THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: OBSTACLES, OBJECTIVES, AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000400350002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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The Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Obstacles, Objectives,
and Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
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NESA 88-10038
July 1988
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Reverse Blank
The Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Obstacles, Objectives,
and Prospects
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Near
East and South Asia Division, with contributions by
Office of Global Issues, and the
Office of Leadership Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Issues and Applications
Division, NESA
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NESA 88-10038
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Key Judgments
Infornzation available
as of 13 June 1988
was used in this report.
The Arab-Israeli Conflict:
Obstacles, Objectives,
and Prospects
Prospects are dim for a peace settlement between Israel and either Jordan
or Syria over the next several years because of sharp differences both
within and between Israel and the Arab world on how to negotiate a
settlement and what the terms should be. The nonthreatening nature of the
no-war, no-peace situation generally prevailing on the Syrian-Israeli and
Jordanian-Israeli borders in recent years has undercut the urgency of
formal peace for key states. Nevertheless, violent clashes between Palestin-
ians and Israelis in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip since December
1987 have underscored the volatility of the Palestinian problem and the
potential for more serious regional tension if a negotiating process is not es-
tablished.
There is a less-than-even chance that Arab-Israeli negotiations will be
started within the next two years. Movement on an international peace
conference is blocked by the strong opposition of Israel's Likud bloc and
the failure of Arabs to agree on operational details, particularly Palestinian
representation. At the same time, no Arab leader is likely to repeat
Egyptian President Sadat's initiative and hold separate direct negotiations
with Israel in the foreseeable future. Syria would move swiftly, aggressive-
ly, and probably successfully to scuttle separate negotiations between Israel
and Jordan or Arab-Israeli agreements that left the Golan Heights under
Israeli control.
Disagreement over the political and territorial terms of a settlement is
sharper than that over the negotiating framework, and the initiation of an
international conference or other negotiating processes almost certainly
would raise emotions on key issues. No settlement to the conflict would
meet the major players' minimum demands, which are mutually exclusive
on key points.
Requirements for Movement
Overcoming the intransigence of Israel's Likud bloc and Syria is essential
to a serious negotiating process and peace:
? Likud flexibility would require substantially increased domestic Israeli
support for the initiation of a peace process, which might result from
visits to Israel by Cabinet-level Arab officials or a warming of Israeli
relations with Moscow and major Western capitals that made an
international conference appear less risky to Israel. Prolonged violence in
the territories that caused a sharp increase in Israeli casualties as well as
other economic, political, and military costs of Israel's occupation also
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might lead to a surge in domestic support for negotiations, but Likud
leaders almost certainly would wait until calm was restored before
agreeing to concessions.
? Syria would become more flexible on the terms of negotiations if it were
confident Israel was prepared to withdraw from the Golan Heights in
exchange for peace with Damascus. Syria would also want a say in the
resolution of the Palestinian problem and substantial economic induce-
ments from Moscow, the Gulf Arab states, or the West.
The Palestine Liberation Organization would tacitly support non-PLO
Palestinian representation in peace talks only if a negotiating process
supported by the other key players appeared ready to proceed, with or
without PLO endorsement. The PLO certainly would not risk being left out
of negotiations that had the approval of Likud and Syria and were set to
deal comprehensively with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some analysts believe
that the PLO would try to play a spoiler role in a peace process from which
it was excluded, possibly even aligning itself with radical states to
undermine negotiations. At a minimum, PLO leader Arafat would need to
sense an imminent breakthrough in the current stalemate before risking a
bold move to resolve the question of Palestinian representation in negotia-
tions.
Behind-the-scenes diplomacy between Israel and key Arab states?with
the United States and other third parties, perhaps including Saudi Arabia
and the Soviet Union, acting as intermediaries?offers the best hope for
inching the peace effort forward and improving the political environment
for negotiations. A halt to Israeli settlement activity, land acquisition, and
oppressive security practices in the occupied territories; public statements
by Arab leaders recognizing Israel's legitimate security needs; and cultural
or educational exchanges between Israel and Jordan also would improve
prospects for progress. Even Israeli introduction of limited autonomy in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip?whether unilateral, negotiated, or bro-
kered through intermediaries?would have a salutary impact over time, if
such steps included reduced Israeli military and administrative presence in
Arab communities.
An agreement by Israel's Likud bloc, Syria, or the PLO to allow a
negotiating process to move forward, however, would not suggest that they
were about to moderate their terms for a final settlement. Likud and
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Syrian leaders would be unlikely to compromise on their major objectives
under almost any circumstances. Likud would steadfastly oppose a return
of major portions of the West Bank to the Arabs, and Syria would insist on
complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan and a Palestinian settlement.
Ultimate compromise that might bring about an Arab-Israeli settlement
would depend on:
? The ability of Israel's Labor Party to outmaneuver or outvote Likud and
gain Knesset support for major territorial concessions, which probably
would require a Labor-led National Unity government if not a Labor
government.
? A Syrian decision that a negotiated Israeli withdrawal from the Golan
Heights and a settlement between Israel and Jordan on the occupied
territories would provide Damascus with greater political and economic
benefit than the status quo.
A peace settlement would need to be implemented in stages, perhaps over a
period of 20 years. A period of 20 years would provide an opportunity to
build Israeli and Arab confidence in the terms of an agreement and, at the
same time, would allow both sides to reconsider adhering to final commit-
ments should such confidence not develop. A Jerusalem settlement is the
most problematic issue and probably could be secured only after the other
elements of a deal were agreed on. A political and territorial settlement
that had even a slight chance of gaining broad Arab and Israeli acceptance
would require concessions from both sides?territorial compromise from
Israel and security guarantees from the Arabs?and, probably, at least
$15-20 billion in external aid, coming mostly from Western nations and the
Gulf Arab states.
Implications of Stalemate and of Peace
The continued absence of formal peace is unlikely in itself to seriously
damage major US interests in the Middle East over the next several years,
but it will complicate US relations with Arab states and fuel Arab
criticism of perceived US passivity. Arab criticism of US policy in the
Middle East will ebb and flow, depending on Israel's handling of Palestin-
ian unrest in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as the pressure of
other crises?notably, the Iran-Iraq war?that might take priority in the
region. Stagnation in the peace-seeking process would also lead to periodic
tension in US-Israeli relations, particularly at times of serious violence in
the occupied territories.
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A comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement, on the other hand, would
greatly reduce the chance of another Arab-Israeli war and the attendant
risk of a US-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East. It also would slow the
pace of the arms buildup in the region and remove the major irritant in US
relations with moderate and radical Arab states.
A peace settlement would not be a panacea for regional problems, however,
and tension between Israel and its Arab neighbors would be likely to last
long after a negotiated end to the conflict. The durability of a realistic set-
tlement would be uncertain even under optimal conditions, as extremist
Palestinians and Israelis would work to undermine peace terms, serious
internal discord probably would develop between Jordanians and Palestin-
ians, and leadership change in Syria or Jordan would risk an abrogation of
peace treaties by successor regimes. In the event a peace treaty collapsed
and another Arab-Israeli war erupted, chances for a renegotiated settle-
ment in the foreseeable future would be almost nil.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
iii
Scope Note
ix
Key Players: Strategies and Objectives
1
Israel
1
Labor's Strategy
2
Likud's Strategy
5
The Radical Fringe
6
Syria
6
Jordan
7
Palestinians
9
Other Players and Their Influence
11
The Arabs
11
Egypt
11
Gulf Cooperation Council States
12
Iraq
13
Soviet Union
14
Western Europe
15
Perceptions of the US Role
16
Israel
16
Syria
16
Jordan
16
PLO
19
Soviet Union
19
Implications of Major Developments
19
Leadership Change
19
Another Arab-Israeli War
21
An End to the Iran-Iraq War
21
Prospects and Requirements for Movement Toward Peace
22
Gaining Israeli Flexibility
26
Gaining Syrian Involvement
29
Palestinian Representation
30
First Steps
33
Autonomy
34
Implications for US Interests
34
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A Stalemate
34
War
35
A Settlement
35
The Durability of Peace
36
Appendixes
A. UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338
37
B. Key Statesmen in the Peace-Seeking Process
39
C. Results of a Simulated International Peace Conference
43
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Scope Note
This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the basic components
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, paying particular attention to the major
territorial issues, differences among the parties to the conflict, areas of
compromise and deadlock, and prospects for movement toward a peace
settlement over the next several years. Analysts involved in the drafting of
the assessment have discussed the subject with other US Government
officials and agencies. In addition, several active and retired US policy-
makers closely involved in Arab-Israeli peace-seeking efforts reviewed the
paper in draft and provided comments and suggestions.
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Figure 1
Israel and the Arab World
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