CIA OFFICIAL TOLD PROBERS CASEY SKIRTED 'BUREAUCRATS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00142R000700920032-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: August 27, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08: CIA-RDP89T00142R000700920032-7
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ON PAGE - " 27 August 1987
CIA official told probers Casey
skirted `bureaucrats'
By Nancy J. Schwerzler
Washington Bureau of The Sun
WASHINGTON - William J.
Casey, the "last great buccaneer" of
swashbuckling spies, became impa-
tient with the cautious "bureaucrats"
and "shoe salesmen" of the modern
CIA he headed and looked to Lt. Col.
Oliver L. North to run the Iranian
arms deals, a senior said
in a transcript released yesterday.
Clair George. the CIA's deputy di-
rector for operations, or covert activi-
ties, testified in private before the
congressional Iran-contra commit-
tees Aug. 5-6 that Colonel North
came up with "endless harebrained
schemes" to free the hostages.
said that one North idea. for 81y the
mil-
freedom of the hostages
lion each, was a "scam." the inves-
tigative released by
tigative panels show that a bribery
scheme concocted by Colonel North.
involving a Lebanese informant for
agents of the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration and financed with $2
million that was to be provided by
multimillionaire H. Ross Perot, fell
apart after the informant
without rodued
with 8200,000 - ing the hostages.
Mr. George also disclosed that he
has been questioned extensively by
the office of Lawrence E. Walsh, the
special prosecutor probing the Iran-
contra affair, about two missing CIA
The documents are important be-
cause they warned of an arms cargo.
and its purpose, in a November 1985
shipment to Iran that the CIA was
asked by Colonel North to help expe-
dite. Mr. George said that he learned
of the request after the fact and that
at the time he thought the shipment
involved oil drilling equipment, not
arms.
From the outset of the Iran arms
deals, he said. top-ranking CIA offi-
cials were kept in the dark. and no
one in the operations division he
headed knew in mid-1985 that other
U.S. officials had begun conversa-
tions with Manucher Ghorbanifar to
seek help in freeing the hostages.
"We knew less about what was
going on in Washington than we did
overseas." he said.
CIA professionals had long
viewed Mr. Ghorbanifar as "uncon-
trolled," "dishonest and untruthful."
and had taken the unusual step in
1984 of issuing a "burn notice" ad-
vising all CIA agents not to deal with
him.
Mr. George said that once it be-
came clear that the operation would
proceed with Mr. Ghorbanlfar, he re-
fused to deal with such "a bum" and
told Mr. Casey of his view. The CIA
director responded by putting
Charles Allen. an official with no
overseas covert experience, in
charge of the CIA liaison with Mr.
Ghorbanifar and Colonel North on
the operation.
In his testimony, Mr. George pro-
vided insights into how Mr. Casey
viewed himself and his agency. Mr.
Casey was "the last great buccaneer
from OSS." the Office of Strategic
Services that was the predecessor of
the CIA. Mr. George said.
"I'll let you in on a secret," he told
cables that sounded an early alarm
that the U.S. was shipping weapons
to Iran as part of an arms-for-hos-
tages trade in late 1985.
Explaining that under normal
procedures it would have been im-
possible for the documents to bypass
his desk, he said when ked the
don't
cables were destroyed.
cable from an
know." Referring
agent in Portugal who reported that
Richard V. Secord. a middleman in
the arms deals and the contra sup-
ply network, said that the United
States was "trading missiles for hos-
tages." Mr. George said that he never
saw it and that if he had. "that one
would have grabbed me."
was that
said,
One possibility, he
cabal of people engaged in a cov-
er-up to sort of send a cable like that
somehow get all the copies suoof it. and
make it disappear."
would be difficult even for him, a
32-year CIA veteran with 20 years of
overseas covert experience: "Even I
couldn't fast enough whip up a cable
like that and pick up all the copies
and make sure no one had seen It."
the panels. "The way to handle Bill
Casey was outflank him to the right.
charge him with being less than ad-
venturous. suggest that maybe he
really wasn't ready to take the high
risk...."
In Colonel North. Mr. George said.
Mr. Casey saw a like-minded man of
action, one who "had guts in ap-
proaching anybody. anywhere. any-
time, in any conditions. without any
concern about their title. rank. You
know, we all grew up that you don't
just storm into the CEO's office the
third day with the company. and Ol-
lie did it. Bill Casey liked Ollie North.
We all did."
But liking and believing were two
different things where Colonel North
was concerned, Mr. George said. Ex-
aggeration was another North trade-
mark: "Everything was his. 'The
world is mine. I'm going to see the
president. I'm going to see the king.
I'm going to fly down to Central
America and have a private confer-
ence. How would you like some tick-
ets to a Redskins game?' "
And despite the apparently close
relationship between Mr. Casey and
Colonel North, Mr. George said he
does not believe that Mr. Casey au-
thorized a broad, "off the shelf" pri-
vate covert network that Colonel
North has claimed the CIA director
planned for global operations be-
yond the jurisdiction of Congress.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/08: CIA-RDP89T00142R000700920032-7