IRAN-IRAQ: NEGOTIATING AN END TO THE WAR

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Iran-Iraq: Negotiating
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Secret
NESA 88-/0033
May 1988
:~?py 6 3
A Research Paper
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Iran-Iraq: Negotiating
an End to the War
This paper was prepared by
Directorate of Operations.
~VESA. It was coordinated with the
Division, NESA
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Issues and Applications
Secret
NESA 88-10033
May 1988
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Iran-Iraq: Negotiating
an End to the War 25X1
Key Judgments A negotiated settlement is the most likely end to the Iran-Iraq war. An out-
I~t/ormation available right victory by either side is unlikely, as is a cessation of hostilities without
as of 6 May 1988 resolution of at least the core demands of both sides-for Iraq, the Iranian
was used in this report.
withdrawal from occupied territory; for Iran; blame and punishment of
Iraq for initiating the conflict. Even with resolution of a broad range of
outstanding issues, Iran and Iraq are unlikely to sign a full peace treaty un-
til at least one of the leaders passes from the scene. Given the hostility be-
tween the two nations, we judge that a settlement would result in no more
than a "cold peace."
Iran's belief that it can win the war has been the primary obstacle to a ne-
gotiated settlement. Before around-the-table negotiations can begin, Iran
must pass through a potentially long and agonizing phase in which it first
explores the possibility of negotiating an end to the war and then commits
itself to resolving the conflict by peaceful means. Some analysts believe
that Iran already has reached this stage and is ready to negotiate a
settlement.
Iraq is unwilling to make certain compromises, and its eagerness to
negotiate-first displayed in 1982 when it withdrew from Iranian territo-
ry-cannot be taken for granted. President Saddam Husayn will not
diminish either his or the Bath Party's control of the government to satisfy
Iranian demands. Baghdad has hardened its negotiating position somewhat
in the wake of its recapture of the Al Faw Peninsula.
Costly Iranian defeats in the ground fighting-such as the loss of Al Faw
in April-and high Iraqi losses would be the scenario most likely to cause
serious movement toward negotiations. Other developments that might
push the conflict toward a negotiated settlement: include the death of either
leader or other dramatic regime change.
Successful negotiations are likely to. involve a single mediator. The UN
Secretary General or a special envoy appointed by him, Turkey, and
Algeria are the most likely candidates.- International organizations such as
the United Nations, as represented by the Security Council, or the
Organization of the Islamic Conference are not likely to play significant
mediatory roles, but their support for a settlement could prove essential.
Secret
NESA 88-10033
May 1988
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We place the issues to be resolved in a comprehensive settlement of the war
into four categories:
? Blame and punishment.
? Cease-fire and withdrawal.
? Territorial issues.
? Questions of good neighborliness.
A fifth category of regional security guarantees, possibly involving the US
military presence in the Gulf, may also emerge.
Crafting a solution to the issue of blame and punishment in a manner that
is acceptable to both parties will, in our view, be the most difficult aspect of
negotiations. A formula that, in the end, might be least objectionable to
both sides probably would include:
? A carefully worded judgment about the start of the war by a respected
body, which is pointed enough to satisfy Iran yet qualified enough that
the Iraqis do not reject it. Such a statement might include condemnation
of Iraq for invading Iran without exploring all peaceful options and
repeatedly using chemical weapons, blame for Iran for continuing the
war, and some rectification of the imbalance (in Iran's view) of interna-
tional, especially UN Security Council, responses to the hostilities.
? The creation of a large reparations fund-perhaps $20-40 billion-
financed mostly by the wealthy Gulf Arab states and heavily skewed to
favor Iran.
The Iraqi recapture of the Al Faw Peninsula is a major step in restoring the
borders to their prewar status and will ease settlement of territorial issues
in any negotiations. The status of the Shatt al Arab river remains
contested, however, and would be the thorniest territorial question. A
possible settlement would draw the boundary at the thalweg (the middle of
the navigable channel) on the basis of an agreement reached in 1975 and
create a commission to arbitrate the rights, uses, and obligations regarding
the waterway. Iran will have to evacuate remaining occupied territory as
part of any formal settlement acceptable to Iraq.
Cease-fire and withdrawal and enforcement of border security probably
will become embroiled in questions of timing and national sovereignty,
particularly if international forces are involved. Currently, Iraq insists that
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cease-fire and withdrawal precede negotiations, while Iran insists the first
step should be simultaneous cease-fire and the convening of an internation-
al tribunal to assess blame for initiating the conflict.
Iran and Iraq are unlikely to accept either a US or a Soviet mediatory role;
both superpowers are distrusted by the belligerents. Washington and
Moscow almost certainly will be looked to, however, for quiet support of
any peace effort, possibly related to UN participation.
A negotiated end to the war evolving from stalemate would have a mixed
impact on US interests. On the positive side, it would probably push oil
prices down, reduce the chances of a superpower confrontation, open the
possibility to improved US-Iranian relations, and reduce Iraqi dependence
on the Soviet Union.
The continuation of the war, however, has produced beneficial trends for
the United States that may be weakened or reversed if a settlement is
reached. The war has distracted the Arabs from the Arab-Israeli arena and
focused their attention on the Gulf conflict where US goals complement
rather than clash with Arab goals. The war has fostered Iraqi moderation
and accelerated Egypt's political reentry into the Arab world. The conflict
also has been a major barrier to improved relations between Syria and
Iraq, two important Soviet clients, and provided the impetus to improved
security cooperation between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation
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Issues To Be Resolved in Negotiations and Possible Settlements 7
Good Neighborliness 14
Implications of Peace for Iran and Iraq 24
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Scope Note
This paper
examines the dynamics of a potential negotiat-
ed settlement of the Iran-Iraq war, ranging from a minimum negotiated
cease-fire to a full peace treaty. It reviews the issues to be resolved and the
positions of the belligerents and assesses the obstacles to negotiations as
well as the hurdles in negotiations. The study examines past cases of
successful negotiation between Iran and Iraq for lessons applicable to the
current impasse and identifies outcomes that would be least objectionable
to the parties.
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Boundory ropresenlation is
nol necessarily authoritative.
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Iran-Iraq: Negotiati~
an End to the War
The obstacles to a negotiated settlement of the Iran-
Iraq war are formidable. Indeed, hostility between
Iran and Iraq springs from the personal vendetta
between the two leaders, the religious (Shia-Sunni)
and ethnic (Persian-Arab) schisms between the two
countries, the shared belief that the political ideology
of the other is the embodiment of evil, competition for
hegemony in the Persian Gulf, and along-festering
territorial dispute.
Nonetheless, their history of discord also includes a
history of overcoming differences. Some 11 treaties
have been negotiated-and later repudiated-be-
tween Iraq (or the Turkish Ottoman empire) and Iran
that have delimited their 1,480-kilometer border or
settled other differences.'
In the current dispute, we judge that Iran's belief that
it can still achieve its maximum war goals-the ouster
of Saddam Husayn and the ruling Bath Party-
through military force represents the greatest obstacle
to entering negotiations. Iran, however, has not been
consistent in stating its war aims. At times Iranian
officials have called only for Saddam's ouster and
have implied acceptance of the Bath Party. At a
minimum, Iran requires an assessment of blame
against Saddam for starting the war and some form of
punishment.
Iran
Before around-the-table negotiations can begin, in our
view, Iran must pass through a potentially agonizing
prenegotiation phase in which it first explores the
' The first known agreement is the Treaty of Zuhab signed between
the Ottoman and Persian empires in 1639. In its grandiloquent style
it concluded that "This happy peace will last and be maintained
until the day of resurrection." Later agreements include the Treaty
of Hamadan, 1727; Treaty of Constantinople, 1736; Treaty of
Mughan, 1746; first Treaty of Erzurum, 1823; second Treaty of
Erzurum, 1847; Convention between Principals, 1869; Protocol of
Constantinople, 1913; Treaty of 1937 (signed in Tehran); and the
possibility of negotiating and finally commits itself to
resolving the conflict by peaceful means. An academic 25X1
study of conditions surrounding previous successful
negotiations concludes that a "hurting stalemate,"
conveying a sense of hopelessness and unacceptably
high cost to the belligerents, is most conducive to
successful negotiations.
The nearly eight costly years of war demonstrate the
Iranian regime's willingness to endure great pain.
During the course of the war thousands have been
killed, and the economy has been heavily damaged. In
1984 and 1985, Tehran sought mutual cessation of air
attacks on civilian areas partly because the regime 25X1
feared a weakening in public support for the war. The
regime has dealt with this year's Iraqi missile cam-
paign, in part, by channeling the populace's fear and
frustration into anger against Baghdad.
' Iran has continually sought prohibitions against attacks against
civilian areas and shipping and against chemical warfare. Tehran
undoubtedly would like to fight a war that did not bother its civilian
populace and, not surprisingly, favored Iranian warmaking capabil-
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An Alternative Outcome: No War, No Peace
The possibility that the war could `;fizzle out" with
no resolution of outstanding issues is often raised as
the most likely scenario should the conflict remain
stalemated. A nonnegotiated end to the war might
emerge, jor example,.from alimited peace initiative
that achieved a de jacto cessation of hostilities but
did not carry over to a broader settlement. Points
made in support of this case are that:
? Ground fighting already continues at a very low
level most oj'the year, interrupted only by Iranian
offensives, which are declining in intensity.
? The regime in Tehran may conclude that it cannot
win the war, but cannot Ford to admit this
publicly by entering negotiations. A cessation of
hostilities without settlement favors Iran, which
holds key Iraqi territory.
? Since, many analysts argue, Saddam's personal
position would be threatened more by peace than by
war, Saddam may prefer a technical state of war,
but without the burdens ojjighting, to a negotiated
settlement.
This scenario would present the United States with a
short-term,situation in the GuU'better than the status
In our judgment, between 1982 and at least early
1988, the Iranians believed, with some justification,
that they were gradually winning the war. The cap-
ture of most of the oil-bearing Majnoon Islands in
1984 and the southern end of the strategic Al Faw
Peninsula in 1986 boosted Iranian morale and deter-
mination to continue.
The Iranian defeat at AI Faw and the loss of six ships,
including two naval combatants, in the clash with US
military forces in the Persian Gulf in April 1988,
however, were significant reverses for Tehran: The
immediate result of the setback at Al Faw was
increased stridency in Iran's position, but over time
the defeat may mark a turning point in Iran's willing-
ness to negotiate.
quo, but along-term situation potentially more dan-
gerous. For a time, the.flow oj'oil would be unimped-
ed, US-Soviet competition reduced, and the threat of
the war expanding to include US,friends in the region
removed. Over time, however, this scenario, as com-
pared to a negotiated settlement, would.?
? Maintain a high demand jor weapons sales to the
region, providing Moscow its most productive en-
tree to the Gulf Arab states, and a lucrative market
.for China to exploit.
? Sustain a high level of'Soviet-Iraqi military ties.
? Probably result in another war.
We believe both belligerents have major incentives jor
reaching a settlement, however:
? Baghdad Tears-realistically, in our view-that a
relaxed international atmosphere would give Iran
access to a wider arms market and tip the military
balance in Iran's favor. Iraq also is committed to
the return of captured territory.
? With the GCC states having hinted a willingness to
pay Iran jor an end to the war, we believe that,
should Tehran decide the war is not worth .fighting,
it would seek reparations as well as a condemna-
tion oj'Iraq through negotiations.
Further Iranian defeats and significant Iraqi losses
would be most likely to cause movement toward
serious negotiations without provoking a hardening of
Iraq's attitudes. Other developments that might push
the conflict toward a negotiated settlement include
the death of either leader or other dramatic regime
change in either country
The Iranian regime maintains a unity of purpose as
well as sufficient public support for the war.
some leaders are not
enthusiastic about continuing the conflict, but their
discontent will remain muted as long as Khomeini
continues to pursue the war.
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The Iranian leadership is realistic about the substan-
tial military strength of Iraq and the international
forces arrayed against Tehran. The regime, however,
believes that it has overcome formidable odds in the
past-against the Shah, the United States, and the
Iraqi invasion-and can do so again.
There is a minority view among analysts that Iran
views the war as a stalemate and is ready for a
negotiated settlement of the war. These analysts cite
the Iranian response to the UN Secretary General's
implementation plan for Resolution 598 as evidence.3
The key points of the Iranian position are that
Tehran:
? Does not reject any part of Resolution 598 (includ-
ing withdrawal from occupied territory).
? Accepts acease-fire as the first step to an integrated
approach to a negotiated end to the war.
? Insists that a link be established between a cease-
fire and identification of responsibility for initiating
the conflict.
? Would formalize the undeclared cessation of hostil-
ities once the identification of the party responsible
is completed.
The minority view holds that, although the Iranian
position can be seen as a rejection of Resolution 598,
it nonetheless reflects an Iranian willingness to negoti-
ate an end to the war. (Iran asserts that Resolution
598's insistence on withdrawal before negotiations
begin is an unworkable, and probably unprecedented,
formula for conflict resolution.)
Iraq
Baghdad has viewed the war as a stalemate since
1982 when it withdrew from Iranian territory. Since
then, Baghdad has been willing to negotiate on terms
it rejected the first year of the war. For example,
Baghdad insisted that negotiations precede withdraw-
al when Iraq occupied Iranian territory-a demand
that it has since reversed now that Iran holds Iraqi
territory.
' On 20 July 1987 the UN Security Council unanimously approved
Resolution 598, which, among other things: demanded that, as a
first step toward a negotiated settlement, Iran and Iraq observe an
immediate cease-fire and withdraw all forces to internationally
recognized borders; requested that the Secretary General explore
the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into
responsibility for the conflict; and decided that the Security Council
would meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure
Baghdad is not willing to negotiate unconditionally.
Despite being on the strategic defensive for years and
suffering wide swings in morale, Iraq feels strong
enough to hold out for reasonably favorable terms.
Although Iraq would prefer to end the long war of
attrition, it probably believes that its military strength
will enable it to outlast Khomeini.
In the wake of its victory at Al Faw, Iraq is likely to
continue to press Iran militarily and has already
hardened its negotiating position. According to US
officials at the United Nations, Iraq's reaction to its
Al Faw victory was to disengage from UN diplomatic
efforts. Baghdad has also strengthened its demand
that Iran unequivocally accept Resolution 598 before
negotiations begin.
President Saddam Husayn will not agree to a settle-
ment that diminishes his control of Iraq or the power
of the Ba`thist regime. Baghdad is confident that its
Gulf Arab allies, the Soviets, and the West, fearing an
Iranian victory and its implications, cannot abandon
Iraq. We believe that the international community's
pressure for an end to the war with no victor strength-
ens Iraq's hand
The Ba`thist regime is stable and, like Iran, shares a
unity of purpose in sustaining its own war effort. We
judge the great majority of Iraqis blame Iran for
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Figure 4
War Casualties Comparisons
WWI
US
France
Russia
Germany
WWII
US
Russia
Germany
Japan
Vietnam
a Includes killed and wounded.
b Figures calculated through yearend 1987.
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~ecre[
continuing the war and see little choice but to support
the Ba`thist regime. Kurdish and Shia dissidents do
not seriously threaten either the war effort or popular
acceptance of the regime. Saddam appears to main-
tain firm control of the population through his effec-
tive security service, although he has faced infrequent
assassination attempts by Iraqi dissidents.
Saddam's death probably would provide an opening
for negotiations, as each side would want to probe the 30
other to see if his demise had created opportunities to
end the war. Saddam's death alone, however, would
be unlikely to cause either side to make significant zs
concessions. Tehran would be unlikely to drop its
demand that Iraq accept blame for starting the war-
terms that Saddam's successors would find difficult to _
accept, at least initially.
Issues To Be Resolved in Negotiations
and Possible Settlements
We place the issues to be resolved in a comprehensive
settlement of the war into four categories:
? Blame and punishment of the aggressor.
? Territorial issues.
? Questions of good neighborliness.
? Cease-fire and withdrawal.
Should Iran broaden its demands-as we believe it
may-to include reduction of the US naval presence
in the Gulf, a fifth category of regional security
guarantees would emerge that would complicate ne-
gotiations and put important US. interests at stake.
According to diplomatic sources, recent Iranian emis-
saries to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states
have stressed three Iranian desires that:
? The Gulf be "neutralized."
? The GCC pressure .Iraq to stop attacks against
ships.
? All foreign naval forces be withdrawn from the
Gulf.
These may represent the basic elements of an Iranian
long-term regional security doctrine that would best
achieve the goal of Iranian domination of the Gulf
and be incorporated into Iranian demands in compre-
hensive negotiations to end the war. Resolution 598
Figure 5
Iran and Iraq: Diversion of Manpower
Iran
Iraq
__ I I I I I I
1970 80 85 86 87 90b
Selected years
a Work force is defined as working age population minus students, disabled,
internal security farces, and that percentage of working-age women not
seeking employment.
b Projected.
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Both Iran and Iraq argue that the other was responsi-
ble for initiating hostilities. We believe that both
countries contributed to the conflict's origins.
The most obvious move to full-scale war, however,
and the fast capture of territory was Iraq's bombing
of every major airbase in northern Iran and its
invasion with nine divisions along a 700-kilometer
.front on 22 September 1980. But Baghdad argues
that its invasion was justified because Tehran had
been trying since early 1979 to overthrow the Iraqi
? Aided Arab and Kurdish dissidents and former
officials of the Shah's regime.
? Directed the takeover of the Iranian Embassy in
London in early 1980.
? Sponsored assassination attempts against Iranian
o.~cials.
? Violated Iranian territory with Iraqi military forces
in 1979 and 1980.
? Arrested and then executed a leading Iraqi Shia
cleric, Ayatollah Muhammad Bagr al-Sadr, and
expelled thousands of Iraqi Shias of Iranian origin.
regime.
Baghdad contends that Tehran:
? Directed assassins in a terrorist campaign in
Baghdad.
? Harassed Iraqi diplomats, including taking over
two Iraqi consulates in western Iran in November
1979.
? Shelled Iraqi border posts and towns and violated
Iraqi airspace.
Iran asserts that its attempt to undermine the Iraqi
regime was a justified response to hostile Iraqi
policies. Tehran says that Baghdad:
makes a nod to this Iranian concern by requesting
that the Secretary General examine-in consultation
with Iran, Iraq, and other states of the region-
measures to enhance the security and stability of the
region.
We expect that the most likely negotiated end to the
conflict will not encompass all the outstanding issues.
We. believe, however, that a lasting settlement of the
war must at least resolve the central Iranian demand
that Iraq be blamed for initiating the conflict and the
Iraqi demand that Iran withdraw from occupied
territory. Resolution of other outstanding issues would
add to the durability of a settlement, but it is difficult
Iraq sought an accommodation with Iran c{f'ter the
Shah's departure, but by late 1979 we believe that
both sides were providing significant amounts of
support to each other's dissidents. During 1980 both
sides almost certainly conducted terrorist operations
against each other's o,~rcials. In early 1980, Baghdad
probably began planning for the invasion of Iran.
Iraq, however, did not begin mobilizing its troops for
the invasion until after the Iranian shelling of Iraqi
border towns on 4 September 1980.
until at least one of the leaders passes from the scene.
Blame and Punishment
The Iranian demand that Iraq and Saddam Husayn
be blamed for the war derives its impetus from the
personal rivalry between Khomeini and Saddam, the
religious imperative to define the war as a just cause,
the revolutionary imperative to export the revolution,
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and partially from the need to justify the high human
and economic cost of the war. The last three reasons
militate against an easy change in this Iranian de-
mand after Khomeini's death and lead us to conclude
that blame and punishment will be a fundamental
question regardless of Khomeini's death.
We believe crafting a solution to the blame and
punishment issue acceptable to both parties will be
the most difficult aspect of a negotiated end to the
war. A historical survey of attempted negotiations
worldwide reveals that they nearly always have foun-
dered when core values-those affecting a principal's
existence or identity-were at stake, as is the case
with Iran's central demand for punishment of Sad-
dam Husayn.
Iran has focused on the idea of an international
tribunal that would assess blame against Iraq for
starting the war and then levy punishment. According
to the UN Secretary General, Iran views this as a
four-stage process-determination, judgment, punish-
ment, and reparations. Secure in its assumptions
about fault for the hostilities, Tehran has stated that
an impartial tribunal need take only two to three days
to deliberate and judge Iraq the aggressor, but that
assessing appropriate punishment is a legal process
that could require a year or more. Iran at least has
implied a willingness to negotiate the terms of punish-
ment, but we see no hard evidence so far that Iran
defines punishment in any other terms than removal
of Saddam as ruler of Iraq.
Iraq accepts the concept of a tribunal and believes it
has a good case of its own. According to UN docu-
ments and Embassy reporting, Baghdad would like a
tribunal to be judicial in nature and to determine not
only who started the war but also who is responsible
for the continuation of the war, that is, Iran. The
Iraqis believe any impartial tribunal would be influ-
enced by the Iranian provocations that led to the Iraqi
invasion. Embassy reporting indicates the Iraqis be-
lieve they can make a case for their massive move into
Iran on the grounds that there are no broadly accept-
ed norms for correct proportionality of response to
provocation
A settlement on the issue of blame that we judge
would be least objectionable to both sides probably
would have two general aspects:
? A carefully worded judgment by a respected body
about the start of the war. Such a judgment would
have to be pointed enough in criticizing Iraq to
satisfy the Iranian demand for blame, yet qualified
enough that the Iraqis do not reject it.
? The establishment of a "reconstruction fund" as a
form of negotiated reparations, whose payments
would be skewed to favor Iran.
To be accepted by both Iran and Iraq, a statement
would have to be laboriously coordinated with them, 25X1
regardless of the makeup of the tribunal or commis-
sion. Some of the elements of a finding might be that:
? Iran and Iraq both took actions that fueled tension
in the year before the war started.
? Iraq violated several articles of the UN Charter by
occupying territories without thoroughly exploring
peaceful alternatives.
? The international community, including the United
Nations, is partly to blame. The UN Security
Council, distracted by the Soviet move into Afghan-
istan and the US-Iran hostage crisis, neglected to
take action to stem the escalating tension between
Iran and Iraq before the war began and was not 25X1
impartial in its early attempts to deal with the
hostilities. (The UN Charter does not fully cover the
circumstances surrounding the start of a war. It is
vague in specifying when a country can defend itself
with force and the proportionality of such an
action.)
? Iran is at fault for continuing the war long after
Iraq sought a negotiated settlement.
? I.raq.has repeatedly used chemical weapons in the
war.
25X1
25X1
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Figure 6
Damage to Economic Targets in Iran and Iraq
As Sahra
1
.,r
C
y
?
ti~ I by 7~
.. ~ / , ~
,--~~.. ~ '~','
Hamadan ~ '~`~~
Khana/gin
f" t
j Mandari ~
AGHDAD
hor5a'mshahr
yy~,, ~ ~
ICbAbad&n
WAR DAMAGE
~ Heavy Medium ~ Light
-?A"'-
.~Mari~en~~-~~- ` ~~~.~ ' ~~~~TFHRANrc:
..J ~ ~
'AI B~f
~Az Zubayr ~ ~
Abu al Kha;ib~
~~Kh? r al Amara
Kuwait ~~., `~ "?""`"Z
ranian oilfield)
Saudi Arabia
.,a ~ .~~ ~ err-, ~ ~ ~ 7 , ~ ~ ~~; ~~..
L . r~ s /" -~y~ . ~T~I~ ~ ~
tYG ~ 1 '`l \~a~~~
u.~ ?1 . ` ~ ~o? i
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We judge the most workable arrangement for repara-
tions would be amultibillion-dollar fund with contri-
butions primarily from the GCC states and with
payments lopsided in favor of Iran. The fund probably
would be cast as a "reconstruction" fund to avoid the
implication of war guilt by the contributors. If Iran
still holds the Majnoon Islands during negotiations,
Iraq might be pressed to contribute the equivalent of a
share of projected oil revenues from the area.
Earlier Iranian demands for several hundred billion
dollars are clearly unrealistic, but $20-40 billion
might be more attainable. For comparison, the GCC
states have delivered about $40 billion dollars in aid to
Iraq since the war began (a point Iran would undoubt-
edly raise in negotiating reparations). Japan has hint-
ed that it would be willing to participate in a recon-
struction fund, and some West European states may
offer to participate as well, particularly if the arrange-
ments guaranteed access to major projects in a post-
war reconstruction effort.
A formula for a reparations fund would have several
difficult aspects: Iran wants a "peace commission" to
come to Iran to determine actual damages-a process
that would take at least several months. A timetable
for payment would have to be established (a 10-year
period might be appropriate). Even then, the total
amount for such a fund would be largely dictated by
the willingness of the GCC states to contribute. The
money promised probably would fall well short of
money delivered, causing some friction between Iran
and the GCC states.' Because Iran, Iraq, and all of
the GCC states except Oman and Bahrain are mem-
bers of OPEC, questions of oil prices and OPEC
quotas may become integral to negotiations over
reparations.
Territorial Disputes
Theoretically, the border issues should be relatively
easy to settle. Neither side harbors significant
? An example of GCC aid shortfall is the Baghdad Pact commit-
menu-the ]0-year aid package mandated at an Arab summit
meeting in 1978 from the wealthy Gulf states to Jordan, Syria, and
the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Gulf states agreed to
provide $35 billion over 10 years ($3.5 billion per year). In'no year
was the full amount paid. At the end of 1987, the ninth year, $17
billion of a promised $31.5 billion, or 54 percent, had been paid.
historical territorial ambitions in the other's country.
Moreover, the international land boundary between
the two countries has been largely delineated to both
countries' satisfaction. The 1975 Algiers Accord pro-
vided favorable concessions to Iran along the Shatt al
Arab, the only joint water boundary and the most
important territorial issue in negotiations. At times
both parties have hinted that they could accept a
return to the provisions of the accord.
25X1
The Iraqi recapture of the Al Faw Peninsula is a
major step in restoring the borders to their prewar
status and will ease settlement of territorial issues in
negotiations. Al Faw has great strategic importance
because of its location along the western side of the
Shatt, and Iran's loss. of the territory will weaken
Tehran's hand in negotiating the future of the Shatt.
By holding Al Faw, Iran could render Iraq land-
locked, since it would control both banks of the Shatt
al Arab at its mouth and, therefore, access to Iraq's
only deepwater port-AI Basrah. Until 1975, all 25X1
treaties dealing with the Shatt al Arab had failed
because they required Iranian ships bound for Aba-
dan and Khorramshahr to traverse Iraqi territorial
waters. Any outcome that resulted in Iran controlling
the Shatt al Arab would produce the opposite and
more serious effect on Iraq-and probably lay the
groundwork for future conflict.
The Iranian occupation of Iraq's Majnoon Islands will
complicate negotiations. The manmade islands in the
Hawizah Marsh north of Al Basrah cover a signifi-
cant, although undeveloped, oilfield. Tehran has sug-
gested in the past that the oil from the Majnoons
could be applied to reparations after the war, imply-
ing that Iranian departure from this territory will not
come cheaply for Iraq.
Still, in our view, Iran will have to leave occupied
territory as part of a settlement acceptable to the
current Iraqi regime. We believe that, once Iran has
25X1
25X1
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?Irbil ~(\, ~ SSar Dasht
~/-~ ? Mahabad
?P,ire'n Shahr
As ? Panjwt(6
Sulaymaniyah
t~+
Qa;r-e Shirin
Iranian-occupied
territory, May 1988
. Mariviin
Sanandaj
r23dkAg'!h yc~
Bakhtar~n
Badrah. Mehren ar
T;9,i~
'Ali al Gha6i
?behl6ien
"~~?o
Az Zubayi s
JConstantinople
Protocol, 1913 'Ah an
anchorage given to Iran tS'~d
r
Olran-Iraq Treaty, 1937
boundary shifted to'thalweg
in the vicinity of Abadan
Algiers Accord, 1975
entire boundary
shifted to thalweg
Kuwait
ubiyen. .
Khorr
,.
`Dezful R~ a 'Z1~~?'.
rP_. ~` ~ l ]-G .
see
In5ll
a~ndar-e Khomeyni
(Treaty of Erzurum, 1847
boundary followed low water
markon Iranian side of river
~ Nahr-e
AI Fawn ? Qasr
? Behba'han'
Esfahan
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History of Iran-Iraq Border Disputes
The Iran-Iraq border extends for more than 1,480
kilometers between the border with Turkey and the
mouth of the Shatt al Arab. No single geographical
feature delineates the border, which-with significant
exceptions along the Shatt-crosses lightly populated
and economically unimportant territory. Since the
first known bilateral treaty in 1639, disputes over the
land boundary have been relatively minor, with fric-
tions usually resulting from repeated failures to
demarcate the boundary properly.
The Shatt-a waterway formed by the confluence of
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers-serves as the bor-
derfor 105 kilometers, and control of shipping on the
Shatt and sovereignty over the waterway have been
contested for centuries. Iraq has long perceived that
its interests in the Shatt were more vital than Iran's,
justifying its claimforfull sovereignty. The waterway
is Iraq s only outlet to the sea from its only deep-
water port at Al Basrah, whereas Iran has a long
coastline on the Persian Gulf: This reasoning
originally was presented by the Ottoman Turks and
reluctantly conceded by Persia in 1639. The Iranians
grew unhappy with Iraqi sovereignty as their
cities along the Shatt became more important
economically, particularly with the increased impor-
tance of oil and concentration of Iran's oil industry
nearby. Ottoman, and later Iraqi, efforts to limit
Iranian shipping and to charge import duties aggra-
vated the situation.
Iran continually sought to change the river boundary.
It gained a concession from Iraq to move the bound-
ary from the eastern bank to the thalweg in a small
area opposite the Iranian city of Abadan in 1937. A 25X1
navigation convention in that treaty was never hon-
ored, however, contributing to Iranian frustrations. In
1969, the Shah abrogated the 1937 treaty, and
relations between Iran and Iraq worsened.
Fear of war and a willingness on both sides to make
trade-offs on Iranian support for Kurdish dissidents
in northern Iraq and on Iraqi control of the Shatt led
to the Algiers Accord of 1975. For the.~rst time the
entire boundary was moved to the thalweg, restricting
Iraqi sovereignty to the western side of the Shatt.
Baghdad s contention that the treaty was forced on it
has contributed to its desire to reestablish full sover-
eignty over the waterway.
decided to enter serious negotiations to end the war, it
will be willing to leave the Majnoon Islands and other,
less important, occupied territory, but not without
fully exploiting its position at the bargaining table.
We believe the formula for the Shatt al Arab most
likely to succeed would be a return roughly to the
terms of the Algiers Accord of 1975, with the interna-
tional border drawn at the thalweg as specified in the
accord. Both sides probably could agree on the gener-
al principles of freedom of navigation, equal access to
the river, and the formation of a river commission.
Once Iran and Iraq agree in principle to solve the
Shatt al Arab dispute, more detailed, and probably
contentious, discussions of the rights, uses, and obliga-
tions would have to follow for the river to open to
traffic. Questions such as whose flags fly on ships 25X1
given the authority) and organize personnel ~ 25X1
entering the Shatt and whose pilots are used were
burning issues before the war started. We believe a
workable solution would be the establishment of a
Shatt commission that would provide:
? A means for continuing contact between the two
countries to address detailed Shatt issues.
? Channel and navigational maintenance and pilots.
? An organization to collect tolls (even set tolls, if
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We believe that a Shatt commission would have to be
at least trilateral in scope, to consist of Iran, Iraq, and
a third party, such as the regional UN economic
commission. With Iraq and Iran alone probably inca-
pable of establishing or maintaining the simplest of
commissions, the third party could provide some
objectivity and reduce the possibility that disagree-
ment over the Shatt would erupt into conflict.
Good Neighborliness
A number of lesser, but still important, issues fall into
the category of maintaining correct relations between
the two countries. These issues are likely both to
present stumblingblocks in negotiations and to be
used for minor concessions to break deadlocks. The
issues and possible solutions include:
? Cessation of support to dissident groups. Renewed
Iranian support to the Kurds was claimed by Iraq as
a major reason for abrogating the Algiers Accord
just before invading Iran in September 1980. We
believe the parties could, as in the past, reach an
agreement of mutual noninterference in the internal
affairs of the other, although covert support for
dissident groups probably would continue. Iraq
would press Iran at least to curtail the activities of
the dissident Shia Da`wa party, and Iraq probably
would be willing publicly to limit support for the
Iranian leftist Mujahiden-e Khalq organization and
Arab separatist groups in Khuzestan.
? Exchange oJ'prisoners. Baghdad's continuing stress
on the return of Iraqi prisoners of war underscores
the importance it attaches to this issue. Iran holds
more than 75,000 prisoners of war and Iraq holds
about 20,000. We judge that both sides would
return the prisoners of war, fearing most that their
own nationals had -been brainwashed or recruited as
agents while confined by the other side.
? The Iranian demand that Shias exiled.from Iraq
since the Iranian revolution be repatriated. One
Iraqi reaction to Iranian provocations before the
war was to exile more than 60,000 Shias of Iranian
extraction suspected of sympathizing with the cleri-
cal regime in Tehran. We believe that Iraq would be
willing to accept some of the exiles. Iraq's ruthless
internal security apparatus, however, would watch
them closely and imprison or perhaps even execute
some. Iraq would almost certainly strongly resist
Iranian efforts to link the return of Iraqi prisoners
of war to the return of these exiles.
? Iranian Shia access to holy sites in Iraq.S Baghdad
would not relinquish sovereignty over holy sites in
Iraq but probably could offer an annual quota of
pilgrimage visas to Iranians. Iraq could use modula-
tion of this number as a bargaining card. For
comparison, Saudi Arabia has received requests for
as many as 300,000 Iranian pilgrims in one year but
has allowed only about 150,000 Iranians to make
the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in recent years.
? Normalization ojrelations. A comprehensive settle-
ment might also have provisions for the reestablish-
ment of diplomatic ties and commerce and the
cessation of hostile propaganda. The two countries
maintained embassies in one another's capitals
through the first seven years of the war. The trade
relationship between them has always been small,
however, and prospects for future commercial ties
are limited.
Cease-Fire and Withdrawal
As the haggling in the United Nations over imple-
mentation of Resolution 598 demonstrates, procedural
questions can prove extremely difficult to overcome.
Iraq insists on the sequential implementation of the
resolution-cease-fire and withdrawal to international
borders as the first step, then negotiations-while
Iran insists that acease-fire be linked to the establish-
ment of a commission to establish blame as the first
step.
' Since the outbreak of the war it has been impossible for Iranians
to visit the two holiest shrine cities for Shias-An Najaf and
Karbala' in Iraq. This inaccessibility has greatly enhanced the
significance for Iranian Shias of the holy cities in Saudi Arabia,
particularly Medina, and is a contributing factor to the increased
tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia at the annual pilgrimage.
14
25X1
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Iran rejects the proposal that withdrawal occur before Table 1
negotiations, and we believe that Iran would not leave Belligerents' Willingness To Compromise
Iraqi territory, unless forced out militarily, before
negotiations began-or even in their early stages. For
its part, we believe Iraq would not tolerate for long a
cease-fire in place and continued Iranian occupation
of Iraqi territory. Iraq would probably prefer negotia-
tions while fighting continued to a cease-fire in place,
because Iran could rebuild militarily during a cease-
ment, such as the return of prisoners of war. ~ to Iran 25X1
To be workable, we believe that overall negotiations
would have to proceed while Iran still holds Iraqi
territory. Withdrawal from occupied territory would
probably have to be near-simultaneous with the im-
plementation of other aspects of a negotiated settle-
its terms for a settlement. The process could allow for Initiation of negotiations while fighting Medium Medium
at least a tacit end to the war. continues 25X1
dtsengage from the process once started, tncreastng
the pressure on Tehran at least to develop and refine
Procedural issues
believe the clerical regime might find it difficult to
Cease-fire and withdrawal
A benefit to Iraq for changing its stance and accept-
ing a cease-fire without prior Iranian withdrawal is
that it would enmesh Tehran in a peace process. We
ncNau~auui~ ui iray~ JtuaS LOw 1V1eQlUm-
during withdrawal and perhaps on a long-term basis. ~ High
As an alternate possibility, Iran and Iraq may prefer Cessation of support to dissident groups High Medium-
to exchange observers. High 25X1
Possibility of
Compromise
Iraq
Iran
Key issues
Blame and punishment
Iranian demand for the removal of
Saddam Husayn and the end of Ba`thist
rule in Iraq
Nil
Low
Impartial tribunal judgment blaming
Iraq for starting the war and holding
Iran responsible for continuing the war
Medium
Low
Return to prewar land and water bound- High Medium
aries with the evacuation of occupied
territories
Broad negotiations before troop Low- Medium-
The procedure for monitoring withdrawal and withdrawals to prewar boundaries Medium High
postwithdrawal treaty adherence will probably require Other issues
international monitoring. We judge that an interns- Establishment of diplomatic relations High High
*:,,,..,i i TT~T ,... n ........:.....:.... ..c ~w,. r,.i,.....:.. ~,._c__ and Shia access to holy sites in Iraq
flights are made to ensure adherence to terms of
Establishment of governing regime for Medium High
Shatt al Arab waterway _
Establishment of formula and timetable High :High
for reparations
Enforcement procedures for monitoring High High
withdrawals, border security, and treaty
. adherence
a This table assumes a context in which the war is stalemated and
Iran and Iraq commit themselves to a negotiated settlement. The
judgments of willingness to compromise are based on our assess-
ment of the intrinsic value of each issue to the belligerents.
25X1
25X1
Resolution 598 calls for a team of UN observers to
"verify, confirm and supervise" the cease-fire and
withdrawal. An arrangement might be reached simi-
lar to those made between Israel and Syria and Israel
and Egypt, where regular third-party reconnaissance
disengagement.
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Negotiations and Settlements Between Iran and Iraq
Since the onset of the current war, Baghdad and
Tehran have successfully settled some issues:
Exchange of Prisoners of War. During the past.few
years Iran and Iraq have regularly exchanged some
oJ'their prisoners of'war. Iraq had tried to link the
exchange to a comprehensive settlement of the war
but dropped this demand rather than block the
exchange. Iran, although angered on occasion by
reportsfrom the International Committee of the Red
Cross (Red Crescent) and the United Nations con-
demning Iranian abuses of prisoners, has allowed the
exchange to continue without the propaganda bene.~ts
it had sought. Turkey, the Red Crescent, and the
United Nations have assisted in negotiating and
implementing the exchanges.
Moratoriums on Attacks on Civilian Areas. Iran and
Iraq have temporarily agreed to partial cease-fires-
halting air and Scud surface-to-surface missile at-
tacks on cities-on several occasions. The first mora-
toriumfollowed an appeal by the UN Secretary
General in June 1984. We believe that the Secretary
General s appeal only provided a pretext for acease-
,ftre that both sides anxiously wanted. Tehran and
Baghdad were sufleringfrom the attacks, and the
regimes were worried about domestic instability.
Both sides accommodated the Secretary General and
allowed UN observer teams to monitor compliance.
AJ'ter a respite, however, Iraq renewed its air attacks
on Iran's cities as a response to Iranian offensive
action.
Another moratorium was temporarily accepted by
both parties at the Secretary General's insistence in
early 1985. After a visit to the area in April 1985, the
Secretary General noted that the moratorium was not
being observed. The "war of'the cities" reached its
peak of intensity in early 1988. Iraq has on several
occasions declared unilateral halts in missile and
bombing attacks, and Tehran has responded by stat-
ingthat it would attack civilian areas only in retalia-
tion for Iraqi air raids.
Trapped Ships and Oil Spills. Iran and Iraq tried to
negotiate two other issues, butfailed, probably be-
cause neither country believed that its interests were
directly c~"ected by the outcome. UN Special Repre-
sentative Olc