LETTER TO ROBERT GATES FROM BILL BAKER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 29, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
FAU 66-U1b1
% 0
STAT
29 April 1988
Bob:
Here are the talking points for your "Trends in Soviet Leadership"
presentation.
In preparing these talking points, we drew heavily on the speech you made
on 19 January to the Dallas Council on World Affairs. We also incorporated
the talking points prepared by SOVA for your upcoming trip; information from
the summary in "Gorbachev's Economic Program: Problems Emerge" of
13 April 1988; a memorandum on Soviet leadership prepared by the Nb/USSR, and
various articles in the U.S. media.
The figures on the numbers of personnel changes within the Soviet Union
that you used in your 19 January Dallas speech have been updated and are
current as of 27 April.
Attachment's:
As Stated.
c'kl-fin 1(5
pe,,c( eaLkc
fr19
(-
CA
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
PROPOSED TALKING POINTS
FOR
ROBERT M. GATES
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
ASPEN INSTITUTE OF HUMANISTIC STUDIES
MAY 17, 1988
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
INTRODUCTION
CHIP BOHLEN, FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION, USED TO
COMPARE ANALYZING POLITICS IN THE KREMLIN TO WATCHING A WRESTLING
MATCH TAKING PLACE UNDER A RUG. YOU COULD TELL THAT THERE WAS A LOT
OF HEAVING AND STRUGGLE, BUT YOU COULDN'T TELL WHAT WAS GOING ON.
NOW, TO AN EXTENT THAT IS UNPRECEDENTED, THE RUG HAS BEEN KICKED
ASIDE, AND WE CAN SEE MORE THAN THE SHAPE OF THE STRUGGLE. THE
EXTRAORDINARY PUBLIC CONFRONTATION THAT WE HAVE WITNESSED SINCE THE
PUBLICATION OF THE LIGACHEV-BACKED ARTICLE IN THE CONSERVATIVE
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA SHOWS THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET LEADERS ARE
WILLING TO EXPLOIT GLASNOST FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. THE STRUGGLE
FOR POWER WAS PREDICTABLE, BUT -- FOR THE MOMENT -- WE HAVE A
CLEARER VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF TIMING, THE INTENSITY OF THE t
CoMireilleN
STRUGGLE, Wft-THE STRENGTH OF RESISTANCE TO PERESTROI K poLi+4 (?A &?
LIGACHEV-GORBACHEV SHOWDOWN
IT IS CLEAR THAT LIGACHEV OR WHOEVER AUTHORIZED THE ANDREYEVA
LETTER CHOSE HIS MOMENT.
THE LENGTHY LETTER TO THE EDITOR SIGNED BY "ANDREYEVA" WAS
PUBLISHED ON MARCH 13TH, A DAY BEFORE GORBACHEV WAS SCHEDULED TO
LEAVE FOR YUGOSLAVIA.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
-- THE LETTER, WHICH USED TWO LENGTHY LIGACHEV QUOTATIONS WITHOUT
ATTRIBUTION, WAS A BROADSIDE ATTACK ON PERESTROIKA, AND CALLED
INTO QUESTION THE HEART OF GORBACHEV'S PROGRAM.
PREDICTABLY, GORBACHEV RESPONDED TO THE DIATRIBE.
GORBACHEV'S RESPONSE, IN THE FORM OF A SHARPLY-WORDED PRAVDA
EDITORIAL, SIGNALED HIS DETERMINATION TO STAY THE COURSE WHILE
Au%
LIGACHEV HAS BEEN TARRED WITH DEFENDING THE STATUS QUO
THIS BLOWUP HAS SHARPENED THE BATTLELINES IN THE LEADERSHIP ON
HOW FAR AND FAST REFORM SHOULD GO.
? GORBACHEV CAN COUNT ON CLOSE COLLEAGUES SUCH AS PARTY
SECRETARY YAKOVLEV, FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, AND
PREMIER RYZHKOV -- AS WELL AS REFORM-MINDED ELEMENTS WITHIN
THE ELITE AS A WHOLE -- TO BACK HIS PROGRAM. BUT OTHERS,
SUCH AS LIGACHEV AND KGB CHAIRMAN CHEBRIKOV, REPRESENT
FORCES WITHIN THE RULING ELITE WHO WANT TO SLOW THE PACE OF
CHANGE AND EMPHASIZE MORE TRADITIONAL APPROACHES.
THE BATTLE IS LIKELY TO INTENSIFY AS THE PARTY CONFERENCE SET
FOR THE END OF JUNE APPROACHES -- WITH THE ULTIMATE PRIZE BEING
CONTROL OVER ITS CHARTER, THE AGENDA, AND THE OUTCOME.
FOR LIGACHEV AND OTHER CONSERVATIVES, THE ANDREYEVA ARTICLE WAS
THEIR YELTSIN AFFAIR, GIVING GORBACHVE A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO
REGAIN MOMENTUM AND PUT HIS OPPONENTS ON THE DEFENSIVE. f.444.-S
6,friz4c4(114
VI tin rte., A
LPPORTUNr1COMES AT A CRITICAL TIME --DBBACHNEEDS A
60?11711 CovfP46- C)VeiL c0019(ce, 004
1,,
paw I- efltvt 4k L4 cd N
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
griM06.1-4
SHOWING OF BEFORE PRESIDENT REAGAN ARRIVES FOR THE 25 MAY
r. R' tt,141
SUMMIT, ANDWBACHEV NEEDS TO RETAIN CONTROL HEADING.IY0 THE
JUNE PARTY CONFERENCE.
GORBACHEV: STRENGTHENING THE LEADERSHIP AND HIS POSITION
EVERY RUSSIAN AND SOVIET LEADER FROM PETER THE GREAT TO THE PRESENT
WHO SOUGHT CHANGE OR MODERNIZATION HAS FACED FORMIDABLE OPPOSITION.
-- BUT, UNLIKE THEM, GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV REALISTICALLY
CANNOT RESORT TO WIDE-SCALE TERROR AND VIOLENCE TO ELIMINATE
THOSE WHO STAND IN HIS WAY.
HE MUST RELY ON A LONG TERM, LARGELY NON-VIOLENT PURGE OF PARTY
AND BUREAUCRACY AND PLACEMENT OF HIS SUPPORTERS IF HE IS TO
REMAIN IN POWER AND SUCCEED AT ALL.
IN HIS THREE YEARS AS GENERAL SECRETARY, THERE HAVE BEEN LARGE-SCALE
PERSONNEL REPLACEMENTS.
THERE HAVE BEEN 8 NEW FULL MEMBERS AND 5 CANDIDATE MEMBERS
ELECTED TO THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO.
40% OF THE FULL MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN
ELECTED SINCE GORVACHEV TOOK OVER.
10 OF 12 CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARIES ARE GOReACHEV APPOINTEES.
72 OF THE 101 MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ARE NEW.
11 OF THE 13 FIRST DEPUTY AND DEPUTY CHAIRMEN OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS ARE NEW UNDER GORVACHEV.
3
LDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
-- 47% OF THE OFFICIALS IN THE AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX HAVE BEEN
REPLACED.
-- 15 OF THE 20 CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENT CHIEFS HAVE BEEN
REPLACED.
-- 87 OF 165 REGIONAL FIRST SECRETARIES HAVE BEEN REPLACED.
THE STRUGGLE TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY
THERE IS STRONG SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR GORBACHEV PERSONALLY
AND, IN PRINCIPLE, FOR THE NECESSITY TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY.
EVEN SO, NEARLY EVERY STEP GORBACHEV SEEKS TO TAKE TOWARD
STRUCTURAL ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL CHANGE IS A STRUGGLE, AND
SUPPORT IN THE POLITBURO FOR HIS INITIATIVES SHIFTS CONSTANTLY.
? FOR EXAMPLE, HIS PROPOSALS FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE AND A PARTY
CONFERENCE WERE REJECTED IN JANUARY, 1987, BUT ADOPTED IN
JUNE OF THAT YEAR.
II WITH THE EXPULSION OF MOSCOW PARTY BOSS BORIS YELTSIN IN
NOVEMBER, 1987, WE SAW THAT EVEN GORVACHEV'S ALLIES CAN BE
A HINDRANCE IN THE DELICATE POLITICAL BALANCING AND
BARGAINING HE MUST PURSUE TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS.
BELOW THE POLITBURO, SUPPORT FOR CHANGE -- AND ESPECIALLY
FAR-REACHING CHANGE -- IS EVEN SHAKIER.
-- OPPOSITION FROM THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND PARTY APPARATUS
IS A CRITICAL PROBLEM FOR GORBACHEV.
-- SENIOR LEVELS OF THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACY STAND TO LOSE THE MOST
IF GORkHEV MOVES TO DECENTRALIZE THE SYSTEM AND ARE IMPORTANT
4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS PROGRAM.
WHILE MANY SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
BUREAUCRACIES UNDERSTAND THE CONNECTION BETWEEN A STRONG DEFENSE
AND A HEALTHY ECONOMY, THEY ALSO ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE IDEA OF
GREATER CONSTRAINTS ON DEFENSE SPENDING AND SKEPTICAL OF
PROMISED BENEFITS.
OTHERS, FOR EXAMPLE THE KGB, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL
FOR INSTABILITY AT 'HOME AND IN EASTERN EUROPE CREATED BY ANY
RELAXATION OF POLITICAL CONTROLS.
THE SOVIET POPULATION SEEMS TO BE PASSIVELY SUPPORTIVE, BUT THEY
HAVE SEEN CAMPAIGNS FOR CHANGE COME AND GO.
THE INTELLIGENTSIA ARE PROBABLY THE ONLY GROUP THAT COMES CLOSE
TO GIVING WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT.
TAKEN AS A WHOLE, GORACHEV'S REFORM MEASURES ARE AN IMPRESSIVE
PACKAGE THAT IN SCOPE AND SPECIFICITY GOES WILL BEYOND THE SO-CALLED
KOSYGIN REFORMS IN 1965.
NEVERTHELESS, BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CONTRADICTIONS AND THE
RETENTION OF SO MANY ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, THE REFORMS
HAVE YET TO BE IMPLEMENTED.
EVEN IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THEY ARE FULLY IN PLACE IN 1991 AS
INTENDED, THET WILL NOT CREATE THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIC MECHANISM
THAT GOXACHEV SEEKS AS THE MEANS TO REDUCE OR CLOSE THE
TECHNOLOGICAL GAP WITH THE WEST.
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
INSTEAD, THEY SPELL TROUBLE FOR HIS ECONOMIC PROGRAM.
SOVIET GNP GREW BY LESS THAN ONE PERCENT LAST YEAR -- A RATE
REMINISCENT OF THE LATE BREZHNEV PERIOD.
GORBACHEV'S QUALITY CONTROL PROGRAM IS DISRUPTING PRODUCTION.
? INDUSTRY GREW BY ONLY L.5% AND THE CRITICAL CIVILIAN
MACHINE-BUILDING SECTOR DID NOT EXPAND AT ALL.
NEW INITIATIVES IN ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT ARE CREATING
CONFUSION AND APPREHENSION IN SOME QUARTERS, AND BUREAUCRATIC
FOOT-DRAGGING AND OUTRIGHT RESISTANCE IN OTHERS.
A SHARP DECLINE IN SOVIET HARD CURRENCY EARNINGS (THE RESULT OF
FALLING OIL PRICES AND THE DEPRECIATION OF THE DOLLAR) WILL
LIMIT MUCH NEEDED SPECIALIZED IMPORTS FROM THE WEST.
FINALLY, FOR A MODERNIZATION DRIVE THAT DEPENDS IN SUSBTANTIAL
MEASURE ON HARDER WORK, THERE ARE FEW REWARDS FOR SUCH WORK.
? SHORTAGES OF CONSUMER GOODS, REDUCED JOB SECURITY, AND
WIDESPREAD CONCERN OVER POTENTIAL INCREASES IN CONSUMER
PRICES ARE UNDERCUTTING THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVED WORKER
PRODUCTIVITY.
MPLICATIONS OF LACKLUSTER ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
IF THE ECONOMY CONTINUES TO PERFORM POORLY IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS,
TENSION WITHIN SOCIETY AND THE LEADERSNIP WILL INCREASE.
BUREAUCRATS WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY FRUSTRATED BY LOSS OF
PRIVILEGES AND STATUS AND BY DEMANDS THAT THEY SHOW GREATER
INITIATIVE.
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
-- MILITARY LEADERS ARE LIKELY TO BECOME MORE AND MORE UNEASY IF
BENEFITS FROM THE INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION FAIL TO MATERIALIZE.
-- SOVIET CITIZENS, WHO HAVE BEEN THE REAL LOSERS, WILL NEED TO SEE
SOME IMPROVEMENT IN LIVING STANDARDS IF THE REGIME IS TO ACHIEVE
NECESSARY GAINS IN WORKER PRODUCTIVITY AND AVOID WIDESPREAD
DISCONTENT.
FAILURE TO HEAD OFF THESE TENSIONS COULD CALL INTO QUESTION
GORBACHEV'S STRONG POLITICAL POSITION AT HOME.
POLITICAL REFORM
GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM REMAIN LESS WELL-DEFINED
THAN HIS ECONOMIC AGENDA. BUT HE AND HIS ALLIES HAVE SHOWN A
GROWING CONVICTION THAT THE REVITALIZATION OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY
CAN SUCCEED ONLY IF THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL
ARENA AS WELL.
GORBACHEV IS FRUSTRATED WITH THE STRAITJACKET OF INHERITED
DOCTRINE THAT OPPONENTS OF CHANGE HAVE SOUGHT TO IMPOSE ON HIM.
HE IS DEPICTING HIS OWN PROPOSALS AS AN EFFORT TO RETURN TO
LENIN'S ORIGINAL INTENT.
GORBACHEV'S CAMPAIGN FOR "DEMOCRATIZATION" IS DESIGNED TO
REVITALIZE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, BUT IN RECENT
MONTHS, EVEN GORBACHEV HAS BACKED AWAY FROM SOME OF THE MORE
CONTROVERSIAL ASPECTS OF HIS "DEMOCRATIZATION" CAMPAIGN.
GORBACHEV'S USE OF GLASNOST IS, IN MY OPINION, AN ATTEMPT TO
Rktreichoo- 4.1f.tu urtlet4r4vapt
4417,,,odivA (nape ReNe_04 T-6 ,r4e pipitt,Ke-
SoaPeald.414 to-fez. Pc v116 : -kJ
Attc. "iNohnaly,;(14,444-; ?-4
tteri Pie -
- _
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000-800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
ACHIEVE SOME RATHER OLD-FASHIONED OBJECTIVES THROUGH AN APPARENT
LIBERALIZING FORCE.
? GLASNOST IS BEING USED TO CRITICIZE OFFICIALS GORBACHEV
SEES AS HOSTILE AND TO PRESSURE THEM TO GET WITH THE
PROGRAM.
? IT IS BEING USED TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEMS HE WANTS TO ATTACK,
SUCH AS ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG ABUSE IN ORDER TO MOBILIZE
SOCIETY BEHIND HIS CAMPAIGNS.
HE HOPES TO USE THE ATMOSPHERE OF GREATER OPENNESS TO COOPT
INTELLECTUALS AND PARTICULARLY ENGINEERS AND SCIENTISTS TO
BE FULL PARTNERS IN THE ATTEMPT TO MODERNIZE THE ECONOMY.
? IT ENABLES THE REGIME TO COMPETE WITH FOREIGN AND OTHER
UNOFFICIAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. SINCE THE POPULATION
WILL HEAR ABOUT RIOTING IN KAZAKHSTAN AND THE DISASTER AT
CHERNOBYL ANYWAY, GORBACHEV BELIEVES IT IS BEST TO PRINT
THE NEWS AND PUT AN OFFICIAL SPIN ON IT.
? FINALLY, HE INTENDS TO LEGITIMIZE BROADER DISCUSSION OF
PROBLEMS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS IN ORDER TO BREAK THE BACK
OF DOMESTIC RESISTANCE AND INCREASE HIS ROOM FOR MANEUVER
AT HOME. FURTHER, HE SEES THE EXPANSION OF POLITICAL
DEBATE AS A NECESSARY STEP TO ACHIEVE HIS LONGER RANGE
GOALS.
WHAT GORBACHEV IS SUCCESSFULLY CHANGING IS THE OFFICIALDOM OF THE
PARTY AND STATE BUREAUCRACY. ONCE AGAIN THE PURGE HAS BECOME THE
8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved fo.r. Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
VEHICLE FOR CONSOLIDATING AND ENHANCING PERSONAL POWER, AS WELL AS
FOR IMPLEMENTING CHANGE.
RUN-UP TO THE PARTY CONFERENCE
IN RECENT WEEKS, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS GORBACHEV'S DRIVE TO
RESTRUCTURE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS NOW GATHERING MOMENTUM. THE
PRESS HAS BEGUN TO PUBLISH REFORM PROPOSALS WHICH RAISE THE MOST
SERIOUS AND CONTENTIOUS -IDEAS, PARTICULARLY:
ELECTING PARTY LEADERS BY SECRET BALLOT WITH A CHOICE OF
CANDIDATES.
LIMITING TERMS OF OFFICE TOA MAXIMUM OF 8 TO 10 YEARS.
CHANGING THE OCCUPATIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
TO REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF ENTRENCHED PARTY ELITES AND
GOVERNMENT MINISTERS.
REDUCING THE SIZE OF THE PARTY APPARATUS BY ELIMINATING THE
BRANCH ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS.
FORMING A NATIONAL-FRONT-TYPE ORGANIZATION, SIMILAR TO THOSE
FOUND IN EASTERN EUROPE, THAT WOULD INCLUDE OTHER POLITICAL
GROUPS BESIDES THE COMMUNIST PARTY.
THE EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR SUCH PROPOSALS IS UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, AND
GORBACHEV FACES A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE AS HE SEEKS TO LAY THE
GROUNDWORK FOR RADICAL CHANGE AT THE CONFERENCE.
-- CONSERVATIVE LEADERS ARE NUMEROUS AT THE REGIONAL LEVELS WHERE
THE DELEGATE SELECTION PROCESS IS TAKING PLACE.
9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8
THE ACTUAL POWERS OF THE CONFERENCE REMAIN UNCERTAIN, INDICATING
THERE IS PROBABLE HIGH-LEVEL DISAGREEMENT ON BOTH THE ISSUES AT
STAKE AND HOW THEY WILL BE RESOLVED.
MOST OF THE LEADERSHIP WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MOSCOW PARTY BOSS
LEV ZAYKOV AND UKRAINIAN PARTY CHIEF SHCHERBITSKIY HAS REMAINED
CONSPICUOUSLY SILENT ON PARTY REFORMS.
CONCLUSION
AND EVEN IF GORBACHEV GETS WHAT HE WANTS AT THIS PARTY CONFERENCE,
HIS AGENDA IS SO INHERENTLY CONTROVERSIAL, RISKY, AND THREATENING
THAT HE IS CERTAIN TO FACE CONTINUING OPPOSITION. IN HIS RECENT
SHOWDOWN WITH LIGACHEV, GORBACHEV WON, BUT HE WON A SINGLE BATTLE IN
A VERY LONG WAR. FOR GORBACHEV, IN THE WORLD OF KREMLIN POLITICS,
THERE WILL ALWAYS BE A LIGACHEV.
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP89G00720R000800020003-8