PERSONNEL SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00530R000601630001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/14 :CIA-RDP90-005308000601630001-0
;~ ~ ~ - ~
r~@S~OVt$~-
1. PERSONNEL SECURITY PROCEDURES AND TIMEFRAMES=
A. Copies of appropriate portions of manuals pertaining
tv security clearances are attached as Enclosures (1) and (2).
Enclosure (1) Director of Central Intelligence Directive
1/14
Enclosure (2) OPNAVINST 5510.1G, Chapters 21, 22,
23 and 24
B. Breakdown of time it takes to complete the security
process, by major components of the process -
(1) Initiation of requests (completing forms,
Rathering information, mailing, etc.): 2 - 4 weeks
(2) Investigation by the Defense Investigative
Service (DIS) : 4 - 5 months
{3) Adjudicationjnotification: 2 - 3 months
{4) Total completion time.: 6 - 12 months-
A. Statistics on those not hired (1985 - 198?) because
the did not meet security requirements:
1985 1986
1987
Not 4 3
Available
8. Data on numbers who withdrew their employment
application during the security review process (1985 - 1987)
3, EXTENT OF IMPACT OF SECURITY PROCESS ON LIFESTYLE/FAMILY
ISSUES (Number of staff who cite as their reason for leaving
some aspect of the security requirements -- i.e. reinvestiga-
tion, family travel limitations, etc. (19$5 -.1987):
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/14 :CIA-RDP90-005308000601630001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/14 :CIA-RDP90-005308000601630001-0
4. IMPACT OF INVOLUNTARY STAFF SEPARATIONS ON SECURITY:
A. Number of staff removed per year, reasons for removal
and security clearance level of those removed (1985 - 19871:
i985
No. removed: 8
Reason Removed: Performance (6), Excessive Absenteeism (1),
Giving Classified Information to an Un-
authorized source (1)
Levels of Clearance: TS 8 Below (5)
SCI (3) .
Reason Removed: Performance (7), Excessive Absenteeism (1),
Giving Classified Information to an Un-
authorized source (1)
Levels of Clearance: TS 8 Below (3)-
SCI (6)
'~7
No. removed: 11
FCeason Removed: Performance (9) , Criminal Activity (2)
Levels of Clearance: TS Z~ Below (5)
SCI t6)
~,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/14 :CIA-RDP90-005308000601630001-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/14 :CIA-RDP90-005308000601630001-0
B. Agency policies on assessing the level/type of
classified information removed staff have, and whether there is
a risk that removed staff will act against the national security
interest:
If an employee with sensitive intelligence access were to be
removed under other than favorable circumstances, a security risk
evaluation would be conducted. That evaluation would encompass a
review of the removal circumstances and review of the list of
security accesses held. The scope of the category would be
assessed as would the potential damage to national security if
the information were made available to unauthorized recipients.
In view of the wide variety of unique factors envisioned for any
such case, each incident would of necessity require
individualized handling tailored to specific attendant
circumstances. _
C. Examples of alternatives other than removal -- for
those employees deemed a security risk if separated -- and extent
to which agencies use these alternatives:
No examples of alternatives are available because no such action
has occured within NIC as of this date. Should such action be
required however, NIC security would work closely with the
NIC/Navy civilian personnel office and. the-JAG office to explore
the entire spectrum of alternate options available within DOD/DON
frameworks.-
5. VIEWS ON THE POLYGRAPHY EXAMINATION AS A SECURITY TOOL:
The Counterintelligence Security Polygraph (CSP) is an additional
security tool that enables us to monitor compliance of the
special trust that has been given to those who occupy the most
sensitive intelligence positions.
The merits of the polygraph as a screening tool are recognized,
however its use in evaluating continuous access to sensitive
material is of greater value.
The polygraph should be viewed as one of many options available
in meeting our security- responsibilities.
Suggested literature: DOD Directive 5210.48 (DOD Polygraph
Program) and DOD Directive 5210.488 (DOD Polygraph Program).
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/03/14 :CIA-RDP90-005308000601630001-0