SYRIA: ASSAD AND THE PEACE PROCESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89S01450R000600580001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
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Syria: Assad and the
Peace Process
An Intelligence Assessment
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NESA 88-10065
November4958
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00,,,uct Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Syria: Assad and the
Peace Process
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Reverse Blank Secret
NESA 88-10065
November 1988
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 21 October 1988
was used in this report.
Syria: Assad and the
Peace Process
Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad retains an almost singlehanded ability to
undermine movement toward a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Assad does not oppose in principle a peaceful resolution to the 40-
year conflict with Israel, but he is determined to block any peace initiative
that does not fully consider Syrian interests?particularly the return of the
Golan Heights?or attempts to circumvent Damascus. To this end, Assad
is prepared to intimidate Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO), or provoke Israel, in a manner that would stalemate progress
toward a political settlement not to his liking.
Assad believes time is on the side of the Arabs in the struggle with Israel.
Assad faces little, if any, internal pressure to make peace with Israel or to
go to war. He believes Syrian and Arab demographic advantages ultimate-
ly will tip the strategic balance in their favor.
Assad deeply mistrusts US motives in pursuing the peace process. He is un-
willing to actively pursue a political settlement because he believes
unconditional US support for Israel prevents the satisfactory resolution of
Arab demands. Assad is seeking a prearranged deal in which territorial
concessions to Syria are agreed upon before negotiations. For Assad, the
actual negotiating process would be to determine the means of implementa-
tion. In Assad's view, the inability of the United States to obtain a unified
response from Israel supporting the peace process and a commitment on
territorial concessions has reduced pressure on Damascus to compromise
its hardline position.
Syria's conditions for ending the state of war with Israel include full and
unconditional Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in June 1967. In
Syria's view, if this condition was met, the state of war could be replaced
by an absence of hostilities?but not normalization of Syrian-Israeli
relations. We believe Assad is prepared to make guarantees concerning
Israel's security, such as demilitarization of the Golan and the assignment
of an international observer force to the area, but his version of peace does
not include diplomatic or commercial relations.
Damascus has consistently upheld the right of all Palestinians in the
diaspora to return to their homes and thus has not endorsed the idea of a
West Bank?Gaza Strip state. Syria has carefully avoided specific formula-
tions for Palestinian statehood, stating that the Palestinians themselves
must determine what constitutes a satisfactory solution.
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Assad, nonetheless, will take whatever steps he believes are necessary to
prevent the Palestinians?especially Yasir Arafat's PLO?from negotiat-
ing on their own because he fears they would ignore Syrian interests. Assad
wants to control the PLO and direct it to Syrian interests. Assad probably
would be flexible on the Palestinian question provided that its resolution
was accepted by other Arab states and the final configuration of a
Palestinian entity did not diminish Syria's preeminent political role.
Assad will not compromise on the demand for the return of the Golan
Heights to full Syrian sovereignty. We doubt, however, that a quick grab
for the Golan?even as a Sadat-style tactic to break the political impasse
and start negotiations?is likely within the next two years. Assad would
prefer to settle the conflict with Israel by means short of war and, in our
judgment, the defensive element continues to dominate Assad's strategic
thinking. He may be gambling that the growing Syrian military threat?
particularly the development of chemical weapons?will prompt the United
States to "deliver" Israel into a peace process on Arab terms
Assad intends to avoid negotiating with Israel for as long as possible in the
belief that Syria's long-range strategic position will improve. Assad sees
the state of no-war/no-peace as conducive to his efforts to develop Syria's
military arsenal and maximize Damascus's regional influence, which stems
principally from Syria's role as the sole confrontation state with Israel. In
his view, Israeli concessions will not be forthcoming until Syria strengthens
its negotiating hand by achieving strategic parity. Assad believes that
Israel has no incentive to make peace with the Arabs given its military
strength and unswerving US support.
Despite obstacles that Assad perceives as limiting prospects for a process
he finds acceptable, he fears being left out. Assad probably would attend
an international conference, if only to sabotage the talks. Under almost any
circumstances, Assad will have viable tactics to undermine moves toward
peace that threaten Syrian interests. He has successfully demonstrated his
ability in the past to use subversion, military force, terrorism, and .
assassination to this end.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
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Scope Note
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New Tactical Flexibility. . . Within Rigid Limits
1
The Syrian Bottom Line?Palestine and the Golan Heights
6
US-Syrian Disconnect Over Peace
8
Conference Modalities?Maximizing Syrian Influence
9
Steadfastness?The Correct Course
10
Strategic Parity?The Military Option
12
Regaining the Golan Through War
13
Challenging Israel in Lebanon
15
Outlook
15
Reverse Blank
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JecTel
Scope Note
This Research Paper is based primarily on an examination of Syria's
official statements over many years. Careful study of such material, in our
view, provides rich insights into Syrian policy.
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Syria: Assad and the
Peace Process
New Tactical Flexibility . . . Within Rigid Limits
Despite occasional signals that Damascus may be
ready to consider peace with Israel, we do not believe
that Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad will agree to
join in diplomatic negotiations unless he has guaran-
tees from the United States that the Golan Heights
will be restored to Syria. In early 1987, Assad
appeared to soften his hardline position toward the
resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict when he af-
firmed in a meeting with former President Jimmy
Carter Syria's commitment to a diplomatic solution of
the 40-year-old dispute. In the April 1987 meeting,
Assad hinted for the first time that face-to-face talks
with Israel might be necessary. Assad also publicly
endorsed Soviet calls for an international conference
to end the conflict. In 1988, Assad met with US
envoys on several occasions to discuss the most recent
US peace initiative. Syria strongly criticized US
proposals but did not explicitly reject the process as it
had in the past. Nevertheless, we believe Assad's
relative moderation was largely tactical, reflecting
Syria's political isolation?including problems with
Moscow?and economic difficulties that were eroding
Syria's ability to confront Israel militarily.
Soviet policy in the Middle East has been a factor
shaping Assad's recent tactics toward the peace issue.
Although Soviet and Syrian views on a settlement are
similiar, they do not coincide on some aspects of
Palestinian representation and final status. Damascus
is determined, however, to play down these differ-
ences. New Soviet activism in the region, particularly
Gorbachev's efforts to improve ties to moderate Arabs
and Israel, appear to have made Assad less willing to
offend his principal benefactor. Despite longstanding
strains in the relationship, Assad appears confident
that the Soviets will not require him to compromise
his basic objectives. We see his endorsement of Soviet
peace proposals as little more than a cost-free means
to curry favor with Gorbachev. Assad may feel that
by signing on to the Soviet peace initiative?he
previously endorsed Soviet peace proposals in 1981
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and 1984?Moscow will reduce pressure on Damas-
cus to adjust its negative policy toward the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), or perhaps increase
Soviet generosity on military and aid issues.
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Although Assad has taken a somewhat less belligerent
public stance toward the peace process, we do not
believe he personally is capable of a dramatic move
toward peace as was President Sadat of Egypt. Assad
cannot ignore the fact that the modern state of Israel
was created out of historical and geographic "Greater
Syria." Moreover, Assad is committed to the resolu-
tion of the Palestinian problem and will not jettison
the Palestinian cause to regain lost Syrian territory.
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Assad's public statements and private comments to
US officials and other observers indicate he fervently
believes that the Arabs have been victimized by Israel
and that the expansion of its borders during four wars
is indicative of Israel's quest to fulfill a "manifest
destiny." Assad harps on what he perceives as the
flagrant injustice inflicted on the Arabs by the cre-
ation of the Jewish state. Assad recognizes that, after 25X1
40 years, avenging this offense is not immediately
possible. Nonetheless, he is resolved to restore Arab
honor by extracting concessions from the Israeli state.
This effort virtually has become Assad's political
raison d'etre and the foundation of his political legiti-
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Despite Assad's personal intensity over the conflict
with Israel, there appears to be little, if any, pressure
within Syria to resolve the issue either through war or
a negotiated settlement. According to the US Embas-
sy in Damascus, several factors contribute to making
Syria's position different from that of Egypt or Jor-
dan. Less land and fewer people in Syria are affected
by Israeli occupation, and the roughly 300,000 Pales-
tinians in Syria see little hope that a territory for
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Evolving Confrontation Tactics
While attempting to achieve a credible military op-
tion, Assad has pursued the confrontation with Israel
since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 through
several tactics short of war. The success of Syrian-
backed terrorist operations in undermining US and
Israeli policy in Lebanon from 1982 to 1984?such as
the assassination of Lebanese President-elect Bashir
Gemayel?and Syrian complicity in others?like the
bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in April
1983?encouraged Damascus to repeat these tactics
elsewhere. During 1985, Syria sponsored several
martyrdom operations intended to kill Israelis and
their surrogates in the security zone in Lebanon. In
1986, Syrian tactics took a dramatic leap in terms of
risk, as Syrian intelligence planned two spectacular
terrorist operations to blow up Israeli jetliners in
Europe. International disapprobation following the
discovery of Syria's direct involvement in terrorism
has forced Assad since then to resort to more "tradi-
tional" means of confronting Israel through support
for guerrilla operations, carried out under the rubric
of national liberation struggle.
Although some of these methods appear prudent as
an alternative to war, each carries considerable polit-
ical and military risk. Each also appears to embody
what the US Embassy has described as Assad's
fascination with martyrdom and his belief that in the
face of overwhelming odds nothing is more noble than
risk that entails self-sacrifice.
During 1985, a number of martyrdom operations
were carried out in the Israeli security zone of
southern Lebanon by young Arabs attempting to
unnerve and shame the Israeli occupiers into retreat.
Syria recruited and trained most of the volunteers
and exploited each operation for maximum propa-
ganda value. None of the martyrs succumbed without
associating his or her name with Assad's. The US
Embassy in Damascus reported that each martyr's
name was spread across Syrian newspapers, their
names were put on signs displayed above Syrian
schools, and each was given at least 15 minutes of
prime-time television, including a prerecorded last
testament and an exhortation to join the Arab strug-
gle against Zionism.
The military value of these operations, launched
against checkpoints jointly manned by Israeli sol-
diers and members of the Army of South Lebanon,
was marginal. Most of the dead and wounded were
innocent Lebanese bystanders. Resentment among the
local population over this fact probably was the main
reason the campaign was dropped, although a lack of
"volunteers "?a would-be martyr captured by the
Israelis claimed he was blackmailed into participat-
ing?might have crippled the program. Nonetheless,
the Embassy noted, each operation allowed the Syri-
an regime to trumpet its chosen path of confrontation,
as opposed to negotiation, with Israel. The Embassy
also presumed a hope by the regime that these
operations would have a demonstration effect in the
occupied territories, 'Possibly sparking similar inci-
dents of self-immolation on the West Bank."
In 1986, Syria abandoned martyrdom operations in
southern Lebanon in favor of terrorism on the Euro-
pean stage. Damascus was directly implicated in two
attempts to bomb El Al airliners in Europe, one at
London's Heathrow Airport in April 1986, and anoth-
er in June in Madrid. We believe the decision to
attack the El Al jets almost certainly was taken at
the highest levels of the Syrian Government. Al-
though we cannot confirm Assad's personal culpabil-
ity, we believe these operations fell within guidelines
established by the President.
Syria's rationale for the attacks has never been clear.
We believe Damascus most likely was attempting to
avenge Israel's intercept the previous February of the
Libyan jet returning senior Syrian Ba`th Party offi-
cials to Damascus and Israel's apparently unpro-
voked downing in Syrian airspace of two Syrian
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MIGs in November 1985.
On a strategic level,
Assad may have viewed such an operation as a
component of the psychological war against Israel
that would demonstrate the ability of Israel's ene-
mies to exploit its vulnerabilities. From a Syrian
perspective, spectacular acts of terrorism against
Israeli interests would help to undermine the invinci-
ble image earned by Israel as a result of its stunning
military victories over the Arabs during the last four
decades.
Caught redhanded in the El Al attempts, Syrian
officials became concerned about the political, eco-
nomic, and military consequences of being linked to
international terrorism. Syria dramatically lowered
its profile in international terrorism and has not been
implicated in terrorist operations outside the Middle
East since June 1986.
Sobered by the fallout from his terrorist ventures
against Israel, Assad appears to have returned for the
time being to more traditional means of confronta-
tion. Several incidents carried out during the past two
years by Syrian-supported groups indicate that Da-
mascus is selectively pursuing its regional political
agenda through guerrilla and terrorist raids. The
Palestinian hang-glider attack against an Israeli mil-
itary outpost in November 1987 is the most dramatic
example to date that Syria continues to sanction
operations against Israel and its surrogates.
Damascus has
sought to avoid charges of sponsoring international
terrorism, however, by referring to these operations
as legitimate acts of national liberation struggle.
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peace deal will benefit them as most are 1948 refu-
gees. A less tangible consideration is that few people
in the ruling circles of Syria have family, political, or
ethnic roots in the Golan. The Embassy notes that
Syria is not cycling into leadership positions people
whose attitudes and perceptions are shaped by direct
identification with the occupied territories.
In the near term, Assad seems confident there is little
danger that he will be forced to negotiate with his
Israeli nemesis. Syrian commentaries reflect their
expectation that movement toward an international
conference will founder because, in Syria's view,
Israeli political leaders are not really interested in
peace. the
inability of the United States to obtain a unified
response from the Israelis supporting the peace pro-
cess has reduced pressure on Syria to compromise
positions or agree to modify calls for guarantees in
advance of negotiations for the return of territories
occupied in 1967. Assad can continue to meet with
high-level US officials and articulate his desire for an
eventual accord, knowing
that actual delivery on these promises will not become
an issue.
We believe, more-
over, that Syrian officials expect a loss of political
dynamism in American peace efforts during the
change in the US administration.
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More important, As- ? 25X1
sad believes time is on his side and that the strategic
balance between Damascus and Tel Aviv ultimately
will shift in Syria's favor. In public and private 25X1
discussions he frequently cites historical examples of 25X1
steadfastness and patience as the sine qua non for
shaking off the yoke of former occupiers. In the long
run, Assad believes Israel cannot win. In a meeting
with US officials earlier this year, Assad said the
Israelis would have to accelerate their movement
toward peace or be swallowed up by the Arabs. He
noted that Syria's population increases by 500,000
each year and remarked that every six years "we give
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Figure 1
100 Miles
Hatay
Province
Bubayrat
al Asad
Cyprus
Mediterranean
Sea
DAMASCUS
Palestine
British
Mandate
1920-48 \c\
n12\
Line
UNDOF
Zone
Golan
`--Heights
occupied)
Dead
Sea
Egypt
//Gulf of
Aqaba
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritali e
Saudi Arabia
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Greater Syria
Greater Syria was the historic region essentially comprised
of the modern-day states of Israel,, Jordan, Lebanon, and
Syria with the Hatay Province (ceded to Turkey in 1939) as
well as the status-to-be-determined, Israel-occupied terri-
tories of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
AdIr.
%
714824 11300600
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Assad's View of Israel
Consistently cool and calculating in his political
decision making toward Israel, Assad's speeches re-
veal a personal reaction to the Jewish state that is
visceral and vitriolic. In meetings with foreign offi-
cials and in his public statements, Assad harps on the
Israeli threat to the Arabs and of "unlimited Zionist
ambitions" toward Arab land and wealth. Despite his
limited knowledge of Judaism, Assad treats tradi-
tional Jewish texts such as the Torah as blueprints
for current Israeli political action. Assad is convinced
that Israel believes its divinely given borders cover all
the territory between the Nile and the Euphrates. He
constantly?and mistakenly?asserts to visitors that
this statement of blatant territorial ambition is en-
graved on the walls of the Israeli Knesset building.
In a speech celebrating the end of Ramadan in May
1988, for example, Assad told his audience:
The ambitions of racist Zionism are as clear
as the sun. . . . This is clear in the Zionist
books and precepts. They do not want Pales-
tine alone or a piece of land here or there.
They do not want only another Arab country.
They want the land from the Nile to the
Euphrates. . . . It is repeated several times in
their precepts. They want Israel's state from
the Nile to the Euphrates to impose their
hegemony beyond that until it covers the
entire world.
In a speech in 1987, Assad asserted that the Torah
mentions the peoples to be expelled from their lands
and houses" and to be "enslaved and exploited." On
another public occasion, Assad said that Israelis
believe that their God had granted them the land
between the Nile and the Euphrates and that this
land was a trust around their necks that they must
safeguard. "On this basis," said Assad, "they feel
guilty as long as they do not liberate all this
territory."
Assad believes that Israel continues its quest to fulfill
its destiny not only through war, which has produced
dramatic expansions in its territory, but also through
guile?for example, its quest for "secure" borders.
Former President Carter recounts an exchange he
had with Assad on the issue of Israel's need for
secure borders. Assad ridiculed the concept in the
face of modern missiles, airplanes, and other weap-
ons. Carter quotes Assad:
It is strange to insist on secure borders on other
people's territory. The Israelis claim that they
took the Golan to protect their settlements, but
then they built new settlements on the Golan,
some of them only 300 meters from our territo-
ry! Why should secure borders be 50 kilometers
from Damascus but 350 kilometers from Tel
Aviv?
Assad's memory holds a catalogue of Israeli offenses,
especially those he sees as terrorism. In a speech in
November 1986 the US Embassy commented that
Assad's indictment of Israeli "terrorism" ranged
from the Vanunu and Dikko kidnapings to assassina-
tions of Palestinians in Europe and the Middle Easta
He also listed acts of Israeli espionage carried out on
American soil against the United States, including
the theft of uranium from Pennsylvania, the Pollard
case, the smuggling of krytron switches, and an
alleged statement by former CIA official George
Carver that US secrets reach the Israeli Embassy at
the "speed of light."
a Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli nuclear technician who disclosed
information about Israel's nuclear program to a London newspa-
per, allegedly was abducted from Europe by Israeli intelligence in
September 1986 and returned to Israel. Israeli authorities initially
denied knowledge of Vanunu's whereabouts. Eventually his deten-
tion in Israel was acknowledged, but the means by which he was
returned to Israel were never revealed. Vanunu was tried in secret
and in March 1988 was convicted of treason and espionage. Former
Nigerian Minister and opposition figure Umaru Dikko fled into
exile when the Nigerian military overthrew the civilian government
of Dikko 's brother-in-law in late December 1983. Dikko, who was
accused of corruption by the military regime, was abducted from
London in July 1984 by Nigerian authorities collaborating with
three Israelis, described in press accounts as mercenaries. British
security officials discovered Dikko, drugged and packed inside a
wooden crate marked diplomatic baggage, at Stansted Airport,
north of London.
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Figure 2. In an interview in
September 1985, Assad stated
that "Israel has always reject-
ed and continues to reject peace
with the Arabs collectively. It
resorts to hunting the Arabs
one by one because this leads to
the dismemberment of the Arab
nation and this, in turn, further
weakens the Arabs and places
them in a capitulatory position
vis-a-vis Israeli schemes.'
birth to a new Israel." ' More fundamental to ASsad's
view is a conviction the Embassy believes is shared by
many Syrians that there are deep internal contradic-
tions in Israeli society, which may fracture the Jewish
state.
Assad is a patient man and firmly convinced that over
time the strategic balance will shift in favor of the
Arabs. He often mentions that the Crusades lasted
200 years before the Arabs threw off the European
yoke. The Embassy also cites other factors that
contribute to his patience: Assad does not have the
domestic political requirements for an Arab-Israeli
peace and does not suffer the immediate hardship of
the Palestinians. Moreover, Arab nationalism is a real
factor in Syrian politics, according to the Embassy,
and is an area where Assad has a constituency?many
Syrians want peace, but the terms must be acceptable.
The Syrian Bottom Line?Palestine and
the Golan Heights
Assad has been outspoken in his opposition to what he
sees as the divide and conquer tactics of the Camp
David process and is determined to prevent it from
going forward. If there is a peace process, it must not
consist of a series of bilateral negotiations that
amount to capitulation to Israel, Assad says, but
should emerge from a united Arab stand that will
compel Israel to make peace on Arab terms.
The Crusades: A Lesson for All Time
Assad publicly has stated his belief that the Crusades
are "the most prominent and most impressive event in
Arab and world history." Moreover, he believes the
failure of the Crusaders to establish a permanent
European presence in the region provides an eternally
valid model for confrontation with the West. It is
within the context of the Crusaders' defeat that
Assad views the conflict with Israel. In his Revolu-
tion Day speech last March, Assad noted that follow-
ing the Crusader onslaught, the Arabs could not
liberate their land "in one year, 10 years, 20 years, or
30 years." But, he goes on, "we stood fast and
struggled until we achieved the goal of liberation 200
years after the invasion began. Victory was achieved
against the only superpower in the world at that
time." Assad then rhetorically asked his listeners,
"Where is the difficulty in confronting Israel com-
pared with the difficulty in confronting all of
Europe?"
Syria's population increases by 3.7 percent a year?one of the
highest birthrates in the worldl
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Syria's conditions for an end to the state of war with
Israel include full and unconditional Israeli withdraw-
al from all territories occupied in June 1967, includ-
ing the Golan Heights and Arab Jerusalem, and the
recognition of the inalienable right of the Palestinian
people to national self-determination. In Syria's view,
if these conditions were met, the state of war could be
replaced by an absence of hostilities?nonbelligeren-
cy?but not normalization of Syrian-Israeli relations.
During meetings with US officials over several years,
Assad has indicated that all aspects of the Golan issue
are negotiable except that of Syrian sovereignty. On
the basis of these comments, we believe Assad is
prepared to make guarantees concerning Israel's secu-
rity. Assad also has made it clear, however, that his
version of peace does not include diplomatic or com-
mercial relations.
In deference to the 750,000 Palestinians living in
Syria and Lebanon?most of whom are from areas
that are part of Israel proper?Damascus has upheld
the right of all Palestinians in the diaspora to return
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Figure 3
Golan Heights, October 1988
Al
'Ayshiyah
An Nabatiya
at Tanta
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Al Khiyam
The Golan Heights is an Israeli name
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during the June 1967 Six-Day War. More
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expelled from this area during and after
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to their homes and thus has not endorsed the idea of a
West Bank?Gaza ministate. The Embassy reports
that Syrian propaganda has focused on solving the
Palestinian issue while avoiding specific formulations
for Palestinian statehood. Although Damascus says
the Palestinians themselves must determine what
constitutes a satisfactory solution, the Embassy notes
that Assad, in fact, does not like the idea of a
Palestinian state because it would undermine his
ability to manage the conflict with Israel and reduce
Syria's regional influence.
We believe Assad would be flexible on the Palestinian
question provided that its resolution was accepted by
other Arab states and the final configuration of a
Palestinian entity established Syria's preeminent po-
litical influence. Assad certainly would, in the early
stages, continue to insist on complete evacuation of
the occupied territories including East Jerusalem. The
Embassy suspects, however, that with Soviet encour-
agement, Assad would agree to reasonable border
adjustments in the context of a total package.
In our view, Assad will not allow the Palestinians to
negotiate on their own because he fears they will
ignore Syrian interests. Assad's suspicions that PLO
Chairman Arafat intends to pursue a separate peace
were rekindled in June 1988 when Arafat's official
spokesman circulated a paper at the Algiers summit
meeting calling for a political settlement to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. Although the document drafted by
Bassam Abu Sharif was not sanctioned by the PLO
Executive Committee or signed by Arafat, it revived
Assad's concerns that a settlement excluding Syria
could end the peace process and mean that Syria's
demand for the return of the Golan was unlikely to be
addressed short of war.
Following the appearance of the Abu Sharif docu-
ment, Damascus immediately stepped up its cam-
paign to weaken the PLO militarily and politically by
renewing its military assault on Arafat's supporters in
Beirut. In July fighters from Abu Musa's dissident
Fatah faction succeeded in driving the PLO out of its
strongholds in the Shatila and Bun j al Barajinah
refugee camps in Beirut, forcing most to relocate to
the south, near Sidon.
Secret
In our view, Assad will not compromise on the
demand for the return of the Golan Heights to full
Syrian sovereignty. The Embassy believes that every
inch of Syrian territory ultimately will have to be
returned for an agreement to be acceptable to Damas-
cus. Within this concept, the Embassy adds that it has
had indications that the Syrians are prepared to be
reasonable concerning security arrangements and
would accept long-term demilitarization with interna-
tional guarantees.
Many political observers believe that Assad feels a
personal obligation and need to recover the Golan in
his lifetime. The Embassy believes this is not neces-
sarily true, although the Golan issue is intensely
personal for Assad?he was Minister of Defense when
the territory was lost to Israel in 1967. Conscious of
his minority religious status in Syria?Assad is an
Alawite and thus regarded as a heretic by many
Sunni Muslims?he is in no position to trade away
Syrian territory, nor will he enter negotiations unless
he believes the Golan issue will be resolved in Syria's
favor.
US-Syrian Disconnect Over Peace
Assad has long been suspicious of US Middle East
peace efforts, viewing them, according to the Embas-
sy, as part of a strategy to isolate and "encircle" Syria
through step-by-step tactics?Camp David for Egypt,
the 17 May Accord for Lebanon, and a Hussein-
Arafat coalition for Jordan and the West Bank.
Foreign Minister Shara told Assistant Secretary
Richard Murphy in 1985 that, in Syria's view, no US
administration has ever proposed a truly just and
comprehensive peace.
Assad doubted the sincerity of US proposals
presented in 1988, seeing them as designed solely to
diminish the growing pressure on the Israeli Govern-
ment resulting from the Palestinian uprising in the
West Bank and Gaza. According to the US Embassy
in Damascus, senior Syrian officials were convinced
the United States was attempting to rescue Israel
from the uprising by holding out the prospect of a
settlement to the Palestinians, hoping this would
deflate the protest movement.
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Heir to Salah al-Din
Nasir Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi is the preeminent folk
hero to modern Syrians and Assad's principal histori-
cal role model. Assad sees himself as the spiritual
heir to the Kurdish Ayyubid leader, the gentleman
warrior who liberated Jerusalem from the Crusaders
in 1187. Assad often refers to this heroic _figure, who
is buried in Damascus, in describing the similarities
between his own struggle against Israel and the
Muslim victory over the Crusades. Visitors to As-
sad's office have commented on the large painting on
the wall depicting the battle of Hittin, in which Salah
al-Din defeated the Christian invaders and paved the
way for the fall of Jerusalem.
Assad told Assistant Secretary Murphy in a meeting
in 1986 that Syria would respond when it got a fair
peace proposal. Assad's version of a fair proposal,
however, is one in which the outcome is known before
negotiations begin. Assad wants to know "up front"
what the final agreement will look like. Only then is
he ready to enter the process.
before Syria can accept US peace pro-
posals, Washington first must provide assurances on
the outcome on the basis of a unified Israeli position.
Foreign Minister Shara and
probably Assad himself are convinced that Syria can
successfully refrain from taking a committed stance
on any US proposal, as long as the United States has
not obtained a unified response from Israeli leaders.
Following a visit to
Damascus by Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy in
September 1986, a commentary by Radio Damascus
criticized the US approach to peace, pointing out that
the "United States argues that an Israeli withdrawal
from occupied territories, including the Golan
Heights, can be one of the subjects at the direct
9
negotiations sought by Washington. But the United
States does not commit itself to anything."
Assad is especially suspicious of US proposals for a
phased negotiating process on the Palestinian issue.
He fears that plans for a transition period, which he
considers a cover for autonomy, might become perma-
nent. According to the Embassy, Assad suspects that,
even if the implementation of the transition phase is
linked to the beginning of the final status negotia-
tions, once autonomy is implemented, the Israelis
would desert the final status negotiations. Thus, from
Assad's perspective, the final status has to be agreed
upon first, followed by negotiations to determine the
process by which it would be implemented. The
Embassy's view is that Assad believes the US ap-
proach will produce separate deals that maximize
Israel's overwhelming military superiority and ensures
that Israel and the United States will dictate the
outcome. Ultimately, when such a scenario is played
out, Syria will stand alone and be incapable of
recovering its lost territory or affecting the outcome of
a West Bank settlement through its own diplomatic
means.
Despite Assad's temporizing on the peace issue, we
believe he deeply fears being left out of negotiations.
The Syrians may not want to play now, but the
Embassy believes they have left the door open and
Assad will be strongly tempted to participate in a
process with real prospects for Syria to regain the
Golan. Without such prospects, Assad's participation
as a spoiler would be certain. The Embassy recognizes
that getting Assad positively involved would not be
easy but believes that it should not be ruled out as
impossible.
Conference Modalities?Maximizing Syrian Influence
Whether or not he will take a seat in a peace
conference, Assad's views on the mechanics of the
process are evolving. In the past, he consistently has 25X1
rejected formulations for direct negotiations with
Israel. In the 20 April 1987 issue of Time, however,
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former President Carter stated that he was authorized
by President Assad to affirm Syrian support for the
concept of an international peace conference, that
Syria would be pleased to attend, and that it was clear
that many outstanding questions would have to be
negotiated in direct talks between Israel and the
particular nation involved.
Although both Carter and King Hussein have indicat-
ed that Assad has agreed privately to the concept of
bilateral committees within the framework of the
conference, the Embassy in Damascus noted earlier
this year that Assad had not repeated this willingness
to Embassy officials. When pressed on the issue,
Foreign Minister Shara has suggested that there was
a place for committees but reminded the Embassy
that the 1977 Geneva conference envisioned commit-
tees based on a topical, rather than a geographical,
basis.
The Syrians believe that Israel's 40-year-old demand
for direct bilateral negotiations is based on an Israeli
strategy to ignore the Palestinians and to change the
Arab-Israeli conflict solely into a border question.
Foreign Minister Shara has told US officials that, in
Syria's view, once the border problems are solved, the
Palestinians will lose Arab support and Israel would
have achieved its goal of liquidating the Palestinian
people.
The Syrians have additional problems with bilateral
geographical committees. The Embassy believes:
? They will be forced to deal 1 on 1 with the Israelis
regarding the Golan, where they must deal from a
position of inferiority.
? They see themselves being cut out of negotiations
for the West Bank and Gaza and for Lebanon.
Should the Syrians ultimately accept bilateral com-
mittees, they will insist that the results of the individ-
ual committees do not stand on their own. Assad,
thus, is insisting on a plenary body with veto power
over agreements reached at the committee level.
Otherwise, the Embassy points out, should the
Jordanians and Palestinians or Lebanese negotiate an
agreement with the Israelis while the Syrians do not,
Damascus would be faced with another separate deal,
this time under the auspices of an international
conference.
Secret
Assad's tactics regarding the composition of the Arab
delegation appear to be evolving. Following the Egyp-
tian peace treaty with Israel, Assad opposed the
attendance of separate Arab delegations to a confer-
ence, fearing that a Camp David?style settlement
would emerge leading to peace between Israel and
Syria's Arab neighbors but leaving Syrian interests
unaddressed. Assad sought to maximize Syrian influ-
ence?and veto power?by arguing for a single, joint
Arab delegation. Assad still wants a joint delegation,
but his remarks to former President Carter indicate a
willingness to consider country delegations, although
he is opposed to separate Palestinian representation.
Assad's current maneuver to ensure Syrian predomi-
nance in the negotiating process is to advocate the
establishment of functional committees?rather than
bilateral exchanges?that would examine issues such
as boundaries. The Embassy reported a remark by a
senior presidential adviser that an international con-
ference could have a subcommittee structure, with the
Golan being dealt with in a "territories" subcommit-
tee. The Embassy comments that Syria, in this pre-
ferred framework, would be involved in the discussion
of other territorial issues, thus possibly gaining veto
power.
Steadfastness?The Correct Course
Since Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977,
Syria has stressed that the proper strategy to confront
Israel and Egypt's unilateral peace is steadfastness
and confrontation. Assad has repeatedly called for an
Arab alliance against Tel Aviv and Cairo that is
steadfast in demanding a reversal of Camp David,
Egypt's return to belligerency, and a tough line
toward Israel.
Since Assad began to demonstrate tactical flexibility
toward the peace process a year and a half ago,
regional events have helped to reinforce his hardline
strategic position. Principal among these has been the
Palestinian uprising (intifada) in the Israeli-occupied
territories. Assad believes the uprising has vindicated
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Assad and Arafat?Longstanding Animosity
As Defense Minister in the late 1960s, Assad super-
vised Syria's backing for Yasir Arafat's fledging
Fatah movement and its early attacks on Israel. Even
then, Assad sought to maximize Syrian control over
the PLO and he briefly arrested Arafat in 1966. Since
the war in 1967, Assad's drive to control the Arab
confrontation with Israel has led to ups and downs in
his relationship with Arafat:
? September 1970. Assad refused to support Palestin-
ian forces fighting in Jordan even after Syrian
ground units crossed the border. Without Syrian
air cover, the PLO was smashed in Jordan.
? June 1976. Syrian military forces invaded Lebanon
and attacked PLO positions in Beirut and Sidon.
The Syrians supported the Christian Lebanese siege
of the Tall az Za'tar refugee camp in Beirut in
which hundreds of Palestinians died.
? November 1977. After Sadat's trip to Jerusalem,
Syria and the PLO joined forces in creating the
Steadfastness Front along with South Yemen, Lib-
ya, and Algeria.
? June 1982. Syrian and PLO forces fought together
in Lebanon against the Israelis amid widespread
recriminations between the two.
? November 1983. Syrian forces assisted Fatah re-
bels in their siege of Arafat's stronghold in Tripoli,
Lebanon. Arafat was forced to flee to Cairo.
? 1986-87. Syrian-supported Shia Amal militiamen
attacked PLO forces in refugee camps in Beirut,
Tyre, and Sidon, killing over 3,000 people in the so-
called Camps War. The fighting only stopped when
the intifada in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and
Gaza made it temporarily too embarrassing for
Syria to back Amal.
? May 1988. Assad and Arafat met in Damascus
after the funeral of Khalil Wazir, Arafat's deputy,
widely believed to have been assassinated by Israel.
? July 1988. Syrian forces assisted Palestinian Na-
tional Salvation Front forces in driving Fatah out
of West Beirut's refugee camps.
his tough anti-Israeli stance by demonstrating the
effectiveness of Arab steadfastness in challenging
Israel. Syria was quick to support the intifada by
setting up a clandestine radio station, al-Quds (Jeru-
salem), in southern Syria, which initially was very
popular, according to the US Consulate in Jerusalem.
For Assad, the seriousness of the threat posed to
Israel by the intifada has been confirmed by US
peace efforts, which Syrian officials have interpreted
as a ploy to defuse the uprising and save Israel from
potential Palestinian success.
The Arab-Israeli peace process experienced its most
serious jolt in years in July 1988, when Jordan's King
Hussein announced Amman's divestiture of responsi-
bility for the West Bank. The Embassy notes Damas-
cus has cautiously supported the King's disengage-
ment from Palestinian affairs, because he believes
11
that it further undermines the already slim chance of
Arab-Israeli peace talks any time soon. Hussein's
action, moreover, weighs heavily against separate
peace talks between Israel and Jordan.
It is uncertain, however, if Assad can gain longer term
advantage from Jordan's split with the PLO. Assad
welcomes the damage to Arafat's credibility that he
expects to result from the PLO's inability to ade-
quately fill the vacuum on the West Bank, but Assad
also fears that such a failure will force the PLO into
greater dependence on Amman. We believe Assad
will try to preserve the wedge between Jordan and the
PLO by working closely with Jordan on Arab-Israeli
issues to fuel Arafat's suspicions of Jordanian-Syrian
collusion in an anti-PLO campaign.
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The growing Arab consensus calling for Egypt's re-
admittance to the Arab fold also reinforces Assad's
pursuit of a tough line in order to protect Syria's
interests. In our view, Assad is concerned that Syria's
regional influence would be challenged, and possibly
eclipsed, if Egypt is readmitted to Arab councils. We
believe, therefore, that Assad will seek to forestall
Egypt's return to political center stage by keeping
Arab attention focused on Palestinian issues and
Egypt's "treason" in signing a separate peace. He will
continue to support Egyptian oppositionists, like
"Egypt's Revolution," which gets public Syrian back-
ing, and to sponsor the radio station, Voice of Arab
Egypt, which criticizes the peace treaty. The US
Embassy in Damascus reported a conversation last
year in which Assad told US officials he would even
support an Islamic fundamentalist regime in Cairo if
it would break the 1979 treaty.
We expect Assad's focus on Israel will become even
more acute with the implementation of the cease-fire
between Iran and Iraq ending the war. Assad is
concerned that Saddam Husayn's long-festering ha-
tred for him will lead to an Iraqi campaign of
subversion against the Syrian regime. In an editorial
published in the Baghdad press in August 1988, Iraq's
Deputy Prime Minister Taha Ramadan delivered a
scathing attack on the Syrian regime and insulted
Assad personally. The Embassy in Baghdad com-
mented that the attack, coming from a source as high
in the government and Beth Party as Ramadan, sent
a clear message that Saddam has no intention of
letting bygones be bygones. Assad probably will see
his best defense against Iraqi subversion as a more
aggressive campaign against Israel in which he will
attempt to enlist and redirect Baghdad's energies.
Syrian fears over Iraqi intentions have already led to
increased vigilance.
Secret
in July the Syrian
Army's Political Direction Administration had in-
creased the frequency of compulsory political "lec-
tures" given to nearly all active-duty members of the
armed forces. The lectures vehemently attacked the
Iraqi regime and called Iraqi President Saddam Hu-
sayn a tyrant, a traitor, a butcher, and a murderer.
many Syrian military per-
sonnel believe there is an increased threat of Iraqi
subversion and believe the lectures are a direct result
of the cease-fire agreement.
Strategic Parity?The Military Option
Assad firmly believes that Israel will not negotiate an
equitable settlement with the Arabs as long as Israel's
military superiority is unchallenged. Assad told Sec-
retary Murphy earlier this year that, without parity,
Israel can continue to threaten war, "which means
more dollars, arms, and expansion for it." In Assad's
view, Israel has no incentive to make peace with the
Arabs given its military strength and unswerving US
support. By contrast, Assad believes parity will make
peace possible and bluntly told Murphy that peace
would have been possible years ago had it not been for
US suppport for Israel. Assad, moreover, predicted to
Murphy that when Syria obtained parity with Israel,
the Israelis would want to withdraw, and the United
States would bring American, rather than Israeli,
proposals to Damascus.
In Syria's view, a just and enduring solution in the
region presupposes a strategic balance. Foreign Min-
ister Shara told Murphy as long as the balance of
forces between the Arabs and Israel was in Israel's
favor, Israel would be encouraged to impose condi-
tions on the Arabs. Shara added that parity does not
mean only a military option?Syria does not want to
encourage Israel to attack. Rather, in any settlement,
Israel should not believe that because of its power it
can dictate terms to the Arabs. In discussions with
Assistant Secretary Murphy, Foreign Minister Shara
warned that dangerous factors, such as missiles and
chemical weapons, should provide impetus for discus-
sion of means to expedite peace efforts.
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Syrian military planners are well aware that Syria
cannot take on Israel in a full-scale war. The Embassy
reports that repetitive official statements about the
need to achieve parity and redress Syria's strategic
weakness border on paranoia. In our judgment, Assad
will continue to seek strategic parity and a greater
capability to inflict damage on Israeli population
centers to deter Israel from destroying Syria's eco-
nomic infrastructure in the next war. Assad probably
sees the development of a chemical warfare capability
as his only path to achieving deterrence, and Syria is
producing and stockpiling chemical munitions. The
economic difficulties during 1986 and 1987 forced a
reduction in Syria's conventional arsenal and led
Assad to accelerate the chemical weapons program.
Over the next two years, Syria is unlikely to resort to
chemical weapons in response to Israeli provocations
or to limited military engagements. In the event of all-
out war, however, we believe Damascus would quickly
employ its chemical arsenal in an attempt to neutral-
ize Israel's overwhelming military advantage. If Syria
delayed using its chemical weapons, Damascus would
risk losing its chemical capability as a result of Israeli
efforts to destroy these weapons as soon as conflict
erupted.
Regaining the Golan Through War
We believe a quick Syrian grab for the Golan?even
as a Sadat-style tactic to break the political logjam
and start negotiations, is unlikely in the next two
years. Assad is a long way from attaining strategic
parity with Israel, and we believe Assad would like to
postpone a showdown while building Syria's strength.
It is possible, however, that if Assad believed econom-
ic and military problems were further eroding Syria's
strength vis-a-vis Israel, he might be more inclined to
gamble. Syrian offensive strategy would almost cer-
tainly be restricted to trying to seize the Golan, then
holding on until superpower intervention and interna-
tional bargaining resolve the issue in Syria's favor.
Israel probably would escalate the conflict. Although
the Israeli armed forces are vastly superior, Syria
could inflict significant damage on the Israelis?
including against Israeli population centers?because
of improvements in the quality and size of Damascus's
weapons inventory.
13
Figure 4. Assad was profoundly affected by
Israeli actions following the Golan disengage-
ment agreement, reached in March 1974. With-
drawing Israeli forces systematically destroyed
,4/ Qunaytirah, the provincial capital. Assad
ordered that the city not be rebuilt but remain a
monument to Israel's implacable hatred for the
Arabs.
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Syria's economic problems interrupted its convention-
al military buildup, particularly in the ground forces,
during 1986 and 1987. Although the military was 25X1
generally insulated from Syria's economic austerity,
the rapid expansion of the armed forces evident since
1982 has been curtailed. According to reports from
acquisition of major equipment 25X1
items has proceeded at a slower rate. Training during
1987 reached an alltime low, apparently because of
shortages of petroleum and ammunition. In another
cost-saving measure, Syria deactivated one brigade in
a few Syrian divisions. Manpower expenditures were
also reduced by forcing early retirements and cancel-
ing active-duty extensions. 25X1
The army's training regimen appeared to be back on
track during 1988, and the quality of the training is
improving. Damascus apparently is taking more seri-
ously Soviet criticism that Syrian manpower and
training, not Soviet equipment, are the military's most
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Figure 5. During his speech opening the Syrian legislature on
27 February 1986, Assad counseled the citizens of the Golan not to
fear "because 12 million Syrian citizens are able to take back the
Golan there is no doubt about it, and if the Israelis are acting as if
the Golan is within their borders, so we will act as Lithe Golan is in
the middle of Syria and not at its borders. . . History may write
that the Golan was the high point of disaster for the Israelis to the
people of the Golan', we have an appointment to meet."
serious shortcomings. Training in 1988 indicates a
better understanding of longstanding deficiencies in
the military and will almost certainly improve Syrian
capabilities, particularly in the air and air defense
forces.
Nonetheless, Syrian training, in
our view, remains unsophisticated and has yet to
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regularly incorporate combat air support, special
forces, or even chemical defense into their convention-
al armored and mechanized training.
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We agree with the Embassy assessment that the
dissuasive factors for a Syrian attack greatly outweigh
the persuasive ones at present. The Embassy points
out that Assad has no reason to assume that the
Israelis would fight a new war as a limited one, and
previous defeats and the prospect of what he will lose
if he attacks and fails must have a sobering effect. We
believe another key dissuasive factor is Syrian uncer-
tainty about the degree of Soviet support. Moreover,
there is no significant internal pressure to regain the
Golan by force, and the Embassy notes that every
Syrian they have talked to, "down to the most
illiterate peasant," displays great fear of war with
Israel.
Ultimately, as the Embassy points out, any analysis of
Assad's offensive intentions turns on fundamental
assumptions about his rationality and the degree of
Soviet support. In our judgment, the defensive ele-
ment continues to dominate Assad's strategic thinking
for the moment. We believe that miscalculation on
one or both sides remains the greatest danger to the
uneasy peace that prevails between Syria and Israel.
Challenging Israel in Lebanon
We believe that Lebanon will remain the principal
battleground in Syria's confrontation with Israel.
Assad has chosen to challenge Israel in South Leba-
non, rather than on the Golan, in order to reduce the
risk of open warfare with Israel, avoid losing Syrian
lives in the conflict, and limit the prospects for Israeli
retaliation against Syrian targets. Activism on the
part of Lebanese and Palestinian Arabs, moreover,
helps foster the perception of the universal and endur-
ing nature of the Arab struggle against Israel and
builds what Assad hopes will be irresistible pressure
on Israel to come to terms with the Arabs.
Damascus has sought to channel the energies of
Lebanese and Palestinian groups, particularly the
Shia fundamentalist Hizballah movement, into the
confrontation with Israel and its surrogates in the
security zone.
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Damascus's ability to control events in South Leba-
non is very limited, in our judgment. Its behavior
indicates Syria wants to see Israel repulsed from
Lebanon by force of arms, but recognizes that the
confrontation with Israel could escalate beyond con-
trol on the heels of increased cross-border operations
by Lebanese and Palestinian zealots. We believe
Assad is counting on Syria's improved military capa-
bility and Damascus's link to Moscow to dissuade
Israel from retaliating against Syria directly. Assad's
brinksmanship in the south could backfire, possibly
triggering another major Israeli incursion or longer
term presence in southern Lebanon.
Outlook
We believe Assad intends to put off negotiating with
Israel for as long as possible, given his expectations
that Syria's strategic position will improve over the
long term. Assad sees the state of no-war/no-peace, as
conducive to his efforts to maximize Damascus's
regional influence and to develop Syria's military
arsenal. Assad's most cherished dream is to regain the
Golan, and the Embassy notes that the buildup of his
military is being undertaken in part to that end. We
believe Assad would prefer to achieve his goals short
of war, although the recovery of the Golan is one of
the central themes of Syrian foreign policy and Assad
may elect to use force to accomplish this end. We
believe that it is more likely, however, that Assad is
gambling that a growing Syrian military threat?
particularly the development of chemical weapons?
will prompt the United States to "deliver" Israel into
a peace process on Arab terms.
We do not rule out that over time, if Assad perceives
that domestic or regional problems have limited his
military options, he may attempt to settle Syria's
score with Israel diplomatically rather than through
the threat of war. We doubt that Assad would enter
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constructive negotiations with Israel unless he was
confident that major issues would be resolved on
Syrian terms. He has not wavered from his bottom-
line demand for the return of the Golan and resolution
to the Palestinian problem. We do not envision cir-
cumstances under which Assad would abandon either
goal or relax his insistence that these issues be
addressed in tandem.
We believe that, under almost any circumstances,
Assad will have viable tactics to undermine moves
toward peace that threaten or ignore Syrian interests.
He has successfully demonstrated his ability in the
past to use threats of subversion, military buildup,
terrorism, and assassination to prevent Syria's weaker
neighbors, Lebanon, Jordan and the PLO, from stray-
ing too far from the Syrian line. Syrian tactics could
include the following:
? Assassinating senior PLO officials, possibly includ-
ing Arafat, if the Palestinians seem prepared to
enter into the peace process without Syria. Pro-
Syrian Palestinian terrorists have been directly im-
plicated in the assassination of moderate PLO lead-
ers in the past.
? Assassinating other Arab leaders who might be
willing to talk with Israel. Syria was almost certain-
ly involved in the assassination of Lebanese Chris-
tian President-elect Bashir Gemayel in September
1982, whom the Syrians believed had promised to
make peace with Tel Aviv.
? Sponsoring a major terrorist operation against an
Israeli target by a Syrian-backed Palestinian or
Lebanese group. Such an operation might be suffi-
cient to further harden Israeli opinion against con-
cessions to their Arab enemies or provoke a major
Israeli retaliation that could sidetrack peace moves.
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? Massing military forces on the Jordanian border to
intimidate Amman. In 1980, Syria deployed several
divisions along the frontier to pressure King Hussein
during an Arab summit conference.
? Sparking unrest in Lebanon to derail peace moves.
Syria could attack the pro-Israeli Lebanese Chris-
tian enclave north of Beirut to create a regional
crisis and divert attention to the Lebanese arena if
peace talks began without Syria.
? In extremis, targeting US diplomatic officials and
installations to derail peace talks. The Syrians
directly benefited, for example, from the attack on
the US Embassy in Beirut in April 1983, which
disrupted US moves to negotiate a Lebanese-Israeli
peace agreement.
? In desperation, launch a limited military attack on
the Golan Heights.
Even if Assad could redress his grievances against
Israel through negotiations, there is a downside to
peace from Damascus's perspective. Much of Assad's
regional influence?and traditional Arab aid?stems
from Syria's role as the principal confrontation state
with Israel. In an environment of peace, the Syrian
giant would be cut down to size. Assad is not prepared
to give up Syria's dominant role in inter-Arab politics
or sacrifice his significant international status for the
sake of peace, in our judgment. In an environment of
nonbelligerence, Assad probably could compete with
Egypt and Iraq for regional preeminence only if a
peace settlement had been extracted from Israel on
Syrian terms.
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