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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4 $ 8486 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE from the Inter-American Development Bank, ADMIC made approximately 2,300 microbusiness loans averaging $200 each. ADMIC estimates that one job was created for every loan made. During this same time period, ADMIC also provided skills training and other forms of technical assistance to about 4,800 microenterprises. In addition to providing these services, ADMIC played a leading role in establishing eight affiliate organizations in seven Mexican states and training their di- rectors and staff. It also helped to es- tablish an association of 150 microen- trepreneurs and has assisted groups of carpenters, seamstresses, and rug- makers to organize small trade associa- tions. Based upon its performance, ADMIC negotiated a loan guarantee from the U.S. Agency for Internation- al Development which was used to es- tablish a $450,000 line of credit for mi- croentrepreneurs with the Banco Mer- cantil del Norte. ADMIC's success has also resulted in the creation of a simi- lar state-run program in Monterrey. Mr. President, each of these exam- ples provides evidence that low cost aid programs are successful in achiev- ing lasting results. In this era of budget restraint, we should realize-as these examples demonstrate-that helping others to help themselves need not cost a great deal of money. The experimental project approach of the Inter-American Foundation has worked well. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE BI- CENTENNIAL OF THE CONSTI- TUTION ESSAY CONTEST Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am pleased. to join Senator STEVENS in congratulating the winners of the Bi- centennial Essay Contest held by the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America. These students are talented individ- uals, and I commend them for their contributions to the bicentennial of the Constitution. Over the 200 years of its existence, the U.S. Constitution has demonstrat- ed a formidable ability to respond to challenges from any source-whether from the militant rivalry of totalitar- ian governments, or from the more friendly competition of parliamentary democracies, or from the political ex- tremes in this country. Again and again over. the past two centuries, the Constitution has proved its capacity to protect and expand our freedom, while safeguarding the en- during values essential for liberty to grow and flourish. All of the winners of the bicenten- nial essay contest should take pride in their achievement. Their participation has enriched their own lives and their countries, by developing a greater un- derstanding of the principle of the separation of powers in the U.S. Con- stitution that helps to make it the pre- cious charter of liberty and democra- cy. If the Founding Fathers were here today, I am sure they would be as proud as we are of the achievements of these students. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, a bi- centennial essay contest was recently held by the Association. of American Chambers of . Commerce in Latin America. High school and college stu- dents from 13 countries in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean participated in the essay contest. The essays analyzed the sepa- ration of powers in the American system of government and the avoid- ance of political extremes. Considering recent problems in the Philippines, Panama, and Nicaragua, it is enlightening to see . that young people from our southern neighboring countries recognize the greatness of our Nation's constitutional system. Our attention is usually focused on the problem areas in Central and South America-and for good reason. There are countries that are having serious problems. But these are the ex- ceptions. This contest should serve to in Latin America. The U.S. greatest contribution test of time. These students have rec- ognized this. Karen Conway, 17, first-place winner from the Dominican Republic wrote: The Constitution has survived cleavage because of the separation of powers. As a general guide for management, it has ad- justed and expanded to the new conditions imposed upon,it. The very fact that it is able to adapt to change and isn't explicit has made it, workable. The Constitutional Fathers must have certainly intended it this way and must have trusted the American people. Ricardo Torres de Mello, 17, first- place winner from Brazil, noted: Some people have criticized the separa- tion of powers arrangement, arguing that it creates confusion, causes delays and contrib- utes to a lack of direction in American gov- ernment. But this is the prize lsic) that must be paid to safeguard against potential abuses of the powers of the government. Power tends to corrupt! Robert Lustberg, 16, first-place winner from Mexico said: The Founding Fathers separated the gov- ernment into three branches. Yet one must say that the Constitution as well works due to the people which play a role in the politi- cal life of a country, for they try to hold the pieces together, and when an anarchist or havoc-wreaker finds his way in, he may very well upset the system. The separation of powers hence can be said to help make the Constitution work for it provides a framework in which the precepts of the Constitution can be easily enforced, making it easier for the Constitution,to work. The other winners of the essay con- test expressed similarly enthusiastic perceptions of our constitutional system. As members of the International Committee of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, June 23, 1988 I would like to join Senator KENNEDY in asking unanimous consent that the list of 13 winners of the Latin Ameri- can Bicentennial Essay Contest be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the winners were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: Karma Dawson, 17, Lincoln School Buenos Aires, Argentina. Ricardo Torres de Mello, 17, Graded School of Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil. Martin Escobari, .15, Escuela Cooperative Santa Cruz, La Paz, Bolivia. Paulina Bardon, 18, Santiago College, Santiago, Chile. I Karen Conway, 17, Carol Morgan School, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic.. Michael Torres, 14, American School, Guayaquil, Ecuador. Taria Brett, 18, American School, El Sal- vador, El Salvador. Juan Carlos Guirola Palencia, 18, English- American School, Guatemala City, Guate- mala. Dacia Flores, 18, Maya School, Teguci- galpa, Honduras. Phillip Bailey, 22, University of West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica. Robert Lustberg, 16, American School Foundation, Mexico City, Mexico. Sergio Luis Zanotti Cavazzoni, 17, Ameri- an School, Asuncion, Paraguay. ADMINISTRATION SOUTH AFRICA POLICY Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, yes- terday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on which I serve began a series of hearings on the issue of U.S. economic sanctions against South Africa. At the hearing, the Honorable John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary of State, presented an explanation of the Reagan administration's views on pending legislation that would impose further economic sanctions on South Africa and Namibia. I thought Mr. Whitehead's exposition of the issues was excellent. Mr. Whitehead's testimony was pro- fessionally competent. He is one of the State Department's most eloquent wit- nesses. As a public service I ask unani- mous consent that the full text of his prepared statement be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no' objection, the testi- mony was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: TESTIMONY OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN C. WHITEREAD Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this oppor- tunity to present the Administration's views on Senate Bill 2378, the Amendments to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. If enacted, this legislation could have im- portant consequences for the future of American diplomacy in South Africa and in the Southern Africa region. For reasons I hope to make clear in my testimony, the Ad- ministration strongly opposes Senate bill 2378. American interests are not served by legislation which requires that we experi- ment in the economic destabilization of South Africa without genuine prospects of contributing to the solution of that coun- try's problems. s Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4 S8487- June 23, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Despite our strong objections to this bill, we are quick to recognize the feelings which motivated it. South Africa's apartheid system is repugnant to all Americans. While many governments tolerate or even surrep- titiously encourage discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, only in South Africa 'is racial discrimination a civic duty and the failure to practice it a punishable offense. Among nations which profess to identify with Western, democratic values, only South Africa classifies individuals, herds them into groups, and strips them of their individual political rights according to racial and ethnic criteria. This monstrous injustice affronts us all and cries out for redress. Our aversion deepens when we- are con- fronted by the stubborn resistance of the South African government to appeals for peaceful change. Successive generations of black activists-during the defiance cam- paigns of the early 1950s and early 1960s, during the Soweto uprising of the 1970s, and in the latest wave of township protest from 1984 to 1986-have been shattered by progressively harsher and more sophisticat- ed forms of official repression. Despite re- peated, worldwide censure and the imposi- tion of severe sanctions-some of them dating back more than twenty years-South Africa's governing elite remains steadfast in its determination to retain its monopoly on political power. Injustice and inequality are entrenched in South Africa, but not all the trends are neg- ative. Over the past ten years, the nature of apartheid has changed markedly. Numerous petty apartheid provisions have fallen by the wayside, the Pass Laws have been scrapped, central business districts have been opened to blacks, and black labor unions have been legalized and have made impressive organizational strides. These changes testify to? a growing - awareness among many South African whites that apartheid in its purest sense is impractical and uneconomic, if not actually immoral. Consistent with this trend is the finding of the Dutch Reformed Church two years ago that no scriptural justification exists fol- the practice of apartheid. Another institutional pillar of the Afrikaner establishment, the Broederbond, also broke with apartheid or- thodoxy at that time. Regrettably, this will- ingness to dispense with some forms of racial discrimination has not yet developed into a consensus' in favor of addressing the truly critical issue confronting South Africa, which is the issue of permitting all South Africans to participate in deciding how and by whom they are governed. A clear and dispassionate analysis of the crisis gripping South Africa is required if the United States hopes to play a construc- tive role there. Our interests demand that we avoid the pitfalls.of desperate activism on the one side and resignation and disen- gagement on the other. We must accept that the transition to a non-racial democra- cy in South Africa will inevitably. take longer than all of us would like. We must also understand that South Africans them- selves-black and white-will be the agents of their own liberation, with outsiders, in- cluding the United States, playing only a secondary role at best. Above all, we need to acknowledge that such. limited influence as we currently possess derives from our con- tinuing presence on the ground in South Africa. A progressive U.S. business presence, an official aid program reaching out to tens of thousands of black South Africans, our persistence in urging South Africans to con- front the imperatives of dialogue and com- promise and to consider what they are for as well as what they are against-these are the most important assets we have for chal- lenging apartheid. We can condemn, cen- sure and sanction-as this legislation re- quires-and hope against logic and experi- ence that we can achieve some beneficial result. Or we can take a longer view which refuses to disengage, preserves our lines of communication, our contacts and our limit- ed resources within South Africa, and posi- tions the United States to intervene posi- tively at the moment when our limited le- verage can accomplish the most good. THE FALLACY OF SANCTIONS Three years ago, at the height of the vio- lent unrest in black townships across South Africa, - it was fashionable to argue that apartheid had entered its final crisis. Activ- ists in South Africa, exiled black leaders and many observers in Europe and the United States predicted that only a final push was needed to topple the system. Comprehen- sive and mandatory international sanctions were thought by some to be precisely the push required. These prognostications were obviously wide of the mark. Few persons familiar with existing power relationships in South Africa seriously believe that a rapid resolution of the crisis is.possible-with or without sane- tions pressure. Surely it was unrealistic to expect the South African. government to re- spond to-our pressure by ending the-State of Emergency, releasing political detainees or meeting any of the other conditions for lift- ing sanctions outlined in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Not surprisingly, the South African government refused categori-. tally to meet these demands. Presumably in recognition of these fac- tors, Congress has modified its expectations. In reporting out HR 1580, the House For- eign Affairs. Committee describes sanctions as "part of a medium-to-long-term approach designed to maximize both internal and ex- ternal pressure on the apartheid regime". The House report further notes that to ensure their effectiveness, sanctions must be multilaterialized; that .U.S. pressure alone will be insufficient to accelerate the pace of change in South Africa. It should be clearly understood that the Administration has consulted intensively with South Africa's main trading partners, all of whom are major allies of the United States. For the most part, these govern- ments are - strongly disinclined to - either follow an American lead or act unilaterally in adopting further punitive sanctions. Our allies either reject or are highly skeptical of the premise that by destabilizing the South African economy, the West can somehow engineer a relatively peaceful transition to democractic rule in'South Africa. Moreover, these governments judge-as does the Ad- ministration-that international sanctions cannot be effectively enforced without re course to military measures. As some of you may be aware, we have re- ceived in the past two weeks separate, offi- cial communications from the European Community and the British government in- of their deep concerns over ex- traterritorial provisions in this bill. Passage of S2378, particularly the'secondary boycott features, could lead to. GATT disputes with our major. trading partners and underming the U.S. negotiating position in the current round of GATT talks. We should not, therefore, delude our- selves into thinking that it is possible to internationalize sanctions under American. leadership. Our allies will resist this ap- proach, at least until such time as we can demonstrate convincingly that cutting trade links, selling off assets, 'and relinquishing contracts across the- board in South Africa will result in something other than a costly, symbolic protest. The central fallacy of the sanctions ap- proach is not simply that it isn't feasible. Rather, the problem -lies with a fundamen- tal misreading of South African political and economic realities, and with the accept- ance of a false correlation- between econom- - is pain and positive social change. Simply put, sanctions are the wrong tool brought to the wrong job. Sanctions are the wrong tool because South Africa has the resources to resist an economic siege and has been preparing for such a contingency for many years. Al- though heavily dependent on international . trade, South Africa has domestic deposits of virtually every key raw material input needed for an industrial economy, with the major exceptions of crude oil and bauxite. The South African government and private sector have spent millions of dollars stock- piling strategic imports-ranging from crude oil and bauxite to computer and aircraft parts; these stockpiles would provide a.cush- ion against shortages until alternative sources of supply could be found or import substitution projects completed. Based on previous experiences with inter- national embargoes against South Africa, we believe that direct controls on shipments to South Africa would probably not prevent South African importers from obtaining the foreign .supplies that they need. One possi- ble exception would be certain high-technol- ogy goods, for which adequate enforcement. mechanisms already exist. With regard to South African. exports, 65 percent of export earnings are made up of low bulk/high value items such as gold, dia- monds 'and strategic minerals. Most econo- mists believe that an effective boycott of these commodities would be difficult or im- possible to enforce. The remaining 35 per- cent, mainly steel and manufactured prod- ucts, would be more vulnerable to a general boycott. Even here, however, a boycott would not be airtight. For example, in the - past two years sanctions have closed 80 per- cent of South Africa's traditional export market for steel, yet South African steel ex- ports were only down by about 2.9 percent through October of last year. Given South Africa's proven capacity for trade realign- ment and diversion and its still untested ca- pacity for full-scale sanctions-busting, we es- timate that even reasonably well-enforced comprehensive U.N. sanctions would cut total export receipts by something less than 25 percent. The net result of a total trade embargo on South Africa would almost certainly be far less dramatic than proponents of the sanc- tions approach believe. The impact is likely to be a moderate recession over the medium term, comparable to the 1982-1986 period in South Africa. Over the longer, term, con- traints on growth and a decline in competi- tiveness could -push South Africa deeper - into recession. But, whatever their economic conse- quences, what counts is the political impact of sanctions. As one leading South African Marxist theoretician recently noted in a re- versal of. his previous position, the criterion for sanctions should be the question of whether they consolidate the position. of the black worker and black organizations. He concludes that sanctions don't meet that criterion. As' I will point out, sanctions are far more likely to produce perverse results: mild discomfort, at most, for white elites, but a risk of severe economic dislocation for the black work force. THE ECONOMIC COSTS TO THE UNITED STATES Sanctions are not cost-free for the United States. S: 2738 will require U.S. business to find new markets, assuming they are avail- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4 ._ S 8488 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -p- SENATE .-J June 23, 1988 contact with South Africa is to zisread tragically the staying power of the Afrika- ner minority and its determination to put its security ahead of all other interests, in- cluding the interests of South Africa as a whole. South African blacks will be the primary, but not the only, victims of an international sanctions campaign against South Africa. Other victims will be those South African whites who most closely identify with Amer- ican democratic ideals and who support black aspirations for a more just society. Leaders such as Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, Wynand Malan, Helen Suzman, and Denis Worral staunchly oppose an economic and diplomatic quarantine of South Africa. As they struggle to build bridges across South Africa's racial divide, they need the support that a strong U.S. presence-both official and unofficial-provides. They have seen sanctions contribute to a siege mentality among whites which the ruling National Party has successfully fostered and exploit- ed by converting to its ranks thousands of relatively moderate, English-speaking voters over the past two years. They have also wit- nessed a steady erosion over the past year of fundamental civil liberties even in the hith- erto protected sphere of white politics. The same noose which has been used to strangle black dissent is now coiled expectantly around the white, reformist opposition. By dissociating ourselves from South Africa, we simply make it easier and less, costly for au- thorities to pull that noose tighter. By the same token, ultra-conservative fac- tions in South Africa are increasingly drawn to the prospect of cutting trade links, ending the U.S. business presence in South Africa, and limiting contact with the West. From their standpoint, a strong American presence is an unwelcome restraint on South Africa's internal and external policy options. Conservatives resent what they regard as American meddling in South Afri- ca's internal affairs, including our financial and moral support to anti-apartheid groups, and our persistance seeking ways to dis- mantle racial barriers and promote dialogue. They also resent American films and televi- sion programs, our music, journalism and popular culture because of their supposedly subversive influence on a younger genera- tion of Afrikaners. South Africa's U.N. rep- resentative was speaking to this constituen- cy when, in responding a few months ago to harsh criticism of South Africa in the Gen- eral Assembly, he invited the international community to "do its damndest". to Preto- ria. He could have as well added: "and close the door behind you." Neither hardliners in the National Party, nor the growing con- servative opposition, nor the more militant organizations even further to the right will mourn the absence of Americans from South Africa. able, for over $1.2 billion in annual exports of mostly manufactured and high-technolo- gy goods. The forced liquidation of over $1 billion in direct U.S. investment will change little in South Africa except to consolidate the position of local business interests ac- quiring these assets at well below market value. It is reasonable to expect that at least some U.S. companies will challenge the con- stitutionality of this provision on the grounds that it results in the confiscation of assets without fair compensation. While the precise impact of sanctions on the U.S. economy is hard to measure, some industries will be more seriously affected than others. Studies indicate that the U.S. coal industry has already lost an estimated $250 million over the past three years. A siz- able portion of the loss is due to market dis- tortions caused by existing U.S. sanctions against' South Africa. Foreign customers of the U.S. government enriching services who use South African uranium provide approxi- mately $350 million a year in revenues. Some of these customers will take their en- richment business to Europe and the Soviet Union if the U.S. cannot process their mate- rial. These estimates do not include the poten- tial cost of South African countersanctions. Even a temporary disruption of strategic mineral exports to the United.States would have serious, repercussions over -a broad range of U.S. industries. According to the U.S. Bureau of Mines, the direct economic costs to this nation re- sulting from a decision to embargo.South African strategic and critical minerals im- ports are estimated at $1.85 billion per year. About 94 percent of these estimated costs are for two platinum-group metals (PGM's), platinum and rhodium. Platinum is primarily used in the produc- tion of automative catalytic converters, and about two-thirds of 1986 total domestic in- dustrial consumption was used for this pur- pose. In 1986, the United States imported 86 percent of its platinum supplies form South Africa. Outside the Soviet Bloc, there are insuffi- cient alternative supply sources to South Africa to meet United States platinum. metal requirements. In 1986, the total pro- duction of countries other than South Africa and the Soviet Union, including do- mestic primary and secondary production, could only satisfy about 40 percent of United States demand. Rhodium is a very rare metal absolutely essential for compliance with Clean Air Act auto emissions standards for nitrous oxides. Omitting the Soviet Union and other cen- trally planned economies, U.S. consumption of rhodium was almost one-half of the Western world total. The primary applica- tion of rhodium is in the production of auto- motive catalytic converters. Over 70 percent of U.S. consumption (93 thousand ounces in 1986) was used in this application in 1986. Rhodium demand is increasing worldwide as emission-control requirements are placed on nitrous oxide emissions, and as the control requirements are applied to a larger fleet of vehicles. In 1986, South Africa provided about 53 percent of Western world supply, the Soviet Union 38 percent, and secondary recovery 5 percent. There are insufficient non-South African rhodium supplies to meet U.S. demand. It should be pointed out that while the South African government has never threat- ened the U.S. with a disruption or a cut-off of strategic minerals supplies, it is certainly has this option. Pretoria also. has .the option of slapping countersanctions on neighboring black states, all of whom are critically de- pendent on South African trade or trans- port routes or both. Passage of this bill would put South Africa's intentions to the test with regard to both the U.S. and our in- terests in stable development of- the region. THE POLITICAL COSTS OF SANCTIONS If sanctions are the wrong tool, they are also being used for the wrong job. Ostensi- bly aimed at influencing South Africa's key decisionmakers, sanctions miss this target altogether while hitting everyone else, caus- ing collateral damage in precisely those sec- tors of South African society which are pushing hardest for fundamental, peaceful change. If comprehensive,, international sanctions against South Africa are extended, we should anticipate that the main losers will be South African blacks. They will be the first to suffer the effects of a prolonged re- cession in terms of lost opportunities, lost jobs, and decreased government spending on black housing, black education, and services provided to black. townships. This is unin- tended and possibly tragic economic impli- cation of the sanctions approach. At the same time, the forced withdrawal of U.S. corporations from South Africa will end funding and logistical support for a wide range of programs designed to promote black economic empowerment, foster black self-reliance, and build professional and leadership skills' U.S. and other Western corporation play an important part in help- ing to sustain an estimated 2,000 such pro- grams which exist at the grassroots level. In the face of mounting restrictions on most forms of opposition political activity, these programs provide a vital organizational net- work and fall-back position for those blacks working to build the power bases necessary for challenging the government. In less direct fashion, we stand to lose other opportunities to deflect repressive measures directed at blacks. If the threat of a total economic embargo on South Africa becomes reality, the South African govern- ment have even fewer reasons to heed outside advice on what it regards as its in- ternal political affairs. Although our stand- ing with the South African government will have even fewer reasons to heed outside advice on what it regards as its internal po- litical affairs. Although our. standing with the South African government declined sharply following passage of the Compre- hensive Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986, we re- tained enough influence to argue persua- sively in favor of a stay of execution for the Sharpeville Six. We have also successfully lobbied to postpone and, hopefully, side- track pending legislation which could end all foreign funding to groups whose activi- ties the government broadly defines as "po- litical:" These are small but -significant achievements. We cannot realistically expect to repeat them if we continue down the road toward punitive trade embargoes and a severance of ties with South African officialdom. I cannot accept the argument that by in- flicting additional economic hardship politi- cal frustration on South African blacks we create the conditions necessary for a suc- cessful challenge to apartheid system. Nor is it reasonable to think that sanctions will have a demoralizing effect on white elites, thereby rendering them more vulnerable to pressures for fundamental change. Under any conceivable .sanctions scenario the South African government will assign top priority to protecting white jobs and to'en- suring that the police and military are funded at levels sufficient to avoid any de- cline in their capabilities. The suppression of new outbreaks of black unrest is a fore- gone conclusion. To suppose that outside powers can rearrange government priorities through economic quarantines and reduced SANCTIONS AND THE BLACK OPPOSITION Claims that the overwhelming majority of South African blacks support sanctions cannot be substantiated. Certainly respect- ed black leaders of community, labor, church and student organizations, as well as the ANC and PAC in exile, continue to call publicly for further punitive measures against Pretoria. Some,' like Archbishop Desmond Tutu, believe that sanctions are the only alternative to' uncontrollable vio- lence. Leaders of the Front Line States have also, in past years at least, been outspoken in calling for U.S. and Western sanctions against South Africa. Yet there are signs that over the past two years a serious rethinking of the sanctions strategy has taken place. Some mass organi- zations, such as conservative black churches Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4 ?- S8490, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Today I would like to bring to the Senate's attention the story of a single child which recently appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer. Only when we give names and faces to the individual victims of apartheid, can we begin to understand how South Africa's blacks are suffering. This young girl's name is Nosipho, which means "unexpected gift," and she lives in the South African black township of Edendale. This is not one of the places that make the headlines. Crossroads, Soweto, Alexandra, and other names are more familiar to us as cauldrons of apartheid. Nosipho's troubles in Edendale, however, are typical of too many black children growing. up in South Africa today. Nosipho's problem, quite simply, is that she wants to go to school to learn-her problem is that she is black. She is just a 10-year-old, who doesn't know that her teachers are barely lit- era to themselves, or that her township school can't begin to compare with even the worst of public schools for whites. Nosipho may never even see a college campus, much less attend a university. Nosipho is not even required to show up to her inferior school. Primary and secondary education in South Africa is compulsory only for white children. Nosipho just wants to be able to go to classes without fear, without looking over her shoulder. For the past year, however, this has been impossible. In one of the great ironies that char- acterize the black majority's struggle for freedom, Edendale has become not' only a black versus white battle- ground, but also a black versus black battleground. Little more than a year ago, blacks called a boycott of Edendale schools to protest the pathetic education provid- ed to them. I can understand a protest boycott. It speaks to the frustration of black parents crying out, speaking out, pro- testing out against an inadequate school system. It will not work-in all probability. We know that. But to South African blacks, what else can they do? So they boycott-boycott the school system. And to prove their ef- fectiveness, they insist that all black children boycott the school. It is a sense of frustration. They do not know what to do. The school system is inferior. They cannot take up arms. They do not want to take up arms. They just want those who run the school system to know how unhap- py they are with the school system, and so they boycott the school system. And little Nosipho is caught . in be- tween. This left Nosipho's mother, Nancy, and others like her, in a quandary. If she sends her daughter to school in violation of the boycott, she-and No- sipho-appear to be supporting the regime. If she keeps Nosipho home from school, Nosipho falls farther and farther behind in her stpdies. She then becomes. caught in the unbreak- able cycle of illiteracy and poverty that traps South African blacks. Nancy is herself only marginally liter- ate. Nosipho wanted to attend school in spite of the boycott, and Nancy cau- tiously agreed. This was early last year. Nosipho's schoolbus was stoned on the first and subsequent days of the boycott, and she was accosted by black youths not much older than her- self as she entered the school. The school now requires badges to be worn by all students to prevent in- filtration by disrupters. The badge is like a scarlet letter for Nosipho. While wearing it, she is a target for youths who accuse her of supporting apart- heid-as if this 10-year-old child fully understands the implications of such a charge. Little Nosipho just wants to go to school. Nancy has attempted to give her daughter an education, to break the iron grip of illiteracy and poverty. Ironically, though, Nosipho is left with a lasting fear of the classroom, not understanding the catch-22 that has made school in Edendale taboo. Mr. President, during, this time of re- membrance for the massacre at Soweto, I call on the Senate to remem- ber something just as important as those lives lost in the Soweto shoot- ings 12 years ago. I ask my colleagues to think for a moment about Nosipho, and the plight of,this single South Af- rican child who simply wants to go to school. She is a living victim of apart- heid. Her plight symbolizes what apartheid is doing to. the social fabric of South Africa. . In their callous disregard for human dignity, the white minority govern- ment is forcing horrible choices upon innocent children like Nosipho, and working-class people like Nancy. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that a copy of the Plain Dealer article be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Plain Dealer magazine, June 12, 19881 THE LESSONS OF SOUTH AFRICA (By Jean Hey) This is the story of a 10-year-old girl so anxious to learn it could kill her. "Kill her? That's a little melodramatic," you may think. To American ears perhaps it is. ButRthis is the story of Nosipho. a child struggling to learn in the trouble-torn land of South Africa. Fear is part of a normal school day for No- sipho. Fear of the policemen-white and black-who stand at the school gates with their guns drawn to keep out "trouble- makers." Fear on her daily bus ride to and from school, in case bricks are hurled through the windows. Fear of the big chil- dren who threaten to. hurt her if she comes to class when they advocate school boycotts to protest the poor education offered to black South Africans. Fear as she sees the alarm that sweeps across the face of her mother, Nancy, at the unexpected knock at the door. June 23, 1988 The voices behind the door shout: "Whose side are you on? Do you support the United Democratic Front, or Inkatha," Nancy freezes. She doesn't answer. She hopes they will go away. This is Edendale, South Africa. 1988. It used to be a quiet black township sprawled next to the white city of Pietermaninzburg. Nobody paid much attention to it. Soweto Alexandra ... Crossroads. Those are the infamous names that for decades have stolen the .limelight of the international press. Now Edendale. is on the world 'map be- cause the United Democratic Front and In- katha are fighting for control of the people of Edendale. Inkatha is the party of Chief Ma,ngosuthu Buthelezi, accused by the UDF of being a stooge of the South African gov- ernment. Its members are . from the Zulu tribe whose home is in Natal. Without com- plete support in Natal, Inkatha loses -all chance of becoming a national force. The UDF, on the other hand, is a multira- cial national organization that propounds the complete restructuring of South Africa along socialist principles. It is closely allied to the outlawed African National Congress. Nancy's fear as she hears the knock at her door is real. She knows if she gives the wrong answer-if she says she belongs to the wrong organization-she could be killed. Easily. Life is cheap is Edendale these days. The bloody struggle between Inkatha and the UDF has taken more than 100 lives in the last few months alone. Ambulance sirens pierce the nights. Gangs of children-many younger than 12- with knives and homemade guns carry out orders from the leaders of. both groups: roam the streets, seek out the vigilantes and kill on sight. Blacks terrorize and kill blacks in a. land where they share a much greater enemy-the white South African govern- ment. Nancy doesn't belong to either Inkatha or the UDF. In fact she dislikes both. She wishes they would leave her and Nosipho in peace. She wishes the knocking at her door would end. "If I say I don't belong to either party they call me a 'sellout.' They say if I don't support either, I support the South African government. "Then they will burn my house." Nancy is not a politically active black South African. Her political aspirations go no further than having a small home, with a garden big enough for a couple of chick- ens, and an education for her children that will bring them respect and money. She rec- ognizes education as the lifeline that Nosi- pho must grab if she is to prosper. In Nancy's mind any education-no matter how, bad-is better than no education. Nancy's formal education stopped in the eighth.grade. She wasn't stupid; she, didn't hate school; and she wasn't lazy. had she ' her way she would have completed the infe- rior schooling provided for blacks in South Africa. She would have stomached the third-rate education, the barely literate teacher, the overcrowded classrooms and the scarce and outdated textbooks. And she would have continued to walk the long miles to school every day. . If Nancy had been white, she wouldn't have been allowed to leave school for at least another two years. Schooling for whites is compulsory. Blacks, however, are free to drop out whenever they choose. . But by the time Nancy was 14 her father was dead and her mother needed her to stay at home and look after the other children while she went off to work. Today, Nancy is a domestic servant. She lives in an outbuilding on the two-acre prop- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4 S 8489 June 23, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE. and Chief Buthelezi's.Inkatha. movement which claims to represent more than six million Zulus, have always been opposed to international sanctions. Other organiza- tions, such as the National African Federat- ed Chamber of Commerce, which represents most major black business interests, official- ly subscribe to sanctions while leaving indi- vidual members ample room to express doubts. Even within the staunchly pro-sanc- tions COSATU, debate simmers over the wisdom of promoting international embar- goes. While it would be wrong to infer that black opposition leaders are simply out of touch with their rank and file, debate over the effectiveness of sanctions is unquestion- ably livelier now than ever before: This new mood is captured. in Soweto playwright Gibson Kente's popular drama "Sekunjalo," which depicts comrades destroying a town- ship by intimidating, burning and boycott- ing. It ends with a declaration of hatred for Afrikaner rule and a dance routine in which the actors sing "Who's gonna plant that cane? Who's gonna drive that train? Who's gonna fly that plane?" Kente's actors re- count the events of the 1850s when the Xhosa nation killed its cattle and' burned its grain in the faith that the dead would rise and the Russians would come to drive the British into the sea. The actors compare those times with the current calls for sanc- tions and bemoan. the self-destructive tradi- tion of black South African resistance to white rule. The Marxist intellectual and leader of the black-consciousness-based National Forum. Neville Alexander-hardly an apologist for apartheid-makes the same argument- from a different perspective. He wrote' recently that "I believe ... that the insistence on total sanctions is senseless-as senseless as an unqualified academic boycott and'unlim- ited school boycotts-which amount to sui- cide if you do not have, real power, and if the government is not yet so weak that such pressure can bring it to its knees." Across South Africa's borders, reassess- ments of the effects of sanctions and possi- ble South African countersanetions on the economies of the Front Line States. are also underway. As a result, Front- Line 'leaders have modified their rhetoric, moved serious discussions of sanctions to the margins of international meetings and abandoned plans to apply sanctions of their own. Trade be- tween. South Africa and most neighboring states has actually increased over the past year. These observations are not meant to sug- gest that black South Africans have come to terms with white domination, or that South Africa's black-ruled neighbors have accept- ed the status of satellites to the regions economic superpower. What has occurred, I believe, is that sanctions have been re-evalu- ated and strong misgivings have developed about. both their high costs and effective- ness. KEEPING OPEN U.S. OPTIONS I alluded earlier to the combination of outrage and Impatience with which many Americans react to the situation in South Africa. But neither we nor South Africans can afford U.S. policies motivated primarily by passion. There exists' a broad American consensus on what is wrong in South Africa and on the steps South Africa and its citi- zens must take to correct these wrongs. This consensus could provide the basis for a real- istic, workable, and non-partisan approach to the South African crisis. Any sound American policy toward South Africa must take into account at least two fundamental constraints: First, we must accept that South Africa's crisis in an en- during one. There are no quick'solutions. None of these problems can be solved in iso- Resorting to drastic remedies, such as. the lation from the others., misuse of American power to to destabilize Our mediation continues, and it Is impor- the South African economy, only increases tant that Congress not undercut this effort chances of a catastrophic outcome for all by ordering drastic changes in our bilateral South Africans. Second, we must also accept relationship with one _ of the negotiating that our leverage Is limited. South Africa parties. While it may be in South Africa's can survive-even thrive-without trade or best interests to achieve a negotiated settle= contact with Americans. Our mission should - ment in Angola and Namibia, Pretoria could be one of using all available means to maxi well decide .that a harsh, diplomatic rejoin- mize our influence and leverage. This can't' der- to expressions of 'U.S. hostility is a be achieved through a policy of economic and diplomatic dissociation from the prob- Operating from these premises, the Ad- ministration has constructed an approach ,,which emphasizes both the protection of en- during U.S. interests in South Africa and the promotion of rapid, fundamental change in that society. This approach has a number of key elements. The Administration has undertaken stren- uous efforts to keep open all our lines of communication, to expand contracts across the racial and political spectrum, and to open up opportunities for the kinds of nego- tiations which are South Africa's only alter- native to a slow descent into civil war. Over the past eight years, all groups in South Africa, including the full range of opposi- tion movement leaders, have had access to the highest levels of our government. We continue to make it clear to the South Afri- can government that we believe It has a spe- cial responsibility to create the necessary conditions in which negotiations with credi- ble opponents can take place. Expanding our assistance to. apartheid's victims is a top priority. South Africa's struggling black communities-need our fi- nancial ' support, our technical and profes- sional training, and our help in developing organizational and leadership skills. These are the building blocks from which the dis- advantaged majority will construct a more just and more democratic future for South Africa. To the extent that numbers of blacks already possess the knowledge and the skills, and hence the economic power, that a modern industrial state, requires, they have greatly strengthened their bar- gaining position vis-a-vis South Africa's gov- 'erning elite. We must work to develop fur- ther this leverage and to help turn it. to po- litical advantage. This is the central thrust of our official aid program to South Africa. Obviously, - sanctions-induced unemploy- ment, a -turn by South Africa towards au- tarky and tighter state control of the econo- my. and a reduced American presence in South Africa would all work against this effort. In dealing with South Africa, we must continue to put a strong emphasis on the re- gional context. Turmoil in South Africa con- tinues to spread outwards in shock waves which threaten the economic and political stability of neighboring states.. Our. regional diplomacy is committed to reducing these states' economic vulnerabilities and to easing misunderstandings - and tensions in their dealings with South Africa. 'In,this regard, negotiations currently un- derway to secure Namibian independence and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from both Namibia and Angola assume spe- cial importance. A negotiated solution would be a signal achievement for American diplomacy and would win widespread ap proval throughout Africa. Progress has been made which even 'sympathetic observers sible. We have laid down the conceptual Mr v" President,, the numbers are basis for a settlement and brought all par- shocking. The state of emergency was ties to the realization that Namibian inde pendence, the removal of foreign armies fecently extended, and the number of from Angola, and the resolution of Angola's children arbitrarily jailed remains un- internal conflict are interrelated problems. conscionably high. higher immediate priority. - As a final note, I would like to point out that in a few months' time a new U.S. ad- ministration will enter office and will no doubt undertake a review of U.S. policy toward South Africa and the region. It would be wrong for Congress to commit the United States, in the final days of this ad- ministration, to the extreme measures con- templated in S2378. To do so will deny the new Administration the option of continuity in U.S..policy while at the same time seri- ously restricting its choices before it has even entered office. The South African dilemma will be with us for some time to come. The only reasona- ble course Americans can adopt is one which ensures that we retain as many diplomatic tools and channels of influence as possible in the search 'for ways to remain relevant and involved in finding a solution. Regretta- bly, S2378 takes us in precisely the opposite direction. APARTHEID AS IT AFFECTS NOSIPHO Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about one of the most poignant and painful aspects of the strife that has engulfed South Africa. During the Senate's hours of debate over the situation there, we have ad- dressed many issues. We have debated the effects of sanc- tions on the black minority; We have considered-how Pretoria's .actions destabilize the- region -as a ; whole; And we have discussed the appropri- ate role for international corporations to ending apartheid. In my view, the Senate has played a constructive role . in charting the - course of United States foreign policy toward South Africa. Yet, Mr. Presi- dent, I think that in our debate over landing rights, Krugerands, and disin- vestment we sometimes overlook the day-to-day suffering meted out by Pre- toria's apartheid regime. Now is a particularly important time to remember the painful consequences of apartheid for the children of South Africa. Last. year, I attended a symposium on the plight of South African chil- dren. Many have been caught in. the web of mass arrests under Pretoria's martial law "justice system." In fact, nearly one-third of the total number of blacks detained by the Police during the 3-year-old "state of emergency" Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/01/23: CIA-RDP89T00234R000200310017-4