to say first
of all that over 90 percent of the national foreign
intelligence budget is devoted to the collection and analysis
of information, along with required administrative support,
About half of the Intelligence Community's and CIA's overall
collection and analysis resources are devoted to the Soviet
Union. The lion's share of that effort is devoted to Soviet
weapons and military programs and the economic structure
underpinning them,
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Intelligence Support to the Policy Process
Now, if CIA is not spending most of its time or money
trying to overthrow governments, what exactly does it do? It
devotes the overwhelming preponderance of its effort and money
collecting information. We get information from satellites,
from newspapers, periodicals, radios, and television around the
world, from our diplomats and military attaches overseas and of
course from classic spies, That information flows to
Washington where analysts sift through it, examine it, collate
it, try to make sense of the millions of bits and pieces that
come to us on the nearly infinite number of issues and
developments world-wide of interest to the United States, We
then report our findings to policy officials and military
commanders,
Thus, however disappointing, the typical CIA officer is not
much like James Bond or Rambo. Indeed, they are dedicated
people who spend their lives under cover in all corners of the
world working long hours collecting scraps of information -- or
more rarely, the mother lode -- that will help complete the
mosaic in Washington; they are the engineers who are at the
cutting edge of space technology; they are the specialists in a
hundred disciplines trying to make an ever more complicated
world understandable and to provide warning not just of war but
of dramatic change of any kind that will affect the fate or
well-being of the United States,
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What is intelligence information and how is it used by the
policymaker? The key is the relevance of the information to US
policy and US interests. It is the focus of our analysis on US
national security interests, and the advantage of unique or
prior knowledge, that makes intelligence valuable to the
policymaker, Some examples illustrate how intelligence
directly serves the policymaker:
-- We have provided detailed information on Soviet tanks,
on their armor, design, strengths and vulnerabilities.
One specific result has been to provide vital
information that allowed US weapons developers to
improve anti-armor weapons.
-- We regularly provide detailed assessments to support
economic or trade negotiations, Nothing gives the
negotiator more of an advantage than knowing what the
person on the other side of the table plans to propose
or wishes to avoid,
-- Intelligence on the plans of terrorist to attack US or
allied installations or personnel is regularly used to
alert security forces and otherwise frustrate the
actions of terrorists, We can point to many specific
cases where intelligence allowed us to prevent attacks.
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-- CIA recently completed a comprehensive analysis of how
the Soviets place officers into the UN so they can
influence the policies and members of that organization,
-- Analysis of foreign restrictions on US business
operations and investments combined with foreign
support for their own business ventures are essential
inputs to US economic negotiations,
-- Information is regularly provided to law enforcement
officials on intelligence acquired on the activities of
drug traffickers. But equally important is analysis
that has supported US efforts to convince heads of
governments about the threat that drug traffickers pose
to their people and their governments,
-- We identify key US or Western technologies being
illegally acquired by the USSR, assess the value of the
technology to the Soviets, the parties involved in the
transactions, the involvement of foreign governments in
the activities, and the specific process used by the
Soviets to acquire the information or hardware,
-- As the US actively negotiates with the USSR on arms
control, intelligence assesses the ability of the US to
monitor Soviet compliance or non-compliance with
agreements.
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Information on these issues, the policies and attitudes of
key leaders and new governments, trends in oil production, the
plans of debtor nations to suspend payments or challenge
creditors, and countless other subjects is key to the
formulation of effective US policies,
Intelligence Support
How, then, does this information find its way to the
policymaker?
First of all, there is the intelligence that senior
officials get day to day and during crises. The President
receives the President's Daily Brief, a report of developments
worldwide in the preceding 24 hours, Other officials receive u
similar document, the National Intelligence Daily. During the
course of the day, the National Security Advisor takes the
President intelligence reports on significant, developments
overseas. In a crisis, the flow of information increases and
the President will receive briefings in meetings with his
senior White House, State, Defense, and Intelligence advisors.
Other senior policy officials receive similar support, tailored
to their special responsibilities and needs,
Second, intelligence has a role to play in the development
of longer-range policies. All Presidents have created various
Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level committees to examine policy
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options and to plan for the future. Meetings of these groups
usually begin with an intelligence briefing. The Intelligence
Community also contributes analysis to policy papers describing
both the events at hand and potential opportunities or problems
for the United States.
Beyond such briefings and contributions to policy papers,
National Intelligence Estimates play an important role in the
making of policy, These estimates are the most formal
expression of Intelligence Community views and all of the
intelligence agencies of the government both contribute to and
coordinate on what is said in these estimates, In recent years
there has been special emphasis on the presentation of
disagreements, alternative views and the description of diverse
possible outcomes -- along with an extra effort to ensure their
relevance. This process of debate can be a tough one. Faint
hearts should stay away. Views are challenged routinely and
dissents are common.
In the end, every estimate is considered and approved by
the heads of all US intelligence agencies. While we are
occasionally wrong, and our debates occasionally fierce, we are
incredibly jealous of our independence and objectivity.
Stories you read about slanted intelligence are false. Neither
Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committee has identified
any slant in assessments and they see them all, And, I can
assure you, they would not hesitate to bring any such concern
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to our and the publics attention. In the drafting, debate,
coordination and approval process, the integrity and
objectivity of our estimates are protected.
The value and significance of the estimates varies, Some
that have the most impact, like the military estimates, receive
modest attention at the top levels of government, Those on
problems that are important but on which few policymakers are
expert -- like Cambodia, International Narcotics Trade or
Southern Africa -- are read closely, as are those on certain
economic issues, Some, like Mexico, get attention because they
are provocative. Those covering problems so vast and
complicated that a policymaker can't get his or her arms around
them -- like foreign technological competition -- are read with
interest but sometimes are just too sweeping to serve as a
focus for action. There are, regrettably, some estimates that
are either irrelevant to current concerns, too long or even
wrong -- and they deserve the ignominious fate they often
suffer. But most estimates simply provide background,
perspective, information and are as objective and unambiguous a
forecast of the future on a given subject or issue as we can
develop. And I believe these estimates play their proper role
in informing policy decisions.
Finally, another means by which the policy process is
informed are specialized assessments by individual agencies.
CIA's assessments or research program is the product of the
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largest intelligence analysis organization in the world, The
range of issues is breathtaking -- from strategic weapons to
food supplies; epidemiology to space; water and climate to
Third World political instability; mineral resources to
international finance; supplies of energy and oil to forced
labor camps; Soviet laser weapons to remote tribal
demographics; chemical and biological weapons proliferation to
commmodity supplies; and many, many more,
The third and perhaps most important way in which
intelligence reaches policymakers is through warning reports.
In this connection, the top priority for the American
Intelligence Community is providing warning of war, Next in
importance is monitoring military and weapons developments of
our adversaries, including their research and development on
future weapon systems. Following that, we pay attention to
warning of problems in a host of other areas from instability
in key Third World countries, to resource shortages and energy
supplies to the implications of demographic developments around
the world, to food supplies and famine, and, most recently of
all, to the technological prowess of competitor nations,
I also should note that Intelligence also affects the
policy process through our support for Congress. Last year,
CIA alone gave some 1600 briefings on Capital Hill, and
provided thousands of intelligence assessments -- and by no
means only to our Oversight Committees.
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Covert Action
This business of collection, analysis, warning and
estimating unfortunately is pretty tame stuff -- it certainly
grabs no headlines nor does it have the sparkle of intrigue and
excitement. That role is played by covert action, which,
because it is more in keeping with the popular imagination of
the spy business, gets media attention for disproportionate to
the scope of such activities,
Covert action is an effort on the part of any government
clandestinely to assist its friends, promote setbacks to its
adversaries, and overall advance its interests, In the case of
the United States, it includes support to opposition elements
in totalitarian states, to democratic forces in authoritarian
states, and to those resisting Communist aggression,
Most of the myths about CIA and most of the criticism of
the Agency derive from its role in covert action, Covert
action is an instrument of foreign policy, always decided upon
by policy officials, briefed to Congressional oversight
committees, governed by extraordinarily far-reaching rules and
laws, and implemented by CIA. This instrument has been used by
every Administration since World War II, There have been
important successes and important failures, as is logical when
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one considers that covert action is often -- too often -- an
option of last resort, where no other means has worked or can
even be tried. Both the successes and the failures of covert
operations approved by policymakers and funded by Congress have
generated criticism of the Agency.
No nation in the world has such an elaborate set of checks
and balances and safeguards with respect to covert activity as
does the United States -- an approach fully in keeping with the
type of government we have, It is an instrument that must be
used sparingly, effectively, and proportionately. Covert
activities must be chosen with care and in the context of
larger political considerations. Covert action is an
instrument where accountability, both inside the Executive
Branch and with respect to the Congress, must be strict, And
we all subscribe to the rule of thumb articulated by the
President, that any covert action should seem to the American
people consistent with both our principles and our interests if
it were to become public,
Problems and Concerns
The relationship between the Intelligence Community and the
policy community is always touchy. If it is not, we in
intelligence clearly are not doing our job. On many issues, it
is not possible consistently to satisfy simultaneously the
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Departments of State and Defense, the National Security Council
staff, other agencies of the government, and the Congress.
Someone will often be unhappy at us for assessments with which
they disagree,
Let me be more specific about what we in intelligence
consider to be our biggest problems as we think about our
support for the policymaker.
1, How do we obtain and sustain quality analysis? How do
we produce realistic, tough-minded and accurate
assessments? How do we identify and offset our own
biases?
2. How do we balance our resources in both collection and
analysis between requirements for current intelligence
and the need for information on longer term problems?
3. How do we establish a close relationship to the
policymaker required for relevance and timeliness
without getting so close that our independence and
objectivity are jeopardized? How do we remain
objective when CIA is involved in the policy -- whether
covert action or counterterrorism, or others?
4, How do we take into account inherent uncertainties of
any given situation, express those uncertainties to the
policymaker and be honest about our own uncertainty?
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5, How, in both collection and analysis, do we ensure our
openness to new ideas, new approaches, and new ways of
doing things?
6. How do we ensure that important intelligence
information reaches the policymaker in a timely way --
often through a phalanx of aides and special assistants?
7, How do we ensure that we are working on problems
important to the policymaker and reflecting their
priorities?
8, How do we get the attention of policymakers who often
have such a short tenure for long term problems that we
have identified?
9, How do we cope with expectations on the part of
policymakers and members of Congress unfamiliar with
the world of intelligence? How do we help them
understand that we often are trying to forecast
decisions that have not been made, provide firm answers
where they are not possible, and collect information
where the realities weigh heavily against success?
10, How can we get policymakers and the Executive Branch
and would-be policymakers in the Congress to protect
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our intelligence sources better and to be more
aggressive about security?
The policymakers have their own complaints about
intelligence support:
1. They seek day to day battlefield intelligence,
especially in the political arena where we are often
unable to provide it, By the some token, occasionally
our intelligence is actually too good and reduces the
policymakers' flexibility or room for maneuver,
2. They often are unhappy when intelligence assessments by
implication challenge policy, whether on Lebanon, the
Soviet gas pipeline, grain embargoes, or Vietnam --
although there are other examples where policymakers
have read a situation or the future better than we,
3, The Intelligence Community is always updating or
revisiting its assessments, a source of frustration to
policymakers who then must sometimes revise a policy or
negotiating strategy built on earlier intelligence.
4. Because almost all intelligence goes to the Congress,
it is often used as ammunition against the policymaker,
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5. Intelligence assessments occasionally are just flat
wrong, and the policymaker must cope with the
consequences.
6, Intelligence is usually an institutional Cassandra --
it is the voice of gloom and doom. It is too reluctant
to explore the vulnerabilities of our adversaries and
opportunities for our own government,
7, The expression of uncertainty, ambiquity, or
alternative analyses are often seen as hedging by the
policymakers.
Most of these policymaker concerns are inherent in the
dynamic interaction between policymakers and intelligence
officers. But contrary to what you might read or hear, most of
the time the relationship is cooperative and productive. And,
in recent years especially, policymakers have looked to us and
depended upon us with increasing frequency and confidence,
Future Challenges
What are the future problems and trends that will face the
Intelligence Community? First and foremost is the Soviet
problem, In the 1950s and 60s, the United States had
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comfortable margins of economic, military and political power
over the USSR. The dominant reality now is that there is no
margin for error -- the cost of intelligence miscalculations
will be high. The military problem has become harder with
greater denial and deception, more weapons under development,
higher technologies and the potential of dangerous
breakthroughs. Meanwhile the political situation, and now even
the economic forecast, is significantly less predictable than
the period from 1964 to 1985.
Second, intelligence is becoming more central to the policy
process, Whether in technology transfer, international energy
and economics, arms control or a score of other issues, policy
depends both tactically and strategically on high quality
intelligence, This will make guarding our objectivity both
more difficult -- and more important.
Third, increasingly CIA and the Intelligence Community are
the only elements of the government looking to the future in a
coherent manner. At a time when an average tenure of an
Assistant Secretary in Washington is 21 months, we are
identifying military, economic, demographic, resource, and
other issues that will not become serious problems for five or
ten years or even into the 21st Century, We are scouting the
future and the challenge is getting someone to pay attention.
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Fourth, we must recognize that intelligence probably
through the remainder of this century will be an important
offensive instrument of American foreign policy as it is used
to complement more traditional economic, political and military
programs to support those resisting aggression, to promote the
forces of democracy or nationalism, to counter terrorism, or to
disrupt international narcotics networks.
Fifth, as recent events have made clear, more must be done
about security -- of people and of facilities,
The real intelligence story in recent years is the
significant improvement, with help from both the President and
Congress, in the quality, relevance and timeliness of
intelligence support to the policymaker -- a story that has
been neglected in preference to controversial covert actions,
problems between CIA and the Congress, and spy scandals. We
understand this political reality, but it is imperative that
Americans know that our primary mission remains the collection
and analysis of information. We carry out this mission with
integrity, dedication, and skill, The President, the policy
community and the Congress -- our customers -- depend upon us,
task us, and help us more and more each day. We attract
America's brightest young people, who find with us
exceptionally challenging, honorable, and consistently
fascinating careers.
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The United States has the finest global intelligence
service in the world. It helps to safeguard our freedoms
against our adversaries and helps the policymaker understand
and deal with an increasingly complex and unpredictable world
around us. CIA is truly America's first line of defense; its
eyes and ears, and at times its hidden hand, And, I assure
you, it is alive and well, serving as the nation's watchman in
the global night,
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