PROTECTIVE C3CM; AN OPSEC OBJECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00530R000701710003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-00530R000701710003-8
JOURNAL of ELECTRONIC DEFENSE ? OCT 84 ? ?
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An OPSEC Objective
WALTER G. pEELEY
Deputy Director Communications Security
National Security Agency
rotective C3CM attempts
to prevent an adversary
from destroying our crit-
ical C3 facilities and to protect
our communications against
jamming and intrusion. The Na-
tional Security Agency (NSA),
has a vital interest in this area.
It is responsible for US commu-
nications security (COMSEC) in-
cluding secure communications
practices and procedures, and ad-
vising on the selection and
of COMSEC
equipment and
systems. It also
vigorously fos-
ters effective
control of emis-
sions. These -
measures re-
duce an adver-
sary's capabil-
ity to identify
and target our
C3.
A Protective
C3CM program
must effective-
ly identify
COMSEC and
other security
vulnerabilities,
and recom-
mend correc-
tive measures. Over the years, in
supporting a wide variety of mil-
itary and other government op-
erations, NSA has found the
Operations Security (OPSEC)
process to be the most effective
method of accomplishing this
objective.*
In OPSEC, operational consid-
erations, intelligence analysis
The National Security Agency devel-
oped the data collection and analysis
techniques that were used in the first OP-
SEC study and were subsequently embo-
died in OPSEC methodology. These tech-
niques have proven to be the most suc-
cessful means of identifying, assessing,
and eliminating security weaknesses.
use
identifying and protecting the in-
formation needed to accomplish
this, is typical of the type of prob--
lem effectively addressed by
OPSEC.
Every OPSEC study begins
with the development of Blue
(friendly) and Red (enemy) force
data bases. The collected data is
analyzed to identify Blue force's
susceptibility to intelligence ex-
ploitation and to determine the
Red force's ability to detect and
exploit them. The results are then
analyzed to estimate the relative
significance of each type
and source of information that
the enemy could intercept and
use to his ad-
vantage.
The Blue
force data base
is developed by
interviewing
the people who
support and
carry out an op-
eration or func-
tion. As a rule,
it is not profit-
able to rely on
adversarial ex-
ercises to gath-
er information.
Empirical stud-
ies, such as
those conduct-
ed by COM-
SEC monitors,
may well be es-
sential to obtaining signal or
propagation characteristics, re-
solving conflicting allegations,
or illustrating a security weak-
ness, but the need for such stud-
ies should follow from the initial
analysis. Reliance on adversar-
ial attacks for data base devel-
opment is needlessly time con-
suming, expensive, and often
leads to erroneous conclusions.
The information collected is of-
ten fragmentary, and seldom af-
fords insight into the underlying
causes of security weakness. In
short, we simply cannot spend
the time and money that an ad-
trol of the executing force, there
may be other peripheral activity,
such as radar tracking, which
could be observed by an enemy.
The susceptibility of each
event to exploitation must be de-
termined, a process which re-
quires the expertise of skilled
analysts in each of the pertinent
intelligence or security disci-
plines. Empirical studies can be
arranged at this point to address
specific questionable issues, but
it will be found that communica-
tions-electronics susceptibilities,
for the most part, are readily ap-
parent to COMSEC analysts.
Plain-language communications
would be evaluated -from the
standpoint of their explicit intel-
ligence value, as well as their in-
techniques, and a variety of se- '
curity disciplines are brought to
bear on specific problems.
OPSEC's goal is to enhance
operational effectiveness by pro-
tecting that information which
an adversary must have in order
to counter our operations. Early
OPSEC surveys tried to identify
and eliminate sources of exploit-
able information pertaining to
our imminent military opera-
tions. This objective still figures?
prominently in OPSEC, but our
experience indicates that the ,
OPSEC process can be applied to
virtually any government opera-
tion, program, or function which
could be exploited by an enemy.
For example, an adversary
might try to prevent us from ef- .
fectively using our close air sup-
port aircraft, or from executing
our retaliatory nuclear forces.
Countering these obiectives by
ferential value in relation to oth-
er communications and observ-
able events. Communications
practices and procedures, such
as frequency and callsign usage,
would be examined for weakness-
es which an adversary could ex-
ploit to identify specific organi-
zations for targeting or to pre
diet forthcoming activity. Since
most types of US military activi-
ty are often characterized by dis-
tinctive patterns in the timing,
-volume, and directional flow of
their communications, analysts
would seek to isolate patterns
and determine their significance.
Signal characteristics would al-
so be addressed to determine if
there are susceptibilities to radio-
fingerprinting and position lo-
cating techniques.
After completing this process,
each event in the Blue force se-
quence that is judged susceptible
to intelligence exploitation is ar-
rayed against known or esti-
mated Red force capabilities.
The products of this comparison
of susceptibilities and adversary
threat capability are statements
of vulnerabilities.
It is not uncommon to find
that a multitude of vulnerabili-
ties have been identified. While
it is almost axiomatic that an
adversary can acquire some in-
formation of intelligence value,
the critical issue is whether or
not he will acquire the informa-
tion he needs to achieve his
objectives.
Because of the complexity of
this type of problem, NSA has
advocated using operations anal-
ysis techniques in all OPSEC
assessments to help determine
the relative significance of spe-
cific vulnerabilities. One such
technique, a variation on a com-
monly accepted decision analy-
sis routine, has proved especial-
ly useful.
A key feature of the assess-
ment process is refinement of the
OPSEC objective. "The identifi-
cation and protection of infor-
mation which an adversary must
have to keep us from using our
Close Air Support assets effec-
tively," is typical of many gen-
eral OPSEC objectives. Howev-
er, the scope of a problem stated
in such terms could require con-
sideration of a sizeable number
of adversary scenarios aimed at
countering CAS operations.
By examining the event-se-
quence list and vulnerability in-
formation developed by the sur-
vey portion of the OPSEC study,
analysts and command opera-
tions personnel are able to iden-
tify events which are critically
' important to a successful mis-
sion. The purpose is to see if an
adversary could exploit specific
vulnerabilities to keep those crit-
ical events from being accom-
plished and also to identify the
most likely ways he might attain
his objective.
In the case of CAS operations,
we can focus on those specific
vulnerabilities which enable an
adversary to destroy critical C3
facilities, jam critical communi-
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-00530R000701710003:8
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-00530R000701710003-8
? 1:,!..7:41.
.cations links, or intrude on com-
munications systems.
Operations security analysts,
working closely with command
operations and intelligence per-
sonnel, postulate adversary
strategies ? sequential steps of
what the adversary must know
and do to carry out his attacks
successfully. The options avail-
able to the adversary for ac-
complishing each step are de-
fined and probabilities assigned
to indicate the likelihood of
completing a step successfully.
In the somewhat simplistic ,
example shown in table 2, it is
considered that the enemy
attempt to undermine CAS op-
erations by jamming the critical
communications link between
the Forward Air Control Party
(FACP) and the CAS aircraft.
For the purposes of illustration,
it is stipulated that the callsigns
and frequencies used in plan-
ning and executing the CAS
mission are unchanged from ,
thosed used in peacetime exer-
cises; further, that the circuit
used to request CAS support is
unsecured.
Given the stipulations of the
strategy depicted in table 2, tile'
overall probability of the enemy ;
successfully jamming the CAS/1
FACP communications link on
detection is calculated to be 83
percent; the probability of suc-
cessfully detecting and follow-
ing frequency changes is 62 per-
cent. We consider these figures to
be "soft," i.e., they are rough es-
timates of high possibilities of
enemy success rather than as-
sertions of precise probability. ,
The estimates are nevertheless a
valid guide and are of consider-
?
able value in demonstrating the
benefits of any security meas-
ures proposed to counter the
enemy strategy.
Security measures are selected
to keep the enemy from complet-
ing one or more steps in his at-
tack strategy. If, for example, we
could keep the enemy from know-
ing that CAS support had been
requested for a geographical
area or from knowing that the
CAS/FACP communications
link was critical to successful air
support, he might well direct his
intercept and jamming assets to
other, seemingly more lucrative
targets.
For the purpose of illustration,
however, let us say that OPSEC
analysts in collaboration with
command operations and com-
munications personnel decide to
attack step 3 in the adversary's
strategy.
If changing callsign and fre-
quency systems were used in all
peacetime CAS exercises and
operations, the rapid acquisition'
and recognition of CAS/FACP
communications would be se-
verely inhibited. The probability
of the adversary knowing the
frequency used on the CAS/
FACP link as a result of inter-
cepting the communications of
previous exercises is nil. Further,
the probability of an enemy
agent being able to acquire and
? 1: EVENT
,
Ground force requests the Tactical Air Control Center STACC
to. provide CAS.
TACC/Af0C sends Air Tasking Order toying Operations
Ce./.!!!; '
WOe i-enda Operations Or-der to the CASsquadron and to the
commands that Will provide Electronic Warfare (EW) and -
Air Refueling (AR) support to the CAS alrciaft.-::f:?-?
cAs alrcpft preparations!;
Tanker takeoff
EW aircraft takeoff
CAS aircraft takeoff
t 1'-?
Tanker aircraft reach AR track
CAS aircraft start refueling
CAS aircraft end refueling
? ?????-? Us. ,
EW eirCraft on station
T 24 Hrs.
22
T.?=-15 kfrs..71
?.?-:-?;.!3 Hrs.
T
T-1.5 Hrs.
T :Z1:2 Firs.
?1.10 14rsA
J..-50 Mn: '
T-20 Mm.?
,CAS air'craft, on station In Area of Op' erations (AO) contacts
the Forward Air 'Control Party (FACP)
P...
Enemy., Jective.:Atop/Inihlhit Cik5 bilammIng FACP commUnicafions.
"
. .
Step 1: Know,CAS suppOii requested
0ptIon 1: intercept request for support
OptIon 2. Agent relied
Optten 3: RECCE detects CAS preparation
Step 2: knOW CXii_FACpr.adio ftnk Critical
OptionI:-'0Pen'sOUre lOterniatien??
,J.Option 2 intercept Of peacetime exercises
Option 3: :Agent reports
Step 3: Know ireCts?irsed orICAS/FACP)14,i
.ipption't ?Intercepi of peacetime exercises
'Option2: -Agent reports
Step 4:-jarn:CAS/FACp link
Step5: Detect and fOlfow'fie'Ci.:Chtinges ithiner
pass the frequency fora single
forthcoming operation would be
very low.
Looking again at table 2, if we
accordingly set the probability
of Option 1 of Step 3 at 0, and the
probability of Option 2 at .05, our
new computation of the overall
probability of the enemy suc-
cessfully jamming the CAS/
FACP communications would be
less than 5 percent!
Using the same method, we
could calculate the impact of us-
ing other approaches, such as
low probability of intercept or
anti-jam equipment. Each could
give a different measure of ef-
fectiveness.
CONCLUSION
At NSA, we recognize that
there are pitfalls inherent in the
subjectivity of the assessment
process described above. The
process is only as good as the
analysts working the problem
and the validity of the data
available to them. We are work-
ing, however, to develop more ef-
fective means of quantifying the
benefits of security to military
commanders. Such measure-
ments are often a critical con-
sideration in ensuring that
CONISEC is effectively and eco-
nomically applied.
We are convinced that it is not
necessary to provide uniformly
high security to all communica-
tions. We know from past expe-
rience that substantial gains in
security can often be achieved
cheaply by procedural changes
which impact only slightly on
operational efficiency. The prob-
lem, however, is to identify the
precise security needs for com-
manders.
In the case of protective C"CM,
we want to conceal or otherwise
protect our critically important
communications links and
nodes. We can make some of
these communications more dif-
ficult for an adversary to ac-
quire, we can hide them amid the
mass of unimportant electromag-
netic activity, and we can build
systems which can work through
various types of jamming. Criti-
cal nodes, our command, con-
trol, and communications facili-
ties can be concealed by remot-
ing of antennas, judicious rout-
king of communications, and
procedures designed to confuse
or mislead an adversary. The
means of protection must always
answer the threat? the proba-
bility that an adversary can
achieve his offensive C3CM ob-
jectives against us.
We believe that the OPSEC
process is an ideal method for
determining security needs with
some precision. NSA, in collabo-
ration with the Service Crypto-
logic Elements, stands ready to
support military commanders in
using OPSEC to identify, ana-
lyze, and assess their protective
C3CM problems.
Walter G. Deeley, has been the
Deputy Director lor.Communica-
tions Security, National Security
Agency, since June 1983. He has
served with NSA and its predeces-
sor organizations since 1948. ?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/10/26: CIA-RDP90-00530R000701710003-8