GORBACHEV'S GROWING CONFRONTATION WITH THE KGB: A COMING SHOWDOWN?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01451R000400440001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
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Gorbachev's Growing
Confrontation With the KGB:
A Coming Showdown?
An Intelligence Assessment
9
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SOV 88-10045X
June 1988
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Intelligence
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Gorbachev's Growing
Confrontation With the KGB:
A Coming Showdown?
An Intelligence Assessment
This intelligence assessment was prepared by
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, Domestic Policy Division, SOYA,
Secret
sov 88-10045X
June 1988
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 15 June 1988
was used in this report.
Gorbachev's Growing
Confrontation With the KGB:
A Coming Showdown?
Despite evidence of significant KGB support for Gorbachev's bid for party
leadership in 1985, there now appears to be a growing rift between the
General Secretary and the KGB, including its chairman, Viktor Chebri-
kov. This relationship began to change as Gorbachev's domestic reforms
were increasingly perceived by elements in the KGB as threatening to their
interests. Now, Gorbachev apparently wants to curb the power and
influence of the KGB itself. There is evidence that some in the KGB are
starting to fight back.
Concerns about Gorbachev's policies do not appear to be equally shared
throughout the KGB. Some in the First Chief (Foreign Intelligence)
Directorate may welcome glasnost and perestroyka for making it easier to
establish contacts with foreigners and to advance Soviet interests abroad.
But those KGB officers who built their careers in the internal security
area, including Chebrikov, have reason for concern.
Differences between Chebrikov and Gorbachev came out in the open last
September, when the KGB chief criticized aspects of the General Secre-
tary's reform agenda for harming the country's security. Chebrikov and
other senior KGB officials apparently fear that glasnost, greater toleration
of dissent, and reforms in the legal system could sharply reduce their
ability to guarantee the stability of Soviet society. Senior security officials
also apparently believe that, over the long term, Gorbachev wants a
reduced role for the KGB, and they are concerned that this will threaten
their jobs and privileged positions
Chebrikov is now siding with more cautious members of the Politburo who
are trying to slow the General Secretary's program. Recent rumors of
Chebrikov's opposition to perestroyka, reports that he was "Second
Secretary" Ligachev's only supporter at a heated Politburo meeting over
reform, and unconfirmed stories, leaked to Western reporters and diplo-
mats, of the replacement or augmentation of Gorbachev's KGB body-
guards with military troops suggest that Chebrikov is increasingly per-
ceived as taking a greater role in leadership politics on the side of the
conservatives
The KGB, which has become involved in party politics at several critical
junctures since Stalin's death, can be a dangerous adversary. Although the
KGB has never acted on its own, it has been on the winning side in party
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soV 88-10045X
June 1988
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power struggles in 1957, 1964, 1982, and 1985. Short of a political
showdown, members of the KGB could use connections at home or abroad
to spread rumors to damage the General Secretary, use information in
their confidential files to discredit his supporters, or even provoke incidents
to embarrass him.
Gorbachev needs a loyal KGB more than ever to monitor elite compliance
with policies that are unpopular at lower levels as well as to monitor
political attitudes. Thus far, however, the KGB has been largely untouched
by Gorbachev's restructuring of the Soviet agencies responsible for nation-
al security. This stability increasingly appears to be more a reflection of his
difficulty asserting control over the KGB than his high regard for its
performance.
The revival of ethnic unrest in the Caucasus has posed a serious political
challenge that may force the General Secretary to accede temporarily to
the demands of Politburo conservatives. However, while in the short run
Gorbachev may be forced to make a tactical retreat, we believe that
political reconciliation appears unlikely.
The General Secretary will need to gain control of the security service to
further his reforms and to preclude its becoming involved in plotting
against him by more conservative party leaders. Gorbachev already has
increased party oversight of KGB activities by naming a personal ally to a
position in the Central Committee Secretariat to supervise legal reform,
the police, and the KGB. This action may have bought him some time, but
to achieve his goals he will ultimately have to replace Chebrikov
The contest for control of the KGB will no doubt continue to be part of the
intense political struggle between Gorbachev and his reformist allies and
party conservatives. If Gorbachev can build on a recent victory over
conservatives and bolster his political authority, he will be in a stronger po-
sition to press for reform of the KGB and the replacement of Chebrikov.
His progress in this key area is likely to be an important measure of his
ability to press his political agenda.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
111
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Introduction
1
Early Support for Gorbachev
1
KGB Concerns With Gorbachev's Reform Agenda
2
Glasnost
3
Treatment of Dissidents
3
Legal Reforms
4
Historical Revisionism
4
Economic Reform
6
Foreign Policy
6
Divisions Within the KGB
6
Active Opposition?
7
Gorbachev's Discontent With the KGB
9
Reforming the KGB
10
Chebrikov and the Conservative Opposition
12
Prospects
12
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KGB Headquarter
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Gorbachev's Growing
Confrontation With the KGB:
A Coming Showdown?
Introduction
Since becoming General Secretary in March 1985,
Mikhail Gorbachev has moved to strengthen his
personal authority over the key Soviet agencies re-
sponsible for national security?the Ministries of
Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Internal Affairs, as well
as the International Department of the Central Com-
mittee. So far, however, the KGB appears to have
been largely untouched. Each of these other organiza-
tions has had its chief and many of its top personnel
replaced under Gorbachev and has experienced a
strong dose of his restructuring efforts. In contrast,
the only senior KGB leader replaced under Gorbachev
was First Deputy KGB Chairman Georgiy Tsinev
who was retired in 1986 on the eve of his 80th
birthday. This stability increasingly appears to be
more a reflection of the difficulty Gorbachev is having
asserting his control over the KGB than his high
regard for its performance.
Early Support for Gorbachev
One reason the KGB may have initially escaped
restructuring is that it appears to have helped Gorba-
chev's rise to power. By the late 1970s Gorbachev was
already a protege of then KGB Chairman Yuriy
Andropov, apparently having forged a close relation-
ship during Andropov's vacation visits to Stavropol',
where Gorbachev was the party boss. During Andro-
pov's tenure as General Secretary from 1982 to 1984,
he actively advanced Gorbachev's career and ap-
peared to be grooming him as his successor
Gorbachev apparently also had independent backing
within the KGB because many there reportedly recog-
nized the need to address domestic problems ignored
by Leonid Brezhnev. More than any other institution,
the KGB had knowledge of the negative effects on the
Soviet population of the stagnation of the Brezhnev
era.
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that ignoring it posed a greater long-term threat to
the stability of the system than reform.
During the Chernenko regime (1984-85), many in the
KGB hierarchy saw Gorbachev as Andropov's ideo-
logical successor and supported his bid for power.
Gorbachev 25X1
was popular among many senior KGB officers and
that some regretted Chernenko's appointment as Gen-
eral Secretary and continued to support Gorbachev 25X1
because he seemed to represent a force for change.
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Indeed, KGB support may have played a key role in
Gorbachev's selection as General Secretary.
some
senior officials of the KGB were more aware of this
problem than was the party leadership, recognizing
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Viktor Chebrikov
During his first 18 months as General Secretary,
Gorbachev appeared to maintain a good working
relationship with the KGB and its chairman:
? At the first plenum following Gorbachev's election,
Chebrikov was made a full member of the Politburo.
? The KGB Chairman delivered the Revolution Day
speech in November 1985, an indication of high
status in the leadership. In the address, he enthusi-
astically supported the key elements of Gorbachev's
program and appeared to signal his support for
further change by becoming the first Politburo
member to break the taboo against using the word
"reform."
? At the 27th Party Congress in March 1986, KGB
representation increased from four to five, despite
an overall drop in the size of the Central
Committee.
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The KGB seal
KGB Concerns With Gorbachev's Reform Agenda
As Gorbachev's reform agenda unfolded, however, it
became increasingly clear that aspects of it could
impinge on important KGB equities. His reforms have
the effect of curbing traditional KGB prerogatives,
unleashing forces in society that make the KGB's job
of social control more difficult, and directly threaten-
ing the status of KGB officers. More recently, there
have been signs that he is moving directly to reduce
the administrative power of the KGB.
The first hints of differences between Gorbachev and
Chebrikov began to surface in the fall of 1986. One
US Embassy source maintained that Chebrikov was
Gorbachev's most determined opponent on the Polit-
buro, while others suggested differences on a wide
range of subjects, including glasnost and economic
reform.
Gorbachev intends to
replace Chebrikov in order to establish stronger per-
sonal control over the KGB.
The forces being unleashed under the banners of
glasnost and democratization appear to be the aspects
of Gorbachev's reforms that are causing the KGB the
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greatest concern. In September 1987 on the 110th
anniversary of the birth of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy?first
head of the Soviet security service?Chebrikov ap-
peared to question key aspects of Gorbachev's reform
agenda, suggesting that they are producing undesir-
able consequences. Since then, other policy differ-
ences have also come to the surface. Many of these
concerns appear to be widely shared within the KGB.
Glasnost. In his major public statements over the past
three years, Chebrikov has given only limited support
to glasnost and has suggested that media openness
benefits the USSR's enemies. He seems to be increas-
ingly concerned that, by ending tight control over
public expression, glasnost is making societal control
more difficult and that this loss of vigiliance could
endanger the regime:
? Chebrikov expressed initial reservations about glas-
nost in a September 1985 Kommunist article, in
which he stressed the dangers of foreign espionage
and said that increasing public exposure of Western
intelligence activities was the KGB's contribution to
glasnost.
? In the 1985 Revolution Day speech, Chebrikov only
tepidly endorsed glasnost, warning that the manipu-
lation of Soviet dissenters by foreign intelligence
services continued to be a danger.
? He strongly reiterated the vigilance theme at the
27th Party Congress in early 1986, noting that
Western intelligence was exploiting the ideological
immaturity of Soviet citizens.
? Chebrikov stated his concerns most strongly in his
Dzerzhinskiy Day speech last September. While
praising the party's program of "broad glasnost," he
noted that the Soviet media had damaged security
by allowing the West "to speculate on the shortcom-
ings and unresolved questions that exist in our
country."
? In a speech in April 1988, Chebrikov did not endorse
openness and noted that poor ideological education
and Western radiobroadcasts were major causes of
recent ethnic unrest in the Caucasus.
While senior KGB officials have publicly emphasized
"vigilance" during periods of international tension,
the tone and content of Chebrikov's warnings about
the threat of Western ideological subversion are un-
usual because they come in a period of improving
relations with the United States. In contrast, Andro-
pov?who supported detente as KGB Chairman in the
early 1970s?did not mention the issue in speeches
during the period 1973-76.'
Chebrikov's concerns are apparently shared by other
top KGB officers.
KGB chiefs in Georgia, Latvia, and
Leningrad, according to reports from Western jour-
nalists and US diplomats, sought to halt the distribu-
tion of controversial films, such as Is it Easy to be
Young? and Repentence, because they portray dissent
in a favorable light.
Treatment of Dissidents. In his Dzerzhinskiy Day
speech, Chebrikov implicitly criticized the release of
political prisoners, charging that they continue to act
as agents of Western intelligence services. He also
forcefully noted that regime tolerance of independent
political associations?which Gorbachev has support-
ed as necessary for enhancing the process of reform?
allowed "extremist elements" to penetrate certain
organizations and exploit the "democratization" pro-
cess to split the "monolithic unity of party and
people." By arguing that the release of dissidents had
contributed to massive protests that took place last
' It should be noted that in the early 1970s there had not been the
fundamental questioning of party control as there is under Gorba-
chev.
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summer by Baltic and Crimean Tatar nationalists,
Chebrikov implied that Gorbachev's concessions on
human rights had not worked.
Other senior KGB officers appear to share Chebri-
kov's negative assessment of the impact of Gorba-
chev's policy toward political dissenters. Writing in a
party journal in 1986, First Deputy Chairman Filipp
Bobkov asserted that human rights activists served as
agents of foreign intelligence services.
Legal Reforms. A major feature of Gorbachev's do-
mestic program is legal reform. He appears to be
trying to curb extralegal activities and give a fuller
platform to the rule of law in the USSR.
He
apparently hopes that these reforms will help over-
come alienation from the system and give Soviet
citizens confidence that they can participate in the
reform process without fear of retribution.
To accomplish this, Gorbachev has proposed changes
in the Soviet legal system that would repeal laws
restricting political dissent, give the accused greater
access to attorneys, and streamline the procuracy and
courts. He is also supporting laws that would allow
Soviet citizens to sue the government, and the aboli-
tion of laws that allowed prosecution for anti-Soviet
agitation and propaganda?under which the KGB
persecuted thousands of dissenters in the 1960s and
1970s. Laws have already been adopted to curb KGB
abuses of psychiatric institutions by placing them
under the Ministry of Health and by prohibiting
outside authorities from administratively interring
dissenters. While the proposed legal reforms will not
radically transform the Soviet system, they would
reduce the ability of the KGB to administer punish-
ment.
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It would seem natural that these policies would cause
unease in an organization that sees itself as the
ultimate guard of public order. KGB officers, who
have in the past frequently circumvented legal proce-
dure in dealing with "enemies of the people," no
doubt resent the prospect of having to operate within
tighter legal norms.
Historical Revisionism.
senior KGB officers are nervous
that articles exposing secret police abuses during the
Stalin era could tarnish the image of their service.
The publication of a spate of recent novels, histories,
and memoirs about the Stalin era contain details
about the role of the security services that surely
discomforts the KGB. Three recent examples are:
? A piece in Literaturnaya gazeta about the Stalinist
terror quoting secret police documents advocating
the use of torture in connection with the "Doctors'
Plot."'
? An article in a Moscow newspaper by a noted
military historian recalling the execution of 50
percent of the Soviet officer corps in the 1930s and
calling for the exposure and punishment of those
who perpetrated the terror.
? A history of the arrest and execution of the leader-
ship of the Leningrad party organization, reporting
that mental and physical torture was used against
senior party officials in the late 1940s, including a
member of the Politburo.
This approach is in marked contrast to the Andropov
years when Soviet literature on the KGB was unfail-
ingly favorable, creating an image of the "security
organs" as the lawful protector of Soviet society.
this campaign enhanced the legitimacy of the
KGB and the prestige of its officer corps.
z In late 1952, several prominent physicians?most of them Jews?
were charged with working with Western intelligence services to
poison Stalin and other Soviet leaders.
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Historically, A Strained Relationship
During previous periods of political strain, Stalin,
Khrushchev, and Brezhnev dismissed or even execut-
ed KGB chairmen who had once been political allies:
? Dzerzhinskiy (1917-26) . . . founder of the Cheka
(Security Service) . . . began practice of mass repri-
sals against hostages during Russian Civil War. . .
died in office.
? Menzhinskiy (1926-34) . . . never a significant polit-
ical figure . . . died in office.
? Yagoda (1934-36) . . . founder of forced labor camp
system . . . once close ally of Stalin. . . shot in 1938.
? Yezhov (1936-38) . . . carried out Great Purge (Yez-
hovshchina) in which millions perished, including
591 of 634 leading security officials. . . purged in
1938 and executed.
? Beriya (1938-53) . . . security czar for entire peri-
od . . . periodically as head of the security police
himself . . . managed Gulag as well as secret police
empire, responsible for nuclear weapons research
and development. . . executed in 1953.
? Merkulov (1941, 1943-46) . . . protege of Beriya . .
executed in 1953.
? Abakumov (1946-52) . . . professional security offi-
cer, promoted at Stalin's behest in mid-1940s . . .
executed in 1955.
? Kruglov (1953-54) . . . security professional promot-
ed by Politburo as interim security chief. . . retired
and died in obscurity.
? Serov (1954-58) . . . professional security officer . . .
political protege of Khrushchev . . demoted in
1958.
? Shelepin (1958-61) . . . following career in Komso-
mol, Khrushchev appointed him to rebuild KGB . . .
later promoted to Central Committee Secretariat
and Politburo.
? Semichastnyy (1961-67) . . . a protege of Shelepin
who also began career in Komsomol . . . played
critical role in coup against Khrushchev. . . in
1967, following defeat of Shelepin by Brezhnev,
appointed to minor party post.
? Andropov (1967-82) . . . career party apparatchik
who served in Budapest as Ambassador during
revolution. . . following 15 years as Chairman,
reentered the Secretariat.
? Fedorchuk (1982) . . . career security official . . .
head of Third Chief (Military Counterintelligence)
Directorate in late 1960s, head of Ukrainian KGB
1972-82. . . demoted, served as Minister of Interior
1982-86.
? Chebrikov (1982-present) . . . following service in
World War II, party apparatchik in Ukraine 1949-
67 . . . chief of KGB Personnel Department in late
1960s. . . Deputy Chairman and First Deputy
Chairman under Andropov.
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Chebrikov is clearly unenthusiastic about a more open
examination of Soviet history, including the repres-
sion of the Stalin era. In his Dzerzhinskiy Day
address, he limited criticism of the Stalin purges to
events in 1937-38 and tried to deflect blame from the
security service by claiming that senior Chekists had
opposed mass arrests and executions and that many
colleagues of Dzerzhinskiy had become innocent vic-
tims. Moreover, according to a source of the US
Embassy, in March 1988 Chebrikov vociferously pro-
tested to the Central Committee about the publication
of the World War II diary of a senior scientist in a
proreformist journal that referred to the security
service as the "gangrene eating away at the party." In
addition to damaging the reputation of the security
service, Chebrikov may fear that the kind of frank
discussion now permitted could call into question the
legitimacy of the political system itself.
Economic Reform. Information on KGB attitudes
toward Gorbachev's economic reforms is limited. US
Embassy reporting suggests that, while many senior
KGB officials welcomed such administrative mea-
sures in 1985 as the antialcohol campaign that
strengthened social discipline, they became concerned
that economic reform would reduce their role in
managing sensitive industries in the defense-industrial
sector
There also appear to be differences over agricultural
reform between the General Secretary and the KGB
Chairman. In the Dzerzhinskiy Day speech, Chebri-
kov implicitly supported the current agricultural sys-
tem by defending collectivization as necessary for
industrialization, making no mention of its human
costs. Gorbachev increasingly over the past two years
has been pressing for agricultural reform by criticiz-
ing Soviet agriculture and promoting collectives as a
crucial measure to increase food production, a step
that Chebrikov may oppose because the breakdown of
agricultural organizations may make it more difficult
for the KGB to maintain local control
Foreign Policy. Chebrikov's speeches and articles
strongly suggest that he is worried about the domestic
consequences of expanded ties to the West, especially
Secret
the new opportunities for Western intelligence ser-
vices to gather information. There is evidence of
distance between Gorbachev and Chebrikov on two
important foreign policy issues:
? Chebrikov has not publicly endorsed the INF Trea-
ty. He is probably concerned with its verification
provisions giving Westerners access to sensitive mili-
tary installations. In a speech in 1984, he accused
the United States of making an artificial issue of
verification as a means of prolonging the
negotiations.
? Chebrikov appears to be unenthusiastic about the
pullout from Afghanistan, despite the fact that some
KGB components believe the war has damaged the
Soviet Union's foreign prestige and intensified do-
mestic societal stresses. Since the early 1980s, Che-
brikov has spoken about the danger to the USSR's
southern frontier posed by fundamentalist Islamic
organizations operating from Afghanistan and Paki-
stan. Senior KGB officials in Muslim Central Asia
repeatedly warned in their speeches and published
articles in the 1980s that the threat of Islamic
extremism was a major reason for Soviet interven-
tion in 1979.
Divisions Within the KGB
Concerns over Gorbachev do not appear to be equally
shared throughout the KGB. Senior KGB officers, for
example, are probably divided over the question of
reform. KGB Deputy Chairman Georgiy Ageyev took
a more positive view of glasnost than Chebrikov in an
article last April arguing that "open discussions of
statewide problems?augments our strength and at
the same time deprives our enemies abroad of their
threadbare arguments." Some in the First Chief
(Foreign Intelligence) Directorate may welcome glas-
nost and perestroyka for making it easier to establish
contacts with foreigners and advance Soviet interests
abroad. Other KGB components unaffected by Gor-
bachev's reforms?for example, the Eighth (Commu-
nication), 15th (Protection of Government Facilities),
and 16th (Signals Intercept) Chief Directorates?may
remain on the sidelines
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Moreover, some aspects of Gorbachev's agenda may
be generally popular within the KGB as a whole.
many senior
KGB officers in Moscow appear to appreciate the
need for the antialcohol and discipline campaigns, for
example. in-
creasing concern by the KGB that other parts of the
Gorbachev program may destabilize society.
Concern is probably highest in the provincial KGB,
where some security officials protected corrupt party
leaders under Brezhnev, and in fact probably shared
in the spoils of corruption. A Soviet journal reported
in March that in Uzbekistan former First Secretary
Rashidov, a notoriously corrupt ally of Brezhnev, had
been able to control the appointment and promotion
of senior KGB officials in his republic.
Outright Stalinists
are probably becoming a rare species even in the
provincial KGB, yet many Chekists probably share
the dictator's concern about political and social disci-
pline.
Active Opposition?
Although the evidence is far from conclusive, there
have been subtle signs that some within the KGB may
be trying to undermine Gorbachev's authority. It
seems quite likely that, as in previous periods of
leadership tension, some senior KGB officers may
have become involved with party factions. Given their
control of communications facilities and their role as
bodyguards, KGB components can play a crucial role
in political coups. While this is a risky business, there
is a long history of KGB involvement in high Kremlin
politics. For example:
? In 1957, the KGB Chairman refused to cooperate
with the so-called Antiparty Group trying to depose
Khrushchev, and this enabled Khrushchev to learn
7
of the plot against him and to rapidly convene a
Central Committee meeting to thwart it.
? In 1964, KGB elements helped isolate Khrushchev,
keeping him incommunicado at a Black Sea resort
while his Politburo colleagues in Moscow made
arrangements for removing him from office.
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? In early 1982, KGB elements in Moscow and abroad 25X1
spread damaging rumors about General Secretary
Brezhnev and his family that appeared to help pave
the way for Andropov's rise to power.
? Gorbachev's association with KGB officials allowed
him to utilize confidential information against his
rivals in the struggle for succession in early 1985.
Also feeding rumors about opposition within the KGB
to the General Secretary are persistent stories of
assassination attempts against Gorbachev during the
past two years
It is possible that the KGB has spread
these rumors in an attempt to embarrass Gorbachev
or that the KGB's Ninth Directorate, responsible for
leadership security, has been lax in preventing assassi-
nation attempts on Gorbachev
It is quite possible that KGB
officials at the organizations' highest levels would
consider joining with Politburo conservatives in a
move to oust Gorbachev?as they did in 1964 against
Khrushchev. In fact, there are indications that Gorba-
chev is concerned about the loyalty of the KGB. One
source of the US Embassy reported that he met with
individual army commanders to ask their support
should the KGB join a political coup,
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however, that KGB officials at the lower levels would
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Principal KGB Components
The KGB conceives itself as the "sword and shield" of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. More than an intelligence agency or domestic security service,
the KGB, with a total staff of more than 500,000, also commands an armed force
of more than 200,000 (Border Guards) and has offices in every district of the
USSR.
Chairman V. M. Chebrikov
First Deputy Chairmen
F. D. Bobkov
N. P. Yemokhanov
Chief Directorates
First Foreign Intelligence
Second Internal Security and Counterintelligence
Third Military Counterintelligence
Eighth Communications Security
Fifteenth Protection of Government Facilities
Sixteenth Communications Intercept
Border Troops
Directorates
Fourth Transportation Security
Fifth Dissident and Ideological Subversion
Sixth Protection of the Economy
Seventh Surveillance
Ninth Leadership Protection
Government Communication
Operational-Technical
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Gorbachev and KGB bodyguard
be informed about such machinations at the top. Nor
is it plausible they would participate on their own in
plotting a coup that is beyond their capabilities
Short of becoming actively involved in a coup, there
are a number of ways elements of the KGB who are
opposed to Gorbachev could try to undermine his
position:
? They could use their connections at home or abroad
to spread rumors to damage the General Secretary,
which Western journalists and diplomats stationed
in Moscow speculate is being done. Several times in
the last two years there have been reports that KGB
officials allied with the conservative opposition have
floated rumors that portray Gorbachev as a weak
embattled leader and his wife Raisa as pushy,
ambitious, and a profligate spender.
? KGB officials could use unflattering information in
their files to discredit Gorbachev supporters, as
Chebrikov apparently did in the 1985 succession
debate to impugn Grishin.
9
? KGB officers could allow or even provoke incidents
to discredit the General Secretary.
Gorbachev's Discontent With the KGB
Gorbachev's regard for the KGB may have declined
as he became more aware of its shortcomings and as
he saw its resistance to his broader programs.
he has become concerned about the KGB's
level of nepotism. He is no doubt also angered by
KGB collusion with corrupt party officials as has
recently been reported in the Soviet media
Gorbachev may also have lost faith in the KGB
because of its failure to prevent nationalist demon-
strations and its sloppy handling of the Cessna
incident:
? The KGB apparently did not alert the Politburo to
the danger of nationalist unrest when it replaced
Kazakh's First Secretary Kunayev with a Russian
in December 1986. The Kirghiz KGB Chairman
admitted publicly in March 1987 that the Kazakh
riots had "alerted" the KGB to the potential threat
posed by anti-Soviet nationalism in Central Asia.
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? Political demonstrations in Yerevan and a pogrom
against Armenians in Azerbaijan earlier this year
may also be seen as "intelligence failures" by the
General Secretary. Given the responsibility of the
KGB for monitoring elite compliance with the cen-
ter's policies, it seems most likely that Gorbachev
holds the KGB responsible for not warning the
Central Committee of the level of nationalist feel-
ings in the Armenian party.
? Gorbachev reportedly was angered by the slow
reaction of troops of the KGB Ninth (Guards)
Directorate to the Cessna landing in Red Square in
May 1987. According to Western press reports it
took KGB forces over 30 minutes to arrive after the
landing
Gorbachev may also be concerned about the loyalty
and competence of the Ninth Directorate, which is
responsible for his protection and-
is personally supervised by the KGB
Chairman.
A West European Communist repeated a rumor to a
US Embassy contact that Gorbachev replaced his
KGB bodyguards with paratroopers in March 1988.
Such an action would be a clear signal of the General
Secretary's distrust of the KGB.
appears to reflect popular perceptions of sharp differ-
ences between the General Secretary and the KGB
Chairman. the KGB
remains responsible for Gorbachev's security.
the KGB was responsible
for Gorbachev's security in Yugoslavia in late March,
and the that
KGB officials were responsible for Gorbachev's secu-
rity during the May Day celebrations in Moscow.
Secret
Reforming the KGB
Discontent in the KGB also appears to be fueled by
concern that Gorbachev is pushing for a restructuring
or purging of the security service.
Gorbachev could also curb the influence of the KGB
without reducing its effectiveness by dividing it into
foreign intelligence and internal security services?
Khrushchev used this tactic in the mid-1950s, hiving
off the criminal police and the labor camp administra-
tion from Beriya's hugh security apparatus.
Such a division would limit the authority of present
and future KGB chairmen by effectively reducing
their role as the security generalissimo
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Over the past year, Gorbachev has taken a number of
steps that could help pave the way for reducing the
size of the KGB and strengthen his control over it:
? In early 1987, he moved Anatoliy Luk'yanov, a
personal ally, into the party Secretariat with respon-
sibility for the judiciary, police, and the KGB.
Chebrikov has now
relinquished some direction of the KGB to
Luk'yanov.
la committee
under party secretary Yakovlev?a close Gorbachev
ally?was created to coordinate the implementation
of glasnost in the security forces. Yakovlev's depu-
ties reportedly are the chief of the Main Political
Directorate of the Armed Forces, the Minister of
Internal Affairs, and a first deputy chairman of the
KGB
Unflattering Soviet press treatment of the KGB could
also be laying the ground for further increasing party
oversight or reforming the KGB:
? Although it is unclear if Chebrikov was trying to get
his own house in order or was forced to acknowledge
problems by the Politburo, his unprecedented re-
buke of a KGB officer published in a January 1987
Pravda ended a long period of immunity from
public criticism enjoyed by the KGB.
? In January 1988 Pravda reported that two provincial
KGB officials had been disciplined for the illegal
arrest and prosecution of a police officer investigat-
ing corruption in Odessa.
? A Pravda article last December appeared to suggest
the need for tighter oversight of the KGB, noting
that "Lenin reacted sharply to mistaken views and
actions on the part of some Chekists and misuse of
rights given to them."
11
? A recent letter in a pro-reform weekly also argued
for tighter control by pointing out that the party's
loss of control over the security services in the past
"led to arbitrariness and lawlessness in their work
which produced such sad consequences."
? An article in the prestigious literary journal Novyy
mir in June blamed Lenin and Dzerzhinskiy for 25X1
establishing concentration camps in 1920-21. The
article noted that the human rights abuses of Dzer-
zhinskiy's Cheka made the Stalinist atrocities more
possible. 25X1
? A Soviet journalist with ties to Gorbachev called for
"public control" of the KGB, the Ministry of Inter-
nal Affairs, and the military on a television docu-
mentary in June.
Criticism of the KGB in the provincial press has also
increased. Last January, the chief of the Tadzhik
KGB was censured in the local press, and last April
the Turkmen press noted that the Republic KGB
chairman and his family were occupying a building?
originally built as an orphanage.
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Nevertheless, in addition to the lack of change in the
KGB, Gorbachev's apparent difficulty appointing a 25X1
new head of the Central Committee's Administrative
Organs Department (AOD) suggests he is meeting
resistance in his efforts to assert control over the
security service. Since Stalin's death, the AOD has
been the designated instrument of day-to-day party
control over the KGB, although in practice there has
sometimes been an incestuous relationship between
the watchdogs and those being watched. AOD. chief
Nikolay Savinkin, 74, the last Brezhnev appointment
serving as a Central Committee department chief,
appears to have been removed because he has not
appeared in public since last fall. So far, it seems that
he has not been replaced and that the first deputy
head has been acting in his position. While the AOD
is supervised by Gorbachev's ally Luk'yanov, the
replacement of Savinkin by a Gorbachev supporter
would strengthen the General Secretary's control of
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Chebrikov and the Conservative Opposition
Many of the concerns in the KGB about Gorbachev
appear to be shared by a conservative group in the
leadership that would prefer to pursue a slower pace
of reform than does Gorbachev. Increasingly, "Sec-
ond Secretary" Ligachev has been particularly out-
spoken on many of the same issues, delivering two
speeches about the time of Chebrikov's Dzerzhinskiy
address that echoed many of the same concerns about
glasnost and democratization getting out of hand.
President Gromyko and Defense Minister Yazov have
also expressed similar concerns about glasnost. Fur-
thermore, Chebrikov has career ties to Ukrainian
First Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, who is also
part of this more conservative group in the leadership.
An increase in the influence of conservatives last fall
may have contributed to an apparent leadership con-
sensus to slow the pace of the reforms. Most signifi-
cantly, over the past year Soviet policy on human
rights has toughened. Restrictions have been placed
on demonstrations by human rights organizations;
Ukrainian and Baltic activists have been summarily
deported to the West; protests by Baltic, Crimean
Tatar, and Armenian nationalists have been repressed
violently; and criminal charges have been manufac-
tured by the security organs to incarcerate dissidents.
Although the toughening up may reflect a general
leadership reaction to the negative effects of lasnost
it is clearly a victory for the conservatives.
Chebrikov's increased influence in the regime was
reflected in the Politburo lineup at the Red Square
parade on 7 November 1987 and at the April 1988
Lenin Day celebration, where he had a higher status
than he had previously. Chebrikov may also have
benefited from the removal of Gorbachev ally Boris
Yel'tsin as Moscow First Secretary. Sources of the
US Embassy report that, in his speech to the Central
Committee, Yel'tsin criticized the KGB, maintaining
that it needed to be cut back in size and authority.
Chebrikov also spoke at the plenum, and, according to
US Embassy sources, directly criticized Yel'tsin for
seem n too many foreigners and talking too freely to
them.
Secret
Chebrikov is clearly seen as a mainstay of the conser-
vative group in the Politburo by Gorbachev support-
ers. Recent rumors of Chebrikov's opposition to peres-
troyka, reports?including one from a senior Soviet
official?that he was Ligachev's only supporter at a
heated Politburo meeting over reform, and stories of
the replacement of KGB bodyguards with military
troops that have been leaked to the Western press
suggest that Chebrikov is increasingly perceived as
taking a greater role in leadership debates on the side
of the conservatives
Nationalist violence in the Caucasus since February is
posing a serious challenge to Gorbachev and has
probably helped coalesce the conservative opposition.
Furthermore, as a result of this political violence,
Gorbachev probably will have to make concessions?
at least temporarily?to the demands of party conser-
vatives on law-and-order issues.
as a result of these
disturbances, the KGB and other law enforcement
agencies will be granted greater latitude
Prospects
Tensions between Gorbachev and the KGB are likely
to rise. Although nationalist violence in the Caucasus
may force him to accommodate for tactical reasons
some demands of conservatives in the leadership, we
believe he will not retreat on his overall reform
program. For this reason, many in the KGB who are
accustomed to tight regime control over society and to
operating with impunity will remain opposed to the
General Secretary and his policies. They will probably
continue to try to undermine Gorbachev and his
policies within the party leadership and at the local
levels. Moreover, they could pose a direct danger to
the General Secretary if a conservative faction co-
alesces further in the Politburo or the Central Com-
mittee.
Gorbachev?for his part?will continue to try to
strengthen his control over the KGB. While he may
want to weaken its political power or harness it to his
own ends, he will not want to damage its effectiveness
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Possible Replacements for Chebrikov
Several top Soviet officials are rumored to be possi-
ble replacements for Chebrikov. Some of the rumors
hold that Chebrikov would be shifted to Kiev to
replace Ukrainian First Secretary Vladimir Shcher-
bitskiy, which would also allow the General Secre-
tary to remove a troublesome opponent. Gorbachev
would probably prefer to bring in an outsider or a
relatively junior official of the KGB?as he did in
appointing Yazov as Defense Minister?who would be
politically beholden to him. The officials being men-
tioned for the post include:
Boris Karlovich Pugo (50) . . . Latvian by nationality,
though born and educated in Moscow. . . First Secre-
tary of the Latvian Communist Party and member of
Central Committee. . . served in the KGB from 1978
to 1983, Chairman of Latvian KGB from 1981 to
1983 . . . during tenure arrested several hundred Lat-
vian nationalists and considered the toughest Latvian
security chief since Beriya . . . strong supporter of
Gorbachev's reform agenda . . . appointment could
signify a tougher policy toward ethnic unrest in non-
Russian republics.
Filipp Denisovich Bobkov (65) . . . First Deputy
Chairman of KGB and member of Central Committee
since 1986. . . previously supervised Fifth (Antidissi-
dent) Dir' ' snce a protege of Chebrikov, but
reputed o be more liberal on cultural
matters . . stz wou d probably be unenthusiastic
about Gorbachev's reform agenda.
Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze (60) . . . Full
member of Politburo and Minister of Foreign Affairs
since July 1985. . . served as First Secretary of
Georgian Communist Party from 1971 to 1985, where
he cracked down on local nationalism and corrup-
tion. . . previously headed Georgian section in Minis-
try of Interior. . . strong supporter of bureaucratic
reform in MFA . . . could rebuild KGB as Gorbachev
ally.
Georgiy Petrovich Razumovskiy (51) . . . Chief, Orga-
nizational Party Work Department . . . Gorbachev
ally . . . appointed to Secretariat by Gorbachev in
March 1986 and promoted to candidate member of
Politburo in February 1988 . . . experienced in per-
sonnel work. . . could redirect and cut KGB
bureaucracy.
Anatoliy Ivanovich Luk'yanov (57) . . . Chief, General
Department . . . appointed to Secretariat by Gorba-
chev in early 1987. . . public appearances suggest
that he is secretary for security organs, including the
KGB . . . may also supervise democratization and
legalization campaigns . . . attended legal faculty of
Moscow State University year behind Gorbachev.
in foreign intelligence or essential domestic security
work. Furthermore, in a period of radical change,
Gorbachev needs a loyal KGB more than ever to
monitor elite compliance with policies that are unpop-
ular at lower levels as well as to monitor political
attitudes.
The General Secretary's best hope for accomplishing
this may be moving selectively against Brezhnev-era
appointees in the security forces, slowly replacing the
13
senior leadership with his supporters. Although it
would be difficult in the near term to remove Chebri-
kov from the Politburo, Gorbachev may seek to win
his colleagues' agreement to transfer him to a less
sensitive post?chief of the Party Control Commission
or First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party
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So far, the combination of increased party oversight
and lack of turnover in the KGB suggests there is a
standoff between Gorbachev and the KGB. The fol-
lowing indicators would suggest that Gorbachev is
making headway in gaining control over the KGB:
? Replacement of Chebrikov as KGB chairman, par-
ticularly with a Gorbachev supporter such as
Luk'yanov.
? Increased turnover in other top KGB positions,
especially if key posts are filled with outsiders.
? Cuts in the size of the KGB.
? Reorganization of the security services, especially
its division into domestic and foreign components.
? Increased public exposure of recent KGB abuses
and prosecution of KGB officials.
? The selection of a Gorbachev ally to head the
Administrative Organs Department.
? Legal changes that restrict KGB room for arbitrary
action against citizens or that remove le al bases for
preemptive measures against dissent.
Secret
In addition to the absence of any of the above steps,
indicators that the more traditional elements in the
KGB are continuing to resist successfully would
include:
? Evidence that Gorbachev's legalization campaign
had been watered down or delayed.
? The continuation of "administrative measures" of
law control sanctioned by the regime such as the
deportation of nationalists, or the arrest and sen-
tencing of activists.
? Restrictions on "informal" groups that had been
active since 1985.
The contest for control over the KGB will no doubt
continue to be part of the intense political struggle
taking place between Gorbachev and his reformist
allies and party conservatives. If Gorbachev can build
on a recent victory over conservatives and bolster his
political authority, he will be in a stronger position to
press for reform of the KGB and the replacement of
Chebrikov. His progress in this key area is likely to be
an important measure of his ability to press his
political agenda.
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