IRAN-IRAQ: NEGOTIATING AN END TO THE WAR

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
40
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 2, 2012
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 1, 1988
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1.pdf2.29 MB
Body: 
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Iran-Iraq: Negotiating Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 - .?l~1 n;......a..~..a...~s ~'~ a -.~ ~~?' `_. an End to the War C W M/JJK -rnur.~:r ivur~~z . /U /~ .5 ff:.. %l ~,6 8~8 ~`~`~ t ~[I~TAL NUMBER OF OOPIES ~ ,S' )ISSEM DATE ~~~` ~ ~ 'ODPIFS .. ~ ~ ~ I~_ JOB NiJMRER ...............:...... . Secret NESA 88-/0033 May 1988 :~?py 6 3 A Research Paper Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Iran-Iraq: Negotiating an End to the War This paper was prepared by Directorate of Operations. ~VESA. It was coordinated with the Division, NESA Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Issues and Applications Secret NESA 88-10033 May 1988 25X1 ~ox"i 25X1 L ~JC "I Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret Iran-Iraq: Negotiating an End to the War 25X1 Key Judgments A negotiated settlement is the most likely end to the Iran-Iraq war. An out- I~t/ormation available right victory by either side is unlikely, as is a cessation of hostilities without as of 6 May 1988 resolution of at least the core demands of both sides-for Iraq, the Iranian was used in this report. withdrawal from occupied territory; for Iran; blame and punishment of Iraq for initiating the conflict. Even with resolution of a broad range of outstanding issues, Iran and Iraq are unlikely to sign a full peace treaty un- til at least one of the leaders passes from the scene. Given the hostility be- tween the two nations, we judge that a settlement would result in no more than a "cold peace." Iran's belief that it can win the war has been the primary obstacle to a ne- gotiated settlement. Before around-the-table negotiations can begin, Iran must pass through a potentially long and agonizing phase in which it first explores the possibility of negotiating an end to the war and then commits itself to resolving the conflict by peaceful means. Some analysts believe that Iran already has reached this stage and is ready to negotiate a settlement. Iraq is unwilling to make certain compromises, and its eagerness to negotiate-first displayed in 1982 when it withdrew from Iranian territo- ry-cannot be taken for granted. President Saddam Husayn will not diminish either his or the Bath Party's control of the government to satisfy Iranian demands. Baghdad has hardened its negotiating position somewhat in the wake of its recapture of the Al Faw Peninsula. Costly Iranian defeats in the ground fighting-such as the loss of Al Faw in April-and high Iraqi losses would be the scenario most likely to cause serious movement toward negotiations. Other developments that might push the conflict toward a negotiated settlement: include the death of either leader or other dramatic regime change. Successful negotiations are likely to. involve a single mediator. The UN Secretary General or a special envoy appointed by him, Turkey, and Algeria are the most likely candidates.- International organizations such as the United Nations, as represented by the Security Council, or the Organization of the Islamic Conference are not likely to play significant mediatory roles, but their support for a settlement could prove essential. Secret NESA 88-10033 May 1988 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret We place the issues to be resolved in a comprehensive settlement of the war into four categories: ? Blame and punishment. ? Cease-fire and withdrawal. ? Territorial issues. ? Questions of good neighborliness. A fifth category of regional security guarantees, possibly involving the US military presence in the Gulf, may also emerge. Crafting a solution to the issue of blame and punishment in a manner that is acceptable to both parties will, in our view, be the most difficult aspect of negotiations. A formula that, in the end, might be least objectionable to both sides probably would include: ? A carefully worded judgment about the start of the war by a respected body, which is pointed enough to satisfy Iran yet qualified enough that the Iraqis do not reject it. Such a statement might include condemnation of Iraq for invading Iran without exploring all peaceful options and repeatedly using chemical weapons, blame for Iran for continuing the war, and some rectification of the imbalance (in Iran's view) of interna- tional, especially UN Security Council, responses to the hostilities. ? The creation of a large reparations fund-perhaps $20-40 billion- financed mostly by the wealthy Gulf Arab states and heavily skewed to favor Iran. The Iraqi recapture of the Al Faw Peninsula is a major step in restoring the borders to their prewar status and will ease settlement of territorial issues in any negotiations. The status of the Shatt al Arab river remains contested, however, and would be the thorniest territorial question. A possible settlement would draw the boundary at the thalweg (the middle of the navigable channel) on the basis of an agreement reached in 1975 and create a commission to arbitrate the rights, uses, and obligations regarding the waterway. Iran will have to evacuate remaining occupied territory as part of any formal settlement acceptable to Iraq. Cease-fire and withdrawal and enforcement of border security probably will become embroiled in questions of timing and national sovereignty, particularly if international forces are involved. Currently, Iraq insists that Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret cease-fire and withdrawal precede negotiations, while Iran insists the first step should be simultaneous cease-fire and the convening of an internation- al tribunal to assess blame for initiating the conflict. Iran and Iraq are unlikely to accept either a US or a Soviet mediatory role; both superpowers are distrusted by the belligerents. Washington and Moscow almost certainly will be looked to, however, for quiet support of any peace effort, possibly related to UN participation. A negotiated end to the war evolving from stalemate would have a mixed impact on US interests. On the positive side, it would probably push oil prices down, reduce the chances of a superpower confrontation, open the possibility to improved US-Iranian relations, and reduce Iraqi dependence on the Soviet Union. The continuation of the war, however, has produced beneficial trends for the United States that may be weakened or reversed if a settlement is reached. The war has distracted the Arabs from the Arab-Israeli arena and focused their attention on the Gulf conflict where US goals complement rather than clash with Arab goals. The war has fostered Iraqi moderation and accelerated Egypt's political reentry into the Arab world. The conflict also has been a major barrier to improved relations between Syria and Iraq, two important Soviet clients, and provided the impetus to improved security cooperation between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret 25X1 Issues To Be Resolved in Negotiations and Possible Settlements 7 Good Neighborliness 14 Implications of Peace for Iran and Iraq 24 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret Scope Note This paper examines the dynamics of a potential negotiat- ed settlement of the Iran-Iraq war, ranging from a minimum negotiated cease-fire to a full peace treaty. It reviews the issues to be resolved and the positions of the belligerents and assesses the obstacles to negotiations as well as the hurdles in negotiations. The study examines past cases of successful negotiation between Iran and Iraq for lessons applicable to the current impasse and identifies outcomes that would be least objectionable to the parties. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret Boundory ropresenlation is nol necessarily authoritative. Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret Iran-Iraq: Negotiati~ an End to the War The obstacles to a negotiated settlement of the Iran- Iraq war are formidable. Indeed, hostility between Iran and Iraq springs from the personal vendetta between the two leaders, the religious (Shia-Sunni) and ethnic (Persian-Arab) schisms between the two countries, the shared belief that the political ideology of the other is the embodiment of evil, competition for hegemony in the Persian Gulf, and along-festering territorial dispute. Nonetheless, their history of discord also includes a history of overcoming differences. Some 11 treaties have been negotiated-and later repudiated-be- tween Iraq (or the Turkish Ottoman empire) and Iran that have delimited their 1,480-kilometer border or settled other differences.' In the current dispute, we judge that Iran's belief that it can still achieve its maximum war goals-the ouster of Saddam Husayn and the ruling Bath Party- through military force represents the greatest obstacle to entering negotiations. Iran, however, has not been consistent in stating its war aims. At times Iranian officials have called only for Saddam's ouster and have implied acceptance of the Bath Party. At a minimum, Iran requires an assessment of blame against Saddam for starting the war and some form of punishment. Iran Before around-the-table negotiations can begin, in our view, Iran must pass through a potentially agonizing prenegotiation phase in which it first explores the ' The first known agreement is the Treaty of Zuhab signed between the Ottoman and Persian empires in 1639. In its grandiloquent style it concluded that "This happy peace will last and be maintained until the day of resurrection." Later agreements include the Treaty of Hamadan, 1727; Treaty of Constantinople, 1736; Treaty of Mughan, 1746; first Treaty of Erzurum, 1823; second Treaty of Erzurum, 1847; Convention between Principals, 1869; Protocol of Constantinople, 1913; Treaty of 1937 (signed in Tehran); and the possibility of negotiating and finally commits itself to resolving the conflict by peaceful means. An academic 25X1 study of conditions surrounding previous successful negotiations concludes that a "hurting stalemate," conveying a sense of hopelessness and unacceptably high cost to the belligerents, is most conducive to successful negotiations. The nearly eight costly years of war demonstrate the Iranian regime's willingness to endure great pain. During the course of the war thousands have been killed, and the economy has been heavily damaged. In 1984 and 1985, Tehran sought mutual cessation of air attacks on civilian areas partly because the regime 25X1 feared a weakening in public support for the war. The regime has dealt with this year's Iraqi missile cam- paign, in part, by channeling the populace's fear and frustration into anger against Baghdad. ' Iran has continually sought prohibitions against attacks against civilian areas and shipping and against chemical warfare. Tehran undoubtedly would like to fight a war that did not bother its civilian populace and, not surprisingly, favored Iranian warmaking capabil- Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret An Alternative Outcome: No War, No Peace The possibility that the war could `;fizzle out" with no resolution of outstanding issues is often raised as the most likely scenario should the conflict remain stalemated. A nonnegotiated end to the war might emerge, jor example,.from alimited peace initiative that achieved a de jacto cessation of hostilities but did not carry over to a broader settlement. Points made in support of this case are that: ? Ground fighting already continues at a very low level most oj'the year, interrupted only by Iranian offensives, which are declining in intensity. ? The regime in Tehran may conclude that it cannot win the war, but cannot Ford to admit this publicly by entering negotiations. A cessation of hostilities without settlement favors Iran, which holds key Iraqi territory. ? Since, many analysts argue, Saddam's personal position would be threatened more by peace than by war, Saddam may prefer a technical state of war, but without the burdens ojjighting, to a negotiated settlement. This scenario would present the United States with a short-term,situation in the GuU'better than the status In our judgment, between 1982 and at least early 1988, the Iranians believed, with some justification, that they were gradually winning the war. The cap- ture of most of the oil-bearing Majnoon Islands in 1984 and the southern end of the strategic Al Faw Peninsula in 1986 boosted Iranian morale and deter- mination to continue. The Iranian defeat at AI Faw and the loss of six ships, including two naval combatants, in the clash with US military forces in the Persian Gulf in April 1988, however, were significant reverses for Tehran: The immediate result of the setback at Al Faw was increased stridency in Iran's position, but over time the defeat may mark a turning point in Iran's willing- ness to negotiate. quo, but along-term situation potentially more dan- gerous. For a time, the.flow oj'oil would be unimped- ed, US-Soviet competition reduced, and the threat of the war expanding to include US,friends in the region removed. Over time, however, this scenario, as com- pared to a negotiated settlement, would.? ? Maintain a high demand jor weapons sales to the region, providing Moscow its most productive en- tree to the Gulf Arab states, and a lucrative market .for China to exploit. ? Sustain a high level of'Soviet-Iraqi military ties. ? Probably result in another war. We believe both belligerents have major incentives jor reaching a settlement, however: ? Baghdad Tears-realistically, in our view-that a relaxed international atmosphere would give Iran access to a wider arms market and tip the military balance in Iran's favor. Iraq also is committed to the return of captured territory. ? With the GCC states having hinted a willingness to pay Iran jor an end to the war, we believe that, should Tehran decide the war is not worth .fighting, it would seek reparations as well as a condemna- tion oj'Iraq through negotiations. Further Iranian defeats and significant Iraqi losses would be most likely to cause movement toward serious negotiations without provoking a hardening of Iraq's attitudes. Other developments that might push the conflict toward a negotiated settlement include the death of either leader or other dramatic regime change in either country The Iranian regime maintains a unity of purpose as well as sufficient public support for the war. some leaders are not enthusiastic about continuing the conflict, but their discontent will remain muted as long as Khomeini continues to pursue the war. 25X1 25X1 25X1 1X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret The Iranian leadership is realistic about the substan- tial military strength of Iraq and the international forces arrayed against Tehran. The regime, however, believes that it has overcome formidable odds in the past-against the Shah, the United States, and the Iraqi invasion-and can do so again. There is a minority view among analysts that Iran views the war as a stalemate and is ready for a negotiated settlement of the war. These analysts cite the Iranian response to the UN Secretary General's implementation plan for Resolution 598 as evidence.3 The key points of the Iranian position are that Tehran: ? Does not reject any part of Resolution 598 (includ- ing withdrawal from occupied territory). ? Accepts acease-fire as the first step to an integrated approach to a negotiated end to the war. ? Insists that a link be established between a cease- fire and identification of responsibility for initiating the conflict. ? Would formalize the undeclared cessation of hostil- ities once the identification of the party responsible is completed. The minority view holds that, although the Iranian position can be seen as a rejection of Resolution 598, it nonetheless reflects an Iranian willingness to negoti- ate an end to the war. (Iran asserts that Resolution 598's insistence on withdrawal before negotiations begin is an unworkable, and probably unprecedented, formula for conflict resolution.) Iraq Baghdad has viewed the war as a stalemate since 1982 when it withdrew from Iranian territory. Since then, Baghdad has been willing to negotiate on terms it rejected the first year of the war. For example, Baghdad insisted that negotiations precede withdraw- al when Iraq occupied Iranian territory-a demand that it has since reversed now that Iran holds Iraqi territory. ' On 20 July 1987 the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 598, which, among other things: demanded that, as a first step toward a negotiated settlement, Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-fire and withdraw all forces to internationally recognized borders; requested that the Secretary General explore the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict; and decided that the Security Council would meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure Baghdad is not willing to negotiate unconditionally. Despite being on the strategic defensive for years and suffering wide swings in morale, Iraq feels strong enough to hold out for reasonably favorable terms. Although Iraq would prefer to end the long war of attrition, it probably believes that its military strength will enable it to outlast Khomeini. In the wake of its victory at Al Faw, Iraq is likely to continue to press Iran militarily and has already hardened its negotiating position. According to US officials at the United Nations, Iraq's reaction to its Al Faw victory was to disengage from UN diplomatic efforts. Baghdad has also strengthened its demand that Iran unequivocally accept Resolution 598 before negotiations begin. President Saddam Husayn will not agree to a settle- ment that diminishes his control of Iraq or the power of the Ba`thist regime. Baghdad is confident that its Gulf Arab allies, the Soviets, and the West, fearing an Iranian victory and its implications, cannot abandon Iraq. We believe that the international community's pressure for an end to the war with no victor strength- ens Iraq's hand The Ba`thist regime is stable and, like Iran, shares a unity of purpose in sustaining its own war effort. We judge the great majority of Iraqis blame Iran for 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret . Figure 4 War Casualties Comparisons WWI US France Russia Germany WWII US Russia Germany Japan Vietnam a Includes killed and wounded. b Figures calculated through yearend 1987. Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 ~ecre[ continuing the war and see little choice but to support the Ba`thist regime. Kurdish and Shia dissidents do not seriously threaten either the war effort or popular acceptance of the regime. Saddam appears to main- tain firm control of the population through his effec- tive security service, although he has faced infrequent assassination attempts by Iraqi dissidents. Saddam's death probably would provide an opening for negotiations, as each side would want to probe the 30 other to see if his demise had created opportunities to end the war. Saddam's death alone, however, would be unlikely to cause either side to make significant zs concessions. Tehran would be unlikely to drop its demand that Iraq accept blame for starting the war- terms that Saddam's successors would find difficult to _ accept, at least initially. Issues To Be Resolved in Negotiations and Possible Settlements We place the issues to be resolved in a comprehensive settlement of the war into four categories: ? Blame and punishment of the aggressor. ? Territorial issues. ? Questions of good neighborliness. ? Cease-fire and withdrawal. Should Iran broaden its demands-as we believe it may-to include reduction of the US naval presence in the Gulf, a fifth category of regional security guarantees would emerge that would complicate ne- gotiations and put important US. interests at stake. According to diplomatic sources, recent Iranian emis- saries to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have stressed three Iranian desires that: ? The Gulf be "neutralized." ? The GCC pressure .Iraq to stop attacks against ships. ? All foreign naval forces be withdrawn from the Gulf. These may represent the basic elements of an Iranian long-term regional security doctrine that would best achieve the goal of Iranian domination of the Gulf and be incorporated into Iranian demands in compre- hensive negotiations to end the war. Resolution 598 Figure 5 Iran and Iraq: Diversion of Manpower Iran Iraq __ I I I I I I 1970 80 85 86 87 90b Selected years a Work force is defined as working age population minus students, disabled, internal security farces, and that percentage of working-age women not seeking employment. b Projected. Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 secret Both Iran and Iraq argue that the other was responsi- ble for initiating hostilities. We believe that both countries contributed to the conflict's origins. The most obvious move to full-scale war, however, and the fast capture of territory was Iraq's bombing of every major airbase in northern Iran and its invasion with nine divisions along a 700-kilometer .front on 22 September 1980. But Baghdad argues that its invasion was justified because Tehran had been trying since early 1979 to overthrow the Iraqi ? Aided Arab and Kurdish dissidents and former officials of the Shah's regime. ? Directed the takeover of the Iranian Embassy in London in early 1980. ? Sponsored assassination attempts against Iranian o.~cials. ? Violated Iranian territory with Iraqi military forces in 1979 and 1980. ? Arrested and then executed a leading Iraqi Shia cleric, Ayatollah Muhammad Bagr al-Sadr, and expelled thousands of Iraqi Shias of Iranian origin. regime. Baghdad contends that Tehran: ? Directed assassins in a terrorist campaign in Baghdad. ? Harassed Iraqi diplomats, including taking over two Iraqi consulates in western Iran in November 1979. ? Shelled Iraqi border posts and towns and violated Iraqi airspace. Iran asserts that its attempt to undermine the Iraqi regime was a justified response to hostile Iraqi policies. Tehran says that Baghdad: makes a nod to this Iranian concern by requesting that the Secretary General examine-in consultation with Iran, Iraq, and other states of the region- measures to enhance the security and stability of the region. We expect that the most likely negotiated end to the conflict will not encompass all the outstanding issues. We. believe, however, that a lasting settlement of the war must at least resolve the central Iranian demand that Iraq be blamed for initiating the conflict and the Iraqi demand that Iran withdraw from occupied territory. Resolution of other outstanding issues would add to the durability of a settlement, but it is difficult Iraq sought an accommodation with Iran c{f'ter the Shah's departure, but by late 1979 we believe that both sides were providing significant amounts of support to each other's dissidents. During 1980 both sides almost certainly conducted terrorist operations against each other's o,~rcials. In early 1980, Baghdad probably began planning for the invasion of Iran. Iraq, however, did not begin mobilizing its troops for the invasion until after the Iranian shelling of Iraqi border towns on 4 September 1980. until at least one of the leaders passes from the scene. Blame and Punishment The Iranian demand that Iraq and Saddam Husayn be blamed for the war derives its impetus from the personal rivalry between Khomeini and Saddam, the religious imperative to define the war as a just cause, the revolutionary imperative to export the revolution, 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 secret and partially from the need to justify the high human and economic cost of the war. The last three reasons militate against an easy change in this Iranian de- mand after Khomeini's death and lead us to conclude that blame and punishment will be a fundamental question regardless of Khomeini's death. We believe crafting a solution to the blame and punishment issue acceptable to both parties will be the most difficult aspect of a negotiated end to the war. A historical survey of attempted negotiations worldwide reveals that they nearly always have foun- dered when core values-those affecting a principal's existence or identity-were at stake, as is the case with Iran's central demand for punishment of Sad- dam Husayn. Iran has focused on the idea of an international tribunal that would assess blame against Iraq for starting the war and then levy punishment. According to the UN Secretary General, Iran views this as a four-stage process-determination, judgment, punish- ment, and reparations. Secure in its assumptions about fault for the hostilities, Tehran has stated that an impartial tribunal need take only two to three days to deliberate and judge Iraq the aggressor, but that assessing appropriate punishment is a legal process that could require a year or more. Iran at least has implied a willingness to negotiate the terms of punish- ment, but we see no hard evidence so far that Iran defines punishment in any other terms than removal of Saddam as ruler of Iraq. Iraq accepts the concept of a tribunal and believes it has a good case of its own. According to UN docu- ments and Embassy reporting, Baghdad would like a tribunal to be judicial in nature and to determine not only who started the war but also who is responsible for the continuation of the war, that is, Iran. The Iraqis believe any impartial tribunal would be influ- enced by the Iranian provocations that led to the Iraqi invasion. Embassy reporting indicates the Iraqis be- lieve they can make a case for their massive move into Iran on the grounds that there are no broadly accept- ed norms for correct proportionality of response to provocation A settlement on the issue of blame that we judge would be least objectionable to both sides probably would have two general aspects: ? A carefully worded judgment by a respected body about the start of the war. Such a judgment would have to be pointed enough in criticizing Iraq to satisfy the Iranian demand for blame, yet qualified enough that the Iraqis do not reject it. ? The establishment of a "reconstruction fund" as a form of negotiated reparations, whose payments would be skewed to favor Iran. To be accepted by both Iran and Iraq, a statement would have to be laboriously coordinated with them, 25X1 regardless of the makeup of the tribunal or commis- sion. Some of the elements of a finding might be that: ? Iran and Iraq both took actions that fueled tension in the year before the war started. ? Iraq violated several articles of the UN Charter by occupying territories without thoroughly exploring peaceful alternatives. ? The international community, including the United Nations, is partly to blame. The UN Security Council, distracted by the Soviet move into Afghan- istan and the US-Iran hostage crisis, neglected to take action to stem the escalating tension between Iran and Iraq before the war began and was not 25X1 impartial in its early attempts to deal with the hostilities. (The UN Charter does not fully cover the circumstances surrounding the start of a war. It is vague in specifying when a country can defend itself with force and the proportionality of such an action.) ? Iran is at fault for continuing the war long after Iraq sought a negotiated settlement. ? I.raq.has repeatedly used chemical weapons in the war. 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 ,ecret Figure 6 Damage to Economic Targets in Iran and Iraq As Sahra 1 .,r C y ? ti~ I by 7~ .. ~ / , ~ ,--~~.. ~ '~',' Hamadan ~ '~`~~ Khana/gin f" t j Mandari ~ AGHDAD hor5a'mshahr yy~,, ~ ~ ICbAbad&n WAR DAMAGE ~ Heavy Medium ~ Light -?A"'- .~Mari~en~~-~~- ` ~~~.~ ' ~~~~TFHRANrc: ..J ~ ~ 'AI B~f ~Az Zubayr ~ ~ Abu al Kha;ib~ ~~Kh? r al Amara Kuwait ~~., `~ "?""`"Z ranian oilfield) Saudi Arabia .,a ~ .~~ ~ err-, ~ ~ ~ 7 , ~ ~ ~~; ~~.. L . r~ s /" -~y~ . ~T~I~ ~ ~ tYG ~ 1 '`l \~a~~~ u.~ ?1 . ` ~ ~o? i Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret We judge the most workable arrangement for repara- tions would be amultibillion-dollar fund with contri- butions primarily from the GCC states and with payments lopsided in favor of Iran. The fund probably would be cast as a "reconstruction" fund to avoid the implication of war guilt by the contributors. If Iran still holds the Majnoon Islands during negotiations, Iraq might be pressed to contribute the equivalent of a share of projected oil revenues from the area. Earlier Iranian demands for several hundred billion dollars are clearly unrealistic, but $20-40 billion might be more attainable. For comparison, the GCC states have delivered about $40 billion dollars in aid to Iraq since the war began (a point Iran would undoubt- edly raise in negotiating reparations). Japan has hint- ed that it would be willing to participate in a recon- struction fund, and some West European states may offer to participate as well, particularly if the arrange- ments guaranteed access to major projects in a post- war reconstruction effort. A formula for a reparations fund would have several difficult aspects: Iran wants a "peace commission" to come to Iran to determine actual damages-a process that would take at least several months. A timetable for payment would have to be established (a 10-year period might be appropriate). Even then, the total amount for such a fund would be largely dictated by the willingness of the GCC states to contribute. The money promised probably would fall well short of money delivered, causing some friction between Iran and the GCC states.' Because Iran, Iraq, and all of the GCC states except Oman and Bahrain are mem- bers of OPEC, questions of oil prices and OPEC quotas may become integral to negotiations over reparations. Territorial Disputes Theoretically, the border issues should be relatively easy to settle. Neither side harbors significant ? An example of GCC aid shortfall is the Baghdad Pact commit- menu-the ]0-year aid package mandated at an Arab summit meeting in 1978 from the wealthy Gulf states to Jordan, Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Gulf states agreed to provide $35 billion over 10 years ($3.5 billion per year). In'no year was the full amount paid. At the end of 1987, the ninth year, $17 billion of a promised $31.5 billion, or 54 percent, had been paid. historical territorial ambitions in the other's country. Moreover, the international land boundary between the two countries has been largely delineated to both countries' satisfaction. The 1975 Algiers Accord pro- vided favorable concessions to Iran along the Shatt al Arab, the only joint water boundary and the most important territorial issue in negotiations. At times both parties have hinted that they could accept a return to the provisions of the accord. 25X1 The Iraqi recapture of the Al Faw Peninsula is a major step in restoring the borders to their prewar status and will ease settlement of territorial issues in negotiations. Al Faw has great strategic importance because of its location along the western side of the Shatt, and Iran's loss. of the territory will weaken Tehran's hand in negotiating the future of the Shatt. By holding Al Faw, Iran could render Iraq land- locked, since it would control both banks of the Shatt al Arab at its mouth and, therefore, access to Iraq's only deepwater port-AI Basrah. Until 1975, all 25X1 treaties dealing with the Shatt al Arab had failed because they required Iranian ships bound for Aba- dan and Khorramshahr to traverse Iraqi territorial waters. Any outcome that resulted in Iran controlling the Shatt al Arab would produce the opposite and more serious effect on Iraq-and probably lay the groundwork for future conflict. The Iranian occupation of Iraq's Majnoon Islands will complicate negotiations. The manmade islands in the Hawizah Marsh north of Al Basrah cover a signifi- cant, although undeveloped, oilfield. Tehran has sug- gested in the past that the oil from the Majnoons could be applied to reparations after the war, imply- ing that Iranian departure from this territory will not come cheaply for Iraq. Still, in our view, Iran will have to leave occupied territory as part of a settlement acceptable to the current Iraqi regime. We believe that, once Iran has 25X1 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret ?Irbil ~(\, ~ SSar Dasht ~/-~ ? Mahabad ?P,ire'n Shahr As ? Panjwt(6 Sulaymaniyah t~+ Qa;r-e Shirin Iranian-occupied territory, May 1988 . Mariviin Sanandaj r23dkAg'!h yc~ Bakhtar~n Badrah. Mehren ar T;9,i~ 'Ali al Gha6i ?behl6ien "~~?o Az Zubayi s JConstantinople Protocol, 1913 'Ah an anchorage given to Iran tS'~d r Olran-Iraq Treaty, 1937 boundary shifted to'thalweg in the vicinity of Abadan Algiers Accord, 1975 entire boundary shifted to thalweg Kuwait ubiyen. . Khorr ,. `Dezful R~ a 'Z1~~?'. rP_. ~` ~ l ]-G . see In5ll a~ndar-e Khomeyni (Treaty of Erzurum, 1847 boundary followed low water markon Iranian side of river ~ Nahr-e AI Fawn ? Qasr ? Behba'han' Esfahan Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret History of Iran-Iraq Border Disputes The Iran-Iraq border extends for more than 1,480 kilometers between the border with Turkey and the mouth of the Shatt al Arab. No single geographical feature delineates the border, which-with significant exceptions along the Shatt-crosses lightly populated and economically unimportant territory. Since the first known bilateral treaty in 1639, disputes over the land boundary have been relatively minor, with fric- tions usually resulting from repeated failures to demarcate the boundary properly. The Shatt-a waterway formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers-serves as the bor- derfor 105 kilometers, and control of shipping on the Shatt and sovereignty over the waterway have been contested for centuries. Iraq has long perceived that its interests in the Shatt were more vital than Iran's, justifying its claimforfull sovereignty. The waterway is Iraq s only outlet to the sea from its only deep- water port at Al Basrah, whereas Iran has a long coastline on the Persian Gulf: This reasoning originally was presented by the Ottoman Turks and reluctantly conceded by Persia in 1639. The Iranians grew unhappy with Iraqi sovereignty as their cities along the Shatt became more important economically, particularly with the increased impor- tance of oil and concentration of Iran's oil industry nearby. Ottoman, and later Iraqi, efforts to limit Iranian shipping and to charge import duties aggra- vated the situation. Iran continually sought to change the river boundary. It gained a concession from Iraq to move the bound- ary from the eastern bank to the thalweg in a small area opposite the Iranian city of Abadan in 1937. A 25X1 navigation convention in that treaty was never hon- ored, however, contributing to Iranian frustrations. In 1969, the Shah abrogated the 1937 treaty, and relations between Iran and Iraq worsened. Fear of war and a willingness on both sides to make trade-offs on Iranian support for Kurdish dissidents in northern Iraq and on Iraqi control of the Shatt led to the Algiers Accord of 1975. For the.~rst time the entire boundary was moved to the thalweg, restricting Iraqi sovereignty to the western side of the Shatt. Baghdad s contention that the treaty was forced on it has contributed to its desire to reestablish full sover- eignty over the waterway. decided to enter serious negotiations to end the war, it will be willing to leave the Majnoon Islands and other, less important, occupied territory, but not without fully exploiting its position at the bargaining table. We believe the formula for the Shatt al Arab most likely to succeed would be a return roughly to the terms of the Algiers Accord of 1975, with the interna- tional border drawn at the thalweg as specified in the accord. Both sides probably could agree on the gener- al principles of freedom of navigation, equal access to the river, and the formation of a river commission. Once Iran and Iraq agree in principle to solve the Shatt al Arab dispute, more detailed, and probably contentious, discussions of the rights, uses, and obliga- tions would have to follow for the river to open to traffic. Questions such as whose flags fly on ships 25X1 given the authority) and organize personnel ~ 25X1 entering the Shatt and whose pilots are used were burning issues before the war started. We believe a workable solution would be the establishment of a Shatt commission that would provide: ? A means for continuing contact between the two countries to address detailed Shatt issues. ? Channel and navigational maintenance and pilots. ? An organization to collect tolls (even set tolls, if Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret We believe that a Shatt commission would have to be at least trilateral in scope, to consist of Iran, Iraq, and a third party, such as the regional UN economic commission. With Iraq and Iran alone probably inca- pable of establishing or maintaining the simplest of commissions, the third party could provide some objectivity and reduce the possibility that disagree- ment over the Shatt would erupt into conflict. Good Neighborliness A number of lesser, but still important, issues fall into the category of maintaining correct relations between the two countries. These issues are likely both to present stumblingblocks in negotiations and to be used for minor concessions to break deadlocks. The issues and possible solutions include: ? Cessation of support to dissident groups. Renewed Iranian support to the Kurds was claimed by Iraq as a major reason for abrogating the Algiers Accord just before invading Iran in September 1980. We believe the parties could, as in the past, reach an agreement of mutual noninterference in the internal affairs of the other, although covert support for dissident groups probably would continue. Iraq would press Iran at least to curtail the activities of the dissident Shia Da`wa party, and Iraq probably would be willing publicly to limit support for the Iranian leftist Mujahiden-e Khalq organization and Arab separatist groups in Khuzestan. ? Exchange oJ'prisoners. Baghdad's continuing stress on the return of Iraqi prisoners of war underscores the importance it attaches to this issue. Iran holds more than 75,000 prisoners of war and Iraq holds about 20,000. We judge that both sides would return the prisoners of war, fearing most that their own nationals had -been brainwashed or recruited as agents while confined by the other side. ? The Iranian demand that Shias exiled.from Iraq since the Iranian revolution be repatriated. One Iraqi reaction to Iranian provocations before the war was to exile more than 60,000 Shias of Iranian extraction suspected of sympathizing with the cleri- cal regime in Tehran. We believe that Iraq would be willing to accept some of the exiles. Iraq's ruthless internal security apparatus, however, would watch them closely and imprison or perhaps even execute some. Iraq would almost certainly strongly resist Iranian efforts to link the return of Iraqi prisoners of war to the return of these exiles. ? Iranian Shia access to holy sites in Iraq.S Baghdad would not relinquish sovereignty over holy sites in Iraq but probably could offer an annual quota of pilgrimage visas to Iranians. Iraq could use modula- tion of this number as a bargaining card. For comparison, Saudi Arabia has received requests for as many as 300,000 Iranian pilgrims in one year but has allowed only about 150,000 Iranians to make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in recent years. ? Normalization ojrelations. A comprehensive settle- ment might also have provisions for the reestablish- ment of diplomatic ties and commerce and the cessation of hostile propaganda. The two countries maintained embassies in one another's capitals through the first seven years of the war. The trade relationship between them has always been small, however, and prospects for future commercial ties are limited. Cease-Fire and Withdrawal As the haggling in the United Nations over imple- mentation of Resolution 598 demonstrates, procedural questions can prove extremely difficult to overcome. Iraq insists on the sequential implementation of the resolution-cease-fire and withdrawal to international borders as the first step, then negotiations-while Iran insists that acease-fire be linked to the establish- ment of a commission to establish blame as the first step. ' Since the outbreak of the war it has been impossible for Iranians to visit the two holiest shrine cities for Shias-An Najaf and Karbala' in Iraq. This inaccessibility has greatly enhanced the significance for Iranian Shias of the holy cities in Saudi Arabia, particularly Medina, and is a contributing factor to the increased tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia at the annual pilgrimage. 14 25X1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret Iran rejects the proposal that withdrawal occur before Table 1 negotiations, and we believe that Iran would not leave Belligerents' Willingness To Compromise Iraqi territory, unless forced out militarily, before negotiations began-or even in their early stages. For its part, we believe Iraq would not tolerate for long a cease-fire in place and continued Iranian occupation of Iraqi territory. Iraq would probably prefer negotia- tions while fighting continued to a cease-fire in place, because Iran could rebuild militarily during a cease- ment, such as the return of prisoners of war. ~ to Iran 25X1 To be workable, we believe that overall negotiations would have to proceed while Iran still holds Iraqi territory. Withdrawal from occupied territory would probably have to be near-simultaneous with the im- plementation of other aspects of a negotiated settle- its terms for a settlement. The process could allow for Initiation of negotiations while fighting Medium Medium at least a tacit end to the war. continues 25X1 dtsengage from the process once started, tncreastng the pressure on Tehran at least to develop and refine Procedural issues believe the clerical regime might find it difficult to Cease-fire and withdrawal A benefit to Iraq for changing its stance and accept- ing a cease-fire without prior Iranian withdrawal is that it would enmesh Tehran in a peace process. We ncNau~auui~ ui iray~ JtuaS LOw 1V1eQlUm- during withdrawal and perhaps on a long-term basis. ~ High As an alternate possibility, Iran and Iraq may prefer Cessation of support to dissident groups High Medium- to exchange observers. High 25X1 Possibility of Compromise Iraq Iran Key issues Blame and punishment Iranian demand for the removal of Saddam Husayn and the end of Ba`thist rule in Iraq Nil Low Impartial tribunal judgment blaming Iraq for starting the war and holding Iran responsible for continuing the war Medium Low Return to prewar land and water bound- High Medium aries with the evacuation of occupied territories Broad negotiations before troop Low- Medium- The procedure for monitoring withdrawal and withdrawals to prewar boundaries Medium High postwithdrawal treaty adherence will probably require Other issues international monitoring. We judge that an interns- Establishment of diplomatic relations High High *:,,,..,i i TT~T ,... n ........:.....:.... ..c ~w,. r,.i,.....:.. ~,._c__ and Shia access to holy sites in Iraq flights are made to ensure adherence to terms of Establishment of governing regime for Medium High Shatt al Arab waterway _ Establishment of formula and timetable High :High for reparations Enforcement procedures for monitoring High High withdrawals, border security, and treaty . adherence a This table assumes a context in which the war is stalemated and Iran and Iraq commit themselves to a negotiated settlement. The judgments of willingness to compromise are based on our assess- ment of the intrinsic value of each issue to the belligerents. 25X1 25X1 Resolution 598 calls for a team of UN observers to "verify, confirm and supervise" the cease-fire and withdrawal. An arrangement might be reached simi- lar to those made between Israel and Syria and Israel and Egypt, where regular third-party reconnaissance disengagement. Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/22 :CIA-RDP89S01450R000300300001-1 Secret Negotiations and Settlements Between Iran and Iraq Since the onset of the current war, Baghdad and Tehran have successfully settled some issues: Exchange of Prisoners of War. During the past.few years Iran and Iraq have regularly exchanged some oJ'their prisoners of'war. Iraq had tried to link the exchange to a comprehensive settlement of the war but dropped this demand rather than block the exchange. Iran, although angered on occasion by reportsfrom the International Committee of the Red Cross (Red Crescent) and the United Nations con- demning Iranian abuses of prisoners, has allowed the exchange to continue without the propaganda bene.~ts it had sought. Turkey, the Red Crescent, and the United Nations have assisted in negotiating and implementing the exchanges. Moratoriums on Attacks on Civilian Areas. Iran and Iraq have temporarily agreed to partial cease-fires- halting air and Scud surface-to-surface missile at- tacks on cities-on several occasions. The first mora- toriumfollowed an appeal by the UN Secretary General in June 1984. We believe that the Secretary General s appeal only provided a pretext for acease- ,ftre that both sides anxiously wanted. Tehran and Baghdad were sufleringfrom the attacks, and the regimes were worried about domestic instability. Both sides accommodated the Secretary General and allowed UN observer teams to monitor compliance. AJ'ter a respite, however, Iraq renewed its air attacks on Iran's cities as a response to Iranian offensive action. Another moratorium was temporarily accepted by both parties at the Secretary General's insistence in early 1985. After a visit to the area in April 1985, the Secretary General noted that the moratorium was not being observed. The "war of'the cities" reached its peak of intensity in early 1988. Iraq has on several occasions declared unilateral halts in missile and bombing attacks, and Tehran has responded by stat- ingthat it would attack civilian areas only in retalia- tion for Iraqi air raids. Trapped Ships and Oil Spills. Iran and Iraq tried to negotiate two other issues, butfailed, probably be- cause neither country believed that its interests were directly c~"ected by the outcome. UN Special Repre- sentative Olc