IRANIAN POLITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01156R000100040021-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2011
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: April 4, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP89TO1156R000100040021-63
C/NIWV0nO
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.I.20505
NIC 01799-85
4 April 1985
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Iranian Politics
1. We are moving toward an extremely delicate and complex phase of
Iranian politics. It could represent a turning point for US
interests--for better or for worse. As Khomeini's grip loosens and
Iran's economic problems increase, factionalism is growing and the war
continues to be a losing prospect for Iran--all heightening the chances
for evolving chaos or even some sort of dramatic change. If Khomeini
were to die soon, the most probable scenario for succession would still
involve the emergence of a strong clerical figure or someone with strong
military or Revolutionary Guard backing close to the clerics. The longer
Khomeini moves towards a prolonged half life, however, the messier the
struggle for succession becomes. The messier the transition, the broader
the opportunities are for other non-clerical actors to play a role.
-- The two key actors largely excluded at present are the
left--represented by the Mujahedin-e-khalq and the Tudeh
Party--and the regular military whose loyalties we know very
little about. The Mujahedin-e-khalq are the strongest native
leftist tradition in Iran and although badly bruised, must still
command potentially significant support. While this group has
never shown much willingness to cooperate with the USSR, its
leftist/Marxist outlook could make it much easier for the
Soviets to deal with.
2. 1979 All Over Again? As the radical clergy watches Khomeini's
grip lessening and unrest growing, it will be nervous about its own
future--especially in view of some of the support which Khomeini has lent
to the more moderate elements in the past several months--despite his
continued support for the war.
This Memo is Classified
SECRET in its entirety.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP89TO1156R000100040021-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP89TO1156R000100040021-6
-- There is a distinct possibility that the radical clergy may seek
to replay the hostage crisis of 1979 in which, by a broad attack
upon the US, the;' were able to galvanize Iranian internal
politics, displace the moderates, and seize power. Might the
radical clergy not seek direct attack upon American interests
once again--perhaps in the very expectation that the US might
strike back at Iranian territory proper, thereby polarizing the
internal power struggle and strengthening the radicals?
3. Who Gets to Tehran First? The respective positions of the USSR
and the US in the Iran-Iraq war are particularly anomalous. Rarely do
the US and the Soviet Union end up--even for tactical reasons--on the
same side of a major international conflict where the stakes are so
high. Yet we are both on Iraq's side--because we are both excluded from
Iran. But it is only a matter of time before one or the other of us
finds the opening it seeks in Iran.
4. The USSR will need to calculate very carefully the exact
combination of carrot and stick it wishes to employ with Iran. The
Soviets are largely in a stick phase at present (whereas the first two
years of the Iranian Revolution belonged more to the carrot phase).
Moscow probably calculates that as long as the US is excluded from any
foothold in Iran, the USSR can fairly safely play the squeeze game
against Iran. The object would be to soften Iran up sufficiently--under
military pressure from Iraq--until the clergy crumbles or comes to terms
with the USSR, either to gain arms, to secure some relief from Iraq, or
even to get Moscow's assistance in a peace settlement.
-- Moscow's involvement in a peace settlement is probably less
likely since Iran does not need anyone to intercede for it in
Baghdad. Iran itself is the holdout. Tehran would furthermore
much prefer an Islamic intermediary such as Algeria or Pakistan
than it would a Soviet.
5. I would guess the Soviets are best served by allowing the
clerical regime to continue to crumble until the situation is open enough
for the other Iranian actors described above to play a role. Despite
growing restiveness in Iran we are not yet in that stage--but that stage
could come more swiftly than we realize.
6. The US faces a serious dilemma: the actions of Iranian radicals
may compel the US to treat very roughly a regime which could collapse,
possibly opening the way to a slide to the left and a major Soviet gain.
We will have to balance the costs of defending US credibility and
commitment in the face of terrorist attack against the broader
geostrategic gains to be won or lost for influence in Iran.
Graham u er
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP89TO1156R000100040021-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP89TO1156R000100040021-6
SECRET
NIC 01799-85
4 April 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Iranian Politics
NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:jcn 4 April 85
Distribution:
1 -DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - SA/IA
1 - ER
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - NI0/USSR
2 - NI0/NESA
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/23: CIA-RDP89TO1156R000100040021-6