THE CUTTING EDGE: SOVIET MECHANIZED INFANTRY IN COMBINED-ARMS OPERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Q
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Intelligence
Combined-Arms Operations
Top Secret
The Cutting Edge:
Soviet Mechanized Infantry in
A Research Paper
Top Secret
SOV 87-
August 1987 25X1
.- _
;~tE`~`E~ Directorate of
0414
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Directorate of Top Secret
The Cutting Edge:
Soviet Mechanized Infantry in
Combined-Arms Operations
Forces Division, SOVA
This paper was prepared by ~he
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Theater
Top Secret
sovR~-~nnaa~x
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
The Cutting Edge:
Soviet Mechanized Infantry in
Combined-Arms Operations
Summary The Soviets consider mechanized infantry essential for sustained success on
Information available the nuclear or conventional battlefield. Mechanized infantry would be
as of l June 1987 critical not only for uniquely infantry roles such as close assault, but also
was used in this report.
for operations in urban areas and rough terrain and for exploiting
breakthroughs by defeating NATO reserves and reventin NAT f
reestablishing a coherent defense.
combined-arms formations based on mechanized infantry and tanks sup-
ported by artillery have replaced predominantly tank formations as the
main component of Soviet land combat power.
These changes are driven by the Soviet belief that improvements in
NATO's defensive capability, especially the increased stability of its
tactical defensive zone, threaten the ability of tank formations to operate
independently. The Soviets attribute NATO's enhanced defensive capabili-
ty to technological advances such as antitank guided missiles and to
improvements in force structure.
The growing role assigned to Soviet mechanized infantry has been made
possible by improvements in force quality and organization, including:
? A substantial increase in the combat power of a motorized rifle division
(MRD) through the fielding of new and better infantry vehicles and more
artillery, antiaircraft, and antitank systems. Classified writings indicate
that the Soviets now consider an MRD at least as powerful as a tank
division.
? A significant increase in the amount of motorized infantry within tank
divisions. Since the mid-1970s, motorized rifle battalions have been
added to tank regiments. Along with additional artillery, this has
transformed tank regiments into more capable combined-arms units and
has substantially increased the total number of motorized infantry units
in the Soviet forces.
? The replacement of wheeled infantry vehicles with more powerful and
better protected tracked infantry vehicles. The Soviets have apparently
decided to convert many MRDs, especially in the groups of forces in
Central Europe and the western military districts of the USSR, to an all-
tracked structure, discarding the traditional mix of wheeled and tracked
infantry vehicles. This process has just begun. Because of cost con-
straints, we do not expect all Soviet forces to adopt the all-tracked
structure.
Top Secret
SOV 87-10044CX
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
? The experimental formation of new organizations that use even more
mechanized infantry in combined-arms operations. Two new army corps,
with an unprecedented combination of infantry and tanks at battalion
level, have been developed over the last four years. Up to three additional
army corps of this type may be formed by the end of the decade.
A number of constraints, however, serve to limit the capability of Soviet
mechanized infantry to fulfill demanding tasks assigned to it:
? Longstanding problems with command and control will limit the effec-
tiveness of mechanized infantry forces. Writings by senior Soviet officers
indicate serious concern about the capability of combat officers (battalion
to division) to master the complexities of directing combined-arms
operations. The mixing of mechanized infantry and tanks at battalion
level in the new army corps probably is an attempt to simplify command
and control of combined-arms operations.
? The basic element of Soviet mechanized infantry-the squad-has
declined in size from 14 to 10 men over the last three decades and can
now deploy only seven men for dismounted assaults. The need to provide
a crew for the infantry vehicle and the increase in the number of fire-
support weapons have been among the factors responsible for the
shrinkage in the number of riflemen available for dismounted assaults.
Soviet military writings indicate that the decrease in the size of
mechanized infantry squads comes at a time when the dismounted
assault role of infantry has become increasingly important. The reduction
will make sustained operations of this type more difficult.
? Deficiencies in specialized and realistic training will make it difficult for
infantry to implement more flexible tactics and to operate in urban and
rough terrain. Training problems will also hinder battalion-level com-
bined-arms integration. New tactics and organizations developed since
the mid-1970s will place additional burdens on already overworked and
undertrained junior officers and senior noncommissioned officers.
Top Secret iv
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
? Shortcomings in the number of infantry vehicles would limit the rapid
concentration of divisions to provide capable reinforcements for opera-
tions in Central Europe and to conduct operations in secondary theaters.
Production of modern infantry vehicles has been sufficient to almost
completely equip Soviet MRDs in Central Europe and the western USSR
with their authorized complement. But nearly half of the remaining
MRDs lack their full complement of infantry vehicles and probably
would make up the shortfall with civilian trucks. We project that infantry
vehicle production over the next 10 years will be sufficient to maintain al-
ready modernized forces and to expand slowly the number of fully
equipped MRDs in the rest of the USSR.
Despite these shortfalls, in a conventional war in Europe, NATO soldiers
would be faced with large numbers of Soviet mechanized infantry equipped
with well-protected, heavily armed, and maneuverable infantry vehicles.
The firepower and protection margins of Pact infantry vehicles will put
most current NATO infantry vehicles at a significant disadvantage. ~
v Top Secret
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Ton Secret
Soviet Pessimism Concerning the Conventional Battlefield 1
Mechanized Infantry Missions
Assaulting Prepared NATO Defenses 3
Assaulting Urban Defenses 4
Assaulting in Rough Terrain 6
Organization and Structure 7
Limitations of Soviet Mechanized Infantry 9
The Shrinking Soviet Squad 9
Shortfalls in Infantry Mechanization 11
Outlook for Soviet Mechanized Infantry 13
Signs of New Organizational and Structural Approaches 14
Retaining the Motorized Rifle and Tank Division 14
Corps/Brigade
Continued Shortfalls in Infantry Mechanization
Developing Soviet Assault Tactics
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
The Cutting Edge:
Soviet Mechanized Infantry in
Combined-Arms Operations
Since the late 1960s the Soviets have become increas-
ingly concerned with conventional war fighting. Au-
thoritative Soviet writings indicate that the Soviets no
longer feel confident that war in Central Europe
against NATO would begin with, or quickly escalate
to use of, nuclear weapons. They now believe that a
conventional conflict might be protracted or even
terminated without ever going nuclear. This has
prompted the Soviets to devote greater attention to
conventional operations and the capability to conduct
such operations on the European battlefield.
This doctrinal reassessment was influenced by two
other developments that led the Soviets to attach
greater importance to mechanized infantry on the
modern battlefield. First, and most important, was the
Soviet perception of the increased capability of
NATO defenses, given technological advances such as
antitank guided missiles and improvements in NATO
force structure. These have caused the Soviets to
reinforce the role of infantry in combined-arms
operations.
Second were Soviet evaluations of combat during the
1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Israeli army, one of the
most experienced in armored operations, lost hun-
dreds of tanks in the first days of the war because it
failed to properly deploy its infantry forces. Operating
without infantry support, Israeli tank units counterat-
tacked Egyptian infantry that had crossed the Suez
Canal and were repulsed with heavy losses. Israeli
tactics were later adjusted to place greater reliance on
combined-arms formations, which reduced Israeli
tank losses and allowed for greater overall success.
The Soviets call their infantry "motorized rifle" units.
In fact, their firstline units meet the Soviet definition
of mechanized infantry, that is, combined-arms units
composed of infantry equipped with armored infantry
vehicles, tanks, and artillery. The lack of infantry
vehicles in many of the Soviets' rear-echelon divisions,
however, would compel them to employ truck-mount-
ed infantry units or motorized infantry. This type of
unit is transported in trucks or lightly armored vehi-
cles, generally without tanks. A modern example of a
motorized infantry unit is the British Territorial
Army brigade, which is equipped with the Saxon
armored personnel carrier (APC). There are also light
infantry units, which do not have organic motor
transport. An example is the US 82nd Airborne
Division. The Soviets do not field any light infantry
Soviet Pessimism Concerning
the Conventional Battlefield
25X1
25X1
Soviet military planners have become increasingly
concerned with NATO's growing conventional defen-
sive capability. They believe that NATO exploitation
of new military technology and improvements in its
force structure are increasingly calling into question
their ability to dominate the conventional battlefield.
The Soviets consider the vastly improved hit-and-kill
probabilites of such modern weapons as the Hellfire 25X1
antitank guided missile (ATGM) and Copperhead
precision guided munition to represent a qualitatively
new threat to their forces. 25X1
L~J~ I
The almost complete mechanization of NATO ground
forces in Central Europe is a major concern of Soviet
planners. NATO armored formations now possess
greatly increased firepower and could quickly react to 25X1
Soviet thrusts, rapidly altering force ratios on the
Soviets' main axis, thereby disrupting their operation-
al planning.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Warsaw Pact analyses of modern NATO defenses
exhibit a particular concern about the greatly in-
creased threat to Pact tank forces.
cle in Voennyi Vestnik (Military Herald), Soviet
Major General Biryukov (a professor at the Frunze
Combined-Arms Academy) projected that a Soviet
tank battalion independently attacking a NATO
mechanized infantry company would suffer casualties
of at least 50 percent without a guarantee of success.
There is ample precedent for such projections and
concerns. As a result of their study of World War II
combat operations, for example, the Soviets found
that in an attack, on average, they lost 30 to 40
percent of tanks committed. The bulk of these losses
(88 percent) were the direct result of German antitank
fire. Of course, modern NATO antitank weapons are
not only more numerous but more effective as well.
the comparison in the table of average NATO
antitank weapons densities to World War II German
densities shows the destructive potential of NATO
defenses. Clearly, the number of tanks and antitank
weapons in a kilometer (km) of front has increased
significantly. The increased capability of these sys-
tems as well provides a general appreciation of the
kind of problem the Soviets foresee.
Soviet Solutions
General Biryukov recommended that infantry, sup-
ported by tanks and artillery, be used to clear away
NATO antitank defenses before tank units were
committed. From our analysis of the Soviets' military
adopted precisely that solution. In the last 10 years,
Weapons Densities in Select Battalions
(per kilometer of front)
Tanks Antitank Machineguns
Weapons
1944 German battalion 5 to 7 8 to 10 12 to 15
NATO battalion 12 to 17 e 30 to 45 50 to 75 b
heavy
a Excludes 50 to 60 APCs or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).
n Excludes 50 light machineguns.
Soviet fire-support weapons have improved and be-
come much more numerous. Artillery (including self-
propelled pieces) at division level and below has been
increased in both numbers and in weight. Soviet
army- and front-level ' artillery has been expanded
and strengthened with the addition of such new
systems as the BM-27 multiple rocket launcher. The
Soviets have also developed innovative concepts such
as the reconnaissance fire complex~esigned to pro-
vide more timely and accurate support-to exploit the
increase in available fire-support weapons. There has
been a similar growth in the fire support provided by
Soviet fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft.
In addition to increasing the numbers and quality of
offensive weapons, the Soviets are also taking defen-
sive steps, including employing countermeasures
against the most important NATO antiarmor weap-
ons-the TOW and Hellfire ATGMs and the Copper-
head guided projectile.
The Soviets consider infantry crucial to three specific
types of assault activity: breakthrough of NATO
tactical defenses, assaults on urban areas, and as-
saults in rough terrain.
25X1
25X1
25X11
25X1
25X1
25X1
')FYI
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
The Soviets have initiated a number of measures
intended to restore high offensive tempo.0 25X1
they will assign mecha- 1~X"I
nized infantry rather than tanks to lead breakthrough
the weakness of NATO defenses made the use of tank
divisions in the first echelon expedient, leading to a
rapid breakthrough. They evidently altered their plan-
ning because of both the vulnerabilities of tank forces
and the growth of the combat power of infantry units
The development of infantry vehicles z and their inte-
gration into the combined-arms force have presented
the Soviets with novel tactical problems centered on
two related but still unresolved concerns: how infantry
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
7FX1
25X1
The term infantry vehicle is used to include both tracked IFVs and
wheeled APCs. The Soviets often use these terms interchangeably.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
vehicles and tanks would be coordinated in a com-
bined assault and at what point infantry should
dismount from their infantry vehicles and continue
the assault on foot.
According to unclassified writings from the late 1960s
to the early 1970s, the Soviets developed solutions
that had infantry vehicles operating either alone or
with tanks in the assault. The onboard infantry would
deliver fire from inside the vehicle and would not
conduct dismounted assaults. The writings also indi-
cated that the weight of the combined infantry and
armor attack and the heavy volume of fire would
overwhelm enemy defenses.
Two events caused the Soviets to reevaluate these
tactical concepts. One was their growing realization
that NATO development and fielding of ATGMs
presented a qualitatively new threat to armored at-
tacks. The other was the lesson they learned from the
1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Soviets were shaken by
the sound defeat suffered by Syrian forces, which had
used Soviet tactics and equipment. Syrian mecha-
nized infantry remained mounted during assaults on
Israeli positions in the Golan Heights and suffered
very heavy casualties from Israeli tank and antitank
fire.
Since then the Soviets have been attempting to devel-
op satisfactory concepts for governing the coordina-
tion of fire and maneuver of infantry and tank forces.
Their current practice is to protect the infantry
vehicles from ATGM fire by dismounting the infantry
at a safe distance-approximately 800 meters-from
defensive fire. Soviet writings indicate that the com-
bined automatic fire from the infantrymen and the
infantry vehicles would suppress enemy antitank fire,
allowing the tanks that follow behind to overrun the
enemy position.
The Soviets recognize that even this solution suffers
from serious faults. Limiting the tanks to the speed of
infantry advancing on foot presents the defender with
slow-moving targets; alternatively, allowing the tanks
to forge ahead of the infantry prematurely would
disrupt the mutual supporting fire of the tanks and
infantry and would leave the tanks vulnerable to
antitank weapons
Soviet writings also recognize that dismounted infan-
try once within 800 meters of the enemy would be
extremely vulnerable to small-arms fire. Despite the
problems inherent in a dismounted infantry assault,
however, writings on the subject by Colonel General
Merimskii, Chief of the Ground Forces' Combat
Training Directorate, continue to assert that mounted
attacks should be executed only when enemy defenses
are weak or in a meeting engagement. In an article in
Yoennyi Vestnik (Military Herald) from the late
1970s, Merimskii corrected officers who advocated
mounted attacks, declaring such attacks appropriate
only for special conditions. The latest available writ-
ings continue the emphasis on dismounted assaults.
Assaulting Urban Defenses
Assault on urban areas is the second specific assault
activity distinguished by the Soviets. They typically
classify medium to large cities as urban terrain, but it
appears that they are expanding their definition to
include smaller built-up areas.
Recent Soviet writings state that it would be almost
impossible to bypass or blockade every city encoun-
tered during an advance. Previously, Soviet doctrine
called for the bypass of urban centers in the interests
of maintaining high rates of an advance. The Soviets
recognized that urban centers could rapidly be turned
into defensive strongpoints that would be difficult to
storm. A city could be conquered in a short time only
if attacking forces were able to drive into the city
before the defenders had a chance to prepare defen-
sive positions. In describing modern conventional op-
erations in the European theater, a recently published
Soviet military engineering textbook postulates that
large urban areas where street fighting could occur lie
some 40 to 60 km apart along anticipated invasion
routes. Nearly all of these routes are in West
Germany (see figure 2).
The Soviets recognize that infantry is the only force
that can successfully assault urban objectives. Since
World War II, Soviet armor officers have consistently
pointed out in open Owritings that tank
forces are ill suited for city fighting. As indicated in
their writings, the Soviets believe that the commit-
ment of large tank units to the seizure of cities, as was
25X1
25X1
25X1
1~X"I
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Top Secret
Figure 2 .
Most Likely Soviet Invasion Routes in a NATO-Pact War
Density of built-up areas
- Greatest
~ Medium
n Least
~~
100 Miles
AMSTE OAM~~~~~'
NETHERLAND;
Find border of Oermeny hew not bsen
eslebtiaAed. The rapretlentetipns W. seine
oehv twundarise ere rrot neosewuhy
euthaiietiw. The 64R Me looeud Me
wet of iN yyowmmentin Ihb 6gstrm
Sector of ?srlm. However, Cdnebr Berlin;
inoludmp dl lour occupied wcGww /~'
nleine ite four Power juridioN sletue. }
SW112ERLANCI
*~~
LiYuky~
~-
SW EDEN
Baltic
Sea
EAST GEMANY
Danube
varr~r
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Too Secret
Despite dramatic changes in military technology
since World War II, the close-assault role oI infantry
has remained essentially unchanged. The,following
quotation illustrates this point. It was written by the
French commanding o.~icer of the 2nd battalion, 8th
Moroccan Tirailleurs, who was killed in action in
May 1944 during the Monte Cassino battles:
As far as infantry is concerned, I am more than
ever convinced that the standard infantry action
consists in a body of attackers seeking hand-to-
hand combat. Bear in mind that all the ad-
vances in armament over the centuries have only
aimed at one thing: to fire from as far away as
possible to avoid this hand-to-hand combat
which men fear. The job of infantry is to break
through enemy lines; to do that they must get in
among those lines. In an attack, no matter how
powerful the artillery and the heavy weapons,
there comes the moment when the infantryman
gets close to the enemy lines, all support ceases,
and he must mount the charge that is his last
argument, his sole raison d'etre. Such is the
infantryman's war ... [and] the object of his
training should be to prepare him for what one
might call `the battle of the last hundred
meters.'
done in Berlin and Vienna in 1945, would result in a
low offensive tempo and heavy tank losses. For exam-
ple, during the Soviet attack on Berlin, one Soviet
tank army lost more than 1,300 tanks and assault
guns over atwo-week period.'
elements of motorized rifle divisions
(MRDs) would probably be detailed to destroy resis-
tance in urban areas that could not be bypassed or
isolated. Tank divisions would be employed only if the
Soviets felt NATO defenses were unprepared and
could be rapidly overwhelmed.
' The intensity of urban combat is reflected in the fact that the tank
army started with 667 tanks and assault guns, and essentially lost
this initial inventory, had it replaced, and then lost it again. Only
the close location of major tank repair units allowed the Soviets to
Tactically, Soviet doctrine recognizes that the nature
of urban terrain would necessitate the use of indepen-
dently operating units. Such conditions would prevent
the maneuver of large units and encumber command
and control. Soviet writings indicate that urban objec-
tives would first be divided into a number of smaller
sectors to split the defender, with each sector de-
stroyed in turn. The basic Soviet combat element for
these operations would be a dismounted mechanized
infantry battalion. The battalion would be reinforced
with mortars and some artillery and would have
combat engineers assigned for demolition and flame
work. Tanks and infantry vehicles would be used only
for fire support.
Although Soviet military writing devotes considerable
attention to urban assaults, there is little evidence to
indicate that Soviet troops are trained for such opera-
tions.
bypassed urban areas
In the Non-Soviet
Warsaw Pact (NSWP), however, Polish infantry and
East German border guard units receive much more
specialized training for urban operations. The Soviets
may believe that the limited training time available to
their two-year conscripts compels concentration on a
limited number of skills, with the expectation that
these skills can be adapted to different situations. It is
also possible in some instances that Polish and East
German units might be assigned to assualt and occupy
Assaulting in Rough Terrain
Attacking in rough terrain is the third specific Soviet
assault category. This type of assault has always been
an important facet of Soviet doctrine and would be
necessary in operations against NATO. The Soviets'
occupation of Afghanistan has served to heighten
their interest in such operations.
The Soviets recognize that rough terrain degrades the
effectiveness of tank units.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
225X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
For example, there are no tank divisions present in the
mountainous Transcaucasus Military District (MD),
and the MRDs fielded there have much smaller tank
complements than do Soviet MRDs in the Western
Theater of Military Operations (TMO). Tactically,
the Soviets expect that the terrain would direct the
flow of battle into separate but coordinated actions by
independent task forces structured around infantry
battalions. The main attack would advance along
valley floors using small flanking detachments or
tactical air assault forces to seize ridge lines and
passes. Success would hinge on rapidly outflanking
enemy positions and maintaining high advance rates,
thereby preventing the enemy from reestablishing a
coordinated defense.
Organization and Structure
The MRD is the basic Soviet infantry formation. It
consists of three infantry regiments and one tank
regiment plus various combat support and service
support elements. Analyzing the MRD by applying
combat potential scores developed by Soviet military
planners shows how it has evolved into awell-
balanced combined-arms formation
This has been achieved, for the most part, through
increases in antitank weapons and infantry vehicles,
giving the Soviet commander a more flexible
organization.
The combat power that Soviet planners assign to
MRDs has grown substantially. Reflecting the up-
graded role assigned to infantry forces since the late
1960s, the Soviets have considered an MRD to con-
tain more combat power than a tank division (see
figure 4). This is the result of the introduction of large
numbers of infantry vehicles, ATGMs, and improved
surface-to-air missiles (see figure 5). By the 1980s,
modernization and reorganization of MRDs and tank
divisions had all but eliminated the difference in
combat power.
The addition of mechanized infantry and fire-support
weapons into Soviet tank divisions has transformed
them into better balanced combined-arms units, how-
ever. Since the mid-1970s, motorized rifle battalions
have been added to tank regiments, significantly
expanding overall mechanized infantry forces. More
artillery has also been added to tank divisions and
regiments. These organizational changes have ad-
dressed many of the defects found by the Soviets in
their tank divisions.
Equipment modernization and reorganization of tank
units has essentially transformed motorized rifle and
tank regiments into comparable combined-arms for-
mations. One type of regiment is infantry heavy, while 25X1
the other is tank heavy. The motorized infantry
regiment would be useful, for example, in assaults
against prepared defenses. A tank regiment, exploit-
ing the speed, weight, and shock power of its tanks,
would be useful for rapidly shattering weakly pre-
pared defenses. This convergence indicates the contin-
ued adherence to fielding two distinct types of regi-
ments and two types of divisions.~~ 25X1
25X1
The Soviets have sought to provide their infantry with
a vehicle that could operate with tanks in all types of
terrain and battlefield conditions. Their doctrine re-
quires that infantry vehicles have both along-range 25X1
antitank capability (3,000 to 4,000 meters) provided
by ATGMs and a shorter range capability (1,000 to
2,000 meters) with automatic cannon for use against
lightly armored targets. The required protection levels
of infantry vehicles have also apparently been in-
creased, largely as a result of changes in the threat
posed by NATO. Previously, Soviet infantry vehicles
were protected only against shell fragments and
small-arms fire. They are now required to be protect-
ed against small-caliber automatic cannon fire such as
Bradley
the 25-mm cannon on the US M2 Bradley. The
Soviets' latest IFV, the improved BMP-2, has signifi-
cant firepower and protection advantages over the
225X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Top Secret
Figure 4
Soviet Perception of Growth in Combat Power of Motorized
Rifle and Tank Divisions, 1960-85
1,2llU BMP
T-64
Seif-
T-80
propelled
art~,~ery
~
~
1,000
?r~
i
r ~
.~, j~
800
i
,r
600
400
~ i i i i ~ i i i i I i
0 1960 65 70
Motorized Self-
rifle _ propelled
battalion artillery
L ~ i i i i I i i i i
75 80 85
MRD (T-80)
TD (T-80)
MRD (T-64/72)
TD (T-64/72)
economic infantry formations have evolved, the number of
tracked vehicles and two with wheeled vehicles
infantry vehicles and less capable wheeled infantry
vehicles whose primary advantages are that they are
less expensive, easier to maintain, and faster. The
trade-off of capability for cost has enabled the Soviets
to mechanize a large number of MRDs faster than if
they had chosen to procure an entirely tracked force.
Typically an MRD has one regiment equipped with
constraints and maintainance considerations have infantrymen in a squad available for dismounted
compelled them to field a mix of fully capable tracked assaults in many armies has shrunk:
This has been due chiefly to the introduction of and
Limitations of Soviet Mechanized Infantry the improvements to infantry vehicles. Beginning with
the introduction of the BMP, the commander usually
The Shrinking Soviet Squad
The infantry squad is the basic combat element of the
ground forces. As the organization and equipment of
1960s
1980s
Soviet
9
7
US
10
6
British
10
7
West German
6
6
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Figure 5
The Improving Equipment of Soviet Mechanized Infantry
BMP-2 IFV
- higher rate of fire
- longer range
- better protection
AK-74 assault rifle
- more ammunition
- increased range
- capability to fire rifle
grenade
Artillery
- longer range
- self-propelled
Plamen (automatic grenade
launcher)
Antitank guided missiles
(AT-5)
- longer range
- greater penetrating capability
- improved guidance
Antiaircraft weapons
(ZSU-M 1986,SA-16)
- longer range
- more accurate
Vasilek (automatic mortar)
- high rates of fire
- more responsive fire support
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Top Secret
Figure 6
Evolution of the Soviet Motorized Rifle Squad
Vehicle ~ RPG
Grenadier
Light
Machinegunner
Rifleman
1950
No Vehicle
~ ~
1955
BTR-152
~ ~~`
1965
BMP-1
~
~ ~ ~;
1980
BMP-2
~~
!'~.
1l `4 ~?
did not leave the vehicle during dismounted squad
operations, further reducing the number of infantry-
men available. For these reasons, the number of
infantrymen available for assaults has progressively
shrunk from 14 in 1950 to seven in 1985 (see figure 6).
The development of Soviet and Western combined-
arms forces for modern battlefield operations has
resulted in the substitution of firepower in the form of
heavily armed infantry vehicles for dismounted infan-
trymen. For example, although automatic grenade
launchers have been introduced in Soviet motorized
rifle battalions, in an assault firepower could not fully
compensate for a man on the ground with a rifle. This
is especially important in urban warfare, as the
Israelis found in Beirut in 1982. The Israelis were
unprepared for the heavy casualties characteristic of
urban fighting, and they quickly experienced short-
ages in units capable of conducting dismounted as-
saults. World War II and postwar military experience
has shown that smaller infantry squads are less
capable of absorbing casualties and maintaining the
cohesion and effectiveness necessary to accomplish
these missions. The offensive, the most common Sovi-
et mission, will expose infantry to higher casualties
than those from defensive operations, where defenders
are occupying prepared positions. The shrinking
squad size could quickly blunt the Soviet capability to 25X1
conduct dismounted infantry assaults. Even a modest
drop in rifle strength would rapidly degrade the
offensive capability of a Soviet MRD.
Shortfalls in Infantry Mechanization
The Soviets have the bulk of their most modern
infantry vehicles in their forces opposite NATO,
where all but a small number of motorized rifle
regiments have been mechanized. Nearly half of the
rest of the force, however, lacks a full complement of
their authorized infantry vehicles (see figure 7). In the
initial period of a war, some of the shortfalls could be
alleviated by drawing on infantry vehicles stored in
national-level depots or by using vehicles salvaged
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Ton Secret
from the battlefield. Nonetheless, a large number of
Soviet MRDs would still have only truck transporta-
control over the employment of fire-support, antitank,
and antiaircraft weapons, as well as the coordination
of tactical air support.
Soviet unclassified writings suggest that commanders
have not been consistently successful in welding these
varied combat elements into an effective combined-
tion.
In some areas, such as in the southwestern USSR, this
shortfall could have an immediate and detrimental
impact on operations. Soviet exercises commonly por-
tray these forces participating in initial operations
against NATO. Truck-mounted infantry, over half of
the Soviet forces in the region, would be of limited use
against coherent NATO defenses, especially if they
were committed to operations against NATO forces
in West Germany.
The infantry vehicle shortfall in the rest of the Soviet
force might not have as significant an impact. If
committed against NATO, these divisions could be
used in areas where the Soviets were on the defensive,
freeing more capable divisions for offensive combat.
The Soviets may also plan to use these nonmechan-
ized MRDs only after NATO forces had been severe-
ly reduced. In areas such as South Asia, potential
opponents would not be as formidable as NATO,
allowing a greater role for nonmechanized infantry.
Some of the MRDs lacking armored infantry trans-
port might also be designated as a reserve during a
protracted war or as a source of trained replacements
for better equipped units.
Almost all of the NSWP countries have mechanized
their infantry forces to a level at least equal to Soviet
forces in the Western TMO. Only Bulgarian infantry
lacks sufficient infantry transport. The Bulgarians are
making efforts to correct this deficiency, including the
production of domestically modified infantry vehicles.
In the rest of the NSWP forces, only low-strength
divisions lack transport for infantry, but these divi-
sions would probably not be committed to initial
operations against NATO.
Problems of Command
The task of effectively training and employing a
modern Soviet motorized rifle regiment has become
progressively more complex and difficult, especially in
the last 10 years. Until the early 1970s, regimental
commanders were chiefly responsible for directing the
maneuver of their own infantry and tanks. Since then,
they have been given additional responsibilities for
arms formation.
5X1
25X1
theless, the military leadership appears to recognize
the threat such operational deficiences pose to Soviet
capabilities to conduct offensive operations.~25X1
Persistent problems in developing combined-arms
skills probably result, in part, from shortcomings in
the training program. Training is acknowledged in
Soviet writings to be generally unrealistic and unde-
manding, and there appears to be a lack of sufficient
specialized infantry training.
Similarly, Soviet planners realize that NATO will
employ a wide variety of barriers (such as mines and
concertina wire), but there is no appreciable training
in barrier clearing.
25X11
25X1
Outlook for Soviet Mechanized Infantry 25X1
Change in Mission
Analysis of the Soviets' writings and organizational
changes indicates that they intend to assign mecha-
nized infantry an expanded role for future operations.
The increased importance attached to close assault
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Top Secret
and urban warfare in Soviet doctrine will probably
cause continued stress on the role of infantry forces
within combined-arms formations.
Continued improvements in NATO defensive capabil-
ities will also lead the Soviets to emphasize the role of
combined-arms formations structured around mecha-
nized infantry in overcoming these defenses. Improve-
ments in mechanized infantry capabilities may also
lead to the assumption of new roles such as exploita-
tion of breakthroughs (see figure 8)
Signs of New Organizational and Structural
Approaches
There are at least three possible options the Soviets
may consider for further improvement of their mecha-
nized infantry: retaining and improving the existing
structure, moving toward a universal division, or
radically reorganizing some or all existing divisions
into acorps/brigade structure.
Retaining the Motorized Ri,Jfe and Tank Division.
The most likely option is a continuation of present
trends. The reorganization of tank divisions into tank-
heavy combined-arms formations and the equipment
modernization in both tank and motorized rifle divi-
sions have improved the capabilities of both types of
Trends in Pact equipment fielding indicate that, to
further improve MRD capabilities, the Soviets have
decided to move toward a force consisting primarily of
fully tracked or "heavy" infantry. A significant num-
ber of Soviet MRDs, as well as some in the NSWP,
will probably convert to a fully tracked structure, or
will have at least two tracked regiments and one
wheeled regiment (see figure 9). These improvements
would significantly enhance the combat capabilities of
MRDs opposite NATO.
Universal Division. A second but less likely option is
the conversion of motorized rifle and tank divisions
into universal divisions. The Soviets' military writings
from the middle and late 1970s
ndicate that they may believe that
developments in NATO forces will require balanced
combined-arms units-including battalions similar to
those in the independent army corps-for virtually all
operations. The universal division would probably
retain four maneuver regiments.
Among the benefits of a universal division would be
simplification of front- and theater-level staff plan-
ning. Staffs would no longer have to consider reorga-
nizations of subordinate field armies to achieve an
appropriate mixture of tank and motorized rifle divi-
sions for a particular mission. They would need only
to consider the size of the force required. A universal
division would also improve combined-arms integra-
tion and ease training problems, producing greater
terms of training and equipment procurement.
Analysis of recent equipment fielding trends in MRDs
in Central Europe indicates that the greatest growth
during the next 10 years will probably occur in the
quality of assigned fire-support weapons and infantry
vehicles. Over the last decade, MRDs have been
receiving automatic-cannon-armed BMPs and auto-
matic fire-support weapons such as grenade launchers
and mortars. This trend would probably continue with
the fielding of automatic-cannon-armed wheeled vehi-
cles and improved automatic fire-support weapons.
Such a
proposal was advanced in the early 1960s and was
strongly debated by senior Ground Forces officers in
military journals until then Minister of Defense Ro-
dian Malinovskiy decided against it.
Corps/Brigade. The least likely alternative is the
complete restructuring of the Soviet ground forces
into army corps composed of brigades. Such corps
would be large and would resemble Western divisions
in terms of their fire- and combat-support elements
(see figure 10). Since 1982 the Soviets have created
two independent army corps, but these apparently are
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Z~X1
'~tiY~
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Tou Secret
Figure 8
Soviet Concept of Breakthrough and Exploitation:
Kirovograd Operation, 5-16 January 1944
In the Kirovograd Operation, the Soviet 2nd Ukraini-
an Front, attacking along a 100-kilometer front,
pushed back and destroyed elements of the German
8th Army. On 5 January, two Soviet combined-arms
armies attacked on the Front's right wing, one on the
left (a). The German lines were quickly pierced, and
mobile forces consisting of three tank and mechanized
corps were committed on the right, and one tank army
was committed on the left. The forces on the right
wing defeated atwo-division German counterattack
(b). The Soviet mobile forces linked up west of the city
of Kirovograd, encircling elements of the German 8th
Army (c) on 7 January. The Soviet forces now paused,
apparently because of supply problems, allowing the
Germans to transfer four tank divisions to the threat-
ened sector. Soviet attempts to renew the offensive
were halted by the German armored counterattack,
stabilizing the frontlines until the spring. The maxi-
mum Soviet penetration was 70 kilometers.
This illustration is drawn from a text prepared in the
Frunze Combined-Arms Academy entitled Encircle-
ment Operations and Combat (1983). The forces
involved are comparable to a modern Soviet front-
level operation.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Toa Secret
Figure 9
Projected Soviet Creation of "Heavy" Motorized
Rifle Divisions in the Western TMOB
of support equipment would also be a major expendi-
ture. The creation of the smaller Hungarian corps will
be less expensive but will still cause significant train-
Continued Shortfalls in Infantry Mechanization
We expect little increase in the number of infantry
units equipped with a full complement of infantry
12 vehicles by the year 2000. If production rates remain
at current projected levels, a high proportion of the
1o new vehicles will be replacements for older ones
nearing the end of their 30-year service life. We
8 expect the greatest upgrade to take place in Soviet
forces in the Far East. These forces will probably be
6 mechanized to a level comparable to that of Soviet
forces opposite NATO. Soviet Far Eastern forces
4 have traditionally received new equipment only after
it has been widely fielded in the West but ahead of
other TMOs. Only modest improvements are expected
2 in the mechanization of forces in the southern, south-
~ __ ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ I western, and central portions of the Soviet Union. The
~ i9as 90 95 Projected changes will improve Soviet capabilities
against China but will not significantly alter the
a New army corps are counted as MRDs in totals. availability of reserves from the interior MDs.
intended to fulfill special missions (see inset on inde-
pendent army corps). In 1987 the Hungarians began
to convert three divisions into two army corps. It is
unclear whether a parallel restructuring will occur
throughout the Pact or is related to Hungarian efTorts
Developing Soviet Assault Tactics
Future improvements in Soviet infantry vehicle pro-
tection and firepower may make mounted infantry
less vulnerable to NATO antitank weapons, thereby
allowing the infantry to dismount closer to NATO
positions. Increased numbers of rapid-fire weapons in
Soviet assault forces could also provide more reliable
suppressive fire, helping the infantry to dismount and
cover the distance to opposing forces without sustain-
ing severe losses.
25X1
25X1
225X1
25X1
25X1
Conversion to a corps/brigade structure such as in the
Soviet independent army corps ofTers improvements in
combined-arms capability and sustainability. There
are major drawbacks, however. Large-scale conver-
sion would disrupt training, and therefore readiness,
for a significant period of time. The increased amount
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
relatively well-protected, heavily armed, and maneu-
verable infantry vehicles. The presence of these vehi-
cles would complicate NATO defensive efforts that
would already be burdened with defeating heavily
armored and lethal Soviet tanks. In most sectors, until
the Soviets penetrated NATO positions, the bulk of
the assault forces would be mechanized infantry.
Top Secret
In a conventional European war, NATO soldiers in
Central Europe would face a firstline Soviet force
with large numbers of mechanized infantry in com-
bined-arms formations that would be equipped with
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Q
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3
Top Secret
Top Secret
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/26 :CIA-RDP89T00296R000400390001-3