USSR: DOMESTIC FALLOUT FROM THE AFGHAN WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01451R000100090001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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From the Afghan War
USSR: Domestic Fallout
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Intelligence
USSR: Domestic Fallout
From the Afghan War
This paper was prepared byl I Office
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Domestic Policy Division, SOYA
Top Secret
SOV 88-10009CX
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USSR: Domestic Fallout
From the Afghan War
Key Judgments Military involvement in Afghanistan has lasted longer than any previous
Information available Soviet war and, we estimate, has cost the USSR more than 12,000 lives
as of 8 February 1988 and 15 billion rubles, approximately 3 percent of the Soviet defense budget.
was used in this report.
In his recent policy statement concerning conditions for a Soviet military
withdrawal, General Secretary Gorbachev described the war as "bitter and
painful." In fact, domestic 25X1
concern about the war has been growing and increasingly coloring
Moscow's views about its staying power in Afghanistan. The political and
social pressures generated by the war have clearly influenced the Soviet
leadership's deliberations on the critical issue of the timing and nature of
any Soviet withdrawal. 25X1
Growing Debate, Polarization
Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the attitude of
the Soviet elite has changed from moderate support to concern about the
war's human and societal costs. Although the Soviet populace, especially
the Russians, has always demonstrated some ambivalence about the
"burden of empire," no foreign involvement in recent years has received as
much public attention as Afghanistan. In our view, there seems to be a cor-
relation between a more open discussion of the war as a result of the
growing number of Afghan veterans-now over 500,000-and the
strengthening of both support for and opposition to the conflict's continua-
tion.
Because Moscow has limited its reporting of Soviet losses, Soviet citizens
must rely on anecdotal reporting, which overestimates the number of
casualties. Rumors of 100,000-plus losses may have contributed to a
growing polarization of the urban, educated portions of Soviets over the
issue of the war:
? A survey conducted by the United States Information Agency also shows
growing dissatisfaction with the war among the Soviet elite. Interviews
with more than 50 Westerners who had contact with Soviet officials and
intellectuals in 1986 found that 48 percent of party and government
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February 1988
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apparatchiks and 66 percent of the intelligentsia disapproved of the war.
Some 23 percent of officials and 50 percent of intellectuals also said the
war was "shameful."
Repercussions of the War
The war has intensified some societal and health problems. Returning
combat veterans have spread infectious diseases-especially hepatitis-and
drug usage into Soviet military units and civilian society.
most soldiers in Afghanistan
experiment with various types of drugs and at least 10 percent returned ad-
dicted to hashish. In addition, there are rumors that Afghan veterans have
spread AIDS in the USSR.
Chronic corruption in the military induction process has been exacerbated
by the war and is now an important target of the anticorruption campaign.
Despite the reduction of draft deferments after 1985, draft evasion remains
a serious problem. A senior Estonian official reportedly was arrested in
July 1987 for accepting bribes from conscripts seeking to avoid service in
Afghanistan. Since mid-1986, Pravda and the Komsomol (Young Commu-
nist League) press in several non-Russian republics have reported incidents
of bribery by parents to ensure that their sons do not serve in Afghanistan.
Draft evasion is feeding popular resentment of elite groups, who are better
able to bribe their children. out of military service.
The Afghan war has sparked at least 15 major demonstrations in the
USSR since mid-1984. These protests suggest that sentiment against the
war is greatest in, but not confined to, non-Russian areas. Samizdat
(dissident publications) from the Baltic states and western Ukraine indicate
that opposition is intense because the war is perceived as a manifestation of
Russian imperialism.
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gree of political difficulty in terminating it.
Gorbachev's Agenda
By intensifying problems of corruption, narcotics abuse, and nationality
relations, the war has complicated Gorbachev's efforts to form a new
"social contract" with the Soviet people. In early 1987 the General
Secretary reportedly compared a settlement on Afghanistan to Lenin's
Peace of Brest Litovsk in 1918-when the Soviet leader prevailed in a
fierce intraparty struggle and ceded 30 percent of Russia's economic
wealth in order to consolidate Soviet power. The comparison suggests
Gorbachev's view of the war's liability as well as his assessments of the de-
Gorbachev's speech at the 27th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party
on his agenda for domestic reform, which referred to the war as :a
"bleeding wound," implicitly sanctioned a more honest debate on the costs
of the war and declared that Moscow wanted to withdraw soon. His most
recent remarks suggest a genuine intent to do so on the best possible terms.
Considerations
Turnover in the Politburo since the 1979 invasion has given Gorbachev a
freer hand in making a fresh assessment of policy toward Afghanistan. Of
the current full Politburo members, only President Gromyko and Ukraini-
an leader Shcherbitskiy were full members in 1979; most of the Politburo
members today bear no direct responsibility for the invasion. They
probably can portray a policy shift on Afghanistan as part of an overall re-
pudiation of Brezhnev's legacy in foreign and domestic policy. 25X1
At the same time, some key leaders today tend to assess the impact of the
war differently from Gorbachev. "Second Secretary" Ligachev and KGB
Chairman Chebrikov are probably among those most likely to have
reservations about the impact within the USSR of any compromise
settlement.
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Among the older generation of officials there appears to be a widely shared
belief that the USSR should never contract its military perimeter.
Moreover, party officials in the Central Committee from the regions
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bordering Afghanistan-much like the general public-probably are con-
cerned about the specter of anarchy in Afghanistan that could follow a
Soviet withdrawal
The Soviet military may also have significant reservations about what will
be certainly perceived by many as a military defeat if Moscow should
withdraw its forces without guaranteeing the survival of a Communist
regime. While the lack of tactical success has led to recriminations, and
some segments question continued involvement in Afghanistan, the Soviet
military has probably supported remaining in Afghanistan. The war has
provided opportunities for testing and evaluating Soviet tactics and
equipment. It will be psychologically hard for the military to accept the
costs of the war as having been for naught and to be proved "wrong" in the
initial assessment that the war was winnable.
Outlook
Historically, the Soviets displayed an ability to stay the course as long as
they viewed the gains outweighing the costs, but Gorbachev's statement
suggests he may no longer see the war that way. The regime has never ig-
nored public opinion altogether and Gorbachev, more than his predeces-
sors, seems to believe mobilizing public support is important to the success
of his overall program. The USSR appears to have crossed a threshold in
its policy toward Afghanistan, and the domestic stresses caused by the war
have.evidently contributed to a reevaluation of political and diplomatic
solutions eschewed only recently
A negotiated solution that resulted in a staged withdrawal of Soviet troops
and the survival of a pro-Soviet Afghan government for some period of
time undoubtedly would strengthen Gorbachev's domestic position. It
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would enhance his popularity and help him to elicit support for his broader
political agenda among key elites. It also would burnish the image of Soviet
foreign policy and Gorbachev's authority as a statesman. These pluses
would compensate for some adverse effects on Gorbachev's relations with
the military and the KGB, as well as on those Soviet officials who believe
that Gorbachev should "tough it out" to prevent the spread of Islamic
fundamentalism.
A withdrawal from Afghanistan that led to a quick collapse of Moscow's
Afghan client would almost certainly raise tensions between the leadership
and the military, the KGB and some other elites. Gorbachev is under
pressure to protect Soviet equities in Afghanistan, and opinions from
various elites are likely to pressure him against totally abandoning the
Afghan Communists to the Mujahedin. The Soviet leader presumably
realizes that such a pullout would prove embarrassing to the military, the
security forces, the party apparatus, and even much of the general
population. Senior Soviet officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
party, and the Komsomol have up until recently told Western interlocutors
that the USSR cannot be seen as abandoning its Afghan ally-as the
United States did with South Vietnam. Nevertheless, Gorbachev's recent
speech on withdrawal suggests that he has hammered out a Politburo
consensus to run the risk of such an eventuality.
We believe that Gorbachev's announcement of prospective dates for a
withdrawal-while designed to win the Kremlin the best terms possible-
makes the indefinite maintenance of the status quo in Afghanistan less
tenable domestically. The continuation of the protracted conflict would
have an increasingly corrosive effect on Soviet society now that Gorbachev
has made clear his determination to exit. By failing to end "Brezhnev's
war" now, Gorbachev would risk alienating those who identify the war
with his predecessor's period of misrule and look to him as one who is
charting a new course for the country. He would be hard pressed to deflect
public expectations of bringing the troops home. Efforts to shift the blame
to the Mujahedin, Pakistan, and the United States-if a settlement proves
elusive-would not offset the major disappointment among the Soviet
public if the war were to drag on. In fact, by going public, and raising do-
mestic and international expectations, Gorbachev has made it increasingly
difficult for any would-be domestic opponents to reverse field and argue for
a long-term continued presence of Soviet troops
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Does Soviet Public Opinion About the War Matter? 1
The Soviet Intelligentsia
Signs of Increased Social Strain Over the War 5
Draft Dodging and Class Tensions
Drug Abuse and AIDS
A More Realistic Assessment of the War
Leadership Attitudes on the Domestic Costs of the War
Domestic Factors and Gorbachev's Options in Afghanistan
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USSR: Domestic Fallout
From the Afghan Ware 25X1
Scope Note General Secretary Gorbachev's 8 February announcement of a decision to
begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan within two months
of a Geneva accord suggested a determination to end Moscow's military in-
volvement in a "bitter and painful" conflict. This study investigates the
domestic background that has clearly influenced Soviet deliberations by
outlining growing public polarization and dissatifaction with the war. It
also provides an analysis of elite sentiment-including sources of concern
over a pullout among the military, police, and some party. leaders-which
Gorbachev has had to consider and which might constrain his flexibility or
be used against him politically should Moscow's clients in Afghanistan fail
to survive the withdrawal of 115,000 Soviet troops. The paper does not
attempt to deal in depth with the military situation in Afghanistan or the
economic costs of the war
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Afghanistan
Boundary rep-botalicn J.
not necessarily authoritative.
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Top Secret
From the Afghan War
Does Soviet Public Opinion About the War Matter?
The regime has good reason to be concerned about
negative public attitudes toward Soviet involvement in
Afghanistan, which has dragged on for over eight
years. Keeping Soviet young men out of foreign wars
and providing the population with the security it
values so highly have been major sources of regime
legitimacy; the war in Afghanistan has weakened
these props to the system. Moscow's involvement in
the war has also damaged the aura of foreign policy
successes that, since World War II, has enhanced the
regime's image of power and invincibility among the
Soviet public.
Public opinion in the Soviet Union takes much longer
to crystallize and has less of an immediate impact on
regime behavior than in Western democratic societies.
The Soviet system lacks institutional channels
through which public opinion can directly be brought
to bear on official policy; the regime has greater
resources to repress dissent and fewer constraints
against doing so. Historically, the USSR has shown
an ability to stay the course in implementing policies
as viewed in the regime's interests even when they
have produced enormous distress for the Soviet popu-
lation. Nevertheless, the regime has never ignored
public opinion altogether and cannot afford to do so
today. Public opinion has had a significant influence
at some critical junctures in the past, and Gorbachev
has demonstrated a greater sensitivity than his prede-
cessors to the relationship between public morale and
the vitality and stability of the economic and political
system.
Public Opinion Polls
Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979, Soviet public opinion on the war has changed
from grudging support to growing concern about the
war's human and societal costs.
public support for the Afghan war
began to decline in late 1982, and a shift in perception
began to be more clearly manifested in 1984. Evi-
dence from a number of polls, reinforced by reporting
by Western journalists and diplomats, indicates that
Soviet society is increasingly divided in its attitudes
toward the war.
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Top Secret
In some key segments of society, majority opinion
evidently has come to favor a withdrawal from Af-
ghanistan. A United States Information Agency "sur-
rogate study" conducted in 1986, a project to deter-
mine the attitudes of Soviet officials and intellectuals
by interviewing Westerners in regular contact with
them, found that 66 percent of the intellectuals
disapproved of the war and 50 percent found Soviet
action in Afghanistan "shameful." Moreover, one
scientific poll taken in Moscow last summer indicated
most residents of the capital city now oppose the war.
The poll, a random telephone survey of 1,100 Musco-
vites between the ages of 18 and 65 and conducted by
a Franco-Soviet sociological team for a French news-
paper, found 53 percent favored a withdrawal of
Soviet troops and only 27 percent felt troops should
remain in Afghanistan
Evidence from samizdat publications circulated
among the intelligentsia over the past three years
suggests that the turn in public opinion reflects
growing concern over the cost of the war. Reporting
from a variety of US Embassy sources, in turn,
suggests that many intellectuals are especially con-
cerned about casualties and the long-term effect of
the brutal counterinsurgency.
Western journalist in late 1987 that he had drafted an
antiwar poem in the early 1980s, but had earlier
refrained from publishing it because of its potential
use by Western intelligence services. Gorbachev's
decision to release Andrei Sakharov, who was sen-
tenced to years of internal exile in Gor'kiy for his
opposition to Soviet intervention in 1979, has also
probably been an important factor in increasing de-
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The widely circulated samizdat
publication, Manifesto of the Movement for Social
Renewal, stated, "For the first time in the history of
the Soviet state, the Soviet armed forces are conduct-
ing in Afghanistan an undeclared and hopeless war
which brings glory neither to the Soviet Union nor its
armed forces." According to US diplomatic reporting,
these concerns may be reinforced by the perception of
many intellectuals that Soviet youth is increasingly
being polarized into "hippy/pacifists" and "national-
istic thugs."
A few members of the literary intelligentsia, who had
not previously spoken out against the war, seem to
have been emboldened by glasnost to admit their
opposition. The poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko told a
bate on the war.
Younger members of the intelligentsia who have
served in Afghanistan are now publicly discussing the
war and its impact on Soviet society. At an informal
seminar at the Leningrad Youth Palace in December
1987 attended by a US diplomat, a group of intellec-
tuals-approximately 30 of whom were veterans-
openly discussed casualties, the effect of war on the
army, and their Afghan "allies."
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These men see the Afghan war as bleeding Russia and
wasting national resources in a war not in the vital
interests of the motherland at a time when human and
material resources must be conserved to revitalize the
country. For example, a recent manifesto of Pamyat,
a conservative nationalist association, demanded that
the "instigators" of the Afghan war be put on trial. A
samizdat version of the purported text of the speech
by former Moscow Party boss Boris Yeltsin-a hero
to many reform intellectuals-included a call for
Soviet troop withdrawal as soon as possible, probably
reflecting the prevailing mood among Moscow's intel-
lectual community.
Like the general population, the intelligentsia is not
unified on the Afghanistan issue.
wholeheartedly supported the regime's policy in Af-
ghanistan. More extreme nationalist writers such as
Aleksandr Prokhanov, who styles himself as the "So-
viet Kipling," tend to see the war as an important test
for Russia. They glorify the Russian "mission" to
civilize Central Asia, and much of their writing has a
strong racist character. At the May 1987 conference
of the Writers' Union, Prokhanov excoriated writers
who knew nothing of the war in Afghanistan. His
speech was strongly seconded by the deputy chief of
the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces,
Col. Gen. Dmitriy Volkogonov, who described the
pacifistic writings of the liberal intelligentsia as "po-
litical vegetarianism."
Prokhanov's short stories and novels glorify the role of
the Soviet soldier fighting in Afghanistan and argue
that war is better than peace, because in peacetime
Soviet society and military "degenerated." Other
exponents of military intervention are having a similar
impact by publishing articles, poems, novels, and even
children's stories about the exploits of Russian sol-
diers. Although many of the stories are potboilers,
Soviet statistics indicate they have a wide readership.
Of the over 500,000 Soviet soldiers who have served in
Afghanistan, the Intelligence Community estimates
that 35,000 have been wounded and more than 12,000
killed. The regime has never disclosed official casual-
ty figures, however, and
Soviet citi-
zens believe the number of Soviet casualties is much
higher than the US estimate:
? A senior official of the USSR Procuracy Office
reportedly said in a 1985 speech that the Soviet
Union lost 15,000 killed annually in Afghanistan.
in 1986 that over 150,000 Soviet soldiers had died in
Afghanistan, the majority from cold and exposure.
in late 1986
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the Soviet Union had suffered approximately 25,000
killed and 63,000 wounded.
? At a meeting of the Leningrad Writers' Club in
November 1987, a member of the audience asked a
party lecturer why it had been necessary to suffer
the loss of 100,000 young men in Afghanistan.
? At the December 1987 seminar of Soviet intellectu-
als, one former soldier claimed that the Soviet
Union had suffered 150,000 killed and 350,000
Soviet casualties in 25X1
Afghanistan have become a 'cause of serious concern
to the Soviet public and the Soviet elite:
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Antiwar Demonstrations, 1984-87
1984
Kazan', RSFSR Sources of US Embassy re-
ported that, following military
funerals, a mob of Tatars
burned draft board building.
Kuybyshev, Sources of US Embassy re-
RSFSR ported mob burned draft board
building in protest against war.
Termez,
-Uzbekistan
city draft board by mothers
protesting deaths of their sons
in Afghanistan.
riots at the
major
riot at draft board ... troops
called to maintain order ... vi-
olence spread to other villages
in southern Uzbekistan.
1985
Yerevan, Western diplomats and jour-
Armenia nalists reported demonstra-
tions at draft board.
Tbilisi, Georgia US diplomats reported demon-
strations at draft board ...
hundreds involved.
Kalinin, RSFSR Riot started by mother pro-
testing regime's refusal to re-
turn son's body for burial ...
500 reported involved, accord-
ing to samizdat account.
Stantsiya Bes- Riot by draftees protesting ser-
Ian, Severo- vice in Afghanistan . .
Osetin ASSR demonstration su-
pressed by regular troops.
Khar'kov,
Ukraine
Astrakhan',
RSFSR
several draftees
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Ulyanovsk,
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RSFSR
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US defense attache officers re-
port demonstration at ceme-
teryby mothers of soldiers
killed in war.
Samizdat reports public self-
immolation of mother whose
son perished in combat ... sui-
cide followed by riot.
Samizdat
reported a major demonstra-
tion by Chechen conscripts ...
sabotaged weapons consigned
to Soviet army in Afghanistan
... dissident sentenced to term
in asylum.
1986
Ashkhabad,
Turkmen SSR
1987
Moscow
Samizdat) eport-
ed major riot at draft board by
young draftees.
US diplomats reported public
protest by five to 10 demon-
strators on eighth anniversary
of Soviet invasion.
Leningrad
two demon-
strations by 20 to 30 protesters
on anniversary of invasion.
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Out of a desire to avoid provoking public indignation
over casualties, the regime has taken extraordinary
measures to minimize public knowledge about the
public anger with the war had caused the Soviet
authorities in 1985 to discontinue bringing back the
bodies of local men killed in Afghanistan. Also,
special hospitals were reportedly created in Central
Asia for those severely handicapped or mangled in the
war, at least in part to keep them out of view.
Such measures have created considerable resentment.
Over the last year or so, Soviet media have begun to
carry stories revealing cases of callous treatment of
stricken families:
? One father reported being incredulous when the
party and military officials who came to his home to
inform him of his soldier son's death were accompa-
nied by the police, who instructed him to hold a low-
keyed funeral.
? In November 1987, a party official writing in
Pravda noted that it was only recently that the
authorities had finally allowed parents to enscribe
on their sons' tombstones that they had died in
Afghanistan.
? Another article noting bureaucratic insensitivity
concluded that, by hiding the losses of the war, "we
are depriving our children (of a heritage) ... as if
admitting to some kind of mistake ... and may be
the indifference to the fate of these kids flourishes
because we do not speak aloud of their deeds."
? In a clear response to such sentiments and concerns,
Gorbachev in his 8 February statement proclaimed
that "the memory of those who have died a hero's
death in Afghanistan is sacred to us." He went on to
stress the intent of authorities to take care of
bereaved families]
Signs of Increased Social Strain, Over the War
Increased dissatisfaction with the war has also been
manifested in an intensification of a number of Soviet
societal problems and the aggravation of political
tensions in the non-Russian republics. Since early
1986, the Soviet media have provided somewhat more
frank information about some of these war-related
domestic problems.
Antiwar Demonstrations and Political Activism 25X1
Immediately following Soviet intervention, Were were
reports of a select number of small demonstrations
against the war in the non-Russian republics. Between
1980 and 1982 news of nine such demonstrations
reached the West.
Antiwar sentiment has apparently caused greater
political violence in the past four years. In 1984,
reports of political opposition at scattered locations in
the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Russian Repub-
lic grew dramatically (as did military casualties in the
ill-fated Panjsher Valley and Paktia Province of-
fenses). Although some demonstrations have been
peaceful and involved only a few dozen people, others
have degenerated into bloody riots that have been
suppressed with a significant number of casualties.
Since mid-1984, there have been reports of at least 1.5
major antiwar demonstrations in the Soviet Union.
According to samizdat, there have also been a number
of carefully orchestrated peace vigils as well as in-
stances of disseminating antiwar literature:
? US diplomats reported in late 1986 that several
peace activists had painted antiwar graffiti in Mos-
cow condemning Soviet intervention.
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Although antiwar sentiment has not generated any
coordinated opposition such as the network of human
rights organizations of the early 1970s, 25X1
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antiwar political
groups have been formed at several locations in the
USSR:
? In August 1987, a United Opposition Party was
formed by an "alliance" of nonparty intellectuals in
Leningrad. Its initial manifesto called for an end to
the war in Afghanistan because of the loss of life.
This group staged a demonstration in October,
during which an Orthodox priest held a sign de-
nouncing the war.
-.An American academic told US Government offi-
cials: that a group of intellectuals in Moscow had
founded an antiwar group in the winter of 1986-87
to discuss the war. She reported that they had
invited her to -a meeting of their circle and to meet
with veterans. She also reported that many of the
members of the circle were children of senior offi-
cials and important intellectuals.
? The dissident peace circle, The Group to Establish
Trust Between the USSR and the USA, periodically
reiterates its call for the immediate and total with-
drawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Since
1980, several of its members have been imprisoned
for refusing to serve in the military and for other
pacifist activities.
Contacts between antiwar groups appear minimal.
Antiwar activists continue to be harassed by the
authorities, prosecuted for previous membership in
these still proscribed organizations, and threatened
with conscription. For example, two Soviet pacifists-
one of whom is blind in one eye-were taken to the
Moscow draft board in March 1987 and threatened
with induction.
Evidence suggests that the security services even
under Gorbachev have been tough on peace activists
in the non-Russian republics. Several Central Asians
who were sentenced to forced labor camps in the early
1980s for protesting the war have subsequently been
sent to harsher labor camps, according to emigre
sources. Furthermore, according to recent Soviet sa-
mizdat, several Muslim religious leaders in Central
Asia, who are reported to have been actively antiwar,
were arrested in the summer of 1987.
Youth Alienation
There is evidence that, at least in major urban
centers, a high percentage of Soviet youth are passive-
ly opposed to the war and cynical about military
service:
? In the Soviet movie Is It Easy To Be Young?, one
young veteran of the war states, "The feeling will
remain with me that I have been involved in some-
thing dirty, something not really human." Another
veteran tells a friend that he is ashamed to wear
medals from service in Afghanistan, adding, "War
doesn't make you mature, it makes you old."
to
avoid the draft he would fake suicide and spend a
little time in a psychiatric hospital. "The army is a
waste of time," he explained. "The army makes
people stupid."
? According to an article in a Central Asian Komso-
mol newspaper last fall, several youths objected to
service in Afghanistan doubting that "it was neces-
sary to go to a foreign country for heroism.'
The regime is clearly sensitive about negative atti-
tudes toward the war among the young, especially at a
time when Gorbachev is making a major effort to
persuade Soviet young people that their interests-are
compatible with, rather than at odds with, those of the
regime. Over the last several years, senior regime
spokesmen-including Defense Minister Dmitriy
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that patriotism has weakened, and several
high-level military spokesmen have decried with un-
usual fervor the growth of pacifist tendencies among
the young. During the US-USSR television program
broadcast from a secondary school in Moscow, a
student's reported remarks-"My brother died in
Afghanistan. I am willing to die for my country, but
not.someone else's."-were censored.
Draft Dodging and Class Tensions
The war in Afghanistan has exacerbated chronic
corruption in the military induction process. Those
who can afford it frequently bribe their way out of
duty in Afghanistan or out of military service entirely.
The price of avoiding Afghan service is high, ranging
Since many ordinary citizens cannot raise such large
sums, much of the population correctly believes it is
the "common people" who are bearing the brunt of
the fighting:
? In an article last fall in Literaturnaya Gazeta, the
author noted that the majority of the soldiers in
Afghanistan were the "children of workers and
peasants." A party official admitted in Pravda last
December that few children of the elite served in
Afghanistan.
? In letters to the Ukrainian-language Komsomol
newspaper, a mother of two soldiers noted that the
burden of service in Afghanistan fell on the working
class and that she doubted whether any of the
children of the "bosses" were serving in the war
zone, and another Ukrainian noted that children of
the elite in one oblast served as guards in military
museums.
Gorbachev evidently believes it is necessary to combat
the ordinary citizens' resentment of privilege in the
highly stratified Soviet political and social system in
order to overcome widespread popular alienation from
the regime and to mobilize grassroots support for his
policies. To this end he has touted the principle of
"social justice," which is taken to mean greater
equality of burden sharing, including military service. 25X1
Accordingly, harsh measures have been taken against 25X1
those trafficking in deferments:
? Former Uzbek First Secretary Usmankhodzhayev
in February 1987 stated that "hundreds of Komso-
mol members had been prosecuted for draft dod-
ging" during the previous two years, and acknowl-
edged that those avoiding conscription had 25X1
increased "significantly" in the past five years.
? The Russian-language press in Kazakhstan reported
that senior party officials had been dismissed from
their positions and others are facing prosecution for
purchasing deferments for their children.
? An official of the Estonian procuracy told a Swedish
journalist in July that the chief of the Estonian draft
board, a member of the Estonian party Central
Committee, had been arrested for accepting bribes
of 1,000 rubles for deferments to avoid service in
Afghanistan. Krasnaya Zvezda admitted in October
that the draft board chief was guilty of mismanag-
ing the board.
Despite these moves, the Soviet regional media, in-
cluding the military press,
noted that draft dodging remains a serious
problem,
draft deferments
still can be purchased illegally from corrupt medical
officers at draft boards.
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Moreover, educational deferments still enable many
elites to protect their sons. In 1981 and again in 1985
university deferments were restricted somewhat. But
in the spring of 1987, a new system of deferments was
proposed to exempt science students from conscrip- 25X1
tion. To the extent that children of the elite have
continued to evade the draft, the war contributes to
undermining the credibility of Gorbachev's "social
justice" claims.
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The Veterans Problem
The more than a half million Soviet soldiers who have
served in Afghanistan, known as Afgantsi, and their
families pose an additional social problem. Those
veterans who survive, like the American veterans of
Vietnam, return home without the benefits of parades
or popular acclaim. The question of veterans' rights as
well as their reintegration into Soviet society have
become issues that the Gorbachev regime has had to
confront.
Most veterans share a feeling that their sacrifices
have not been. appreciated by their countrymen judg-
ing by the Soviet media. On Soviet television last
February, a veteran in his early twenties told a
sympathetic interviewer how he was received with
hostility even by World War II veterans, one of whom
asked how he dared to wear medals "from that war."
One story in the Ukrainian Komsomol paper (repub-
lished in Pravda) reported that a doctor told a legless
veteran requesting assistance, "I didn't send you to
Afghanistan." Stories in the provincial press indicate
other, wounded veterans have committed suicide after
being refused basic services.
Veterans appear to have little in common with their
peers who remained safely at home. Many veterans
have developed very conservative social and political
attitudes and regard their contemporaries as an unpa-
triotic lot immersed in hedonism and lacking in
discipline. This difference in outlook has led to
friction:
? Soviet nonconformist youth, who were passing a
petition requesting a pardon for the West German
pilot who flew to Red Square, told US diplomats in
Leningrad that they were fed up with Afghan
veterans, for whom they obviously had no respect.
The sentiment was apparently returned in kind by
veterans, who reportedly roamed the city beating up
nonconformists.
? In the newspaper of Latvian State University, a
student journalist reported that veterans could not
understand "the animosity, the indifference, the
rudeness, the squabbles, the hissing comments: `we
have seen you Afghan types'."
Poems found in the journal of a 19-year-old conscript
from Kirov killed infighting mirror the low morale of
Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan:
Our so brief time flies quickly by,
And no one seems aware-
Ask our young soldiers of their lot
And be prepared to hear them swear
Take heed, young lad, the day will come
When soldiers this land 'round
Hear one command, that sweet refrain-
You're homeward, homeward bound.
Other underground lyrics more directly challenge the
official explanations for the war:
Not on the Mamaev Hill [Stalingrad]
Not for Rostov, not for Kalad.
My friend died in Afghanistan
He died without glory as an executioner.
It's the fault of the Kremlin elders
That their shameful war goes on
And those who don't agree-are imprisoned
This is what my country stands for.
? Komsomolskaya Pravda noted last April that some
letters to the editor from veterans "essentially call
for lynch law," while others register depression
about the corruption of Soviet society and the
failure of the authorities to crack down on social
disorders
Venting pent-up frustration over how they have been
received at home and hostility toward what they see
as a trend toward social disintegration, some veterans
have banded together in extralegal vigilante organiza-
tions in several cities in the RSFSR and the Ukraine.
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These groups, which have attacked black-marketeers,
prostitutes, and hippies, are part of a broader move-
ment among nationalistic Soviet youth against West-
ernized culture.
Afgantsi have also staged a number of demonstra-
tions, which the regime seems increasingly reluctant
to disrupt with force.
in 1982 former paratroopers who served in
Afghanistan-some in uniform-marched down one
of Moscow's busiest streets chanting, "Long live the
military dictatorship." During the past two years,
authorized demonstrations have been reported in sev-
eral cities, including Donetsk and Leningrad. Sources
of the US Consulate General reported that in Lenin-
grad the police detained two people who protested the
veterans' "fascism" but allowed the veterans' demon-
stration to continue through the main streets of the
Soviet Union's second city.
Soviet officials may be concerned that brutalizing
experiences in Afghanistan have made many veterans
prone to violence. Soviet deserters have reported that,
during so-called punitive missions against Afghan
villages suspected of assisting partisans, Soviet troops
engaged in veritable rampages of indiscriminate kill-
ing that they believe have a profound psychological
impact on young conscripts. The Russian ruling class
has traditionally been apprehensive about latent vio-
lent tendencies in the population at large, and Soviet
elites may fear that Afghan veterans are less easily
intimidated by police control measures than most
Soviet citizens, and that their protests have the poten-
tial of getting out of hand.
veterans were established in Dushanbe and Moscow,
and in early November Moscow announced the for-
mation of a national veterans' organization. 25X1
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Preferential treatment of veterans is resented by
many Soviet citizens, however, who do not welcome
the creation of yet another privileged group whose
benefits come at the expense of the average man. At a
public lecture in December, for example, a party
lecturer's attack on special educational benefits for
Afghan veterans was applauded by some students in
attendance. Furthermore, some employers would
rather not hire veterans because they are entitled to
various job-related privileges. As the size of the
veterans population increases, the perceived burden on
society will increase and tensions will probably grow.
Nationality Problems
The greatest societal problem for the regime in deal-
ing with the Afghan war may be its effect on the non-
Russian minorities, many of whom are frustrated with
the implicit pro-Russian tilt of many of Gorbachev's
policies: democratization and glasnost have gone fur-
ther for Russians; regional development priorities
have favored Slavic areas;.the anticorruption drive.
has hit hardest in the non-Russian areas; and a pro-.
Russian bias has been seen in Gorbachev's personnel
appointments. Overall, the non-Russian population
appears more critical of the regime's Afghan policy,
although local elites in Central Asia evidently have
become more supportive of the war, perhaps because
of the threat to their authority posed by instability in
their backyard.
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Over the past several years, and especially since
Gorbachev's succession, the regime has taken a num-
ber of steps intended to defuse the veterans issue. In
his recent statement, he praised their "self-denial and
heroism" and endorsed priority treatment in educa-
tion and in the work force. Articles in the central
press indicate Moscow is pressuring provincial and
state organs to restructure their treatment of veterans,
and in August the Ukrainian press announced that a
number of rayon-level officials had been punished for
"callous, formal bureaucratic" treatment of disabled
veterans. In the fall of 1987, monuments for Afghan
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Figure 2
Soviet Administrative Divisions
Iceland The United S1.tee Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Eetoni,. Lat,i,. and Lithuania
into the Sovi,t Union. Other boundary representation
is not nec.aenrily authoritative.
Unit d
e c
F.R.G. '..S
`J
C0G.DR..
Ukrainian
S.S.R.S
Black
Sea
Finland
Georg Ian
C S. S. R. .
Sob
-moo
Laptev Sea
R. S. F. S. R.
Soviet Union
5 Tajik-~J
S.S.R
Iran
/Bah,
Qatar
The Western Republics. Ukrainian and Baltic samiz-
dat provide substantial information about opposition
to the war. Many Batts and Ukrainians probably see
the war as another round of Russian imperial aggres-
sion.
Information from samizdat indicates that Batts and
Ukrainians believe they are providing a disproportion-
ate number of soldiers to fight what they see as a
Russian war. In the Baltic areas, demographic factors
may heighten concern about casualties. Since families
are small, the death of a son usually means the end of
a family line. Casualties in Afghanistan are seen as
Bering
Sea
Sea of
Okhotsk
2 ~ Sea of
Japan
North
Kor a
uth
Ko?tea J
depleting the indigenous nationalities in the Baltic
republics, which already are experiencing less than
zero population growth, and making it harder for
them to retain separate identity and resist Russifica-
tion pressures:
? An article in Ukrainian religious samizdat described
local casualties in Afghanistan as "gains for Mos-
cow-losses for Ukraine." Giving equal emphasis to
national as well as moral aspects, the author noted,
"Ukrainians do not wish either to fight, nor do they
want this unjust war."
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Figure 3
Opinion on the Afghan War, by Nationality of
Soviet Citizens Traveling Abroad
1984
Number of persons polled:2,960
Baltic
Central Asian
Caucasians
Ukrainians
Belorussians
Russians
? Estonian intellectuals told a US diplomat in July
that Estonian casualties had been high and that
many veterans had returned emotionally scarred
and inclined to violence.
blood."
1986
Number of persons polled:1,676
Baltic
Central Asian
Caucasians
Ukrainians
Belorussians
Russians
I I
Armenian Communist noted that the war had
strained relations between Armenians and Russians.
There is also increasing evidence of opposition in the
heavily Muslim northern Caucasus and Azerbaijan:
? Baltic samizdat has repeatedly called for youths to
refuse service in Afghanistan, viewing a sentence in
the Gulag as preferable. One underground Lithua-
nian publication recommended in late 1985 that
Lithuanians refuse service in the war zone, to avoid
"being cowardly tools of the occupying power."
Other Estonian samizdat notes that "Ukranians,
Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, themselves op-
pressed, are obligated to fulfill the brutal orders of
Russian officers and spill their own and Afghan
war.
Caucasian Republics. Protests in Yerevan and Tbilisi
in 1985 as well as US Embassy reporting suggest that
Georgian and Armenian nationalists also oppose the
? An American scholar, who visited the region for
talks with academics in the Caucasian republics in
1986-87, recently told US Government officials that
antiwar sentiment among Aseri intellectuals had
increased.
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the mid-1980s because of popular concern about
casualties.
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in the late 1980s both
Christian and Muslim Osetiyans who live in the
mountains of the Georgian republic felt a kinship
for the Afghan Mujahedin.
in February 1985, a company of Osetiyan conscripts
refused to serve in Afghanistan. The soldiers were
later surrounded by a larger unit and arrested. After
incarceration, they still ended up in Afghanistan.
US diplomatic reporting indicates that the
war has polarized public opinion more in Central Asia
than in any other region
Support for the war presumably is strongest among
various local elites. This is most clearly the case with
Central Asian political elites whose privileged posi-
tions depend on the maintenance of Soviet rule. But
many-other well-educated Central Asians-especially
those in scientific and technical fields-probably be-
lieve that, despite flaws in the Soviet system and the
inferior status of non-Slavs in it, continued association
with the USSR.is preferable to the alternative posed
by the Islamic fundamentalists. Those who have
satisfactory professional employment probably believe
they have a personal stake in the continuation of
Soviet rule; in a sense they have been co-opted into
the system. Although nationality and religious differ-
ences. persist, many believe the Soviet system is
carrying out modernization that is desirable, and they
fear what might happen if religious fanatics replaced
the present government. These people clearly are
repulsed by the violence of religious fundamentalists
in Iran and among the Afghan insurgents.
There is increasing evidence, however, that younger
urban intellectuals in Central Asia as well as much of
the traditional rural society apparently are either
ambivalent or oppose the war. Reporting in the Soviet
press, as well as from US diplomats, indicates growing
interest in Islam and Islamic nationalism among these
elements in Central Asia:
? Crimean Tatar samizdat from the mid-1980s con-
tains expressions of support for the Mujahedin.
Tatars in the 1970s and 1980s have played a role in
the Islamic resurgence in Central Asia and have
significant contacts with the Islamicized intelligen-
tsia in Uzbekistan.
Soviet inter-
Union.
vention in Afghanistan contributed to the renais-
sance of Islam and Islamic nationalism in the Soviet
Support for the insurgents in Central Asia seems
strongest along the Afghan-Soviet border.
there was widespread support for the
Afghan insurgents among Tajiks. Mujahedin com-
manders since 1980 reportedly have periodically
crossed the Soviet border into the Turkmen, Tajik,
and Uzbek Republics to distribute religious material,
collect money and food for their troops, and occasion-
ally raid Soviet targets.
We can independently
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confirm four or five Mujahedin military raids against
targets inside the Soviet Union,
)FY-1
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? In April, Pravda twice reported that Mujahedin
attacks on civilian and military targets inside the
USSR had caused Soviet casualties. A Soviet Cen-
tral Committee member told an American academic
at a conference in the United States last May that
there had been a number of such raids and that
Soviet losses had been high.
join the resistance and
in the spring of 1987
d into Afghanistan to
)FY-1
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learn how to fight Soviet troops to liberate Tajikstan
eventually. the Tajiks had 25X1
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Fear of the effect of Islamic fundamentalism on the
five predominantly Muslim republics of Soviet Cen-
tral Asia was reportedly one reason for Brezhnev's
The spectre of Muslim activism inside the USSR
probably makes it difficult for the Kremlin to with-
draw.
ed by Mujahedin efforts to distribute propaganda and
recruit fighters within the USSR.
The Soviet media and senior party officials have
expressed continuing concern about the vulnerability
of the southern tier to Muslim influences:
? General Secretary Gorbachev in November 1986
demanded in a speech in Tashkent that the Central
Asian parties purge themselves of closet Muslims.
Since the speech, several senior Central Asian
Communists have been purged because of what the
Soviet press has claimed is "dual allegiance" to
Islam and the CPSU.
? Since 1982, the number of articles on the KGB
border guards on the southern frontier has in-
creased in the central and regional press. On the eve
of ethnic violence in Kazakhstan in December 1986,
border guard commanders were excoriated for slip-
shod. performance in preventing the infiltration of
anti-Soviet material.
? An editorial in the Uzbek Komsomol press last
spring urged young men to ignore the pleas of
"religious fanatics" not to serve in Afghanistan.
The Tajik press has also carried articles noting the
reluctance of young men to serve against their
coreligionists in Afghanistan. A similar editorial in
the Turkmen press reported that some youths were
refusing to serve in the military because of the
preaching of "reactionary" mullahs.
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been previously recruited by Afghan insurgent com- Drug Abuse and AIDS
mander Ahmad Shah Masood and some had taken The link between the drug problem and the war also
part in a raid against a Soviet border post. may be coloring public attitudes about involvement in
Afghanistan and feeding popular concern about the
emergence of AIDS as a significant problem. Reports
by defectors and emigres suggest that in the war zone
a majority of Soviet conscripts use drugs. Ministry of
Interior officials have acknowledged publicly that
large amounts of Afghan opiates and hashish are
a major clash took place near Mary smuggled into the USSR. Some of the illicit drugs
hedin in 1986.
Muslim conscr
bound for the USSR are brought in by returning
Soviet troops and security officials-a fact that Soviet
officials now ruefully admit:
The war also appears to have intensified dissatisfac- ? In January 1988 a Soviet military attache told his
tion among Central Asian conscripts in the Soviet American counterpart that a Soviet general had
Ground Forces been arrested for smuggling drugs. Furthermore,
last July, the Soviet press announced a senior MVD
official in Turkmenistan had been jailed for 13
years for smuggling drugs into the USSR from
Turkmenistan.
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? On several occasions during the period 1984-86,
Soviet soldiers were prosecuted for smuggling drugs.
Following the Alma Ata riots in December 1986,
nationalist anti-Russian demonstrations may have
taken place in Soviet garrisons in Afghanistan judging
by the comments of an academic reporting on Soviet
Both the security services and the military, as well as
the party, consider the drug problem a serious embar-
rassment, if not a threat. After foreign customs
officials discovered Afghan opiates and hashish on a
number of Soviet aircraft and merchant vessels, Sovi-
et security agencies have broadened their contacts
with Western drug enforcement agencies.
the Soviet military press reported that political offi- turning their children into drug addicts.
ings-that is, indoctrination sessions-to "discuss" nians believe the majority of veterans are addicts.
the riots with the Kazakh troops, suggesting that
tensions may have continued for some time.
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the Afghan issue 25X1
there is a widespread public perception that AIDS is
being spread inside the USSR by returning veterans.
Emigres have reported rumors of a special military
hospital in Central Asia for soldiers suffering from
AIDS, and a party lecturer in Leningrad last May
noted that there was growing public concern about the
has had greater saliency for the elite. Within the
Soviet establishment, opinion is increasingly polarized
between those who-while often regretting that the
Soviet Union ever intervened-believe the continued
prosecution of the war is necessary, and those who
believe that finding a quick political solution to the
war is essential.
spread of AIDS by Afgantsi.
The threat of the spread of AIDS by Afghan veterans
parallels popular concern about the spread of hepati-
tis, another highly infectious disease sometimes asso-
ciated with AIDS.
the number of hepatitis cases among Soviet
soldiers in Afghanistan is very high, and Soviet
military statistics indicate the incidence of hepatitis in
the Soviet 40th Army has increased seven-fold since
1979. A Soviet journalist noted that the public recog-
nizes Afghan veterans by their jaundiced complexion,
indicating the close association in popular thinking
between the war and hepatitis.
Opinion within the political elite has a more direct
bearing on regime policy decisions than sentiment
among the population, although the views of many in
the elite are partly molded by those factors. As
evidenced by the public opinion polls discussed earlier,
the Soviet elite seems dismayed with both the cost of
the war to the Soviet population and the loss of Soviet
prestige abroad.
the war is widely viewed as Brezhnev's
war, part of his legacy of unresolved problems. Elite
concern over the war is increasingly focused on its
retarding effect on Gorbachev's ability to build a
more positive image for the regime and to mobilize
support for domestic reforms
The Party
The party itself has not been immune from the debate
affecting the general populace and the intelligentsia.
(
discussions of the human cost of the
conflict as well as youth opposition to it are appearing
more frequently in the Komsomol press and suggest
that similar concerns probably are percolating within
the party as well.
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nev and his colleagues decided on intervention-a
decison consistent with the preferences of party ideo-
logical officials-because they believed that interven-
tion would preclude the defeat of a Communist ally
and that it would be a short and low-cost affair.
Several defectors have noted that the Brezhnev gener- 25X1
ation initially expected, in 1979 and 1980, that victory
would be attained in 12 to 18 months. Most of these
sources indicate that the issue of domestic repercus-
sions-outside the issue of Muslim fundamentalism-
did not figure in Politburo deliberations. 25X1
As the war dragged on and it was clear there was little
prospect of a near-term victory, the Brezhnev leader-
ship decided to hunker down for the long haul,
believin that time was on the side of the Soviet
Union. the men of Brezh- 25X1
nev's generation saw little choice but to keep a large 25X1
contingent of regular troops in Afghanistan for "a 25X1
generation or more." These men evidently regarded
the war's cost in human and material terms as
bearable ones that could be sustained indefinitely.
when the chief of the 25X1
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Central Committee's Communications and Transpor-
tation Department-who has since been retired under
Gorbachev-visited London in 1984, he briefed the
Embassy on a range of contemporary questions. In the
course of the talk, he noted that the USSR annually
lost 40,000 to 50,000 people in car accidents and
30,000 to 40,000 in drowning.
against these losses the death of a few thousand men
annually in Afghanistan was portrayed as "relatively
insignificant."
Even those older party officials who were concerned
about the consequences of a protracted war tended to
think that escalation rather than negotiation was the
men. of the older generation favor escalation.
With the passage of time and the coming to the fore
of a younger generation of party officials, the domi-
nant outlook on the war has evolved toward greater
pessimism. In conversations with Western journalists
and diplomats., many younger officials have referred
to Afghanistan as the Soviet Union's "Vietnam."
They believe the USSR is mired in a war that is
draining the country's human and material resources.
The USIA surrogate study noted this shift in attitudes
on Afghanistan. Interviews of Westerners in close
contact with Soviet officials in 1986 found that 48
percent of them disapproved of the war and 23
percent found the war "shameful," suggesting that a
significant minority condemned the war on moral
grounds and almost half opposed it for either moral or
Soviet samizdat reinforces the impression that some
party members and low-level officials believe the war
is spiritually damaging the USSR. One party member
wrote in a Marxist samizdat publication that "the war
in Afghanistan has turned into an endless, senseless
nightmare not only for the Afghans, but for ourselves
as well. It is impossible to justify our involvement in
Afghanistan on moral grounds."
Other party officials in the Russian Republic appar-
ently are concerned by the cost of the war to the
Slavic people in practical terms. Just as the Baltic
nationalities believe they are overrepresented in Af-
ghanistan, many Russians suspect they are being
discriminated against. For example, at a public Znan-
iye Society lecture in Moscow in early December, a
party activist asked a Central Committee lecturer
why such a high percentage of Slavs were being sent
to Afghanistan. Similar questions have been raised at
other public lectures in Moscow and Leningrad, ac-
cording to US diplomatic reporting.
The Security Apparatus
The KGB and the Soviet military have significant
domestic as well as foreign equities involved in the
Afghan war. They were directly involved in consulta-
tions before the 1979 invasion and their views are
certainly considered by the current leadership as it
shapes policy on Afghanistan. Because of their long
involvement in Afghanistan-going back many years
before the invasion-and their direct access to objec-
tive information on the war, their appreciation of the
war's cost is probably even more realistic than that of
the Soviet political leadership. This is probably tem-
pered by their concern for the prestige both of the
nation and of their institutions in the event of with-
drawal from Afghanistan under circumstances that
left the country in the hands of a regime not closely
aligned to the USSR.
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i up oecre1
The Military
The military has good reasons for wanting to continue
vigorous prosecution of the war in Afghanistan. Hav-
ing argued as an institution in favor of committing
Soviet forces at the outset and having made repeated
claims of progress since then, the military may not
want to be proved "wrong" in its assessment that the
war was winnable or to see its reputation for compe-
tence further tarnished. Moreover, it is probably
psychologically hard to accept the sunken costs in the
war as having been for naught. Also, the war has
provided an excellent training ground for a whole
generation of officers. These parochial considerations,
combined with larger concerns about the implications
for the USSR of losing face and suffering a strategic
loss by pulling out of Afghanistan, almost certainly
have made the military a key institutional supporter
of the war.
Despite the military's reasons for wanting to continue
the war, Gorbachev apparently has Politburo support
for a withdrawal if he can get the right conditions,
indicating he has overcome military reservations. His
ability to do so may have been strengthened by
personnel changes in the military, including the retire-
ment of former Defense Minister Sokolov-who as
First Deputy Minister oversaw the war for several
years-and the fact that, even within the military,
there is evidence of war weariness
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The military high command has experienced consider-
able turnover since 1979, so that the current hierar-
chy could not be completely saddled with responsibil-
ity for advocating invasion. But many current top
officers have been closely involved in waging the war.
These include Chief of the General Staff, Sergey
Akhromeyev, and his first deputy, Gen. Valentin
Varenikov. Defense Minister Yazov was indirectly
involved as Commander of the Central Asian Military
District from 1981 to 1983. There is little evidence in
public statements to suggest that senior officials of the
Ministry of Defense had altered their views on Af-
ghanistan since Gorbachev became General Secre-
tary. Statements by Yazov and Akhromeyev, as well
as Gen. Andrey Lizichev, chief of the Main Political
Administration, and Gen. Petr Lushev, First Deputy
Minister of Defense, emphasize the duty of "Soviet
internationalists" to protect the Kabul regime.
They might be especially inclined to question the
wisdom of a disengagement plan that failed to guar-
antee a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. In any assessment
of blame that might develop if a withdrawal led to
their client's collapse, they might be tempted to blame
civilian leaders but would be vulnerable to criticism
themselves for failing to defeat the insurgency
Military publications have reviewed recent film
as Is It Easy.To Be Young? that raise question
the futility of the war. An army general writin
Krasnaya Zvezda noted, "In my opinion it ina
tently casts doubts on the need for young peop
fulfill their military duty." Last year, General
s such
about
g in
e to
gonov explicitly endorsed the views of the writer
Prokhanov, who questioned the ability of civilians to
make judgments on war, and who decried pacifism
among the population.
Military newspapers and professional publications for
the officer corps' continue to show widespread senti-
ment for continuing operations in Afghanistan to
secure the USSR's southern frontiers. A reporter for
the daily publication of the Minister of Defense noted
in mid-May, "In the light of the events of March and
April on our southern frontier [Mujahedin raids], we
should ask ourselves what would have happened on
our southern frontiers without the limited contingent
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan." Military spokesmen
at public forums have, according to US diplomats,
cited the same strategic necessities in lectures. In
Leningrad in March, a spokesman noted "our troops
will have to remain ... if we leave the Americans will
move into the area. We will find ourselves even more
encircled with American bases and listening posts....
Our most important concern is our security."
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Though the weight of the evidence shows that the
Soviet military would probably prefer to continue the
war, there is growing awareness of the costs within the
military officer corps. There are signs that, in a period
of resource constraints, the 3 percent of the military
budget consumed by the war may seem excessive to
some officers. A Soviet military attache, for example,
specifically stated that the decline in Soviet naval
activity was due in part to the diversion of funds from
the military to the civilian sector to improve the
overall Soviet economy, and in part to the cost of the
Afghan war.
A few tactical commanders and military intelligence
officers reportedly also believe that intervention is not
worth the cost in human terms, especially since the
military is not allowed to pull out all the stops in
fighting the war. There is growing evidence that lack
of tactical success in Afghanistan has led to recrimi-
nations and frustrations within the military, produc-
ing pressure on the civilian leadership either to up the
ante or pull out:
war as an opportunity for personal advancement, a
number of lieutenant colonels and colonels see it as
disastrous for the USSR on strategic, economic, and
moral grounds.
? In a public forum on Afghanistan in November
1987, a Soviet general officer-while defending the
presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan-noted,
"We have had enough of sacrificing our young ,
soldiers."
Reporting from US Embassy and
and a sense
that the war is a stalemate. One young Soviet political
officer told a US diplomat over dinner that the
dushmany (a Pushtu word meaning enemy and uni-
versally used by the Soviets) were patriots fighting for
their country. Military lecturers have noted that the
insurgents are a formidable enemy and that to defeat
them the Soviet force in Afghanistan would have to be
increased by a factor of four or five.
Some Soviet officers may also have become defeatist
because they are convinced the civilian leadership no
longer has the will to sustain the war for a prolonged
There is also reason to believe that some officers are
becoming increasingly apprehensive that the war is
aggravating social problems within the military rank
and file, abetting pacifistic tendencies among Soviet
youth and generally tarnishing the military's
reputation:
? The Soviet military press also has exhibited more
concern about drug abuse (narkomania), brutal
treatment of conscripts, and nationality tensions
among troops in the 40th Army during the past
year.
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? The military press, along with the party press, has
lamented in many articles that Soviet youth is far
more pacifistic than the older generation. In a
recent address to Soviet writers Yazov made pointed
remarks to this effect.
A More Realistic Assessment of the War
During the past year, the Central Committee's guid-
ance to the party's propaganda organs evidently has
called for a more honest and pessimistic assessment of
the war. Media treatment of the situation in Afghani-
stan has been less than euphoric in its assessment of
the Afghan regime's level of popular support and the
effectiveness of the Afghan military.
Similarly, party lecturers in Leningrad and Mos-
cow-who also take guidance from the Central Com-
mittee Propaganda Department-have admitted in
the past two years that Soviet diplomats and party
officials earlier had been too optimistic about the
success of national reconciliation, that Najibullah
enjoys the support of less than half the population,
and that the resistance is stronger in two-thirds of the
country's provinces than is the government. For
example:
? At a lecture in Leningrad in January 1987, a party
official argued for a diplomatic solution: "Com-
rades, there is simply no other way out. People are
dying in Afghanistan, including our boys. There is
no end in sight-not after'five years or even 10....
The Soviet Union is losing the political struggle-
the USSR is isolated and its proposals to end the
war are getting nowhere."
? At another political lecture in Leningrad in March,
a party spokesman told an audience of 300 that "the
Central Committee had been advised that the Af-
ghan issue could not be settled militarily." The
speaker also noted that the United States might well
have ratified SALT II had the Soviet Union not
gone into Afghanistan.
Various explanations are possible for the increase in
Soviet media discussion of the war and the character
of media coverage. The overall shift toward a pessi-
mistic assessment of prospects for early Soviet victory
could be interpreted as intended to prepare the popu-
lation for either a prolonged war or for striking a
political settlement. Yet the particular items that are
appearing in the press do not seem to follow a
consistent line. Many of them at least implicitly urge
persevering for the long haul. Others clearly reflect a
desire to leave Afghanistan soon, as well as a belief
that the war is not in the USSR's best interest.
It seems likely, then, that the conflicting views and
images that have been allowed reflect some genuine
differences within the Soviet elite over policy toward
Afghanistan. With the relaxation of central control
over the media, different editors are probably pushing
different lines on their own initiative without waiting
for central directives. At the same time, it is probable
that differences within the top leadership itself have
accounted in part for divergent media coverage of the
war. Now that Gorbachev has apparently enunciated
an unambiguous policy preference, the media line
may become more uniform
Leadership Attitudes on the Domestic Costs
of the War
Turnover in the Politburo since the 1979 invasion has
probably given Gorbachev a freer hand in making a
fresh assessment of policy toward Afghanistan. Of the
current full Politburo members only Gromyko and
Shcherbitskiy were full members in 1979, so that
most of the Politburo members today bear no direct
responsibility for the initial intervention. They conse-
quently can portray a policy shift on Afghanistan as
part of an overall repudiation of Brezhnev's legacy in
foreign and domestic policy.
Gorbachev's Views
As a candidate member of the Politburo in 1979,
Gorbachev probably played a secondary role in the
decision to send Soviet troops. A Soviet official in
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lowed to surface.
In the early years of involvement, Soviet media
barely acknowledged any Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan and went to great lengths to prevent the
population from learning that the "limited contin-
gent" of Soviet troops was fighting rather than serv-
ing as advisers. The regime continues to suppress
many details, but since Gorbachev, succession discus-
sion of the war has expanded greatly in the media.
Extreme views-both pro and con-have been al-
During Soviet programs on foreign affairs, many
callers have advocated a Soviet escalation. One caller
to a television program on Afghanistan last August
called for "carpet bombing. " Moreover, some nation-
alist organizations have become vocal in publicly
demanding military victories in speeches and publica-
The great bulk of media coverage of the war is
infused with Russian nationalist and neocolonialist
motifs, extolling the virtues of the heroic Soviet
soldiers fighting in Afghanistan and providing Soviet
audiences with the moral imperative to protect inno-
cent Afghans from the machinations of Western
"imperialists. " Similarly, most published Soviet lit-
erary works dealing with Afghanistan idealize the
Soviet role there. Although the hardships of life in
Afghanistan are acknowledged, the intent usually
seems to be to encourage youth to prepare themselves
1981 claimed that Gorbachev was actually opposed to
the intervention from the start, which explained why
policy on the war was shifting. His 1986 reference to
the war as a "bloody sore" and subsequent public
statements suggest that he was more concerned than
his predecessors about the negative impact of the war
on the USSR internally. Having tied his future to a
At the same time, since early 1987 Moscow has
occasionally publicized adverse remarks by Soviet
citizens on involvement in Afghanistan:
? On the radio program International Situation, lis-
teners last spring asked about Soviet casualties and
criticized coverage of the war. In July, a member of
the audience of the same program stated on the air
that there was no legal basis under Soviet law for
Soviet intervention.
? In the summer of 1987, a columnist in Moscow
News openly argued for a withdrawal of Soviet
troops without the preconditions that were invari-
ably included in the official Soviet position. The
author of the article wrote that a withdrawal would
mean that death notifications "would no longer
bring untold grief to Soviet families" and that the 25X1
country "would be able to release the additional
resources that are so needed" (in the Soviet
economy).
? Moscow News also published an interview with
Andrey Sakharov in December in which he called
for a complete and immediate pullout of all Soviet
troops.
program of domestic economic and political revital-
ization, he apparently came to believe that the Af-
ghan war is complicating his domestic efforts to bring
about a reconciliation between the regime and the
intelligentsia, the group perhaps most disturbed by
the war. Having also made clear his interest in
securing arms control agreements and reducing the
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burden of military spending on the domestic economy,
he apparently concluded that Afghanistan stood in the
way of a more full-fledged East-West detente, and
would pay handsome dividends if it could be resolved.
The General Secretary reportedly viewed the situation
in Afghanistan as comparable to the 1918 Peace of
Brest Litovsk-when Lenin accepted a treaty with
Germany that ceded 30 percent of Russia's economic
wealth to consolidate Soviet power at home. Since the
27th Congress, Soviet party officials close to Gorba-
chev, including those serving in the Central Commit-
tee's International Department, have openly criticized
past policies in Afghanistan and have seemed willing
to reexamine Soviet strategy there linking the
changed perspective to the restructuring of Soviet
society:
Other Leaders
Although Gorbachev's 8 February announcement of
revised Soviet terms for a withdrawal indicates a
consensus within the leadership on the desirability of
a military pullout, a number of key Politburo mem-
bers may assess the costs and benefits of involvement
in Afghanistan differently from Gorbachev.
a diplomatic settlement not result in the collapse of
Moscow's Communist clients in Afghanistan probably
include:
in Afghanistan could lead to a rise in nationalist
agitation in Central Asia. Although he has given a
strong public endorsement to Gorbachev's proposals
as "brilliant," his chairing of a meeting of senior
officials to coordinate and possibly increase econom-
ic assistance for Afghanistan suggests that he is
among those most concerned with perpetuating a
long-term Soviet influence in Afghanistan.
concerned in 1983 that defeat
? Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy, who told a
senior US diplomat in the early 1980s that he
strongly supported the initial decision to intervene.
His subsequent public statements do not suggest
that he has changed his opinion.
military presence in Afghanistan.
? President Gromyko, who was Minister of Foreign
Affairs at the time of the 1979 decision, also
appears to have been a supporter of the Soviet
his hardline rhetoric at the time of
the invasion and subsequent public defense of Soviet
presence suggest he was supported in the initial
decision. In a recent speech he praised Stalin's
prolonged and determined diplomatic struggle for a
"socialist Poland" in context suggesting he might
see a parallel to the current need for a "socialist"
Afghanistan.
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? KGB Chairman Chebrikov has spoken and written
in detail about the threat to the southern frontier, a
view shared by many in the elite.
Domestic Factors and Gorbachev's Options
in Afghanistan
While the domestic impact of the war will not neces-
sarily be the decisive criterion in Moscow's continuing
evaluation of Afghan policy, the evidence seems com-
pelling that it has been an increasingly germane
factor in the regime's evaluation of policy options.
Gorbachev's 8 February announcement suggests that
domestic considerations are a more important factor
now than when the Politburo decided to intervene in
late 1979.
Movement toward a negotiated solution that resulted
in a staged withdrawal-much as Gorbachev recently
proposed-probably will, on balance, strengthen Gor-
bachev's domestic position, particularly if it could
leave a government not antagonistic toward the
USSR in place at least for some period of time.
Progress toward a diplomatic solution would benefit
Gorbachev's political agenda by rallying support from
the intelligentsia, and would go far to convince Soviet
youth that the system was capable of radical change.
Deescalation would also ease nationality tensions.
A withdrawal on terms that led to a quick or immedi-
ate collapse of the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan-dominated regime would to some extent
intensify tensions-already obvious over other is-
sues-with the military and the KGB, as well as with
ideologically oriented elements of the elite that would
reject a compromise endangering a Marxist-Leninist
ally. It could alienate many among the Sovietized
Central Asian elite, who are concerned about the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism across the border.
manageable.
Neverthless, Gorbachev's 8 February proposal sug-
gests that he has hammered out a Politburo consensus
to run just this risk, which he apparently feels is 25X1
Having taken the initial steps, however, the General
Secretary will continue to be under pressure to protect 25X1
Soviet equities in Afghanistan by various elites who
are convinced that the potential cost of the "loss of
Afghanistan" is high. Although Gorbachev can man-
age such costs-and has managed to get Politburo
acceptance to begin a process-it will be difficult to
reverse-he will continue to be sensitive to steps that
would be viewed as a sellout of his Afghan allies. Such
concerns might also limit his tactical flexibility as the
Geneva negotiations unfold.
Nevertheless, continuation of the status quo into the
1990s, if the two sides cannot agree on terms, also
would have real-and perhaps escalating-domestic
costs. A stalemated war would continue to engender
corruption and other problems that over time would
have an increasingly corrosive effect on Soviet society.
Moreover, greater opportunities for dissatisfied
groups to express their feelings under. glasnost could
lead to more unrest among disaffected national mi-
norities-particularly among the USSR's growing
Muslim minority-and would raise the spectre that
the war could become a rallying point for the discon-
tented among the elite, even in Slavic areas. Having
gone public with a timetable for withdrawal, the
regime has significantly raised domestic expectations
that the troops will be returning home soon. Efforts
might be made to shift the blame for any obstacles to 25X1
the rebels, Pakistan, or the United States, but the
public is not likely to accept significant delays com-
placently. Given these public expectations, it will
probably be increasingly difficult for opponents in the
bureaucracy or the leadership to block additional
concessions Gorbachev might propose to bring the
talks to a successful conclusion.
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