INDIA'S NAVY AND ITS INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY: PURSUING REGIONAL PREDOMINANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000300330001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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India's Navy and Its
Indian Ocean Strategy:
Pursuing Regional
Predominance
An Intelligence Assessment
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Secret
NESA 88-10036
June 1988
Copy 386
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Directorate of Secret
* Intelligence 25X1
India's Navy and Its
Indian Ocean Strategy:
Pursuing Regional
Predominance
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,
Reverse Blank
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NESA 88-10036
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 20 June 1988
was used in this report.
India's Navy and Its
Indian Ocean Strategy:
Pursuing Regional
Predominance
We believe India considers its security concerns in the Indian Ocean over
the long term are as important as those with Pakistan and China. New Del-
hi traditionally has relied on diplomacy to safeguard its Indian Ocean
interests but lately is increasing its involvement in the internal affairs of In-
dian Ocean states?sometimes by military means. To support their Indian
Ocean aspirations, the Indians are pursuing a naval modernization and
expansion program to project power more effectively.
New Delhi's Indian Ocean strategy centers on maritime defense and the
assertion of its leadership over other regional states. It also includes
supporting the internal stability of these states, protecting the interests of
local Indian ethnic groups, and limiting?if not supplanting?foreign
presences. New Delhi believes others in the region must not be able to
threaten India militarily or be allowed to act in a way that may destabilize
the area and invite outside interference in the region. India is most involved
in the affairs of Sri Lanka, Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius but also is
concerned with island states farther to the southwest and the Indian Ocean
littoral countries.
The Indian Navy can defend the country's contiguous waters and safe-
guard its maritime interests against threats from neighboring states, but it
cannot carry out maritime power projection operations very far into the
Indian Ocean or for an extended period. India lacks sufficient advanced
oceangoing warships, adequate logistic capabilities, and the requisite
tactical expertise to conduct sustained, modern naval operations beyond
coastal areas. As a coastal force, the Navy is strongest in antisurface,
antisubmarine, and mine-countermine warfare missions; it is weakest in
antiair warfare and support missions.
India's buildup of the Army and Air Force units it would use for power
projection operations extends its reach beyond that provided by the Navy.
The Army's 54th Infantry Division and 50th Parachute Brigade are its
frontline units for these operations, which would be supported by the Air
Force's Jaguar strike aircraft and a growing fleet of transport aircraft.
India's ability to conduct amphibious and airborne warfare missions gives
it a strong intervention capability against Sri Lanka or the smaller Indian
Ocean island states of Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius, or Comoros. India
would lose this military advantage if these island states' forces were
augmented by combat units of outside powers or if it attempted to
intervene in islands farther from its shores or in littoral countries it does
not border.
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India's power projection capability will grow slowly and its Navy will
remain largely a coastal force for the remainder of the century. The
recently leased Soviet Charlie I nuclear-powered submarine?to be used
more for technical and training purposes than for operational activity?and
the newly purchased Bear F long-range antisubmarine warfare?maritime
reconnaissance aircraft are the first naval assets India has acquired that
are not aimed specifically at improving its naval capabilities over Pakistan.
Planned acquisitions will increase the Navy's combat capabilities in all
mission areas, but its ability to conduct sustained operations far from shore
will remain weak. India's military modernization and expansion will
remain primarily focused on the more immediate Pakistani threat, and its
intervention in Sri Lanka will command much attention and effort at the
expense of other activities.
A rapidly expanding force structure, coupled with a dedication to indige-
nous production, will limit the Navy's potential. Acquisition of more ships
and aircraft is likely to outstrip India's ability to man, maintain, and
control the fleet efficiently. Domestic shipbuilding is beginning to overtake
foreign purchases in naval acquisitions and slow the buildup, but it will
lessen military purchases from Moscow and increase opportunities for the
embryonic Indo-US defense relationship.
Indian naval power will not challenge regular US operations in the Indian
Ocean at least until the turn of the century. New Delhi's efforts to restrict
outside involvement in the Indian Ocean will largely remain diplomatic.
The Indian Navy not only is no match for regular US or French Indian
Ocean naval deployments but also would be hard pressed to challenge
Soviet or Australian forces frequently sent to the region. In an Indo-
Pakistani war, however, the Indians would mount aggressive naval opera-
tions close to shore, including a blockade of Karachi, to deter and even in-
terdict maritime shows of support for or resupply efforts to Pakistan.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
111
Scope Note
vii
New Delhi's Goals in the Indian Ocean
1
Increasing Indian Involvement
2
Sri Lanka
2
Seychelles
4
Mauritius
4
Maldives
4
Africa
4
Southeast Asia
6
The Indian Navy
6
Mission and Organization
6
Force Structure
6
The Fleet
6
Bases and Facilities
7
Strengths and Vulnerabilities
7
Antisurface Warfare
9
Antisubmarine Warfare
10
Antiair Warfare
10
Mine and Countermine Warfare
11
Support Operations
11
Operational Expertise
11
Expansion and Modernization
12
Role of Ground and Air Forces in Power Projection
13
Outlook
17
Implications for the United States
17
Appendix
India's Nuclear-Powered Submarine Program and the
Lease of a Soviet Nuclear-Powered Submarine
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Scope Note
This assessment examines India's Indian Ocean strategy and the capabili-
ties of the Indian Navy and those ground and air forces that support this
strategy through power projection operations. Much of the information on
the
and open sources
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India's Navy and Its
Indian Ocean Strategy:
Pursuing Regional
Predominance
We believe India considers its security concerns in the
Indian Ocean over the long term are as important as
those with Pakistan and China. US Embassy report-
ing indicates New Delhi expected foreign interest in
the Indian Ocean to decline after the United King-
dom's decision in 1971 to withdraw from "east of
Suez." The Indians, however, have discovered that the
Arab oil embargo, the Iranian revolution, and the
Iran-Iraq war have increased the strategic importance
of the region in the eyes of outside powers. Indian
officials are concerned that instability in some region-
al states could invite outside intervention.' India has
tried to counter the buildup of US and Soviet forces in
the region with diplomatic efforts, including support
for the UN Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal, but
these efforts have largely been ineffective. As a result,
India is pursuing naval and other military moderniza-
tion and expansion programs that we believe are
designed to improve its ability to secure its regional
position.
New Delhi's Goals in the Indian Ocean
India justifies its regional involvements and naval
buildup by claiming they are necessary to defend its
long coastline, island territories, offshore oil and
mineral interests, and sea lines of communication. US
Embassy reporting indicates Indian officials often
point to the small but potent Pakistani Navy and the
presence in the Indian Ocean of foreign warships and
naval facilities to justify their concern. Indian naval
officers characterize the presence of a US aircraft
carrier task force in the Bay. of Bengal during the
Indo-Pakistani war in 1971 as a form of interference
India would challenge in the future. They also refer to
the need to defend offshore territories, such as Lak-
shadweep and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and
' The Indians are most concerned with instability in Sri Lanka and
Seychelles. In formulating Indian Ocean policy, India also consid-
ers the island states of Mauritius, Comoros, and Madagascar; the
island territories of Diego Garcia and Reunion; the states along the
South and East African and the Southwest and Southeast Asian
littoral; and Australia.
1
The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Proposal
The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal serves as
the centerpiece in New Delhi's regional diplomatic
strategy. Proposed in the United Nations in 1971 by
Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) and Tanzania and adopted
as a declaration, the initiative envisages the Indian
Ocean as an area "to be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes," and proscribes regional military installa-
tions, naval maneuvers, intelligence operations, and
weapons tests. New Delhi supports the proposal as a
means to deny regional military access to outside
powers.
The proposal has not been confirmed as a resolution
and has encountered mixed reaction from the interna-
tional community, we believe largely because of its
fundamental ambiguity over intrusive, foreign versus
legitimate, littoral power naval activity. Most major
Western countries reject the proposal as denying
them necessary access to a region vital to their
national interests, critical to their strategic defense,
and where they maintain treaty and even some sover-
eign responsibilities. The Soviets support the propos-
al in principle but try to focus attention on the US
naval facility at Diego Garcia and away from their
own naval deployments and accesses. Many littoral
states' interpretations of the proposal have diverged
from India's over the years, in our judgment because
they suspect India's intentions and do not wish to face
New Delhi's growing interests and power without the
potential check of foreign powers' presence.
cite the Falklands war in 1982 as an illustration of the
vulnerability of undefended island possessions. India
depends on the sea for most of its oil?receiving about
40 percent in imports from the Persian Gulf and
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about two-thirds of domestic production from the
offshore oilfields of the Bombay High. The Interna-
tional Seabed Authority recently allotted to India a
52,000-square-kilometer seabed mineral exploration
zone in the central Indian Ocean. The Indians also are
determined to protect their foreign trade, which is
almost completely dependent upon shipping and
which they consider vital to their economic develop-
ment.
We believe that, beyond defense, New Delhi's prima-
ry regional goal is to assert its preeminence over other
Indian Ocean countries?those along the littoral and
the island states. New Delhi uses a combination of
diplomatic and military pressure in trying to secure
recognition of Indian leadership from regional states.
Although India may not need to exercise its military
muscle against these states to secure their acknowl-
edgment of this leadership, New Delhi, in our judg-
ment, wants to underscore that it will not allow these
countries to act in ways detrimental to Indian inter-
ests. Indian relations with Nepal?where New Delhi
takes advantage of strong ties and military superiority
to influence Kathmandu's foreign and defense policies
and restrict outside involvement?are often cited by
scholars as the archetype of the relationship it wants
with Indian Ocean states.
In our judgment, safeguarding the internal stability of
the regional states and protecting the interests of
Indian ethnic groups are secondary goals in New
Delhi's Indian Ocean strategy. US Embassy officials
report New Delhi views instability in Indian Ocean
countries as openings for the foreign involvement that
could challenge its leadership. Before its intervention
in Sri Lanka, New Delhi was disturbed that its rivals,
Pakistan and China, provided most of Colombo's
foreign military aid, according to US Embassy report-
ing, and feared that the United States or the United
Kingdom would gain access to the Sri Lankan port of
Trincomalee. We believe New Delhi demonstrates its
support for ethnic Indian communities in Indian
Ocean states, such as Sri Lanka, Seychelles, and
Mauritius, to underscore its regional leadership, to
protect its economic interests, to counteract domestic
criticism, and to head off refugee problems.
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We believe India's long-range strategic goal is to
restrict, and eventually eliminate, the foreign presence
in the region. New Delhi has supported diplomatic
initiatives, like the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
proposal, and has encouraged regional groupings,
such as the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation, the Organization of African Unity, the
Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, to limit foreign, especially
superpower, involvement in these regions?with little
effect. Although India is many years from presenting
a credible challenge to the superpowers in the Indian
Ocean, we believe it is building up the forces that
would be necessary to demonstrate its intentions.
Increasing Indian Involvement
In our judgment, New Delhi over the last few years
has been assuming a more paternalistic role toward
Indian Ocean states and trying to cultivate their
support for its regional policies. India is becoming
more involved in the affairs of these countries by
expanding diplomatic ties and increasing commerce,
security training, and ship visits. We believe New
Delhi hopes its expanded presence will help counter, if
not supplant, foreign involvement in the region. For
instance, provisions in the 1987 Indo?Sri Lankan
accord allowing India potential veto powers over
foreign ship visits and communications facilities in Sri
Lanka appear aimed at limiting US access to the
island, although these provisions have not been exer-
cised.
Sri Lanka
New Delhi's determination to influence regional
states' internal matters is most striking in Sri Lanka.
India has involved itself heavily in trying to achieve a
solution to the island's four-year-long ethnic con-
flict?first by] supporting supporting the Tamil insur-
gents, then by enforcing a peace accord between the
Tamils and the majority Sinhalese. India began sup-
porting the Tamils in the early 1980s to assuage the
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The Indian Diaspora
Over 10 million ethnic Indians live overseas. Indian
expatriates first established themselves in early mi-
grations throughout the British Empire mainly as
indentured servants and unskilled workers, then in a
second wave of migration beginning shortly after
World War II of skilled workers to Southwest Asia
and Africa, and most recently in an exodus of highly
educated people to the developed countries of Europe
and North America.
In our judgment, New Delhi is interested in maintain-
ing cultural ties to these communities and recognizes
the role overseas Indians can play in securing host-
country support for Indian policies. Still, India ap-
pears to believe there are limits to what it can do in
support of its expatriates, as illustrated most recently
in its reluctance to interfere in Fiji despite its anxiety
over the interests of Fiji's Indian community during
that country's coup.
Sri Lanka. Two million Ceylon Tamils, about 13
percent of the island's population, live primarily in
the north and east. They are ethnically related to
about 50 million Tamils in southern India and are
engaged in a separatist struggle with the Sinhalese-
dominated government in Colombo. Another approxi-
mately 850,000 Indian Tamils in central Sri Lanka,
descendants of workers brought by the British from
southern India to work the tea plantations, are more
closely related to the Tamils in southern India but
are officially stateless because neither Sri Lanka nor
India wants to accept total sovereign responsibility
for them.
Mauritius. About 70 percent of the island's 1 million
people are of ethnic Indian origin-51 percent Hindu
and 17 percent Muslim. Because of the powerful role
cultural affiliation plays in Mauritian politics, a
Hindu is generally the only likely candidate for
prime minister and other groups can only gain influ-
ence through coalitions with Hindu factions.
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Seychelles. Only a few hundred of Seychelles's nearly
70,000 people are of Indian descent, but this middle-
class minority monopolizes the islands' important
retail and import-export trade.
South Africa. About 950,000 ethnic Indians live in
South Africa and constitute about 3 percent of the
population. They largely include middle-class work-
ers, retailers, and professionals who, together with
the country's so-called Colored or mixed race indi-
viduals occupy a social and economic niche between
the ruling white community and the disenfranchised
blacks.
East Africa. Ethnic Indians generally make up about
1 percent of the populations of these countries, al-
though the 30,000 on Zanzibar in Tanzania consti-
tute about 8 percent of that island's population. No
Indian community has much political power.
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Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Most countries
in this area have large Indian communities, with
Saudi Arabia's 400,000?nearly 3 percent of its
population?the largest. They are mainly skilled
workers with no political influence.
Southeast Asia. Singapore's 150,000 and Malaysia's
800,000 ethnic Indians constitute 6 and 5 percent,
respectively, of the national populations?the highest
concentrations in the area. Other countries have only
a few thousand. None of these communities exercise
much political clout.
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indignation felt by its own sizable Tamil community
in southern India at the Sri Lankan Tamils' plight
and to forge a counterweight against what New Delhi
perceived as Colombo's increasingly independent for-
eign policy. India also was concerned because increas-
ing violence threatened Sri Lanka's internal stability,
sped the flow of Tamil refugees to southern India, and
led Colombo to seek aid from Pakistan, China, and
the United States. New Delhi apparently pressured
Colombo to sign a peace accord after an intimidating
show of Indian airpower over northern Sri Lanka in
June 1987 in which India dropped relief supplies to
Tamil civilians. Indian military intervention in north-
ern and eastern Sri Lanka quickly followed and the
number of troops reached over 50,000 by the spring of
1988. Although US Embassy reporting indicates the
Indians plan to guarantee security for local elections
this summer and to begin withdrawing their forces,
we believe residual resistance will require some Indian
military presence at least through Sri Lanka's presi-
dential election in 1989.
Seychelles
A year before the Sri Lankan accord, New Delhi
intervened to calm unrest in Seychelles, in an appar-
ent attempt to extend its "policeman" role further
into the Indian Ocean.
because of internal political tension there. The de-
stroyer arrived firing a 21-gun salute, an unusual
show of force, and stayed for a six-day visit, which
received prominent coverage in the local press. Ac-
cording to sources of the US Embassy in New Delhi,
Seychelles President Rene indicated privately that he
would welcome Indian intervention in the event of a
coup or other military threat to his regime. In June
1987, New Delhi acceded to Rene's request to keep a
visiting Indian frigate in Victoria harbor as a show of
force during an anticipated mercenary attack, which
never occurred. In our judgment, New Delhi's support
for the Rene regime marks the first stages of India's
assumption of a role previously played by the Soviet
Union. Indian officials probably calculate a positive
response serves New Delhi's interest of denying
Indian Ocean access to outside powers.
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Mauritius
New Delhi has expanded its involvement in Mauritian
internal affairs, although less obtrusively than in Sri
Lanka and Seychelles. The US Embassy in Port Louis
reports Indian influence in Mauritius counters the
Soviets' attempts to develop their interests there and
works to limit French efforts to project influence from
Reunion. India's External Affairs Minister made an
official visit to Mauritius in July 1987, shortly before
the Mauritian elections, during which he pledged a
grant of $7 million to finance several Mauritian
development projects
In 1986, India established a satellite track-
ing station on Mauritius?New Delhi's first extrater-
ritorial installation in the Indian Ocean. India also
supports Mauritius's claim to Diego Garcia.
Maldives
We believe India relies mostly on its proximity and
the absence of other powerful states close by to
support its position in Maldivian affairs. New Delhi
provides some financial support to Male and promotes
Indo-Maldivian cultural exchange programs. The In-
dians recently established two textile mills in Mal-
dives to produce fabric to be sold to the United States
and Western Europe, thereby avoiding the purcha-
sers' quotas on Indian-produced fabric.
Africa
India has limited its efforts in east Africa and the
immediate offshore island states, Madagascar and
Comoros, largely to political overtures, working hard
in international forums as well as bilaterally to devel-
op relations. Its longstanding support for black Afri-
can opposition to apartheid gains political points with
these states, as do its small-scale aid and military
training programs. Although Tanzania, Kenya, and
Mozambique are among the nine countries separately
listed in India's latest budget as recipients of grants
and loans, aid to African states accounted for only
about 10 ercent of Indian assistance to other coun-
tries.
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Operation Pawan: The Sri Lankan Intervention
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Within hours of the signing in July 1987 of the
Indo-Sri Lankan peace accord to end the fighting
between the Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka,
Indian troops were flown into the island's northern
Jena Peninsula to serve as a -peacekeeping force."
forces had been on
increased alert in southern India at least since early
June, when New Delhi airdropped supplies into Je-
na to provide relief to Tamil civilians suffering under
the government's three-month blockade of the insur-
gent-held peninsula. Although the Indians may have
planned originally to fight the Sri Lankan Army, the
accord called for Indian troops to secure key areas in
the Northern and Eastern Provinces, monitor and
enforce the cease-fire, and assist Sri Lankan authori-
ties in receiving weapons surrendered by the insur-
gents, according to US Embassy reporting.
The Indian occupation of northern and eastern Sri
Lanka was swift. US Em-
bassy reporting indicate approximately 3,000 troops
from the 54th Infantry Division, augmented by BMP
armored personnel carriers, were airlifted to the
Jaffna Peninsula in a matter of days and established
a line separating Sri Lankan security forces from the
insurgents. The aircraft?IL-76s and AN-32s?then
began transporting Sri Lankan Army units south to
Colombo, where they were needed to quell Sinhalese
rioters. Within a few days, the Indian Navy began
ferrying additional 54th Division troops to Trincoma-
lee. This force, also about 3,000 strong with some
BMPs, secured the city and moved north and north-
west. It soon linked up with troops moving out from
Jaffna and then moved south to Batticaloa?relieving
Sri Lankan Army units and helping accept surren-
dered arms from the insurgents.
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India's intervention became more involved and pro- 25X1
tracted than New Delhi initially anticipated. Airlift
and sealift had brought about 10,000 Indian troops
from four different divisions or separate brigades to
Sri Lanka by the end of the first two weeks of
intervention, according to various sources. Opposition
to the accord from hardline Tamil insurgents turned
increasingly violent, and in October Indian forces
began combat operations to take territory from insur- 25X1
gent control and enforce the provisions of the accord.
Six months, 40,000 reinforcements, and about 1,500
casualties later, Indian troops firmly established
themselves in Sri Lanka's north and east and forced
the insurgents back to their rural bases. Still, insur-
gent activity persists, including the ability to bring
illicit arms into the island despite an Indo-Sri Lan-
kan naval blockade. US Embassy reporting indicates
the Indians plan to guarantee local elections in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces in summer 1988 and
to begin withdrawing their forces. 225X1
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Figure 1. Indian Army troops disembark from
Air Force transports during the Sri Lankan
intervention.
Southeast Asia
India appears least interested in or capable of expand-
ing its influence in Southeast Asia. Although India's
volume of trade is greater here than in Africa, the
sophisticated and technologically developed Southeast
Asian economies do not present the same untapped
potential for India. Indian minorities have far less
influence in these countries than do local Chinese
communities. Most of these countries remain suspi-
cious of India's relationship with the Soviet Union,
in some cases believing New Delhi has granted or
plans to grant Moscow basing rights in India.
The Indian Navy
Mission and Organization
New Delhi relies on its Navy to support its Indian
Ocean strategy. The Indian Navy is responsible for
the traditional naval missions of securing the nation's
7,000 kilometers of coastline, safeguarding the coun-
try's maritime interests, and conducting naval warfare
against enemy forces. Although the Navy's main
focus is Pakistan, we believe recent naval moderni-
zation and expansion efforts suggest New Delhi is
placing more emphasis on power projection into the
Indian Ocean.
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ants,' India's Navy is the largest of those of the Indian
Ocean states. The Navy also has about 50 fixed- and
rotary-wing aircraft for various maritime missions.
Headquartered in New Delhi, the Navy deploys most
of its ships from the Western and Eastern Naval
Commands, at Bombay and Vishakhapatnam, respec-
tively, and has a small number of training ships in the
Southern Naval Command at Cochin.
Force Structure
The Fleet. Two modernized World War II?era light
aircraft carriers are the heart of the Indian fleet. The
INS Viraat (the ex-HMS Hermes) arrived in India
last year, and the older INS Vikrant will return to
operational status when it completes its refit at Bom-
bay next year. The Indians then will be able to keep at
least one carrier operational at all times as well as
station a carrier on each coast. Eight Sea Harrier
V/STOL fighter-bombers assigned to the Viraat pro-
vide the carrier force's strike power, although recent
have lost one of these aircraft in a crash and use
another only as a source for spare parts for the rest.
The Navy has 64 Sea Eagle antiship missiles with
which to arm the Harriers. Up to six of the Navy's 14
Sea King antisubmarine warfare helicopters also will
be carrier-deployed and,
Land-based aircraft complement the carrier force in a
variety of maritime aviation roles. The Navy has five
TU-142M Bear Fs and five IL-38 May aircraft for
maritime patrol and antisubmarine warfare missions.
In addition to the Sea Kings, nine Alouette III
helicopters, five KA-25 Hormone helicopters, and
three KA-28 Helix helicopters are available for short-
range antisubmarine warfare duties. Most of these
helicopters are often deployed on larger surface ships.
replacing the aging Canberra bombers in a maritime
strike role and will soon be armed with Sea Eagle
missiles.
' Warships over 500 tons displacement, submarines, and any vessel
armed with antiship missiles.
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In addition to the two aircraft carriers, the Indian
Navy's surface fleet includes 45 other major combat-
ants-26 of them armed with a total of about 100
Styx-class antiship missile launchers. The Indians
have five Kashin-class guided-missile destroyers and
three indigenously designed and produced Godavari-
class guided-missile frigates. The Godavaris essential-
ly are stretched, broad-beamed versions of the six
Leander-class antisubmarine frigates. India has mod-
ernized its two old Whitby-class frigates by installing
missile launchers removed from Osa-class missile
boats, but three older Leopard-class frigates mount
only guns and are kept in the training squadron. The
Navy's eight Petya-class light frigates also mount
only guns. The three Nanuchka-class, two Tarantul-
class, and 13 Osa-class guided-missile boats are the
fleet's smallest antiship missile-armed combatants.
The Navy has augmented its aging submarine fleet of
eight Soviet-built Foxtrot-class submarines with four
Soviet-built Kilo-class and two West German?built
Type 1500 submarines. The Indians leased a Charlie
I?class nuclear-powered submarine from the Soviets
earlier this year, but we believe it will be used more
for training and technical familiarization purposes
than in an operational role. All of these submarines
are armed with torpedoes for antiship missions. Re-
porting is unclear on whether the Charlie I?class
submarine carries any of the eight antiship missiles
for which it was originally configured.
Bases and Facilities. India's three principal naval
bases are at Bombay, Vishakhapatnam, and Cochin.
Bombay serves as home port for over half of India's
warships, and its shipyard is where most of the
country's major ship construction and repair occur.
Vishakhapatnam is the Navy's primary facility for
technical training and for submarine repair
indicate the naval base is undergoing considerable
expansion and becoming increasingly important as a
major repair facility for a variety of ships. Cochin is
the Navy's principal advanced training base and home
port of the training squadron.
7
Figure 2. Prime Minister Gandhi and senior
defense officials welcome India's Charlie I?class
nuclear-powered submarine, INS Chakra, leased
from the Soviet Union.
Other, less important naval facilities include Marma-
gao and Goa on the west coast, Madras and Calcutta
on the east coast, and Port Blair in the Andaman
Islands. Marmagao is a major merchant port and
minor shipyard, and nearby Goa is the primary base
for the Navy's air arm. Ships are not permanently
stationed in either Madras or Calcutta, but the Navy
often uses Madras as a temporary staging base?ships
involved in the Sri Lankan intervention operate from
there?and Calcutta's shipyards are producing sur-
face combatants for the fleet. Port Blair does not host
permanent deployments, but it is the usual staging
base for India's annual triservice exercises. The Indi-
ans recently acquired nine mobile coastal defense
missile launchers from the Soviets that probably will
be deployed this year to some naval installations
where they will improve India's antiship defense and
free some vessels dedicated to coastal protection for
other missions.
Strengths and Vulnerabilities
In our judgment, the Indian Navy can defend the
country's contiguous waters and safeguard its
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Naval Forces of Selected
Indian Ocean Powers
Major
Combatants a
Other
Craft
Total
Littoral powers
India
62
71
133
Indonesia b
17
71
88
Australia b
13
45
58
Saudi Arabia
17
30
47
Pakistan
21
21
42
Outside powers c
United States
21
12
33
USSR
4
14
18
France
4
9
13
United Kingdom
3
2
5
a Warships over 500 tons displacement, submarines, and vessels
armed with antiship missiles.
b These countries have Pacific Ocean commitments as well.
c These numbers represent normal deployments in the Indian Ocean
and adjacent waters, including the Persian Gulf. The United States
and the United Kingdom have a naval base in Diego Garcia, France
has naval bases in Reunion and Djibouti, and the Soviets have naval
access to Ethiopia and South Yemen.
maritime interests against threats from neighboring
states, but it cannot carry out credible power projec-
tion operations very far into the Indian Ocean. We
believe India lacks sufficient advanced oceangoing
warships, adequate support capabilities, and the req-
uisite tactical expertise to conduct sustained, modern
naval operations beyond coastal areas. Our assess-
ments of critical naval mission areas reveal specific
shortcomings that we believe retard power projection.
Antisurface Warfare. India's maritime strike air-
craft?Sea Harriers and Jaguars?are its most potent
antisurface warfare assets, but we believe they will
face problems engaging targets far from shore. The
short-range Sea Harriers must deploy from small
aircraft carriers capable of, but not designed for, long-
range operations and are vulnerable to the advanced
antiship munitions prevalent among other Indian
9
Figure 4. Indian Sea Harrier on carrier flight
deck. Older Alize, which the Harrier replaced, is
in background.
Ocean fleets. The land-based Jaguars are under the
control of the Indian Air Force, a situation that
presents operational problems involving parochially
minded services with virtually no institutionalized
joint planning or doctrine. Moreover, only one Jaguar
squadron is being armed with Sea Eagle antiship
missiles, leaving other land-based aircraft sent on
maritime strike missions to rely on less capable
antiship weapons such as guns, rockets, and bombs.
The Kashins and Godavaris are India's only true
oceangoing surface warfare combatants armed with
modern antiship missiles. Although these ships carry
the improved version of the Soviet Styx missile sys-
tem, we believe the Styx is still inferior to the Sea
Eagle or other Western antiship missiles, such as the
Harpoon and Exocet, that are used by other fleets in
the region. The Whitbys are armed with older ver-
sions of the Styx missile system. The Nanuchkas
carry the improved Styx missile system, but their
small size and fixed missile launchers inhibit their
capabilities in high seas. The other missile boats are
smaller than the Nanuchkas and carry the older Styx
system.
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India's submarine force constitutes a potent antisur-
face threat, but only close to shore. Each of the diesel-
electric submarines can carry between 14 and 22
antiship torpedoes, but the submarines' relatively
small sizes and the Navy's insufficiency in support
ships and other assets for coordinated deployments
limit the submarines' ability to conduct independent
operations far from shore or for extended periods. The
older Foxtrots are India's largest submarines, but they
ineicates they sutler from hull corrosion and faulty
torpedo tubes despite recent overhauls in the Soviet
Union. US naval intelligence reporting indicates the
Charlie I nuclear-powered submarine will carry up to
14 antiship torpedoes from India's existing inventory.
The possibility remains, however, that it is also armed
with up to eight SS-N-7 antiship missiles. Although
the Charlie I's weapons load and extended operating
range give it a credible open-sea antisurface capabili-
ty, we believe its Soviet ownership and questionable
maintenance status would limit its usefulness during
hostilities.
Antisubmarine Warfare. In our judgment, India's
antisubmarine warfare capabilities are less adequate
the farther from shore subsurface threats occur. Its
most capable antisubmarine warfare ships are the
Kashins, the Godavaris, and the Leanders, all of
which carry antisubmarine warfare helicopters and an
array of antisubmarine rockets. depth charges. and
than one-third of Indian surface warships have towed
or variable depth sonars capable of finding subma-
rines hiding beneath temperature layers that deflect
sonar waves, masking noise emanating from subma-
rines. None have long-range antisubmarine weapons.
India's submarines' relatively small sizes, slow speeds,
and lack of support vessels make them ill suited for
antisubmarine warfare operations beyond coastal wa-
ters.
We believe India's airborne antisubmarine warfare
assets also are inadequate, despite the acquisition
earlier this year of TU-142M Bear F long-range
antisubmarine warfare aircraft to augment the
shorter range IL-38 Mays. In our judgment, the Bear
Fs are the most capable antisubmarine warfare air-
craft in India's inventory, although the Soviets often
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Figure 5. Indian Sea King helicopter practices
antisubmarine warfare operations.
cannot track non-Soviet submarines with their Bear
F's. The long range of the Bear F at least enhances its
are overloaded for their power plants, a problem that
has adversely affected performance and caused one to
crash during trials.
The KA-28 Helix antisubma-
rine warfare helicopters, however, are newer and more
capable than the Hormones.
Antiair Warfare. In our judgment, the Indian Navy's
ability to defend against air attacks is weak. The
SA-N- 1 s on the Kashins are the only medium-range
naval surface-to-air missile systems in the Navy's
inventory. The Godavaris and Nanuchkas mount the
shorter range SA-N-4 system. The newer aircraft
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carrier?the INS Viraat?and the Leanders carry
even shorter range Seacat surface-to-air missiles.
Close-in air defense is provided by shipboard antiair-
craft guns. India must rely on its maritime aircraft to
intercept hostile aircraft beyond the range of the
fleet's missile and gun systems. We believe the small
number of these aircraft, the lack of early warning
aircraft to detect air threats, and the limitations of the
surface-to-air missile force leaves the fleet especially
vulnerable to sea-skimming missiles?and even more
so the farther they operate from shore.
Mine and Countermine Warfare. India possesses
enough sea mines and delivery systems to present a
credible naval mine warfare threat. On the basis of
has over 1,000 operable contact-moored and bottom-
sea mines, more than enough to restrict passage at
several ports and maritime traffic choke points in the
Indian Ocean.4 About 30 surface ships and subma-
rines in the fleet are configured for minelaying,
although other ships could perform the same mission
at reduced efficiency. Indian aircraft, notably the
Bear F's, could deliver mines quicker and at greater
distances.
The Indian Navy has a modest countermine capabili-
ty. In our judgment, its 17 mine countermeasures
craft, mainly Soviet-built Natya-class4and smaller,
inshore Yevgenya-class minesweeper's; can sweep
moored mines but have only basic capabilities against
bottom-laying mines. The Indians have no minehunt-
ing craft. We believe India's long coastline and
numerous ports present ample mine warfare targets
for an opponent and could place significant demands
on the mine countermeasures force.
Support Operations. In our judgment, India cannot
support major naval operations far from shore or for
extended periods. In contrast to the fair number and
quality of its base facilities, the Navy's afloat support
is austere. The fleet has only two West German?built
replenishment tankers, which can provide oil and
fresh water to naval forces at sea, and no capability
for underway replenishment of ammunition, spares, or
' The US Navy used only 36 mines to constrict Haiphong harbor
for 300 days during the Vietnam war.
11
dry provisions. The only afloat repair ship, a Soviet-
built submarine tender, has not deployed from port in
years. Help from Indian merchant ships would ease
the problem, in our judgment, but the Indians do not
practice large-scale mobilization of the merchant fleet
in logistic support operations. Moreover,
maintenance and repair at sea, returning to port for
even minor work. The diversity and age of naval
equipment aggravate maintenance support problems.
the materiel condition of Indi-
an ships is often far below Western standards. The
fleet's maintenance pattern is generally two years of
operational duty followed by a six-month refit period,
which removes a major portion of the force structure
from sea duty at any given time.
Operational Expertise. Weaknesses in tactical doc-
trine, training, and intelligence are likely to retard the
rz
Indian Navy still relies on grease-pencil boards an
sound phones to engage surface targets?practices at
least 15 years out of date. The fleet conducts exercises
in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal throughout
the year and makes annual port visit cruises to Red
Sea, East African and Southwest Indian Ocean. and
t,dtc, tiowcycl, LnaL unman naval eXeMISCS Lena to oe
short, set-piece affairs involving only modest realistic
combat training, and the port visit cruises test little
operational capability because of their nontactical
nature. We believe the Navy's unwillingness to exer-
cise with foreign navies and the limited exposure its
personnel have had abroad seriously limit its combat
potential.
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Expansion and Modernization
We believe that aggressive acquisition and shipbuild-
ing programs will enhance the Indian Navy's future
combat capabilities in all its mission areas. We expect
the fleet's ability to project power very far into the
Indian Ocean will grow slowly, however, and the
Navy will remain largely a coastal force for the
remainder of the century. In fact, we believe the
growing force structure will add to the Indians'
support problems and ultimately hinder the Navy
from reaching its full operational potential.
The Navy almost certainly will rely mainly on foreign
purchases to upgrade maritime aviation.
additional Sea Harrier aircraft and 44 more Sea
Eagle antiship missiles from the British?enough to
deploy and arm a Harrier squadron on each aircraft
carrier as well as one on land. India also is considering
buying up to 20 more Sea King antisubmarine war-
fare helicopters and arming some of them with Sea
Eagle missiles for strike missions. The Indians are
also interested in an airborne early warning version of
the Sea King. The Navy plans to replace its older
KA-25 Hormone antisubmarine warfare helicopters
with KA-28 Helix models and to augment its long-
range patrol and antisubmarine warfare force with up
to three more TU-142M Bear F aircraft. It also plans
to arm a version of the Advanced Light Helicopter,
which India is building with West German assistance,
for antisubmarine warfare missions. The Navy is
interested in buying four of the Coast Guard's Dor-
nier 228 short-range maritime patrol aircraft, being
built in India under West German license, and even-
tually arming them with antiship missiles.
We believe that India's growing emphasis on indige-
nous production over foreign purchases will be felt
most in the surface fleet. We calculate that over the
next five years the Navy will receive three more
Tarantuls and four more Natyas from the Soviets.
the Indians have started
building the first four of a planned 12 indigenously
designed Khukri-class light guided-missile frigates at
design and build its own class of guided-missile
cruiser for deployment in the 1990s as well as its own
aircraft carrier by the end of the century. The Indians
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The Indian Coast Guard
Formally inaugurated in 1978, the Indian Coast
Guard is the country's maritime paramilitary force
and is organized under the Ministry of Defense. The
Coast Guard operates about 35 patrol croft, two old
British-built Blackwood-class frigates previously
used by the Indian Navy, and a handful of short-
range aircraft. Its mission is to patrol 7,000 kilome-
ters of coastline, protect India's fishing industry,
apprehend poachers and smugglers, conduct search
and rescue operations, monitor sea pollution, safe-
guard offshore oil installations, and assist the Navy
in maintaining the security of island territories.
Coast Guard headquarters is in New Delhi, with
regional commands based in Bombay, Madras, and
Port Blair.
The Coast Guard's ability to fulfill its mission frees
the Navy to project its orientation farther from shore.
The US Embassy in New Delhi reports the Navy has
shifted some of its erstwhile responsibilities to the
Coast Guard, such as offshore oil protection and
security of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and
will turn over more as the Coast Guard's capabilities
increase. The Coast Guard plans to acquire more
patrol vessels and aircraft, including up to 36 Dornier
228 short-range-maritime patrol aircraft produced in
India under Weft German license, according to the
Guard personnel are detailed from the Navy and,
during hostilities, the Coast Guard comes under the
Navy's command.
are modifying the Tarantuls they are building under
Soviet license with Western systems and plan to
design and build their own class of missile boats. India
is considering several Western mine countermeasures
ship designs for coproduction, and are interested in
buying as many as 2,000 sea mines plus licensed
production rights from Western sources. The Indians
are building a replenishment ship similar to their two
existing oilers.
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We expect that India will improve its submarine force
through both purchases and production, and may
acquire a small number of nuclear-powered subma-
rines for a significant increase in power projection
capabilities. The Indians have contracted for three
more Soviet Kilo-class submarines, are building two
Type 1500 German submarines, and plan to build two
larger Type 1700 boats
the Indians are negotiating with the Soviets
for the purchase of nuclear-powered submarines, per-
haps three Victor I?class boats. Such a force, along
with the Bear F aircraft, would improve New Delhi's
ability at least to monitor?if not threaten?foreign
naval deployments throughout the northern Indian
Ocean.
The Indians are improving their naval bases to keep
pace with their expanding Navy
s building a major base at
Karwar, south of Goa, as a larger and safer haven for
the Western Command, but we do not expect it to be
completed until the mid-1990s.
Port Blair and a nearby airfield are being
expanded, which would allow larger ships and patrol
aircraft to stage from the Andaman Islands for longer
term deployments near the Malacca Straits. The
Indians are building a very-low-frequency radio trans-
mitting station near Cochin, which we believe would
be critical in maintaining communications with long-
range submarine patrols?such as those conducted by
nuclear-powered submarines.
In our judgment, such a rapidly expanding force
structure?coupled with India's determination to de-
velop its indigenous production capability?will pre-
vent the Navy from operating at its full potential.
More ships and aircraft are likely to outstrip India's
ability to man, maintain, and control the fleet effi-
especially in the technical fields, which we believe will
only worsen as employment opportunities elsewhere
draw young men away from the services. New Delhi's
growing emphasis on producing indigenous subsys-
tems for foreign-purchased items or designing and
producing major items on its own is creating new
problems, such as unsatisfactory performances or
delays in design and production.
13
Role of Ground and Air Forces in Power Projection
Indian naval power projection operations are not
likely to take place in isolation from the other military
services, and New Delhi is preparing the Army and
squadron with escort task forces annually in joint
operations with the Army and Air Force, usually in
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Some recent
exercises have taken place on India's west coast and
have involved airborne operations, while others have
included civilian ships that help boost the Navy's lift
and logistic support capacity. The Indian military also
has gained experience in sea and air logistic support
operations during the Sri Lankan intervention.
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and civilian transport craft to lift up to two infantry 25X1
brigades with accompanying armor and artillery?up
to 5,000 men?in a single unopposed amphibious
operation. The Navy has nine Polnocny-class medium 25X1
landing ships, a larger indigenously produced Magar-
class tank landing ship, and nine smaller utility
landing craft stationed with its amphibious squadron
at Vishakhapatnam. the Indi-
ans are building another Magar-class ship, at 5,500
tons displacement the country's largest indigenously
produced naval vessel, at Calcutta and plan to launch
it this year.
India's 54th Infantry Division?about 16,000
strong?is the Army's frontline force for amphibious
warfare. The 54th Division, now deployed to Sri
Lanka but usually stationed in the south, is experi-
enced in landing operations and its 91st Brigade?
about 2,500 strong?often is deployed in the Navy's
pendent brigade also now in Sri Lanka but usually
stationed in southern India, is also trained in amphibi-
ous operations and is designated to be deployed to the
Andaman Islands should the archipelago ever be
threatened. Other units stationed in southern and
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Figure 6
India ,s Intervention Forces
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
'
/ Radius of iIndian
/
land-based mcd,itime strike
Kenya 7
' aircraft (Jagubrs) 460nni
a ta
Zanzibar
11.'Seychelles. ;
*. 6Y6RONI.
s?s ?
Cornoro I1 ?
maurioiuq
fiagase?a?r I ndian
*P?NTANIANARIVO
LOUIS
Radius of Indian
transport aircraft
2,5-90nin?
Sec
340th Inf.
Brielde
Trivandnirr\ V
, ?
?OOLOMB
*MALE
ci?, ffe:
\I
is:EW
EEHI? -
i.
Ag*ra .0r./2-77. 6sAN-34-s
50th Para.
nIclia 7 Brigade '
1
I54th Inf.
Div.-
i
Pune Di
6 apatnam
?
%saw i
derabad Naval Buy of
Ampiliblis Beig7.11
Squadron , ../
:1 NI
i T.
.q41/4; *ik ?
Note: Elements of ground forces shown are
currently deplmed to Sri Lanka.
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Figure 7. Indian Army PT-76 tank rolls ashore
from a Navy Polnocny-class landing ship during
a joint service exercise.
central India with no immediate border commitments
would probably be ordered to provide follow-on eche-
lons in a larger intervention
has proposed the cre-
ation of a standing marine force, patterned after the
US Marine Corps, and appears to be planning to use
the 54th Division or the 340th Brigade as its nucleus.
The Army also is planning to buy about 150 upgraded
Swedish IKV-91 amphibious tanks, some of which we
believe would replace the 54th Division's aging tanks.
India also is improving its ability to deploy airborne
forces and support intervention forces with airpower.
The Air Force has 10 Soviet-built IL-76 heavy trans-
port aircraft and about 100 AN-32 medium transport
aircraft and plans to buy 15 more IL-76s and 20 more
AN-32s. The Air Force also is augmenting its fleet of
Soviet-built MI-8 transport helicopters with larger,
more powerful MI-17s. These aircraft can deploy all
of the 4,500-man 50th Parachute Brigade, the only
major Army unit specifically trained in parachute or
heliborne operations, to areas immediately adjacent to
India, or deliver about 1,250 paratroops as far as
2,600 nautical miles from base?enough, we believe,
to seize an airfield where military and civilian trans-
port aircraft could land more troops. The Army has
another 4,500 paratroopers in smaller units separate
from the 50th Parachute Brigade that it also can use
15
in airborne operations.
ans are interested in developing an aerial refueling
capability, which would extend the range of their air
operations.
We believe India's amphibious and airborne forces
give it a credible intervention capability close to home
but that overcoming a determined defense or conduct-
ing long-range operations would present severe prob-
lems. Although the Indians conduct joint service
exercises, the lack of joint doctrine or a command
structure beyond personal relationships among senior
commanders creates operational difficulties that
could be exploited by an opposing force, in our
judgment. We believe the Indians could successfully
defend their island territories or mount strong coun-
terattacks against hostile forces occupying them and
could intervene with large numbers of troops in
nearby states. Amphibious operations farther from
India?beyond the arc traced from Pakistan to Mal-
dives and to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands?run
higher risks because Indian moves would be detected
earlier and because greater burdens would be placed
on India's support capability for long-range naval
operations.
We believe the Indians would rely on airborne forces
for longer range power projection. Enough paratroops
could be sent in an initial lift to defeat the defense
forces of the small island states of the Indian Ocean?
Maldives, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Comoros?and
pave the way for more forces, in our judgment. We
believe a force as small as a combat brigade deployed
by an extraregional power to any of these countries,
however, would be sufficient to tip the scales against
the Indians. In our judgment, India does not pose a
credible military threat to other equally or more
remote countries, such as Madagascar or countries
along the Indian Ocean littoral that do not border
India.
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LVI VI
A Hypothetical Scenario: An Indian Intervention
Opposed by Force
Unlike the invited and initially unopposed interven-
tion in Sri Lanka, Indian troops could be tasked to
establish themselves in a remote area against hostile
forces. Likely settings for scenarios of opposed inter-
vention would include the Karachi area in an Indo-
Pakistani war, southern Sri Lanka if Sinhalese
Marxists seriously threatened Colombo, or Sey-
chelles or Mauritius following an attempted military
coup. India has practiced opposed intervention opera-
tions in annual triservice exercises and during its
Brass Tacks maneuvers in 1987. On the basis of our
evaluation of these exercises, we believe India would
have difficulty in conducting opposed amphibious and
airborne operations in general, but it would still
succeed in the above scenarios.
We believe Indian naval and air forces would go into
action first to establish local sea control and air
superiority. The naval task force would probably be
built around an aircraft carrier and include up to two
guided-missile destroyers, two guided-missile frig-
ates, two antisubmarine warfare frigates, three sub-
marines, two mine countermeasures ships, one replen-
ishment ship, a few guided-missile boats, and the
amphibious squadron. Once deployed in the combat
area, the guided-missile destroyers and frigates and
at least one submarine would try to sink or chase
away opposing surface ships. The antisubmarine war-
fare frigates and the other submarine, with help from
the antisubmarine warfare helicopters on the carrier
and the destroyers, would deal with enemy subma-
rines. Sea Harriers from the aircraft carrier would
fly combat air patrols as their primary mission,
shooting down enemy aircraft in the vicinity, and
would be tasked with a secondary antiship mission.
The Sea Harrier force could be augmented with land-
based aircraft if the operation were close enough to
India to be within their range.
With local security established, the amphibious craft
would approach the landing beach. Surface ships
would fire their guns at land targets close to shore,
while the Sea Harriers would fly strike missions
against hardened emplacements and targets farther
inland. Infantry would land first with tanks to estab-
lish a beachhead, with the rest of the tanks and the
artillery coming in later waves. With the beach
secured and most of the ground force landed, the
troops would leave a small force behind and push
inland. They would try to link up quickly with
airborne formations dropped in the enemy's rear area
and advance to seize a port or an airfield where
transport ships or aircraft could disembark larger
numbers of troops and equipment.
Airborne operations would be carried out just before
or simultaneously with the amphibious attack?
interposing blocking forces and seizing key communi-
cation centers in the enemy's rear. Land-based air-
craft or Sea Harriers would establish air superiority
over the drop zones, if necessary, after which trans-
port aircraft would fly in and drop paratroops. Again,
infantry would land first with light vehicles and guns,
while most of the heavier equipment would be
dropped or be airlifted in later. Helicopters could be
used as well if the drop zones were within their range
from Indian territory.
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z
Outlook
New Delhi will continue to look for ways to assert its
regional leadership, in our judgment, and will remain
suspicious of the motives behind what it perceives as a
growing foreign presence in the region. We believe
India's growing status as regional leader, internal
instability in many Indian Ocean states, and its
expanding military forces are increasing the chances
for outright Indian intervention throughout the area.
We believe only a small chance exists that India will
be forced to withdraw ignominiously from Sri Lanka,
but even then New Delhi's appetite for regional
intervention under its assumed leadership role would
be only temporarily upset.
Pakistan will remain the primary obstacle to India's
regional ambitions and, therefore, the focus of India's
military modernization and expansion, in our judg-
ment. India's naval advantage over Pakistan?we
believe already greater than both its ground and air
advantages?will increase over time, providing a safe-
ty margin India believes it needs to expand power
projection forces at the expense of shorter range
assets. We believe Pakistan's naval programs, al-
though far more modest than India's, will help the
Pakistani fleet retain over the next few years the
ability to threaten India's west coast, commercial
shipping, and Navy during an Indo-Pakistani war?a
conflict neither side believes is ever very far away.
India's power projection capabilities will grow slowly.
New Delhi's determination to build its indigenous
ship production capacity is slowing the recent spurt of
naval growth?a trend we believe will continue as the
Indians search for designs, subsystems, and technol-
ogy transfer agreements for domestic production as
opposed to quicker acquisitions through outright for-
eign purchases. The Navy has no plans to acquire
additional replenishment ships or develop the organi-
zation and infrastructure necessary to support long-
range naval operations for sustained periods.
Although not yet
a major political issue in India, recent increases in
17
defense spending are generating public criticism that
we believe, along with other budgetary demands, may
over time limit the pace of naval growth.
Implications for the United States
In our judgment, New Delhi's efforts to restrict
outside involvement in the Indian Ocean will largely
remain diplomatic. India will continue to be cautious
in its use of military force, especially if it risks
confrontation with the superpowers. We believe the
Indians will continue pressing the Indian Ocean Zone
of Peace proposal in international forums and spot-
lighting both the US and British presence in Diego
Garcia and rumors of potential US military facilities
in Pakistan to underscore their concern over increas-
ing extraregional presences. Despite India's persistent
calls for a regional ban on nuclear weapons, we do not
believe its diplomatic pressure will extend to serious
efforts for a nuclear-free zone. It has not demanded
nonnuclear assurances from visiting ships, and its
lease of the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine would
publicly compromise such a stand.
We believe India's emphasis on indigenous naval
production will lessen military purchases from Mos-
cow and increase the opportunities for the embryonic
Indo-US defense relationship. The Indians have cho-
sen to build their own Khukri-class light guided-
missile frigates instead of buying Soviet Koni-class
models and have canceled plans for follow-on pur-
chases of Kashin-class guided-missile destroyers while
pressing ahead with plans to build their own class of
similar vessels.
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boats they are building, despite strong Soviet protests,
and also plan to use these engines in the cruisers they
are designing. India is interested in buying US Har-
poon antiship missiles, apparently aware of the fleet's
shortcomings in Soviet weaponry of that type. Senior
Indian naval officers visiting the United States two 25X1
years ago asked specifically to visit the naval base at 25X1
San Diego and mentioned they may be interested in
US help in building the new base at Karwar. 25X1
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We do not believe Indian naval power can effectively
challenge regular US operations in the Indian Ocean,
at least until the next century. The Indians will be
able to monitor US naval movements better with the
Bear F aircraft and the nuclear-powered submarine
but will not soon develop the capability to shadow US
deployments regularly. Despite its support of Mauri-
tius's claim to Diego Garcia, India has shown no
inclination to challenge the US presence there on
anything but diplomatic grounds. In our judgment,
Indian naval forces are no match for regular US or
French Indian Ocean naval deployments and would
be hard pressed to challenge the Soviet or Australian
task forces frequently present. In an Indo-Pakistani
war, we believe the Indians would try to restrict
foreign interference through aggressive naval opera-
tions close to shore, including a naval blockade of
Karachi, to deter and even interdict maritime shows
of support or resupply efforts to Pakistan.
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Appendix
India's Nuclear-Powered Submarine
Program and the Lease of a Soviet
Nuclear-Powered Submarine
Moscow offered to sell nucle-
ar-powered submarines to India as early as 1976 but
apparently had not included sufficiently sophisticated
systems or technology transfer rights to tempt the
indicates the Indians began designing their own sub-
marine nuclear power plant in 1976 with a prototype
originally scheduled to be ready by 1991, although we
believe some preliminary work must have been going
on since the late 1960s. New
Delhi decided to abandon this plutonium-based pro-
gram in the early 1980s and to begin a new one based
was facing severe technical roadblocks and that India
might need to acquire more foreign technology to get
the project moving. We believe that the Indians are
making some advances in their nuclear propulsion
program but will not be able to construct a working
prototype until the next century.
The Lease Agreement
Speculation about an Indian purchase of a Soviet
nuclear-powered submarine grew after the visit of the
Indian chief of naval staff to Moscow in July 1987.
In early January 1988, the Indian and the Soviet press
announced the USSR was leasing a nuclear-powered
submarine to India. the
lease was for three years and no nuclear weapons were
included in the deal.
Charlie I under lease as a compromise.
it was a
Charlie I?class nuclear-powered submarine, renamed
the INS Chakra, that sailed from Vladivostok. We
believe the Soviets may have been unwilling to sell as
modern a vessel as India was seeking and offered the
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Strategic Implications
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We believe New Delhi will use the Charlie I more for
technical and training purposes than for operational 25X1
activity. Leasing, as opposed to purchasing, gives the
Indians a less expensive, immediately available craft
to enable them to become familiar with nuclear 25X1
propulsion technology and the operation of a nuclear-
powered submarine. The Indians appear to be evalu-
ating the submarine in port and in shakedown cruises,
are finding themselves at a disadvantage in making
these evaluations because the Soviets are unwilling to
provide technical data or allow sufficient access to the
propulsion system. We believe the Indians will use
whatever knowledge they gain to decide whether to
try to purchase Soviet nuclear-powered submarines
outright or revitalize their own maritime nuclear
propulsion program.
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Because a nuclear-powered submarine's submerged
time and time-on-station capability are longer than 25X1
those of a diesel model, the Charlie I could enhance
the Indian Navy's ability to monitor the strategic
approaches to the Indian Ocean as well as other
countries' regional naval deployments. In our judg-
ment, however, a single nuclear-powered submarine
will only marginally increase India's naval capabili-
ties. We believe the Indians will be careful to limit the
involvement of the Soviet-owned submarine in poten-
tial confrontations so as not to embarrass Moscow.
Moreover, the Charlie I?class is an older type of
submarine with which the Soviets have reliability and
safety problems, which we believe further curtails its
operational potential with the Indian Navy.
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Indian acquisition of several nuclear-powered subma-
rines would have more impact. We believe the Indians
will use whatever nuclear-powered submarine force
they eventually acquire, along with long-range mari-
time patrol aircraft, to monitor US naval deployments
throughout the northern Indian Ocean and underscore
their regional power ambitions. The unique acoustic
conditions in the Indian Ocean severely hinder sub-
marine detection operations. I
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