LETTER (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00142R000901360007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 7, 1987
• Content Type: LETTER

STAT
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
7 December 1987
Judge--
I thought you would be interested in the
conclusions from the"Covert Action" chapter of
the Iran-Contra Report. They provide a strong
endorsement of covert actions if done in an
appropriate manner.
STAT
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Chapter 24
a. In Latin American countries "[i]t should be taken
to the highest level of government available in the
hope that it would either influence those governments
to be supportive of the Contra program and upcom-
ing debate or at least refrain from undercutting its
cause up here. 1185
b. "A fully sanitized version should be made avail-
able to Ollie North, Pat Buchanan and Elliott Abrams
for their purposes here. I'll leave it up to you to get
the materials on to Elliott, Pat and Ollie."86
Subsequent developments in Honduras confirmed
that the Honduras "emergency" was mainly in Wash-
ington. On Tuesday, March 25, when President
Reagan ordered the emergency military aid, the U.S.
Commander in Chief, South, General John Galvin,
arrived in Tegucigalpa to assess the situation and pro-
vide intelligence and advice to the Honduran govern-
ment, President Azcona of Honduras left the capital
for a seaside vacation.87
Another example of the selective misuse of intelli-
gence occurred in November 1986, after Casey had
meetings in several Central American capitals. The
local CIA station chiefs attended those meetings and
cabled reports of the meetings to the C/CATF, who
was to use these cables as the basis for a draft report
on the Director's trip.
One of the Central American Presidents was criti-
cal of U.S. policies, particularly those supporting the
Nicaraguan armed Resistance. The U.S. Ambassador
in that country told Casey that most Latin American
countries opposed U.S. policy in Central America.
Yet, the remarks critical of U.S. policy were omitted
from the draft trip report prepared for Casey by the
C/CATF. 8 8
On November 23, Director Casey discussed his trip
to Central America in a letter to President Reagan:
"On Thursday, I returned . . . from . . . Central
America. I found the commandantes and the fighting
men of the FDN in high spirit and ready to go. In
stark contrast, the leaders [of Central American coun-
tries] were scared to death that we would not stay the
course ...."89 In fact, one of the leaders refused to
meet with Casey, and another was critical of U.S.
Policies. Casey chose to give the President a distorted
picture of the attitudes of the Central American presi-
dents effectively reinforcing his own view of what
U.S. policy should be.
Misrepresentation of intelligence also occurred in
the Iran initiative. In memorandums recommending
the January Findings, Poindexter told the President
that Iran was in danger of losing the war with Iraq.
According to Poindexter, Casey, agreed with this as-
sessment. Yet, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and Clair George all testified that the intelli-
gence community was of the opposite view-that Iran
had the upper hand in the war.
Secretary Shultz asserted that in connection with
the Iran initiative, the intelligence "he [the President]
was getting . . . was faulty about terrorism."90 The
reason, according to Shultz, was that there was a
problem of keeping "intelligence separated from
policy and control over policy was very much in play
and the Director of Central Intelligence wanted to
keep himself very heavily involved in this policy
which he had been involved in apparently all
along."9 r
The misuse of intelligence was a subject ancillary to
the mandate given the Committees by Congress. The
Committees included these examples because the seri-
ous implications they pose for decisionmaking. This
misuse of intelligence by a Director of Central Intelli-
gence, the National Security Advisor, or any Senior
Intelligence official, frustrates the ability of those
within the executive branch and Congress to arrive at
decisions based upon sound national policy judge-
ments.
Conclusions
Out of necessity, covert activities are conducted, and
nearly all are approved and monitored, in secret. Be-
cause they are not subject to public debate and scruti-
ny, they must be examined carefully within the practi-
cal constraints imposed by the need for operational
security. It has been the United States' historic
achievement to develop a system of law, using stat-
utes, executive orders, regulations, notification proce-
dures, that provides this scrutiny and protection. The
Committees conclude:
(a) Covert operations are a necessary component of
our Nation's foreign policy. They can supplement, not
replace, diplomacy and normal instruments of foreign
policy. As National Security Adviser Robert McFar-
lane testified, "it is clearly unwise to rely on covert
action as the core of our policy."92 The government
must be able to gain and sustain popular support for
its foreign policy through open, public debate.
(b) Covert operations are compatible with demo-
cratic government if they are conducted in an ac-
countable manner and in accordance with law. Laws
mandate reporting and prior notice to Congress.
Covert action Findings are not a license to violate the
statutes of the United States.
(c) As the Church Committee wrote more than a
dozen years ago. "covert actions should be consistent
with publicly defined United States foreign policy
goals."99 But the policies themselves cannot be secret.
(d) All Government operations, including covert
action operations, must be funded from appropriated
monies or from funds known to the appropriate com-
mittees of the Congress and subject to Congressional
control. This principle is at the heart of our constitu-
tional system of checks and balances.
(e) The intelligence agencies must deal in a spirit of
good faith with the Congress. Both new and ongoing
covert action operations must be fully reported, not
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cloaked by broad Findings. Answers that are techni-
cally true, but misleading, are unacceptable.
(f) Congress must have the will to exercise over-
sight over covert operations. The intelligence commit-
tees are the surrogates for the public on covert action
operations. They must monitor the intelligence agen-
cies with that responsibility in mind.
(g) The Congress also has a responsibility to ensure
that sensitive information from the executive branch
remains secure when it is shared with the Congress. A
need exists for greater consensus between the Legisla-
tive and executive branches on the sharing and pro-
tection of information.
(h) The gathering, analysis, and reporting of
intelligence should be done in such a way that there
can be no question that the conclusions are driven by
the actual facts, rather than by what a policy advo-
cate hopes these facts will be.
It has been observed that a country without en-
emies has no need of an army or an intelligence
agency.94
The United States of America, as a great power
with worldwide interests, will continue to have to
deal with nations that have different hopes, values,
and ambitions. These differences will inevitably lead
to conflicts. History reflects that the prospects for
peaceful settlement are greater if this country has
adequate means for its own defense, including effec-
tive intelligence and the means to influence develop-
ments abroad.
Organized and structured secret intelligence activi-
ties are one of the realities of the world we live in,
and this is not likely to change. Like the military,
intelligence services are fully compatible with demo-
cratic government when their actions are conducted
in an accountable manner and in accordance with
law.
This country has been fortunate to have a military
that is sensitive to the Constraints built into the Con-
stitution and to the necessity of respecting the Con-
gress' responsibilities. This attitude of the military has
won the trust of the American people, as George C.
Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army during
World War 11, explained to one of his officers:
But we have a great asset and that is that our
people, our countrymen, do not distrust us and
do not fear us. Our countrymen, our fellow citi-
zens, are not afraid of us. They don't harbor any
ideas that we intend to alter the government of
the country or the nature of this government in
any way. This is a sacred trust. . . .
Like the military, the intelligence services can func-
tion only with the trust and support of their country-
men. If they are to earn that trust, they must heed
Marshall's words.95
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